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Meth in Catt. Th. - Bl's MS, p.32 Hiddon toot.

The bearing of the truths of farth upon what I named positions and counter-positions is, perhaps, obvious, and so one may begin to won an whether the fifth sule, which which would have the theologian accept the responsibility of judgment las my maning in Catholic theology. It is a rule that -has a patter Probestant ring to it and so, as explaid by a Catholic theologian, it cannot have a truly protestant mening But, I should say, it does posses a very definite and ritally important area of application. We learn from He of from

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# Method in Catholic Theology

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My title has to be understood in the light of my terms of reference. The invitation, so kindly extended to me, was to speak on the method I happen to employ in my work as a theologian. What was desired was, not an **EXE** account of methods or of their history, but rather a report on a contemporary approach.

A method, I take it, is a set of NARMA rules or directives for the advancement of a science. It is concerned to tell just what is to be done and to just how to do it. It also is concerned to indicate what cannot be done, what need not be done, and what can be or has to be left to take care of itself.

Such rules can be formulated in three manners. They may regard outward acts of looking and listening, of manipulating instruments, or employing ordinary or technical language. Again, dura, action, and they may go behind language to the concepts and the judgements of the mind. Thirdly, they may turn from the mind's immanent products to the conscious, inquiring, critically reflective the stall outding, subjects. My rules, are of the third type. At first sight, they may well appear to be very unsubstantial. But if you will consent to be very patient with me, there is, I think, some chance they you will agree that my approach makes it to gripe that by asic issues that otherwise can hardly be raised at all.

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But, M however legitimate this question, I do not propose to meet it directly. Modern philosophy, I believe, became so totkally involved in epistemological questions, because it also was interested in the theoretical t basis of method. Since I think it guides, unlikely that you care to discuss cognitional theory, I shall venture to be generous with precepts but brief with reasons.

#### My preaepts are four in multien

My procepts are five in number. They are:

1. Understand.

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- 2. Understand systematically.
- 3. Reverse counter-positions.
- 4. Develop positions.
- 5. Accept the responsibility of judgement.

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As you will have observed, these, precepts are very brief; as you will fear, their explanation is apt to be very ad with long; and compounding, this fear, which is not unjustified, there will be some alarm. For there is nothing specifically rules 3 has taked. theological about the ware composed.

To meet this last pointing at once, I note that I do not believe in a multiplicity of methods. I do not think that there is one set of precepts for mathematics, another for natural science, a third for human science, a fourth for philosophy, a fifth for theology. On the contrary, as human intelligence is one, so also is the grand strategy of its to implement advance; method is concerned with that grand strategy; it undergoes adaptations to exploit the possibilities and to

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adaptations are non nore ikan a matter of bowing to circumstance.

It follows that my exposition will fall naturally into two parts. First, I shall review the five precepts in their general and basic meaning; and in this review I shall be free to draw my illustrations from any field. Secondly, I shall turn to the adaptations relevant to theology and, then, I in mind shall have Catholic theology, of which I am more him by to know comething, objective mind.

My first precept is, Understand. By it I refer not to words or sentences, not to concepts or judgements, not to the data of sense, but to what is the key act or event in any discovery, to the moment when one graspe why, knows the reason, sees the point, catches on. Such moments may be epochal. They may be accompanied with the explosive delight that made Archimedes shout Euroka. They may initiate the almost without interruption Sir over-mastering absorption that kept Isaac Newton at his desk for weeks. But normally they are very pedestrian affairs, occurring marging with the ease and frequency that prex saves us from acquiring a reputation for stupidity. But Nowever, if the act of understanding is beither difficult nor rare, it is none the less fundamental. A discovery is merely the first occurrence of an act of understanding; and the advance primarily of a science is an accumulation of discoveries; and a method aims at no more than encouraging, directing, and ordering such accumulations.

My first precept is illuminated not only by its direct meaning but also by what it omits. I do not say, Make significant acts of understanding. It is significant acts,

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of course, significant x are wanted; but they do not form a distinct species, and they do not result from the observance of a special set of rules; they are simply the acts that happen to close one stage of development and to open another; and they derive their significance not from themselves but from their connection with antecedent and consequent acts.

Again, I do not say, Make correct acts of understanding. For though correct acts are the ones that are wanted, still the difference between a correct act and an incorrect one is not intrinsic. Understanding, of itself, yields no more than ideas, **hypetha** definitions, hypotheses, theories. They may prove to be correct; far more commonly they prove to be incorrect; but in themselves they are neither true nor false. They are more or less helpful, more or less adequate, more or less in the direction of success and achievement. To expect the the correct is an of obtaining extremely efficacious way **keysebtate** nothing at all.

Again, I do not say, Be impartial, Set aside all prejudice, Drop all preconceptions, Doubt everything that cannot be demonstrated. We have to begin with ourselves as we are and, commonly, that means that we have to begin with a large ignorance of ourselves. We cannot revert at will to the <u>tabula rase with which Aristotle oresties</u> our intellects at our birth. Nor is the real problem deliberate bias, wilful narrow-mindedness, conscious excess of certitude. What has to be eliminated is the unconscious aberration that may appear to be the very soul of truth; and the one way to eradicate it is, I think, to advance in understanding.

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Again,

Pinaldy, my first rule is not, Observe, Attend to the data, Attend to them as they really are, Attend to all relevant Each Any of these imperatives, I believe, gives excellent data. advice; but I also believe that both the advice and the one way effective way of following the advice are contained in the more basic precept, Understand. If one toles, to understand, one is inquiring; if one is inquiring, one is attending to something given but not yet understood; such attention is observation. Further, observation becomes full and accurate, just in the measure that one increases in understanding. A good observer has not a broader span of attention than the ordinary man, but he does possess a greater power of giving form or Gestalt to the data, of organizing multiplicities grasping differences that otherwise into perceptible unities, of netrein certainly hay parhaps be seen but remain unnoticed

ordinary man, but he does possess a greater intellectual interest, a greater capacity to organize multiplicities into perceptible unities, a greater concern to note differences, that are noticed only when developing understanding is directing and controlling the intellectual operations of sense for its own ends. In similar fashion, while it is true that one should attend to all the relevant data, it is no less true that understanding is the measure intellectual of relevance and only complete understanding can tell when the totality of relevant data has been taken into account.

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Finally, when I say, <u>Understand</u>, I do not mean, <u>Conceive</u> or know the necessary, the per se, the intelligible, the abstract, or the universal. Any such substitution involves the psychological fallacy. One can attempt to describe or define such an experience as seeing or hearing. The description will be a matter or concepts and words. I But seeing is neither concept nor word. Similarly, one can attempt to describe or define the experience of understanding; but it would be fallacious to **unrease** confuse the experience itself with any of the concepts or words employed in the description. Margaran from my point of view and it would be disastrous to substitute for my first rules understand, a quite different rule that initiated a unreastron for conceptual contents or words.

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Indeed, from my point of view any such confusion would be disastrous, for understanding possesses a versatility that ranges over the whole conceptual field and, as well, pivots between it and the world of sense.

What is understood, may be expressed as mecessary. But the contradictory is also true. Understanding grasps the principles and laws of natural science, but it considers them, not necessary, but only true in fact. They are empirical intelligibilities.

What is understood, may be expressed as per se. But understanding also grasps the theory of probability, and theory reveals an intelligibility in the what is, not per se, but per accidens.

What is known precisely inasmuch one understands, offers a definition of the intelligible. But understanding can also make issue with the non-intelligible; it can take its non-intelligibility as a premiss to develop techniques



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that master it; in this fashion I believe understanding proceeds numbers, in treating irrational, probabilities, the law of inertia, sin, and the fruits of sin.

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We are able to abstract, it is because we understand. But whenever we understand, it does not follow that we can effect a satisfactory abstraction. A conceptual account of a smile or frown, a painting or a symphony, fails to reach the precise intelligibility that understanding grasps in the concrete presentation.

Further, while, concepts are related to the sensible only as the universal to the particular, the same is not true of understanding. It is in the sensible, in the concrete, that understanding grasps intelligibility. To understand a machine or an organism or a social entity is to grasp intelligible interdependence in concrete multiplicity.

Finally, similars are similarly understood, and in this sense it is true that understanding grasps the universal. It remains that understanding may or may not exploit its capacity for generalization. Aristotle credita Socrates with the dixe invention or introduction of universal definitions. But the Athenians did not like them. They considered Socrates' Still, I sugget, teaching subversive. In fact, it was only novel, and the novelty consisted in a far greater concern with the universal than common sense parmits exhibits. For common sense does not seek the universal definitions and truths that must hold with an in every instance, and that must possess the exactitude that will bear the weight of lengthy inferences. Commonsense understanding seeks, not strict universality, but general utility. It aims at an development of intelligence that operates, not through universal principles and deductions, but through the onlinuous 🚧 successive concrete living. adaptations and adjustments demanded by concrete situations

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It is time to turn to my second precept, <u>Understand</u> <u>systematically</u>. By it I mean, first, that one's efforts at understanding must aim at the ideal goal of understanding must and, secondly, that they make explicit the structure through which understanding naturally moves towards this goal.

The ideal goal of understanding is complete meaness. vperates within a meture herion. It Common sense, settles for a mode and measure of understanding that suffice to enable one to live intelligently. But that suffice to enable one to live intelligently. But the human intelligence wants more; it heads for complete explanation of all phenomena; it would understand the universe. It distinguishes endlessly; but it does so only to relate intelligibly; and ideally the network of relations is to embrace everything. It is this complete network of relations, making intelligible every aspect of the concrete universe, that is to be thought of when I say that understanding is to be systematic.

Now this ideal of the ultimate system is not and just a standard by which we know how far we still have to go. It also is an operative component in our progress. Spontaneously we employ it as an implicit premiss in our efforts to understand. A method makes it an explicit and conclously exploited premiss.

exploited premise. This may seem impossible, and so I offer examples that illustrate its possibility. Texts in elementary algebra abound or, at least, used to abound in mysterious problems that, som enough, we learned to solve by writing down,

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Let the unknown number be  $\underline{x}$ . Once that was done, we had only to read the problem capefully again to discover that we could also write down an equation in terms of  $\underline{x}$ . Finally, the solutions of such equations wask no more than the automatic realous pusting of the submatric mathematic more than application of rules, with which, we had been made more than familiar.

Now What is the magic efficacy of writing down, Let the unknown number wy be x. Like all magic, it is only apparent. When one writes out that sentence, one affirms that the unknown lies in the determinate category, number. One implies that it possesses the very definite properties possessed by numbers. One implies that it stands within the network of relations exhibited by counting and by arithmetical operations. Granted all this, one has only to advert to the tata supplied in the problem, to determine which of all numbers is the one required. an a priori science such as Again, physicists know that they are aim to know laws; they conceive laws as functional relations; and when they set out to determine the law of a precise type of phenomenon, they can begin by writing down, Let the unknow the law be the indeterminate function, F(x, y, z, t) = 0. That sentence is far from a confession of complete ignorance. On the contrary, physicists can reach a solution of a large number of scientific issues without settling exactly just which function is the an They argue from differential equations and from required law. can do boundary conditions, and they can so argue because they are in pursuit of an ideal of system.

Now I happen to believe that this technique can and should be employed universally. I believe it is relevant to not only to the natural sciences but also to the human sciences,

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to philosophy and to theology. I base this relevance on the fact that such a technique merely makes explicit what already is implicit in all intelligent and reasonable human knowing. if you ask in what precisely such a tringue co But tor details I spot refer you to my book, Insisht. consists. only say That you write hit illustrated by my primit after to bracket My third and fourth rules have to do with one's own science in feneral + 3 m personal development and, as well, with one's leaprning from othera. To understand systematically sthers. The ideal of understanding systematically is others. The ideal of understanding systematically becomes clear and distinct and effective only at a late stage in the development of the individual and of the race. First, we understand intersubjectively, and the intelligibility we grasp is symbolic. Such is, the understanding of mother and child, of Martin Buber's 'I and Thou,' of Heidegger's Mitsein. By it is known the person, not as object, but as another subject, transparent in smile or frown, in blush or scowl, in tone of voice, in silent gaze. Upon this base there, is grafted the understanding of common sense, that organizes the world with names, and collaborates towards mastering it with language. But intersubjectivity and common sense are propaedeutic to a third stage when the Logos, immanent in man, comes to awareness of its potentialities and asks for a method that will lead to complete understanding.

Now the difficulty of this third stage is that it can be itself, be true to its own inner exigences, only by taking the stock of its earlier history, noting its limitations and demine of previous modes, acknowledging their opposition to the new demands of intelligence and reasonableness, and opting consciously, deliberately, coherently, and thoroughly for the

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There exists, then, I believe, a process of intellectual third ind fourth ingard that conversion and my rules for that process spectres. My first rule was, <u>Understand</u>. In virtue of that first rule I conclude discoveries that all genuine understanding must be retained. My second rule was, <u>Understand systematically</u>. In virtue of that second rule I divide the formulations of some of understanding into two classes, positions and counter-positions. Positions are formulations that can be retained unchanged within the new way. Counter-positions are formulations that have to be recast before they can be made coherent with the new way.

You will recognize in such rules a variant on many older themes. The Fathers of the Church believed in despoiling the Egyptians, of taking their truth while disengaging it from fagane their error. Descartes preached universal doubt, and Newman thought that believing everything, while absurd, none the less was a preferable procedure. The history of the development of science has been a continuous transmutation of notions that once seemed too evident to be controverted. In his <u>Phenomenology</u> of <u>Spirit</u> Hegel has many useful things to say on the coming-to-be of mind. In our own day Rudolf Bultmann has advocated a procedure to strip the New Testament of what he considers mythical elements. The problem exists. <u>Amedomenvisitintation</u> mfmwhubwaxashipwibyhistmungarmthembaging

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But the root of the problem, its really baffling element, lies within the subject, within each one of us. For the problem is not solved merely by assenting to the propositions that are true and by rejecting the propositions that are intulkatual false. It is a matter of conversion, of appropriating one's own rational self-consciousness, of finding one's way behind of preparities and for the <u>natura naturata</u>, the <u>pensée pensée</u>, of words and books, of concepts and judgements, to their origin and their source, to the <u>natura naturans</u>, the <u>pensée pensante</u>, that is oneself as intelligent and as reasonable. Without such self-appropriation and the critical appraisal it generates, one may repeat all that an Augustine says of <u>veritas</u>, or all that an Aquinas says , I believe, of being, but in doing so one will not be raising oneself but up to their level but cutting them down to one's own size.

My fifth rule is, <u>Accept the responsibility of judgement</u>. The obvious content of this rule is negative, for it **denies** rejects the notion that there is any set of rules that, so to speak, automatically or mechanically, brings inquiry to knowledge, truth, certitude. Method is operative only through minds. Minds reach knowledge only through judgement. And there is no recipe for producing men of good judgement.

It is true of nourse, that no method over ventured to offer a recipe for producing men of good judgement. But it also is type true that many methods give the impression that they aim to at relieving the inquirer of the responsibility of making his own judgements. Thus, the method of natural science seens concerned primarily with the conditions of successful

Because such a recipe does not exist, philosophic methods tend to eliminate the issue and scientific methods to evade it. The responsibility of judging vanishes in rationalism, because there the true judgement is necessitated. It vanishes in empiricism, because there what counds is not judging but looking. It vanishes in idealism, because there truth assumes a meaning that does not demand any personal decision. It vanishes in relativism, because there a judgement that is simply true cannot be attained. Again, in natural dual's not acknowledged and, science, the responsibility of judging is evaded and, in its place, there comes a pragmatism, ap\_acquiescence in what works. seems to But while this pragmatism itself work well enough in natural science, in the human sciences its results are not so happy. For in the human sciences measurement is superficial and experiment is monstrous, and there is seenen to be n-Edmond Husserl's demonstration of a proliferation of pecialized fields, each with complete autonomy, each rulerd its conventionally accepted criteria, and all convinced that any effort to give unity and depth to such many-sided ctivity would yeald only another aportality to which no ond else need attend. There has resulted, according to Edmond Husserl in his Krisis der Europeischen Missenschaften, a proliferation of specialized fields. Each of these fields tends to be is autonomous. Each, is, ruled simply by its own conventionally accepted criteria. Nor does there seem to be, under present significance and efficecy, conditions, any possibility of giving unity and depth, to this many-sided activity. For any such effort would be erection of merely the regarded any as just one more specialized field that merited the attention only of those actually engaged in it.

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I have been indicating the dimensions of the issue, and now I must attempt to clarify my position. My first two rules, <u>Understand</u>, <u>Understand systematically</u>, yield no more than bright ideas, hypotheses, theories; and none of these is knowledge. Of themselves, they are merely sounding brass and tinkling cymbal. Only when one can go beyond them to meach knowledge; and taking that step is a matter of good judgement. My third and fourth rules, <u>Reverse</u> the counter-positions, <u>Develop positions</u>, introduce the problem of judgement<sup>m</sup>, inasymch as they are concerned not merely with the inner coherence of systematic understanding but also with a conversion of the subject that judges. It remains that the four rules together fall short of the present issue.

However, if we ask what good judgement is, I think it will appear that the four rules have a preparatory value. Whenever we understand, we fell called upon to judge; but it is only when we understand not merely the matter in hand but relevant also its whole, context, that we can judge well. Children understand many things, but we madistrate with say that they reach the age of reason when they are about seven years old. A youth understands ever so much more than a child, yet 12 he is accounted a minor in the eyes of the law until he reaches the age of twenty-one. Every cobbler is thought a game fair judge, provided he sticks to his last. Finally, the universal principle of good judgement has been named wisdom; because that, orders all things, and so can judge all; but we must note that philosophy holds itself to be, not wisdom attained, but a love of wisdom and a movement towards it.

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In each of these instances the same feature recurs. in a your area Good judgement is not attained until, within the limits of that contain area, a certain fulness of understanding is reached. It seems to follow that my rules, urging understanding, and systematic understanding, the coherence of systematic understanding, head one to the limit where good judgement becomes possible.

Still, possibility is one thing and actuality another. For judgement demands more than adequately developed understanding. It supposes a transformation of consciousness, an ascent from the eros of intellectual curiosity to the reflective and critical rationality that is the distinguishing mark of man. On that higher level, one is involved personally not only the truth of the prospective judgement but also one's own orientation and attitude to truth is are at stake. So it is that every judgement includes a personal commitment, and it was to this espect of judgement that La Rochefoucault therew attention when he slyly remarked that everyone complains of his memory but no one of his judgement.

In insisting upon this aspect of judgement, it is not intention to belittle either the value of an exact analysis my∕ the metaphor. of what is meant by weighing the evidence, or the importance of the techniques that facilitate an assembly of the components on which correct judgement rests. But the techniques are was well enough known, and the analysis I have attempted elsewhere, and, I believe, the real problem lies neither in the techniques Múch modern nor in the analysis. Madarn philosophy and modern science seen to me marked by a flight from the responsibility of ias been That flight is, cloaked under the ma high name of judging. nethod. At least in the human sciences, in philosophy, and/ in theology, that flight, I believe, should be repudiated.

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higher level, there becomes operative what Augustine named a contemplation of the eternal reasons, what Aquinas attributed to our created parti participation of uncreated light, what might a modern thinker, would designate as rational is consciousness. On that level there emerges the proper content of what we mean by truth, reality, knowledge, objectivity; and by the same movement we ourselves in our own reasonableness are involved, for every judgement is at once a personal commitment, an endeavour to determine what is true, and a component in one's own apprehension of reality.

The meaning of my firth rule, <u>Accept the restonsibility</u> of judgement, is ouite simply that there is no substitute for good judgement and that a method that would attempt to provide a substitute is mistaken. It is not to be thought, however, that my fifth rule renounces what well may be regarded as the principal function and the chief benefit of a method, the liberation of scientific progress mamely, that it liberates the advance of a science from the vagarles of individual opinion

However, if I believe that there is no substitute for good judgement, if I believe that method, instead of seeking a substitute, has to make use of good judgement, it is not my intention to entrust the advance of science to the vagaries of individual opinion. No less than those that evade or deny the significance of good judgement, I too believe that a method has to include some technique and jument for overcoming individual, or group, or universal aberration. Where I would differ is in the technique. I acknowledge the full significance of judgement and its personal element, but my third and fourth rules imply a furthe<sup>r</sup> judgement on

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individual judgements. Developing positions and reversing counter-positions are equivalent to judging judgements; and the definitions of positions and counter-positions are based on sf ultimate philmosophic alternatives, that is, on the diverse manners in which individual judgement can go wrong not merely incidentally but in the grand manner of a superficial or a mistaken philosophy.

It is true, of course, that others may and will disagree with my account of the matter. But from the nature of the case, I think that disagreement in the main will be limited to naming positions what I name counter-positions and to naming counter-positions what I name positions. There would result a number of distinct schools, but their number could not be very large, their epistemological assumptions and implications would be in the open, and the individuals that choose between them could do so with an adequate awareness of the issues and of their own personal responsibility in judging.

Admittedly, this is not a watertight solution. But my fundamental point is that there exists no watertight solution. St. Paul held that the Law was efficacious only in giving knowledge of sin. Method would do very well if it did as much. For it was not through method that God saw fit to redeem the intellect of man.

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L have attempted to indicate poughly the meaning of five methodical rules. which I, Xelieve are applicable to an subject. I must now attempt to show their relevance to paptly by showing them to theology, and I shall are do so in three steps considering be immapent in history and partly by showing them to provide first, speculative or systematic theology, secondly, positaye method for the anx study of the history of theology or historical theology and, thirdly, practical or keryman theolog

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Traditionally theology has been conserved as <u>fides</u> <u>cuaerens intellectum</u>, faith in quest of understanding. Faith is presupposed and taken for granted. But this presupposition <u>tight</u> is understood in the spirit of the counsel of Augustine and Anselm, <u>crede ut intelligas</u>. We have believed. Now we would understand.

For there are many things that the believer desires to Nor is the desire an individual affair, a lack understand. that occurs of understanding, in the ignorant but not in the learned. It can be quite general. Such matters forced themselves on the attention of the Church in the patristic period through summ movements known as heresies, Gnosticism and Montanism, Arianism, Nestomrian and Monophysite doctrines; and, from the Nest Polagianten. But in the mediaeval period there developed dentalwest Pelagianism. But what earlier had consisted in anset of particular issues, became in the mediaeval period annahten an object of systematic concern. Peter Abeland & Sichet Non vas a list of one hundred and fifty eight propositions, for In his <u>Sic et Non</u> Peter Abelard listed bach of which one hundred and fifty-eight propositions, and to each of them he appended patristic passages that seemed to show that the proposition was to be both affirmed and denied. The work

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automatically established two points: negatively, it showed that to settle an issue it was not enough to quote the Rathers of the Church; positively, it a implied the existence of a department of inquiry in which mediaeval man was on his own. A slightly later writer, Gilbert de la Porrée, gave a particularly clear-headed definition of the existence of a quaestic: a quaestic exists if and only if there are good reasons both for affirming and for denying one and the same proposition. That definition became the basis of a technique that endured for centuries, a proposition was prefaced with the question mark, Utrum; passages from scripture and from the fathers were cited MMER in favour of the affirmative and then in favour of the negative answer, the author then gave his solution the negative answer; to these were added any of the arguments that might be current; then the author gave his solution its principles and closed by applying missionluming to each of the quetations at was the material basis of or arguments he had begun by citing. ,  $\bar{x}$  About the year 1150 there appeared the Peter Lombard's Quattuor libri sententiarum. It was an ordered compilation of scriptural and patristic passages bearing on Christian doctrine; if it did not emphasize oppositions as did Abelagrd's less thorough and less learned worth, neither it did it conceal them. Peter Lombard was something of a positivist, setting forth the data, and repeatedly leaving to the prudens lector the task of reconciliation. almost For over four centuries commentaries were written  $by_A every$  ranking theologian on Peter's Sentences, and the commentaries consisted in an ever growing and changing series of <u>quaestiones</u>.

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It would seem that my first rule, Understand, has a solid basis in theological tradition. Now, if we turn from mediaeval questions to mediaeval answers, there will emerge hhmmamddenos the traditional form of my second rule, Understand systematically. For in every field of inquiry there comes a time when a scattered set of discoveries coalesces into a rounded whole. Pythagoras established his theorem long Galileo and Kepler established before Euclid wrote his Elements. *keplar's* laws before Newtonian mechanics deduced the lawst from a set of principles. Much important work was done in chemistry prior to the discovery of the periodic table. But it is only a Euclid, a Newton, a Mondeleav comes along with a from the moment when system each gos that a subject has a well-defined existence, that it can be treated as a unity, that it can possess a method of its own. to enist the shown

Now, it is easy enough to discorn in the writings of Anselm and of the twelfth-century theologians a nest of antinomies that centre round the couplets, grace and freedom, faith and reason, to make the very conception of these terms paradoxical and to render an attempt at formulating the theological enterprise either heretical or incoherent. From about the year 1230 these hitherto hopeless problems vanish; theology becomes able to conceive itself, to distinguish its field from that of philosophy and of other disciplines, to tackle particular questions in the light of a total viewpoint. The key discovery was the recognition of what is named the supernatural order but, as the word, supernatural, in ordinary sontine English usage, has a connotation of the irrational, I had best pause to indicate its meaning. The fundamental notion regards primery parse to indicate that the emphasis lies, not on-

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pause to indicate that the primary emphasis lies, not on the word, supernatural, but on the word, order. Things are ordered, when they are intelligibly related, and so there is an order inasmuch as there is a domain of intelligible relations. The discovery of a supernatural order was the discovery of a domain of intelligible relations proper to theology. Just natural as Galilmo Newton discovered that laws reduced to a system of their own, mechanics, and not as Galileo had thought to a pre-existing sytem, geometry, just as Mendeleev discovering an order to which chemical entities reduced, and there by defined the field of chemistry, so too, when Aquinas was still a boy, theology found itself. Christian theology has to deal not only is the gift from God with the gift of God, where the gift is not only from God, but more basically the gift is God. It is a transcendent gift, and utterly free, not only in itself, but also in its whole retinue of consequences and implications. Knowing of it is a faith that is above reason, possessing it is a grace that is above nature, acting on it is a charity that is above good will, with a merit that is above human deserts. Christian fellowship is a bond that transcends family and state, a and Christian understanding grasps the convergence of lines on a focus 

The thirteenth century was not content with this master stroke. The discovery of what theology is about implied for theology a definite place in the total field of Exriction knowledge. Theology is concerned with God and with all things in their relation to God. But while for Bonaventure created things function as symbols that

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is a bond, transcending family and state, that in the fulness of time was established when God sent his Son that we might have the adoptions of sons and, w to show that we are sons, the sent Mix Spirit of his Son, crying out in our hearts, Abba, Father. Munisthanvanienstandingyminvariesfymgnamemthemunumengeness uffviltnesvormumfacesstantiestery

There is a further aspect to this realization of my second rule, <u>Understand systematically</u>. The natural objective of our intellectual desire to know is the concrete universe. Theology can mix succeed as a systematic understanding, only if it is assigned a determinate position in the totality of human knowledge with determinate relations to all other branches. This further step was taken by Aquinas. Where Bonaventure had been content to think of this world and all it contains only as symbols that lead the mind ever up to God, Aquinas took over the physics, biology, psychology, not symbols but and metaphysics of Aristotle to acknowledge, natural realities and corresponding departments of natural and human science.

My third rule was, <u>Reverse counter-positions</u>, and it immediately can be translated into the ological jerns by adverting to the so-called Augustinian reaction against *stat reaction*. Aristotelianism. In essen ce, it was an acceptance of *stat the animit*. Aristotelian logic, but a rejection x of a bonighted pagan's views on science and philosophy. Theology was to be pure. In the hands of Duns Scotus and of William of Ockham it quickly became very purely logical and, while logic is a valid systematic ideal, its atmosphere is too thin to support life. The vagaries of fourteenth and fifteenth century Scholasticism are a long series of illustrations of the

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counter-position that would have, certituide and rigour provisionsements would have, certituide and rigour and therefore brushed aside the uncertainties and the apparently haphazard process of coming to understand.

My fourth rule was, <u>Develop</u> pastix positions. The achievements of the thirteenth century are not a goal but a starting-point. In particular, it lacked what we call the historical sense, namely, an awareness that concepts are functions of time, that they change and dyest develop with every advance of understanding, that they become platitudinous and insignificant by passing through minds that do not understand, that such changes take place in a determinate manner that can be the object of a science. Not only was the sense of history missing in mediaeval thought, but also it happens that any subsequent theology has been ever increasingly occupied with an array of questions that maximize arise from a critique of Christian origins and the developmennt of Christian doctrine and Christian thought. What, it will be asked, is the relevance of the rules I have indicated to historical theology?

It is, I think, twofold. There is their adaptation to historical study in general, and on this point I shall not and dwell. There is also their adaptation to historical theology, and how this occurs, perhaps I have **district** already indicated. There rules seem to immanent in history. I have full illustrated the first from the twelfth century, the second from the thirteenth, the third from the fourteenth, the fourth from a subsequent and still expanding inquiry. At least, I suggest, this gives us a clue and a few further considerations

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will help to determine its significance.

First, I would note a general fact. Historical competence does not suffice to write the history of such a subject as mathematics, or physics, or medicine, of philosophy. If one is ignorant of these subjects, one might meet all the general requirements of historical investigation, but as soon as one turned to what is specifically mathematical or could medical or philosophical, one would be at a loss. One compile measure shi-the data, but one could not select, emphasize, evaluate, order, judge.

Scoondly the reason why knowledge of the subject itself is necessary in writing a history of the subject is

Secondly, from this general fact one can ascend to its ground. The history of a subject is the history of its development, and the history of its development is an abjective and the development of a subject is, so to speak, the objective process of learning by which the subject gradually took shape, progressed, suffer set-backs, uniquai underwent transformations. To be able to discern that objective process of learning, to appreciate what was known and what was lacking at each stage of the process, to determine accurately what i were the strokes that moved the process forward, and what were the oversights that delayed, it is necessary on has to have a thorough grasp of the subject itself.

Thirdly, general methodical rules for the advance of any a subject, if valid, hold not only for the future but also for the past. They will be immanent in history. In similar general Subject will also be immanent in the history of that subject.

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the past. For such general rules armaximply, if truly general, merely make explicit, conscious, deliberate, the native process of learning of the human mind. Hence, even when they were not explicit, none the less they were operative. It is in this sense that the rules are immanent in history, visue of this and it is in the same sense that the general rules can be assigned their concrete, theological significance by appealing to significant periods in the history of theology.

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Fourthly, I have appealed from explicit rules to a prior implicit operativeness. Now I have to take a parallel step from what becomes explicit in theology to what was implicit before theology. Theology is faith in quest of understanding. But the understanding that theology seeks is systematic, and the faith that protects precedes theology is not without understanding. What is understood systematically But the earlier understanding in theology, was understood previously. but in another mode, of understanding, in the mode of intersubjectivity, of symbolic apprehension, of commons sense. Nor is the theologian ignorant of those modes. He was a Christian before he was a theologian Even if he teaches potential theologian a theologian. If he teaches theology, then he is engaged in making Christians into theologians. If he preaches what he has learnt from theology, then he is engaged in transforming what he understands systematically into the use more immediate modes of intersubjectivity, symbol, and common sense. Hence, just as previously I have argued that to write the history of theology one must be not only a historian but also a theologian, so now I should say that to write the history of Christian doctrine one must be not only a historian and a theologian but also a theologian familiar with the

process of transformation that occurs when one moves from one mode of understanding to another.

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Fifthly, how does the theologian acquire familiarity with this process? There are two steps: first, one graspst the general notion; secondly, one sees it operative in the manifest turning-points in the history of Christian doctrine.

The general notion may be illustrated by our apprehension of upace. We seen to begin from a kinessthette Thus, our initial apprehension of space seems to of space. be kinaesthetic; it involves æ coordinate system in which up and down, front and back, right and left, have felt, qualitative differences; it serves us verifier to all our qualitative differences; it is an apprehension that serves us well in all our bodily movements. But it is not an apprehension that can bear the weight of a theory about the universe; for it implies that, if the earth were a sphere, then people at the antipodes would fall into the sky; and so when we attempt to think about the universe, we have to leave aside notions adapted for more immediate and quite differnt ends. Another illustration is supplied by the intersubjective mode of understanding: within its proper limits it is both legitimate and necessary; but to attempt to apprehend the universe through the intersubjective mode results in a mythical personification of everything, where, of course, personification means, not a figure of speech that presupposes some prior literal mode of meaning, but rather the prior, literal mode of apprehension itstelf.

Oncent one has grasped the general nature of transformations from one mode of understanding to another, one can turn to the beginnings of speculative thought in the Christian tradition.

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They are not hard to find. The fourth century was in an uproar over one word, <u>homoousios</u>. The meaning of that word is not to be sought in intersubjectivity, in symbolic apprehension, in common sense. It is a technical term that, initial state term that, of itself, announces the emergence of some type of systematic thinking. As one might expect, there were represented all shades of opinion about it. Even its most staughth defender, Athanasius, regarded it as no better than a regrettable necessity. Not only were there fifty years of controversy after Nicaea, but also there had been a problem long before Nicaea. One can see it take successively different forms in Justin, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origin, Novatian, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Dionysius of Rome.

I have indicated one instance of a shift **sf** in the mode of understanding. But there are others. Something similar took place at Chalcedon with antecedents and consequents extending over centuries. Something similar began with the condemnation of Pelagius at Carthage. Something similar happened when twelfth-century theologians conceived sacraments in terms of grace, and of instrumental causality. In each of these instances, and there are others, one can study empirically the nature of a shift from the intersubjective and commonsense mode of understanding towards an the systematic mode.

But a further and more relevant observation seems in order. Newton insisted, <u>hypotheses non fingo</u>. In a sense his claim was false for the theory of universal gravitation is a theory, a hypothesis. But in another sense his claim was completely justified, for Newton's theory had added to observable data nothing but their immanian immanent intelligibility, their

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verifiable law. As he did not attempt to determine final causes, so he refused to **set** assign the efficient cause that made bodies fall. He was content with an inner functional verified relationship that was to be absenzed ink the observable and measurable features of any local movement and could be extraph polated successfully to the planets. That functional relationship, on the theoretical side, served to define a whole class of movements and so it opened the way to the discovery of quite different classes; and, on the practical side, it enabled man to become an efficient cause and to use natural forces for the attainment of human ends.

I think there is some similarity in the procedure I immediately have indicated. There is not raised, the question of the final cause, whether systematic understanding is a good thing, or whether Nicaea and Chalcedon reached truth. Such questions are not questions for understanding but for judgement, and their treatment comes under the heading of positions and counter-positions. There is not raised immediately the question of the efficient cause: sources and influences have their significance in historical investigation; but I think one first should know what is taking place in the product before one bigins to inquire what causes it to take place in the preicise manner that can be observed; and, besides, the question of sources opens the way to an almost unending series of hypotheses that inevitably take the theologian out of the field in which and he he alone is competent into the excessively large investigations concerned with the broad stream of human thought, human literature, and interacting cultures and civilizations. Similarly, there are not introduced the bered somewhat indeterminate entities Joannine, named biblical, evangelical, Pauline, Palestinian, Hellenistic,

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I have been indicating that my general rules, pursuitably because they are general, are no less applicable to historical than to speculative theology. But I should note, as well, that because they are rules, because they are dynamic, they serve to unite historical and speculative theology as past process and present term. Historical or positive theology is concerned with the becoming of speculative; and speculative theology is the product of historical process. To add positive to speculative theology is not to add something quite extrinsic; it is not to add a new and autonomous department that goes its own independent way. Rather, I should say, theology historical theology is speculative through becoming conscious its of its passhmannd origins and development and, at the same time, speculative theology is just the contemporary stage of the movement that historical theology examines and analyses. To overlook or to xm reject that unity has, I believe, only one result: on the one hand, historical theology becomes lost in the wilderness of universal history; it coases to be a distinct discipline with a proper field and competence; and on the other hand speculative theology showels toto Church Dognatics; it gives up the offort to understand, to serve faith in its quest for understanding; and it attempts. to take over some part in the teaching office of the Shrursh, to tell the faithful what is so

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one result. On the onte hand, historical theology becomes lost in the wilderness of universal history; it ceases to be a distinct deiscipline with a proper field and competence of its own; for it is only from speculative theology that historical can learn just what its precise field is and what are the inner laws of that field in their general manifestations. On the other hand, speculative theology withers away; for its proper task is, not just understanding, but understanding the faith; its positive basis is historical and without that basis it may retire into an ivory tower to feed itself with subtle memories, it may merge with the general stream of philosophic thought, or it may attempt to take over, modestly or despotically, the teaching office of the Church, but the one thing necessary it cannot do, continue that today the process begun so long ago of adding to fr living faith the dimension of systematic understanding.

There remains my fifth rule, <u>Accept the responsibility</u> of <u>judgement</u>. As it is the supreme rule in any science, so its adaptation in theology is the most significant. For theology presupposes faith and, for the Cateolic, faith includes judgements. It is an acceptance of truths revealed by God and taught by his Church, not because we see them to be true apart from that witness, but because we are ready to enlarge our notion of truth itself, because we are ready to take as the measure of truth that is truth even for us, not what we can understand in this life, but what God understands.

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This view of faith transforms the meaning of the first rate, Understand. In other fields, understanding begins not from truths but from data. It is understanding that will promote data to the level of truth, and the truth to be attained is no guiding presence but an ideal whose precise features are not to be discerned. In theology, things are otherwise. There are, indeed, data that are; just data as in the other EXE sciences: most exceptical and historical questions are of that character. But there are also truths, and understanding them involves a reversal of roles; where in other fields understanding precedes and determines truth, in theology understanding follows and is determined.

Now this reversal of roles gives rise to special techniques that centre about the true proposition, the logic of presuppositions and implications, and the semantics or metaphysics of meaning. My one observation is that they are techniques; they serve to chart the path of efforts to understanding; but they arminmum are not ends; they provide the areal scaffolding needed to build the theological edifice; but they are not the edifice itself, the understanding sought by faith; they serve to delimit and to define what is to be understand, but the understanding is something more. It lies in the realm of analogy and in the intelligible interlocking of the truths of faith.

The adaptation of my second rule, <u>Understand systematically</u>, would have to do with the character of the intelligibility to be reached in theology. It is too would be concerned with the definition of limits and the indication of possibilities and, while highly relevant to method, it would, prove to be of a highly technical and specialized character.

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As the Catholic view of faith makes theological understanding a grasp of converging lines that focus upon uncomprehended mystery, so too it places human wisdom and judgement within a contect of communicated divine wisdom and divine judgement. As the Catholic theologian accepts a divine revelation, so also he are believes in its providential preservation. None the less, this does not liberate him from ine also accepting the responsibility of making judgement soft his own. We learn from Geoffrey

of Fontaines that, in the 1290"s, the theological students of at the University of Paris believed they would be excommunicate in if they read the writings of Six Thomas Aquinas. In 1323, forty-nine years after his death, Thomas Aquinas became St. Thomas a Aquinas. Two years i afterwards the Archbishop of Paris officially removed the ban against him. Clearly, if today Aquinas holds a preeminent position in Catholic theology, it is pecause he had the courses to account the responsibility paking basic judgements on the basis of what he understood because he had the daring that is needed to understand ana' and the courage to make far-reaching judgements on the basis of his daring understanding. Moreover, if the decisions Aquinas made were momentous, the element of decisiveness 12~ is not removed when one turns from man of genius to the ordinary honest worker. Everyone engaged in theology, as something more than an exercise in repetitiveness, has to make decisions; and the point to my fifth rule is simply that he would be deceiving himself if he thought that there existed some authatic technique on which he could shift the burden.

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Lecture given to the Society for the Study of Theology, Nottingham, England, April 15, 1959. (File no.: 185)

Note: The numbers in the left-hand margin refer to page numbers of the Latin typescript of "De Intellectu et Methodo" (LD 155).

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# Method in Catholic Theology

My title has to be understood in the light of my terms of reference. The invitation, so kindly extended to me, was to speak on the method I happen to employ in my work as a theologian. What was desired was, not an **mem** account of methods or of their history, but rather a report on a contemporary approach.

A method, I take it, is a set of margin rules or directives for the advancement of a science. It is concerned to tell just what is to be done and to just how to do it. It also is concerned to indicate what cannot be done, what need not be done, and what can be or has to be left to take care of itself.

Such rules can be formulated in three manners. They may regard outward acts of looking and listening, of manipulating instruments, or employing ordinary or technical language. Again, action, and they may go behind language to the concepts and the judgements of the mind. Thirdly, they may turn from the mind's immanent products to the conscious, inquiring, critically reflective I shall outline, subjecti. My rules, are of the third type. At first sight, they may well appear to be very unsubstantial. But if you will consent to be very patient with me, there is, I think, some chance you will agree that my approach makes it to gripo set Jorth possible to come rether quickly with basic issues that therwise can hardly be raised at all.

But, H however legitimate this question, I do not propose to meet it directly. Modern philosophy, I believe, became so tothally involved in epistemological questions, because it also was interested in the theoretical basis of method. Since I think it guite, unlikely that you care to discuss cognitional theory, I shall venture to be generous with precepts but brief with reasons.

#### My preachts are four in maker

Yults, turn My precepts are five in number. They are:

- 1. Understand.
- 2. Understand systematically.
- 3. Reverse counter-positions.
- 4. Develop positions.
- 5. Accept the responsibility of judgement.

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As you will have observed, these, proceeds are very brief; as you will fear, their explanation is apt to be very is with long; and compounding, this fear, which is not unjustified, there will be some alarm. For there is nothing specifically rules 3 has with. theological about the ware copts.

To meet this last points at once, I note that I do not believe in a multiplicity of methods. I do not think that there is one set of precepts for mathematics, another for natural science, a third for human science, a fourth for philosophy, a fifth for theology. On the contrary, as human intelligence is one, so also is the grand strategy of its to implement advance; method is concerned with that grand strategy; it undergoes adaptations to exploit the possibilities and to here to circumvent the difficulties is different fields; but the

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adaptations are non-mover than a matter of bowing to circumstance.

It follows that my exposition will fall naturally into two parts. First, I shall review the five precepts in their general and basic meaning; and in this review I shall be free to draw my illustrations from any field. Secondly, I shall turn to the adaptations relevant to theology and, then, I in mind shall have Catholic theology, of which I can more kinely to know semething, ohis Ply View Mind.

My first precept is, Understand. By it I refer not to words or sentences, not to concepts or judgements, not to the data of sense, but to what is the key act or event in any discovery, to the moment when one grasps why, knows the reason, sees the point, catches on. Such moments may be epochal. They may be accompanied with the explosive delight that made Archimedes shout Eureka. They may initiate the almost without intropline Sir over-mastering absorption that kept Isaac Newton at his desk for weeks. But normally they are very pedestrian affairs, occurring marging with the ease and frequency that pres saves us from acquiring a reputation for stupidity. En However, if the act of understanding is neither difficult nor rare, it is none the less fundamental. A discovery is merely the first occurrence of an act of understanding; and the advance primarily of a science is mersig an accumulation of discoveries; and a method aims at no more than encouraging, directing, and ordering such accumulations.

My first precept is illuminated not only by its direct meaning but also by what it omits. I do not say, Make significant acts of understanding. It is significant acts,

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of course, significant exacts that are wanted; but they do not form a distinct species, and they do not result from the observance of a special set of rules; they are simply the acts that happen to close one stage of development and to open another; and they derive their significance not from themselves but from their connection with antecedent and consequent acts.

Again, I do not say, Make correct acts of understanding. For though correct acts are the ones that are wanted, still the difference between a correct act and an incomprect one is not intrinsic. Understanding, of itself, yields no more than ideas, treated definitions, hypotheses, theories. They may prove to be correct; far more commonly they prove to be incorrect; but in themselves they are neither true nor false. They are more or less helpful, more or less adequate, more or less in the direction of success and achievement. To expect them to be correct; and to demand too much is an of obtaining extremely efficacious way, texebtain nothing at all.

Again, I do not say, Be impartial, Set aside all prejudice, Drop all preconceptions, Doubt everything that cannot be demonstrated. We have to begin with ourselves as we are and, commonly, that means that we have to begin with a large ignorance of ourselves. We cannot revert at will to the <u>tabula rase with which Aristotle oredities</u> our intellects at our birth. Nor is the real problem deliberate bias, wilful narrow-mindedness, conscious excess of certitude. What has to be eliminated is the unconscious aberration that may appear to be the very soul of truth; and the one way to eradicate it is, I think, to advance in understanding.

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Finaldy, my first rule is not, Observe, Attend to the data, Attend to them as they really are, Attend to all relevant Each data. ing of these imperatives, I believe, gives excellent advice; but I also believe that both the advice and the one way effective way of following the advice are contained in the more basic precept, Understand. If one tries, to understand, one is inquiring; if one is inquiring, one is attending to something given but not yet understood; such attention is observation. Further, observation becomes full and accurate, just in the measure that one increases in understanding. A good observer has not a broader span of attention than the prdinary man, but he does possess a greater power of giving form or Gestalt to the data, of organizing multiplicities grasping 1 fferences into perceptible unities. certainly hey parhaps be seen but remain unnot

ordinary man, but he does possess a greater intellectual interest, a greater capacity to organize multiplicities into perceptible unities, a greater concern to note differences, that are there to be seen by anyone, but are noticed only when developing understanding is directing and controlling the intellectual operations of sense for its own ends. In similar fashion, while it is true that one should attend to all the relevant data, it is no less true that understanding is the measure that of relevance and only complete understanding can tell when the totality of relevant data has been taken into account.

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Finally, when I say, <u>Understand</u>, I do not mean, <u>Conceive</u> or know the necessary, the per se, the intelligible, the abstract, or the universal. Any such substitution involves the psychological fallacy. One can attempt to describe or define such an experience as seeing or hearing. The description will be a matter or concepts and words. It But seeing is neither concept nor word. Similarly, one can attempt to describe or define the experience of understanding; but it would be fallacious to **unpass** confuse the experience itself with any of the concepts or words employed in the description. Maxessar from my point of view and it would be disastrous to substitute for by first rules inderstation a quite different rule that initiated a use means that the inderstation of words.

Indeed, from my point of view any such confusion would be disastrous, for understanding possesses a versatility that ranges over the whole conceptual field and, as well, pivots between it and the world of sense.

What is understood, may be expressed as **necessary**. But the contradictory is also true. Understanding grasps the principles and laws of natural science, but it considers them, not necessary, but only true in fact. They are empirical intelligibilities.

What is understood, may be expressed as <u>per se</u>. But understanding also grasps the theory of probability, and intelligibility in the what is, not <u>per se</u>, but per accidens.

What is known precisely inasmuch one understands, offers a definition of the intelligible. But understanding can also make issue with the non-intelligible; it can take its non-intelligibility as a premise to develop techniques

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that master it; in this fashion I believe understanding proceeds number, in treating irrational, probabilities, the law of inertia, sin, and the fruits of sin. When we

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Mare able to abstract, it is because we understand. But whenever we understand, it does not follow that we can effect a satisfactory abstraction. A conceptual account of a smile or frown, a painting or a symphony, fails to reach the precise intelligibility that understanding grasps in the concrete presentation.

Intelligible interdependence in concrete multiplicity.

Finally, similars are similarly understood, and in this sense it is true that understanding grasps the universal. It remains that understanding may or may not exploit its capacity for generalization. Aristotle credit, Socrates with the dimm invention or introduction of universal definitions. But the Athenians did not like them. They considered Socrates' fill, a magnet, teaching subversive. In fact, it was only novel, and the novelty consisted in a far greater concern with the universal than common sense parmits exhibits. For common sense does not seek the universal definitions and truths that must hold in every instance and that must passes the exactitude that will bear the weight of lengthy inferences. Commonsense understanding seeks, not strict universality, but general utility. It aims at a development of intelligence that operates, not through universal principles and deductions, but through the ordinary

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It is time to turn to my second precept, <u>Understand</u> <u>systematically</u>. By it I mean, first, that one's efforts at understanding must aim at the ideal goal of understanding must and, secondly, that they make explicit the structure through which understanding naturally moves towards this goal.

The ideal goal of understanding is complete the mess. where the initial a culture hermon. It Common sense, settles for a mode and measure of understanding that suffice to enable one to live intelligently. But human intelligence wants more; it heads for, complete explanation of all phenomena; it would understand the universe. It distinguishes endlessly; but it does so only to relate intelligibly; and ideally the network of relations is to embrace everything. It is this complete network of relations, making intelligible every aspect of the concrete universe, that is to be thought of when I say that understanding is to be systematic.

Evitter, this ideal provides, not merely a standard by which we may judge how far we still have to so, but also it. in operative component in our afforts towards dumnitudes. Hommitudemanknownmidealammitemapsknownada

Now this ideal of the ultimate system is not that just a standard by which we know how far we still have to go. It also is an operative component in our progress. Spontaneously we employ it as an implicit premiss in our efforts to understand. A method makes it an explicit and conclously exploited premiss. Analy difficult.

This may seem impossible, and so I offer examples that illustrate its possibility. Texts in elementary algebra abound or, at least, used to abound in mysterious problems that, somn enough, we learned to solve by writing down,

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Let the unknown number be  $\underline{x}$ . Once that was done, we had only to read the problem carefully again to discover that we could also write down an equation in terms of  $\underline{x}$ . Finally, the solutions of such equations was no more than the automatic realows processing made more than application of rules, with which, we had been made more than familiar.

Now What is the magic efficacy of writing down, Let the unknown number wor be x. Like all magic, it is only apparent. When one writes out that sentence, one affirms that the unknown lies in the determinate category, number. One implies that it possesses the very definite properties possessed by numbers. One implies that it stands within the network of relations exhibited by counting and by arithmetical operations. Granted all this, one has only to advert to the **t** data supplied in the problem, to determine which un a priori science such ad of all numbers is the one required. procedure is not restricted to methematics. Again, physicists know that they are aim to know laws; J. A. they conceive laws as functional relations; and when they set out to determine the law of a precise type of phenomenon, they can begin by writing down, Let the unknowin law be the indeterminate function, F(x, y, z, t) = 0. That sentence is far from a confession of complete ignorance. On the contrary, physicists can reach a solution of a large number of scientific issues without settling exactly just which function is the required law. They argue from differential equations and from CAN 60 boundary conditions, and they, own so argue because they are in pursuit of an ideal of system. a similar

> Now I happen to believe that this technique can and should be employed universally. I believe it is relevant to not only to the natural sciences but also to the human sciences,

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to philosophy and to theology. I base this relevance on the fact that such a technique merely makes explicit what already

18 implicit in all intelligent and reasonable human knowing. if you ack in what precisely such a tennique consists, I can But for details the precisely such a tennique consists, I can evel so that you with refer you to my prome after to bracket the induces that is no advence of science injurse + of makey in the My third and fourth rules have to do with one's own

personal development and, as well, with one's learning from others. To understand systematically

diases. The ideal of understanding systematically is others. The ideal of understanding systematically becomes clear and distinct and effective only at a late stage in the development of the individual and of the race. First, we understand intersubjectively, and the intelligibility we grasp I think, is symbolic. Such is the understanding of mother and child, of Martin Buber's 'I and Thou,' of Heidegger's Mitsein. By it is known the person, not as object, but as another subject, transparent in smile or frown, in blush or scowl, in tone of voice, in silent gaze. Upon this base there, is grafted the understanding of common sense, that organizes the world with names, and collaborates towards mastering it with language. But intersubjectivity and common sense are propaedeutic to a third stage when the Logos, immanent in man, comes to awareness of its potentialities and asks for a method that will lead to complete understanding.

Now the difficulty of this third stage is that it can be itself, be true to its own inner exigences, only by taking the stock of its earlier history, noting its limitations undrives of previous modes, acknowledging their opposition to the new demands of intelligence and reasonableness, and opting consciously, deliberately, coherently, and thoroughly for the

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There exists, then, I believe, a process of intellectual third and found in gard that conversion and my rules for that process spectra. My first rule was, <u>Understand</u>. In virtue of that first rule I conclude discoveries that all genuine understanding must be retained. My second rule was, <u>Understand systematically</u>. In virtue of that second rule I divide the formulations of sots of understanding into two classes, positions and counter-positions. Positions are formulations that can be retained unchanged within the new way. Counter-positions are formulations that have to be recast before they can be made coherent with the new way.

You will recognize in such rules a variant on many older themes. The Fathers of the Church believed in despoiling the Egyptians, of taking their truth while disengaging it from fagan these error. Descartes preached universal doubt, and Newman thought that believing everything, while absurd, none the less was a preferable procedure. The history of the development of science has been a continuous transmutation of notions that once seemed too evident to be controverted. In his <u>Phenomenology</u> of <u>Spirit</u> Hegel has many useful things to say on the coming-to-be of mind. In our own day Rudolf Bultmann has advocated a procedure to strip the New Testament of what he considers at least mythical elements. The problem exists. Anwhomenvdefinition

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But the root of the problem, its really baffling element, lies within the subject, within each one of us. For the problem is not solved merely by assenting to the propositions that are true and by rejecting the propositions that are false. It is a matter\_of\_conversion, of appropriating one's own rational self-consciousness, of finding one's way behind the natura naturata, the pensée pensée, of words and books, of concepts and judgements, to their origin and their source, to the <u>natura naturans</u>, the <u>pensée pensante</u>, that is oneself as intelligent and as reasonable. Without such self-appropriation and the critical appraisal it generates, one may repeat all that an Augustine says of veritas, or all that an Aquinas says I believe. of being, but in doing so one will not be raising oneself but up to their level but cutting them down to one's own size.

My fifth rule is, <u>Accept the responsibility of judgement</u>. The obvious content of this rule is negative, for it **immine** rejects the notion that there is any set of rules that, so to speak, automatically or mechanically, brings inquiry to knowledge, truth, certitude. Method is operative only through minds. Minds reach knowledge only through judgement. And there is no recipe for producing men of good judgement.

It is true of nourse, that no method ever ventured to offer a recipe for producing men of good judgement. But it also is turn true that many methods give the impression that they aim to at relieving the inquirer of the responsibility of making his own judgements. Thus, the method of natural science seens concerned primarily with the conditions of successful

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methods tend to eliminate the issue and scientific methods to evade it. The responsibility of judging vanishes in rationalism, because there the true judgement is necessitated. It vanishes in empiricism, because there what counts is not judging but looking. It vanishes in idealism, because there truth assumes a meaning that does not demand any personal decision. It vanishes in relativism, because there a judgement that is simply true cannot be attained. Again, in natural manus des la bar not ack science, the responsibility of judging is evaded and, in its place, there comes a pragmatism, an acquiescence in what works. seems to But while this pragmatism itself, work well enough in natural science, in the human sciences its results are not so happy. For in the human sciences measurement is superficial and experiment is monstrous, and there's seems to be some truth th School Hyperit's demociation of a proliferation pecialized fields, each with complete autonomy, each rulerd convinced its conventionally accepted criteria, and all that any effort to give unity and depth to such many-sided ctivity would yield only another specialty to which no need attend. There has resulted, according to Edmond Husserl in his Krisis der Europäischen Missenschaften, aproliferation of specialized fields. Each of these fields tends to be Each, is, ruled stripty by its own conventionally is autonomous. accepted criteria. Nor does there seem to be, under present conditions, any possibility of giving unity and depth, to ricece, this many-sided activity. For any such effort would be merely th regarded and as just one more specialized field that merited the attention only of those actually engaged in it.

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Because such a recipe does not exist, philosophic

I have been indicating the dimensions of the issue, and now I must attempt to clarify my position. My first two rules, <u>Understand</u>, <u>Understand systematically</u>, yield no more than bright ideas, hypotheses, theories; and none of these is knowledge. Of themselves, they are merely sounding brass and tinkling cymbal. Only when one can go beyond them to **x** affirm their truth, to assert that things are so, does one reach knowledge; and taking that step is a matter of good judgement. My third and fourth rules, <u>Reverse</u> **the** <u>counter-positions</u>, <u>Develop positions</u>, introduce the problem of judgement**‡**, inasympth as they are concerned not merely with the inner coherence of systematic understanding but also with a conversion of the subject that judges. It remains that the four rules together fall short of the present issue.

However, if we ask what good judgement is, I think it will appear that the four rules have a preparatory value. Whenever we understand, we fell called upon to judge; but it is only when we understand not merely the matter in hand but relevant also its, whole, context, that we can judge well. Children understand many things, but we **readstrate excitit** say that they reach the age of reason when they are about seven years old. A youth understands ever so much more than a child, yet 13 he is accounted a minor in the eyes of the law until he reaches the age of twenty-one. Every cobbler is thought a gand fair judge, provided he sticks to his last. Finally, the universal principle of good judgement has been named wisdom; becaute æ that orders all things and so can judge all; but we must note that philosophy holds itself to be, not wisdom attained, but a love of wisdom and a movement towards it.

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In each of these instances the same feature recurs. Good judgement is not attained until, within the limits of that members area, a certain fulness of understanding is reached. It seems to follow that my rules, urging understanding, and systematic understanding, the coherence of systematic understanding, head one to the limit where good judgement becomes possible.

Still, possibility is one thing and actuality another. For judgement demands more than adequately developed understanding. It supposes a transportation of consciousness, an ascent from the eros of intellectual curiosity to the reflective and critical rationality that is the distinguishing mark of man. On that haber hevel, one is involved personally not only the truth of the prospective judgement but also one's own orientation and attitude to truth is are at stake. So it is that every judgement includes a personal commitment, and it was to this espect of judgement that La Rochefoucault i drew attention when he slyly remarked that everyone complains of his memory but no one of his judgement.

In insisting upon this aspect of judgement, it is not my intention to belittle either the value of an exact analysis the metaphor. of what is meant by weighing the evidence, or the importance of the techniques that facilitate an assembly of the components on which correct judgement rests. But the techniques are xx well enough known, and the analysis I have attempted elsewhere, and, I believe, the real problem lies neither in the techniques Much modern nor in the analysis. Madarn, philosophy and modern science seem to me marked by a flight from the responsibility of has been That flight is cloaked under the mr high name of udging. At least in the human sciences, in philosophy, and nethod.

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higher level, there becomes operative what Augustine named a contemplation of the eternal reasons, what Aquinas attributed to our created path participation of uncreated light, what wight a modern thinker, worke designate as rational is consciousness. On that level there emerges the proper content of what we mean by truth, reality, knowledge, objectivity; and by the same movement we ourselves in our own reasonableness are involved, for every judgement is at once a personal commitment, an endeavour to determine what is true, and a component in our's our apprehension of reality.

The meaning of my fifth rule, <u>Accept the resconsibility</u> of judgement, is quite simply that there is no substitute for good judgement and that a method that would attempt to provide a substitute is mistaken. It is not to be thought, however, that my fifth rule renounces what well may be regarded as the principal function and the chief benefit of a method, the liberation of scientific progress mamely, that it liberates the advance of a science from the vagarles of individual opinion

However, if I believe that there is no substitute for good judgement, if I believe that method, instead of seeking a substitute, has to make use of good judgement, it is not my intention to entrust the advance of science to the vagaries of individual opinion. No less than those that evade or deny the significance of good judgement, I too believe that a method has to include some technique and function for overcoming individual, or group, or universal aberration. Where I would differ is in the technique. I acknowledge the full significance of judgement and its personal element, but my third and fourth rules imply a further judgement on

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individual judgements. Developing positions and reversing counter-positions are equivalent to judging judgements; and the definitions of positions and counter-positions are based on sf ultimate philmosophic alternatives, that is, on the diverse manners in which individual judgement can go wrong not merely incidentally but in the grand manner of a superficial or a mistaken philosophy.

It is true, of course, that others may and will disagree with my account of the matter. But from the nature of the case, I think that disagreement in the main will be limited to naming positions what I name counter-positions and to naming counter-positions what I name positions. There would result a number of distinct schools, but their number could not be very large, their epistemological assumptions and implications would be in the open, and the individuals that choose between them could do so with an adequate awareness of the issues and of their own personal responsibility in judging.

Admittedly, this is not a watertight solution. But my fundamental point is that there exists no watertight solution. St. Paul held that the Law was efficacious only in giving knowledge of sin. Method would do very well if it did as much. For it was not through method that God saw fit to redeem the intellect of man.

I have attempted to Andicate Doughly the meaning five methodical rules, which I believe are applicable to any I must now attempt to show their relevance to subject/. paptly by showing them to theology, and I shall ats do so in three steps considering be immapent in history and partly by showing them to provide first, speculative or systematic theology, secondly, positive a method for the unit study of the history of theology or historical theology and, thirdly, practical or kelucatic theology.

Traditionally theology has been conserved as <u>fides</u> <u>quaerens intellectum</u>, faith in quest of understanding. Faith is presupposed and taken for granted. But this presupposition is understood in the sparry of the counsel of Augustine and Anselm, <u>crede ut intelligas</u>. We have believed. Now we would understand.

For there are many things that the believer desires to understand. Nor is the desire an individual affair, a lack that occurs of understanding, in the ignorant but not in the learned. It can be quite general. Such matters forced themselves on the attention of the Church in the patristic period through mumin movements known as heresies, Gnosticism and Montanism, Arianism, Nestomrian and Monophysite doctrines; and, from the west Polegianten. But in the mediaeval period there developed incidental west Pelagianism. But what earlier had consisted in anset of particular issues, became in the mediaeval period mamantum an object of systematic concern. Reter Abeland's Sicat Non was a list of one bundred and fifty eight propositions, for In his Sic et Non Peter Abelard listed back of which one hundred and fifty-eight propositions, and to each of them he appended patristic passages that seemed to show that the proposition was to be both affirmed and denied. The work

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automatically established two points: negatively, it showed that to settle an issue it was not enough to quote the Kathers of the Church; positively, it # implied the existence of a department of inquiry in which mediaeval man was on his own. A slightly later writer, Gilbert de la Porrée, gave a particularly clear-headed definition of the existence of a quaestic: a quaestic exists if and only if there are good reasons both for affirming and for denying one and the same proposition. That definition became the basis of a technique that endured for centuries! A proposition was prefaced with the question mark, Utrum; passages from scripture and from the fathers were cited warr in favour of the affirmative and then in favour of the negative answers the author then gave his solution the negative answer; to these were added any of the arguments that might be current; then the author gave his solution its principles and closed by applying minutes mutitude to each of the quatations or arguments he had begun by citing. x = 1000 About the year 1150 there appeared ins Peter Lombard's Quattuor libri sententiarun. It was an ordered compilation of scriptural and patristic passages bearing on Christian doctrine; if it did not emphasize oppositions as did Abeland's less thorough and less learned work, neither it did it conceal them. Peter Lombard was something of a positivist, setting forth the data, and repeatedly leaving to the prudens lector the task of reconciliation. almost For over four centuries commentaries were written by every ranking theologian on Peter's Sentences, and the commentaries consisted in an ever growing and changing series of quaestiones.

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It would seem that my first rule, Understand, has a solid basis in theological tradition. Now, if we turn from mediaeval questions to mediaeval answers, there will emerge minamentaienen the traditional form of my second rule, Understand aystematically. For in every fietld of inquiry there comes a time when a scattered set of discoveries coalesces into a rounded whole. Pythagoras established his theorem long before Euclid wrote his Elements. Galileo and Kepler established laws before Newtonian mechanics deduced the laws from a set of principles. Much important work was done in chemistry prior to the discovery of the periodic table. But it is only a Euclid, a Newton, a Mendeleur come along with a from the moment when system energies that a subject has a well-defined existence, that it can be treated as a unity, that it can possess a method of its own. 2mist there came be shown

Now it is easy enough to discorn in the writings of Anselm and of the twelfth-century theologians a nest of antinomies that centre round the couplets, grace and freedom, faith and reason, to make the very conception of these terms paradoxical and to render an attempt at formulating the theological enterprise either heretical or incoherent. From about the year 1230 these hitherto hopeless problems vanish; theology becomes able to conceive itself, to distinguish ) its field from that of philosophy and of other disciplines, to tackle particular questions in the light of a total viewpoint. The key discovery was the recognition of what is named the supernatural order but, as the word, supernatural, in ordinary sometime English usage, has a connotation of the irrational, I had best parse to indicate its meaning. The fundamental notion regards imery parso to indicate that the emphasis lide, not on-

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pause to indicate that the primary emphasis lies, not on the word, supernatural, but on the word, order. Things are ordered, when they are intelligibly related, and so there is an order inasmuch as there is a domain of intelligible relations. The discovery of a supernatural order was the discovery of a domain of intelligible relations proper to theology. Just natural as Galiles Newton discovered that laws reduced to a system of their own, mechanics, and not as Galileo had thought to a pre-existing sytem, geometry, just as Mendeleev discoverning an order to which chemical entities reduced, indxingrate defined the field of chemistry, so too, when Aquinas was still atural is that , of the sugern a boy theology found itself. Christian theology has to deal not only is the gift from God with the gift of God, where the gift to Actually from God, but more basically the gift is God. It is a transcendent gift, and utterly free, not only in itself, but also in its whole retinue of consequences and implications. Knowing of it is a faith that is above reason, possessing it is a grace that is above nature, acting on it is a charity that is above good will, with a merit that is above human deserts. Christian fellowship 1s a band that transcends family and state, and Christian understanding grasps the convergence of lines on a focus

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that is mystery.

The thirteenth century was not content with this master stroke. The discovery of what theology is about implied for theology a definite place in the total field of **GARTATION** knowledge. Pheology is concerned with God and with all things in their relation to God. But while for Bonaventure created things function as symbols that

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is a bond, transcending family and state, that in the fulness of time was established when God sent his Son that we might have the adoptions of sons and, x to show that we are sons, the sent mix Spirit of his Son, crying out in our hearts, Abba, Father. Contectanteneoustandingymin why hearts abba, with in summany many standing of sons and a state of the sons and the sons and a state of t

There is a further aspect to this realization of my second rule, <u>Understand systematically</u>. The natural objective of our intellectual desire to know is the concrete universe. Theology can **shy** succeed as a systematic understanding, only if it is assigned a determinate position in the totality of human knowledge with determinate relations to all other branches. This further step was taken by Aquinas. Where Bonaventure had been content to think of this world and all it contains only as symbols that lead the mind ever up to God, Aquinas took over the physics, biology, psychology, not symbols but and metaphysics of Aristotle to acknowledge, natural realities and corresponding departments of natural and human science.

My third rule was, <u>Reverse counter-positions</u>, and it inmediated and the translated into theological perses by adverting to the so-called Augustinian reaction against *stat reaction*. Aristotelianism. In essen ce, it was an acceptance of *stat the ancient*. Aristotelian logic, but a rejection x of <u>a contents</u> pagan's views on science and philosophy. Theology was to be pure. In the hands of Duns Scotus and of William of Ockham it quickly became very purely logical and, while logic is a valid systematic ideal, its atmosphere is too thin to support life. The vagaries of fourteenth and fifteenth century Scholasticism are a long series of illustrations of the

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counter-position that would have, certituide and rigour genvelingensemweith where vortion whas know vanderstanding and therefore brushed aside the uncertainties and the apparently haphazard process of coming to understand.

My fourth rule was, <u>Develop</u> pratix positions. The achievements of the thirteenth century are, not a goal but a starting-point. In particular, it lacked what we call the historical sense, namely, an awareness that concepts are functions of time, that they change and trak develop with every advance of understanding, that they become platitudinous and insignificant by passing through minds that do not understand, that such changes take place in a determinate manner that can be the object of a science. Not only was the sense of history missing in mediaeval thought, but also it happens that stryge subsequent theology has been ever increasingly occupied with an array of questions that maxmaxi arise from a critique of Christian origins and the development of Christian doctrine and Christian thought. What, it will be asked, is the relevance of the rules I have indicated to historical theology?

It is, I think, twofold. There is their adaptation to historical study in general, and on this point I shall not **Life** dwell. There is also their adaptation to historical theology, and how this occurs, perhaps I have **lifest** already indicated. Ther rules seem to immanent in history. I have **unde** illustrated the first from the twolfth century, the second from the thirteenth, the third from the fourteenth, the fourth from a subsequent and still expanding inquiry. At least, I suggest, this gives us a clue and a few further considerations

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will help to determine its significance.

First, I would note a general fact. Historical competence does not suffice to write the history of such a subject as mathematics, or physics, or medicine, of philosophy. If one is ignorant of these subjects, one might meet all the general requirements of historical investigation, but as soon as one turned to what is specifically mathematical or could medical or philosophical, one would be at a loss. One compile mean side the data, but one could not select, emphasize, evaluate, order, judge.

Secondly the reason my knowledge of the subject itself

Secondly, from this general fact one can ascend to its ground. The history of a subject is the history of its development, and the bistory of its development is an abjective and the development of a subject is, so to speak, the objective process of learning by which the subject gradually took shape, progressed, suffer set-backs, any and underwent transformations. To be able to discern that objective process of learning, to appreciate what was known and what was lacking at each stage of the process, to determine accurately what t were the strokes that moved the process forward, and what were the oversights that delayed, it is nessed any one has to have a thorough grasp of the subject itself.

Thirdly, general methodical rules for the advance of any subject, if valid, hold not only for the future but also for the past. They will be immahent in history. In similar general Subject will also be immahent in the history of that subject.

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the past. For such general rules axexamply, if truly general, merely make explicit, conscious, deliberate, the native process of learning of the human mind. Hence, even when they were not explicit, none the less they were operative. It is in this sense that the rules are immanent in history, virtue of the and it is in the sense, sense that the general rules can be assigned their concrete, theological significance by appealing to significant periods in the history of theology.

Fourtaly, I have appealed from explicit rules to a prior implicit operativeness. Now I have to take a parallel step from what becomes explicit in theology to what was implicit before theology. Theology is faith in quest of understanding. But, the understanding that theology seeks is systematic, and the faith that proceeds precedes theology is not without understanding. What is understood systematically But the earlier understanding in theology, was understood previously but in another mode, of understanding, in the mode of intersubjectivity, of symbolic apprehension, of commony sense. Nor is the theologian ignorant of those modes. He was a Christian before he was a theologian Even if he teaches potential theologian a theologian. If he teaches theology, then he is engaged in making Christians into theologians. If he preaches what he has learnt from theology, then he is engaged in transforming what he understands systematically into the use more immediate modes of intersubjectivity, symbol, and common sense. Hence, just as previously I have argued that to write the history of theology one must be not only a historian but also a theologian, so now I should say that to write the history of Christian doctrine one must be not only a historian and a theologian but also a theologian familiar with the

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process of transformation that occurs when one moves from one mode of understanding to another.

Fifthly, how does the theologian acquire familiarity with this process? There are two steps: first, one grasps the general notion; secondly, one sees it operative in the manifest turning-points in the history of Christian doctrine.

The general notion may be illustrated by our apprehension Of space. Wassean to begin from a kinasstastis of space. Thus, our initial apprehension of space seems to be kinaesthetic; it involves a coordinate system in which up and down, front and back, right and left, have felt, qualitative differences it sorver us well for the all our qualitative differences; it is an apprehension that serves us well in all our bodily movements. But it is not an apprehension that can bear the weight of a theory about the universe; for it implies that, if the earth were a sphere, then people at the antipodes would fall into the sky; and so when we attempt to think about the universe, we have to leave aside notions adapted for more immediate and quite differnt ends. Another illustration is supplaied by the intersubjective mode of understanding: within its proper limits it is both legitmate and necessary; but to attempt to apprehend the universe through the intersubjective mode results in a mythical personification of everything, where, of course, personification means, not a figure of speech that presupposes some prior literal mode of meaning, but rather the prior, literal mode of apprehension itstelf.

Once one has grasped the general nature of transformations from one mode of understanding to another, one can turn to the beginnings of speculative thought in the Christian tradition.

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They are not hard to find. The fourth century was in an uproar over one word, <u>homoousios</u>. The meaning of that word is not to be sought in intersubjectivity, in symbolic apprehension, in common sense. It is a technical term that, initial states that, of itself, announces the emergence of some type of systematic thinking. As one might expect, there were represented all shades of opinion about it. Even its most staughch defender, Athanasius, regarded it as no better than a regrettable necessity. Not only were there fifty years of controversy after Nicaea, but also there had been a problem long before Nicaea. One can see it take successively different forms in Justin, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origin, Novatian, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Dionysius of Rome.

I have indicated one instance of a shift **nf** in the mode of understanding. But there are others. Something similar took place at Chalcedon with antecedents and consequents extending over centuries. Something similar began with the condemnation of Pelagius at Carthage. Something similar happened when twelfth-century theologians conceived sacraments of angle, and of efficiency. in terms of grace, and of instrumental caugality. In each of these instances, and there are others, one can study empirically the nature of a shift from the intersubjective and commonsense mode of understanding towards and the systematic mode.

But a further and more relevant observation seems in order. Newton insisted, <u>hypotheses non fingo</u>. In a sense his claim was false for the theory of universal gravitation is a theory, a hypothesis. But in another sense his claim was completely justified, for Newton's theory had added to observable data nothing but their **funtalli** immanent intelligibility, their

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verifiable law. As he did not attempt to determine final causes, so he refused to usi assign the efficient cause that made bodies fall. He was content with an inner functional verifield relationship that was to be observed int the observable and measurable features of any local movement and could be extraph polated successfully to the planets. That functional relationship, on the theoretical side, served to define a whole class of movements and so it opened the way to the discovery of quite different classes; and, on the practical side, it enabled man to become an efficient cause and to use natural forces for the attainment of human ends.

I think there is some similarity in the procedure I immediately have indicated. There is not raised, the question of the final cause, whether systematic understanding is a good thing, or whether Nicaea and Chalcedon reached truth. Such questions are not questions for understanding but for judgement, and their treatment comes under the heading of positions and counter-positions. There is not raised immediately the question of the efficient cause: sources and influences have their significance in historical investigation; but I think one first should know what is taking place in the product before one begins to inquire what causes it to take place in the preicise manner that can be observed; and, besides, the question of sources opens the way to an almost unending series of hypotheses that inevitably take the theologian out of the field in which and he he alone is competent into the excessively large investigations concerned with the broad stream of human thought, human literature, and interacting cultures and civilizations. Similarly, there are not introduced the workd and somewhat indeterminate entities Joannine, named biblical, evangelical, Pauline, Palestinian, Hellenistic,

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I have been indicating that my general rules, pressing because they are general, are no less applicable to historical than to speculative theology. But I should note, as well, that because they are rules, because they are dynamic, they serve to unite historical and speculative theology as past process and present term. Historical or positive theology is concerned with the becoming of speculative; and speculative theology is the product of historical process. To add positive to speculative theology is not to add something quite extrinsic; it is not to add a new and autonomous department that goes its own independent way. Rather, I should say, theology historical theology is speculative Atrong to becoming conscious its of its pashmand origins and development and, at the same time, speculative theology is just the contemporary stage of the movement that historical theology examines and analyses. To overlook or to in reject that unity has, I believe, only one result: on the one hand, historical theology becomes lost in the wilderness of universal history; it coases to be a distinct discipline with a proper field and competence; and on the other hand speculative theology showeds are Church Domatics; it gives up the effort to understand, to corve forth in its quest for understanding; and it attempts. to take over some part in the teaching office of the Saruroh, the entry

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one result. On the onte hand, historical theology becomes lost in the wilderness of universal history; it ceases to be a distinct deiscipline with a proper field and competence of its own; for it is only from speculative theology that historical can learn just what its precise field is and what are the inner laws of that field in their general manifestations. On the other hand, speculative theology withers away; for its proper task is, not just understanding, but understanding the faith; its positive basis is historical and without that basis it may retire into an ivory tower to feed itself with subtle memories, it may merge with the general stream of philosophic thought, or it may attempt to take over, modestly or despotically, the teaching office of the Church, but the one thing necessary it cannot do, continue the today the process begun so long ago of adding to fx living faith the dimension of systematic understanding.

There remains my fifth rule, Accept the responsibility of judgement. As it is the supreme rule in any science, so its adaptation in theology is the most significant. For theology presupposes faith and, for the Cateolic, faith includes judgements. It is an acceptance of truths revealed by God and taught by his Church, not because we see them to be true apart from that witness, but because we are ready to enlarge our notion of truth itself, because we are ready to take as the measure of truth that is truth even for us, not what we can understand in this life, but what God understands.

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This view of faith transforms the meaning of the first rule, Understand. In other fields, understanding begins not from truths but from data. It is uncerstanding that will promote data to the level of truth, and the truth to be attained is no guiding presence but an ideal whose precise features are not to be discerned. In theology, things are otherwise. There are, indeed, data that area just data as in the other mix sciences: most exegetical and historical questions are of that character. But there are also truths, and understanding them involves a reversal of roles; where in other fields understanding precedes and determines truth, in theology understanding follows and is determined.

Now this reversal of roles gives rise to special techniques that centre about the true proposition, the logic of presuppositions and implications, and the semantics or metaphysics of meaning. My one observation is that they are techniques; they serve to chart the path of efforts to understanding; but they armdomman are not ends; they provide the areal scaffolding needed to build the theological edifice; but they are not the edifice itself, the understanding sought by faith; they serve to delimit and to define what is to be understand, but the understanding is something more. It lies in the realm of analogy and in the intelligible interlocking of the truths of faith.

The adaptation of my second rule, <u>Understand systematically</u>, would have to do with the character of the intelligibility to be reached in theology. It is too would be concerned with the definition of limits and the indication of possibilities and, while highly relevant to method, it would, prove to be of a highly technical and specialized character.

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As the Catholic view of faith makes theological understanding a grasp of converging lines that focus upon uncomprehended mystery, so too it places human wisdom and judgement within a contect of communicated divine wisdom and divine judgement. As the Catholic theologian accepts a divine revelation, so also he as believes in its providential preservation. None the less, this does not liberate him from the also accepting the responsibility of making judgement soft his own. We learn from Geoffrey

of Fontaines that, in the 1290's, the theological students of at the University of Paris believed they would be excommunicate in if they read the writings of Six Thomas Aquinas. In 1323, forty-nine years after his death, Thomas Aquinas became St. Thomas & Aquinas. Two years à afterwards the Archbishop of Paris officially removed the ban against him. Clearly, if today Aquinas holds a preeminent position in Catholic theology, it is persues he had the courage teracoept the responsibility paking basic judgements on the basis of what he understood because he had the daring that is needed to understand and' and the courage to make far-reaching judgements on the basis of his daring understanding. Moreover, if the decisions Aquinas made were momentous, the element of decisiveness Ythe is not removed when one turns from man of genius to the ordinary honest worker. Everyone engaged in theology, as something more than an exercise in repetitiveness, has to make decisions; and the point to my fifth rule is simply that he would be deceiving himself if he thought that there existed some aubumatic technique on which he could shift the burden.

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