

Report on Lonergan's course 'De Methodo Theologiae' Spring 1963, using notes compiled by Armando Bravo, edited and translated by Robert M. Doran

**February 8: 54200D0L060.**

The course began on 8 February with a discussion of the question, Does there exist a method of theology? It would seem perhaps that there is not, since theology is not one science but a combination or mixture of sciences, and so there cannot be one method but there must be a combination or mixture of methods. Theology today is a combination of literary-historical studies of the scriptures, the councils, documents, pontifical statements, the Fathers, the medieval, modern, and contemporary theologians, the liturgy, Christian art, the sociology of religion, philosophical, psychological, phenomenological, social studies; there is the faith which believes, and there are the mixed conclusions that take premises from faith and premises from reason to yield theological conclusions, where the first premise is from faith, and the second from literary-historical studies. Reference is made to Descamps's article in *Sacra Pagina*, vol. 1, pp. 132-57, frequently referenced by Lonergan in these years. Thus, it would seem, the method of theology is learned principally by learning the method of historical-literary, philosophical, phenomenological, social, etc., studies, and by adding what pertains to faith.

But, L responds, everything depends on the conception one has of theology and of its principle. If things are learned by enumerating authors and by taking one's bearings on the basis of literary-historical studies, prescindng from the pre-predicative, pre-conceptual, pre-judicial realm, then one's principle is not real, that is, it is not the subject operating in such and such a manner; rather it is logical (the premises) or the given (the theological loci, fonts); and since there are many premises, loci, fonts, so also both theology and theology's method is a mixture; there does not exist one relatively autonomous science and method. On the other hand, another conception of theology is not only possible but probable, and in accord with it there would exist a proper method for theology. Reference is made to DB 1795 (DS 3015) to argue that the principle is distinct from the object, which includes everything that is known by reason and everything that is believed by faith; and from 1796 (3016) that the principle of theology is *ratio per fidem illustrata*, faith illumined by reason.

Attending to this real principle excludes any extrinsicism regarding objective truth. Truth is not given apart from an affirming mind. There is only one eternal truth, that is, divine truth. Truth is not given apart from the subject pondering the evidence, rationally judging, reasonably believing. Concepts detached from this principle and floating as it were in the air are either Platonic Ideas or something derived from things without the mediation of intelligence. For every stage in the progress of understanding, there are concepts that express understanding, and so there is a history of concepts of the same thing, and there is an understanding of this history and a crisis of this history. There arise real problems to be solved by us, not simply pointing out and blaming the errors of our adversaries.

Theology is threefold: natural theology, the theology of us on the way, and theology of our eternal homeland. There is theology as a particular science and theology as wisdom. The object of theology as a particular science is God and everything that is ordered to God. The principle is the natural light of reason strengthened by the light of faith or by the light of glory. As for

mediation, there is the mediation of creatures (the old creature), and that of Christ and the Church (the new creature), and there is the immediacy of the *theologia patriae*.

As for the principle and proper object of theology: the proper principle is reason illumined by faith. Reason is the fundamental natural tendency or dynamism that intends being, that is, everything about everything. The light of faith extends the range of this natural principle. Under 'proper object' Lonergan lists three items: (1) There is *intelligentia mysteriorum*, the understanding of mysteries achieved by one who inquires soberly, reverently, perseveringly; this understanding is not reached by reason alone, since we are dealing with mysteries; and it is in process, precisely since it is understanding [i.e., not judgment]. It is by analogy with what is known naturally; it is not a new mode of understanding or one through phantasms proper to the mysteries. It entails the connections of the mysteries with one another and with our ultimate end, but not connections that are naturally known. (2) It also is true that to understand a doctrine is to understand the history of the doctrine. Thus DB 2314 [DS 3886] on the most noble task of theology; thus the understanding of the process; there is the dogmatic end, namely, that one oneself understands, and there is the apologetic end, that one helps others to understand. And (3) there is the growth in understanding also spoken of in DB 2314 [DS 3886].

## **February 12: 54300D0L060**

If theology has its own proper method, it is not just a mixture from other sciences. But this entails withdrawing *from* extrinsicism with regard to truth and concepts and *to* the pre-conceptual, pre-judicial, pre-predicative, that is, to understanding. Then it will have its own principle, which is not reason and not faith, but reason illumined by faith. And it will have its own object, namely, the mysteries as to be understood (and understood not just with a catechetical understanding). This is a function of reason inquiring soberly, reverently, perseveringly. But the understanding achieved will be thematic. The understanding to which we appeal is known by experience, as are hearing and seeing. 'Thematically' here means (a) systematically, as in *Insight*, historically, as in *Verbum*, and as systematic application, as in *Divinarum personarum*, and with an application to the evolution of dogma, as in *De Deo Trino* [i.e., the 1961 'Pars analytica,' which is what BL is referring to here].

This understanding grows in two ways. DB 1796 refers to systematic understanding by analogy and by the connections of the mysteries with one another. DB 1800 speaks of understanding, knowledge, wisdom growing with regard to the doctrine of the faith, in individuals and in everyone, in the whole church, and by stages over the ages. But also it is to be kept in mind that to understand a doctrine and to understand the history of a doctrine are reciprocally related. Where the process is understood, one can proceed from any given age or situation into any other.

Again, the proper principle and object of theology: the proper principle is reason illumined by faith. Reason is the subject as inquiring ('What is it?') and reflecting (Is it? Is it so?). It is the subject as oriented to being (everything about everything), the one, true, good. Faith corresponds to 'we believe everything revealed by God to be true,' whether this be that which could have been naturally known or that which could not be known by us had it not been divinely revealed. Faith is not a new faculty or potency, but a determination within the intellect regarding an object

in being. Reason illumined by faith is not partly reason separated off partly faith separated off but a new and composite principle.

The proper object is, first, an understanding of the mysteries, which is attained insofar as reason illumined by faith inquires soberly, reverently, perseveringly. This understanding differs from the understanding constitutive of faith itself and from catechetical understanding. As such an understanding it is distinct from faith, and as an understanding of mysteries it is distinct from reason. Faith adds to natural reason truths whose 'exquisite' understanding theology as a particular *science* adds to what is naturally known, and whose order with other truths theology adds as *wisdom*. This understanding does not occur through new, infused species but by analogy with what is naturally known. It is not through species proportionate to the object of faith. Thus it is said to be 'obscure.' But this obscurity does not remove or do away with understanding, which includes inverse insight.

Second under 'proper object' is the statement that understanding a doctrine and understanding the history of the doctrine are mutually dependent sets of operations that illuminate one another. Thus DB 1800: understanding, knowledge, and wisdom grow in the course of the ages; and DB 2314 regarding the most noble task of the theologian. Whoever does not understand mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc., cannot write a history of these disciplines or discover the principles or connections. And whoever does not understand the history of a doctrine cannot exactly grasp what needs to be developed, what is already complete, or a connection of the elements. Thus we are speaking of an understanding of the process itself with its many internal intelligible connections which can be ordered in several ways: in accord with what is first dogmatically, or what is first apologetically, or first in terms of the science that is to be further developed and perfected, or first in regard to a controversy, or first in regard to preaching.

[Theological mediation can be considered materially or formally. *Mediatio materialiter* is contained in this set of notes, and *mediatio formaliter* in the next (54400D0L060).]

In mediation considered materially the principle (reason illumined by faith) is applied, and through it theology proceeds to the object. The *medium* considered materially is twofold: (A) first, Christ and the Church, the body of Christ, which provide the object to be understood; and second (B) the revealed, preached, handed down, and declared word of God, which supplies the logical premises.

- (1) A includes (B), since what Christ and the Church are cannot be known with the word, and what the word of God is cannot be known without Christ and the church – and not only without the word about the Church, but without the very sign itself lifted up among the nations, and not only without the word about Christ, but without the historical, crucified, and risen Christ himself.
- (2) Again, (A) adds a social, cultural, and historical context or surrounding (*ambiens*) to which theology necessarily turns in order to understand the word. Language, literature, and doctrine are not subsistent realities. They do not exist except within a community or society. They are not understood unless one takes on the mentality of the community.

And modern linguistic studies are concerned not with written words but with living speech.

- (3) A also adds other sources, other determinants
  - (a) such as dogmatic facts; the sensible aspect of Christ crucified, of the Word become flesh; an artistic aspect; a personal, intersubjective, symbolic aspect.
  - (b) and an ordering in the social, as the theologian subject to the magisterium, to the legal requirements of ‘ne doceat.’
  
- (4) A opens the way to full mediation, the full function of theology as a wisdom that proceeds logically in accord with understanding. As the word is included in the Church, so the Church is included in the world; there is a dialectic between the Church and the world. And theology is one science among many, and must take its place in relation to sociological, historical, psychological, etc., studies.

### **54400D0L060 – February 15, 1963**

[As *mediatio materialiter* was considered in the previous entry so *mediatio formaliter* is the first consideration here.]

We have the material object, the proper principle, the proper object, and mediation. When the principle is applied to the medium, there arise questions. When one proceeds from the principle through the medium to the object, there occur responses to the questions.

The medium is given. It is that about which one asks questions and in which one initially understands and in which one verifies. It is datum that antecedes the questions and the scientific answers, and that does not depend on the questions and the scientific responses.

Thus there arises the distinction of the empirical and the speculative. The empirical: there are no questions without the data about which one asks and to which one adds to fictive data. What one adds to the data is understanding. It is in the data that the understanding is verified. Hypotheses that cannot be verified are not scientific hypotheses. The speculative: that which is not governed by empirical criteria, such as ‘pure reason.’

Next there is considered the division of the empirical sciences. First, there is natural science. Here the datum is the sensible qua sensible and constituted by the very fact of being given, sensed, or appearing, and by that alone. Next, there is human science, where the datum is either sensible or conscious and is constituted both by being given but also by the understanding with which it is already informed. The data of the human sciences are already included within a psychological, social, cultural, historical, religious field. But truth is not included in their ‘formality’ as data. It is true that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Paul understood in such and such a way, but what they understood can be either true or false. Again, there is theological science, where the formality of the datum is not only that it is given and that it is understood, but also that it is true. And from this there arise theological *loca*. Finally, there is transcendental science, where the principle is applied to the principle itself, and there arise a theory of science, a theory

of methods, the objective theories of gnoseology, epistemology, ontology, logic. Transcendental science is at work with respect both to natural reason and reason illumined by faith.

[A further discussion of natural science]: The data are sensibles as such. They are constituted by the very fact that they are given. They do not depend on any understanding, clarification, hypothesis, theory. In themselves they can be seen, heard, etc., by anyone. For example, even if one does not understand a science, one can still see where a needle stands, a column of mercury, the color of , a point of light. But natural science is not restricted to sensible data that are just spontaneously given. The data can be artificially, experimentally produced. Nor is it restricted to sensible data that can be observed without using instruments. Many very powerful instruments have been added to procedures of natural science. Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. In natural science that 'mode' is not one's passions, nor is reception achieved in any act whatsoever. The scientist is not a human being as social or as practical or as aesthetic or as mystical, but a human being as totally devoted to the theoretic goal as was Thales in his wonder at the stars. Natural science reaches its object not through the data alone or through understanding in the data [as in human science] but through understanding that begins from the data and is verified in the data. The object is being. And one does not proceed to the object without some a priori. The a priori is the very subject inquiring, observing, understanding, and verifying. In every science one moves from an a priori from above and from the data from below, employing a scissors action. The a priori of natural science evolved historically and develops [followed by what seems to be 'posse ipsum, sunt implicationes / mediis cognoscuntur / efficacia applicantur – but that is probably not correct since it doesn't seem to make any sense].

### **54500D0L060 – Feb 19 1963**

In natural science the object is not intelligent. There is sought an understanding of what is not intelligent. In the human sciences the object is intelligent, and there is sought an understanding of not that understanding which the intelligent object itself has.

For example, a businessman understands an abundance of materials, say, of grain. He understands his status in the business and among merchants, and he understands other businessmen who are future buyers. But an economist seeks an understanding of economic reality, not in the way a businessman does. He should understand businessmen, etc., but to understand them as businessmen is not his science. He seeks an understanding of the entire process, one that relies on systematic reasons and universal causes. So there are economic systems – mercantilism, the physiocrats, mercantile mechanism (Smith, Ricardo, the Manchester School), direct economics, socialism. These theories are understood, listened to, discussed, expounded among economists. They undergo vulgarization. They have an influence on the common mentality, not because of their theoretical perspectives or in their totality, but fragmentarily, just as they are in fact understood: more or less, and depending on their utility or their advantages for individuals and group. In this way the human situation, the object to be investigated and understood, itself changes. There occurs *die Wendung zur Idee*, which is a universal phenomenon. And this change in the situation and in the object has an influence on economic science. Some principles and laws remain as they are. Others are purified and more exactly put forth. Others are eliminated by the events themselves or because they are erroneous

or because of new techniques of solving problems. [A few Latin words at the bottom of this page are not clear.]

There is a twofold understanding in the human sciences. There is (A) the understanding characteristic of the object of the science, that is, common sense, *Verstehen als existentielle*. And there is the understanding (B) of the subject of the science, and this is what the scientist is searching for. There is a mutual influence between these two, for (C) in the very object of the science there is *die Wendung zur Idee*, and (D) in the subject of the science there is something like an experimental correction, in that history creates its own experiments. Historians write about A, B, C, and D, and there are historical crises regarding A, B, C, and D.

A parenthetical transition to theology: (A) the tranquil possession of the truth, the understanding of the faith which is communicated socially and visibly; (B) authors, tendencies, schools; (C) a great dispute, a council, from which there emerges a change in the concrete situation: e.g., Byzantine liturgy replete with the Trinitarian formulas; (D) a new generation of authors, tendencies and schools in theology itself and in the history of dogma; (E) and the crisis with respect to A, B, C, and D ever since Petavius. This schema is itself something a priori, heuristic, and evolving.

What is investigated concerning 'man':

(1) the meaning of life; the human intentional order as regards that which is intended, the act of intending (sense apprehension, intelligence, appetitive), and the ones who intend;

(2) again the meaning of life that

(a) is undifferentiated, total, superdeterminate, symbolic: G. Durand, Freud-Jung-Binswanger, Eliade; and

(b) is differentiated, as there is a transition to a concrete mode of living and to actions that are to be directed, regulated, informed, repressed; the family, customs, society, education, status, law, economy, technology; and

(c) is cultivated for its own sake in the arts, myth, languages and letters, religions, in history, philosophy, the sciences, theology.

(3) There is a distinction between the undifferentiated and total meaning and the differentiated and specialized one:

(a) the differentiated becomes general, common, insofar as in some way there occurs *die Wendung zur Idee*; and insofar as there develops reflection, crisis, expression (the social and historical aspect);

(b) it [the distinction] corresponds to a twofold human tendency: to the whole 'man,' who develops first and more efficaciously and commonly in animality and sensibility, and to the intelligent, rational, and moral person who intends the universe (everything, being), who distinguishes, and who grasps the relations of the parts.

(c) Linguistic meaning fluctuates under a twofold impulse or influence: (the depth of undifferentiated consciousness, the real which as such is ineffable, confused, obscure; and intelligence distinguishing and ordering, which is ideal, and is almost not attained. A variation of meaning like the continuous spectrum of colors; Greek and classical rhetoric as rationalization of facts, literary genres: the question thus posed is involved in the same error.

## 54600D0L040 – February 22, 1963

Regarding the six steps that we distinguished [in 54500D0L060], A is to B and C is to D as the implicit is to the explicit, *actus exercitus* to *actus signatus*, the *vécu* to the *thématique*, *verstehen* to *erklären*, the *existentiell* to the *existential*, life to theory, experience to experiments, the practical-dramatic subject to the theoretical subject, the perceivable world to the intelligible world. E (historians) combine A and C into a history of religion, of culture, of economic life, etc. They combine B and D into a history of doctrine. And they combine A and C, B and D into the total movement. And with F we encounter a crisis with regard to the first history, the second history, and the third. Again, we have here a heuristic structure, telling us what is to be expected and anticipating a differentiation of methods. The a posteriori in this structure is from the fact of investigations, and these lead to the improvement of methods over the course of time. All this work becomes an a priori in relation to subsequent investigations.

What is investigated? Meaning. (1) The formal element is the ‘intentional’: ‘meaning’ corresponding to what is intended, to the very intending itself, and to the ones who intend: both sense and intellect both apprehending and desiring. (2) There is meaning as undifferentiated, total, superdetermined. *Undifferentiated*: distinctions are lacking between (a) sacred and profane – everything sacred is profaned and everything profane is sacralized; (b) the individual and the community – the individual does not think, judge, choose, act except as part of the community and within traditional structures; (c) the dramatic-practical and the theoretical – a theoretical interest is minimal, but myth and magic satisfy it in the dramatic and practical realms. *Total*: because distinctions are lacking there is a tendency to the whole, to everything, to being. *Superdetermined*: meaning is not restricted to one determinate meaning; thus it signifies this determinate thing in such a way that it also and simultaneously signifies a second and a third. (3) This indeterminate meaning occupied the whole life of man increasingly as we go back to the origins. Still, it is not eliminated in times of great culture and civilization either in the multitude or even in the educated. It can be overlooked, as in rationalism, but then it is just devalorized, not eliminated. M. Eliade, *Images and Symbols*. ‘Paradise Lost’ has degenerated into South Pacific, and the goddesses Artemis, Aphrodite, and Athena into movie stars. (4) The character of this undifferentiated meaning: symbolic (Durand), intersubjective (Scheler; Freud-Jung-Binswanger-Cruchon); incarnate (Marcel, Olier); artistic (Langer, Huyghe).

Regarding the symbolic as in Durand, there exist dominant reflexes – equilibrium, swallowing, mating – to which there are associated images, affects, values, and to which almost everything gets associated by likeness and analogy. St George and the dragon: St George represents all the good elements: light, erect position, sitting on the horse, armed, master of himself and of the horse; he does not fear, he is ‘dexter et habilis’; he proceeds against evil. The dragon represents all the objects of fear, horror, repulsion, contempt. Jonah and the whale: Jonah descends, is swallowed, but emerges none the worse after three days and three nights. The whale again is a monster, but is euphemized. Tao, Tree, Swastika [other examples of symbols?]

Intersubjective: While Aquinas speaks of how the hand spontaneously moves to protect the head, Lonergan found the same reaction in himself with regard to another. When he was walking up to the Borghese gardens, a mother and her small child were coming down; the child began to fall, and automatically, L reached out. There exists a level of experience where ‘I’ and ‘you’ have not

yet been distinguished. The laughter of others makes us laugh; weeping makes us sad; horror makes us fearful.

Two headings are left without comment: the incarnate, and combinations.

### **54700D0L060 – March 1 1963**


Theology's proper principle is reason illumined by faith. Its object is an understanding of the mysteries. This emerges *in fieri* by the interplay of dogma and the sources, and *in facto esse* in systematics. The mediation is through Christ and the Church. The proper method has Christ and the Church as the given, and the science is not a natural science nor a human science but a theological science.

Again, the structure of the object and the a priori functions in the human sciences can be lined up in the six points already seen: (A) experience and understanding, the *vécu*, *actus exercitus*; (B) authors, tendencies, schools: experiment, explication, the *thématique*, *actus signatus*; (C) *die Wendung zur Idee*; (D) a new question of authors, tendencies, and schools; (E) the histories of A, B, C, and D; and (F) the crisis of things historical.

Again too, undifferentiated, total, superdeterminate meaning characterizes constitutive symbols, intersubjective symbols, incarnate symbols, artistic symbols. Differentiated meaning is linguistic: the indicative or the constitutive or both the indicative and the constitutive. The indicative is distinguished into the grammatical and the dictionary: the grammatical covers nouns, pronouns, adjectives; verbs, adverbs; conjunctives, subjunctives, prepositions. The constitutive: the meaning of life over against the absurd, the struggle for existence and the struggle for meaning; the meaning of love by which the beloved is loved; the meaning of the family by which this family lives; the meaning of democracy by which this democracy is a democracy; the meaning of religion in a religious person. This constitutive meaning develops from the global through differentiation to integration and organicity in the individual, in a given culture, in the human race. It is rooted in intentional human nature. It is communicated through the common life, education. It is exhibited through humane letters and liberal arts. It is differentiated in accord with the individuality of a person, a people, a history.

Next there is the differentiation of consciousness itself. [I use here the diagram transcribed from Lonergan's notes by Armando Bravo.]





1 the visible world,  
world of community

2 the world of theory,  
System

12 the systematic exigence

3 the world of interiority (Hegel)

23 the critical exigence

3<sup>0</sup>1 the methodical exigence

3<sup>0</sup>2 the problem of integration

3<sup>0</sup>4 differentiated consciousness

4 the sacred differentiated and mediated by 123

14 liturgy, Church

24 theology

34 mysticism

Not simultaneous in many spheres – free oscillation = integration

Next, undifferentiation and differentiations

There is a distinction between meaning that is undifferentiated, meaning that is differentiated in ordinary language, and meaning that is differentiated in technical language: lux, penumbra, umbra, tenebrae (light, penumbra, shadow, darkness).

[Marginal: Langer 242 ff. I presume the reference is to *Feeling and Form*, which picks up several pages into a chapter entitled 'Life and Its Image,' with discussion of Freud.]

Freud (1) that which can be shown [but is not appropriate] darstellbar. (2) Superdetermination: opposites regarding the same thing are not excluded. Ambivalence: love and hate, joy and sadness, desire and fear. (3) Because opposites are not excluded, there is no negation in the proper sense of the term. Poets negate, but what is negated is evoked. Because it is negated, what is evoked is ambient, standing around, indeed (tenue pallidum). (4) This is not a matter of logical argumentation. There is repetition of various kinds. 'I have said it thrice. What is said three times is true' (Lewis Carroll). (5) condensation: several objects are simultaneously ? (6) Binswanger: preformation. *Traum und Existenz*, dreams of the morning. (7) Homology (Jung, Eliade): (a) hallucinatory dreams; (b) bronze age, iron age, primitive; (c) hermetic; (d) alchemists: Chinese, Indian, European; (8) conflict: C. Odier, *Les deux sources consciente & inconsciente de la morale*, Geneve, 1943.

Distinction of meaning, linguistic differentiation and technical differentiation.

(1) Flat earth: space as [pondero meo cogitem?]

(2) Newton:  $f = ma$   $f_{vis}$  (real)

Today:  $f(x, y, z, t) = ma$

(3) Philosophy: if a cognitive act is similar to ocular vision, what is necessarily valid is per se known; but if it is dissimilar, what is necessarily invalid is per se known.

General points:

(1) the more one approaches the elementary and undifferentiated, the more there is attained a universal language, symbols that are intelligible to all, even the learned; (2) elementary undifferentiated meaning is not at all to be considered in a materialistic fashion. 'Light' does not mean 'merely material light.' This presupposes the development of a differentiation. The accusation of Socrates, *tên selênên gên*, signifies more a spiritual light than a material one, even though this could not have been said in any reflex manner at that time. (3) Classicism: The Greeks (distinguished?) natural and rhetorical (poetic, story) speech, and proper and transferred meaning. As far as literary genres are concerned, for the classicist mind, *either* someone says what he means *or* he is using a literary genre. We all use literary genres at all times. Proper meaning is not something abstract, *per se notum*, but is that which is more common and familiar in some determinate cultural and social milieu. (4) The transcendental aspect: the interpreter can reach to the mind of another to the extent that one (a) either experiences similar things or can imagine them as experienced, (b) can understand the 'thing,' the mode of understanding, (c) can grasp judgments and decisions. (On the written page) nothing more is given than black marks on white paper.

### **54800D0L060 – March 3**

Human science entails an *Aufhebung* that is not to be conceived as total or principal [RD: is this in contrast with Hegel?]. Again, the six steps: A, B, C, D, E, F. [Marginal comment: As for objectivity, constitutive meaning is what makes human reality, and there is objectivity involved: with regard to the family, mores, society, education, the state, the law, the economy, technology.]

Undifferentiated meaning is more conformed to the laws of imagination and affect. Differentiated meaning is more conformed to the laws of logic.

Classicism: there exists a normal mixture. One uses nouns, verbs in their proper sense, includes expressions in phrases in an obvious manner, and thinks in a normal way. There also exist mixtures that depart from the normal. Expressions are used in a transferred way and are composed according to some literary genre. 'Literary genre' means an exception or quasi-exception. Either one says what one means (normal speech) or one says one thing and means another, and that is literary genre.

Romanticism: the laws of imagination and affect are vindicated, and stable forms are rejected.

Historicism: classicism is parochial. Each place and time has its own 'normative' mixture, and other places and times have their own 'normative' mixture. And we all use literary genres.

Briefly some judgments about classicism and historicism. Historicism attends well to concrete data, and is open to everything. But it inevitably tends toward relativism: Troeltsch. Classicism does well to want to salvage reason, absolutes, universal realities, in human life. But it uses a medium that is not suited to this end. Not only does it not apprehend the concrete data of the past, but also it is blind to the concrete data of the present time. It conceives everything through universal ideals and normative laws, e.g., Mediterranean architecture, symmetry, elementary geometric forms; Gothic vital, asymmetrical, elastic equilibrium.

(1) abstraction: (a) of the part from the whole: a man who lacks an eye or a foot remains a man; (b) of form from matter: of a circle from a circular thing; (c) of an invariant structure and proportion. Abstract proportion and proportion in the concrete are equally understood. Aliud concretum ad subsequens – alia proportio.

Thus: the empirical element – potency – words  
the intelligible element – form – meaning  
the judicial element – act – affirmation, negation

(one knowledge)      (one being)

(2) transcendental method

(a) predicaments: the ten genera of being  
transcendentals: being, one, true, good

(b) the conception of the transcendentals varies: Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Avicenna, Aquinas, Scotus, Kant, Hegel

(c) whence practically everything changes; there is no deductive demonstration of realism or of idealism; premises are either taken in the sense of reality or they are not; if they are, the real and the ideal are not demonstrated but presupposed; if they are not, the real and the ideal are not concluded to.

(d) the more accurately and coherently the transcendental position is formulated, the more easily it is reduced to a fundamental structure of the concrete subject.

(e) it is not difficult to discern in these structures what is normative as well as aberrations and deformations.

More particularly, A [the understanding characteristic of the object of the science, the common sense, *Verstehen* as *existentiale* – cf. ‘Common Sense as Object’] demands constant and intimate familiarity, the assimilation of the understanding of the common sense [of another time and place], and does not admit systematic exposition. It calls for acquiring another language [unclear]. E.g., Albright just by touching fragments and dust from urns at Qumran was able to determine their age. Again, the Oxford and Cambridge dons and Greek composition. Or de la Taille: ‘St Thomas never used such an expression.’ It is as if there is acquired the common sense of another epoch, culture, author. Believe the experts, as long as they don’t disagree. If they disagree, we have *F* [a crisis.]

As regards B (authors, tendencies, schools: experiment, explication, the *thématique*, *actus signatus*). Invenitur quaestio: Quid senserit Thomas de historismo, Scotismo?

The fundamental step is comparative. It corresponds in human science to what measuring is in natural science. Otherwise, what is obvious is overlooked because one has not attended to the data: cf. Columbus and the egg [see *Understanding and Being*, p. 3]. Also, otherwise the differences and connections (complexiones) would not be known, and the questions would not come to light as to how things proceeded from A to not-A, or as to how what are not opposed actually cohere with one another. This is very fruitful. The connections and differences in A lead to connections and differences in B. One author is found to be very intelligent while a whole series of authors is found to be mediocre.

Determination of the vocabulary: Lyonnet, *Biblica* 1945; on a particular work, concordances.

The next step is genetic. The connections that make up A lead to the connections that make up B. E.g., the question is not whether Nicea correctly arrived at homoousion but what precisely happened. Not speculating a priori about causes but studying the texts a posteriori, as in ‘*gratia operans*’ or in the question why the Alexandrians were imbued with Platonism.

[New page] The comparative is the first and fundamental step. What measurement is in natural science comparison is in human science. One does not attend fully and exactly to the data without comparisons. And without comparisons differences are

not known. And where the differences are found, scientific work can begin. Compare this to differential and integral calculus.

Comparison reveals differences: successive. Connections reveal interdependence and organicity: simultaneous.

A particular genetic study (1) is not concerned with whether the process from A to B was taken rightly and truly, but with how it actually happened. How did Aquinas arrive at acknowledging actual grace? Why the movement from the naive realism of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Novatian, to Platonism? The hermeneutic problem: Clement of Alexandria Stromata VIII. Also a particular genetic study (2) moves from connection to connection.

Viewed globally, the genetic moves from differentiation to integration. The differentiation of consciousness: Where the *Wendung zur Idee* has not occurred, there myth and magic flourish. And where there is no turn to interiority (the critical exigence), there is endless and fruitless disputation among systems.

Dialectic arises insofar as the issue is the intelligible, the true, and the good as contrasted with the absurd, the false, and the evil. As far as perennial philosophy is concerned, there are many perennial philosophies. There is perennial empiricism, confined to the data; perennial idealism, confined to the intelligible; and perennial realism, concerned with the true.

**54900D0L060** (March 8)

The lead issue is *E* in the scheme: the histories. Lonergan distinguishes  $E_i$ ,  $E_j$ , and  $E_k$ , where  $E_i$  means the history of the immediate data of everyday life (*A*),  $E_j$  the history of writers, schools, tendencies (*B*), and  $E_k$  the history that integrates these. Under these L writes: *Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, Johannes Kommentar, Theologie der Neuen Testaments*. It is not clear if these are respective examples of  $E_i$ ,  $E_j$ , and  $E_k$ .

$E_j$  is treated first and most extensively in this set of notes. There are degrees of descriptive sciences and degrees of explanatory sciences. Instances of the first: zoology, botany prior to any evolutionary explanation. Instances of the latter are evolution, Newtonian mechanics, Clerk-Maxwell equations, special relativity, quantum theory. So too in human studies. The degrees of descriptive science: there are manuscripts, and there is the question *quis*, that is, the authenticity of their authorship must be determined; the question *quid*, that is, the examination of the

works and a critical text; question *quibus auxiliis*, that is, the sources; the question *cur*, that is, the intention of the work, its occasion, its projected readers; the question *quomodo*, that is, the process of documentation and construction; the question *quando*, that is, the chronology of works.

There are both particular and general instances of such descriptive works. Among the particular is Chenu's *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, where the question is not what Thomas taught but what must be known before one studies Thomas. Examples of the latter are Altaner's *Patrologie* and Fitzmyer-Glanzmann, *Bibliographica scripturistica*.

There are also degrees of explanatory work in such studies. First, there is the discovery of a question, and not of a question imported from outside but one rooted in the data themselves. Second, there is the comparative method that studies connections and genetic sequences. Under this heading are listed

von Rad on the religion of the Old Testament and on covenant;

Georg Windenhall, 'Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East,' *Biblical Archeologist* XXIII (1954) Nos. 2 & 3, with the similarity with the king's covenant with a servant;

the question regarding the sapiential literature, whether it was mere decadence or a new genre

Lyonnet in *Biblica* 1945 115-32 on 'Hellenisme et Christianisme'

Arnou on 'Le Platonisme des Pères, in *DTC*

Spanneut, *Le stoicisme des Pères de l'Église de Clément de Rome a Clément d'Alexandrie* Paris 1957

Daniélou, *La théologie du Judeo-christianisme*, Tournai, 1958, and *Message évangélique & culture hellénistique*, Tournai, 1961, with the disclosure that Middle Platonism mixed Platonic and Stoic influences, so that Justin used Stoic language with a Platonic mindset

Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*; the articles appeared first and are more complete, though the judgment is perhaps less sound (word not clear); here the process is from the rhetoric of St Augustine to habitual and actual grace and to the distinction of the natural and supernatural orders

Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale en Moyen Age* and *Liberte a S. Anselmo ad S. Thomam*.

The connection should be homogeneous, i.e., as regards time and author. Thus with regard to Bouillard's *Conversion & grâce chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, Theologie," Aubier, 1942, Thomas never speaks of an elevation of a faculty to an act prior to justification, whereas all modern theologians acknowledge the

necessity of such an elevation. Therefore, actual grace in the strict sense is not found in the works of Thomas. Lonergan would say rather, 'Therefore, there is a difference,' but whether it is because of diverse meanings of grace demands a distinction. The moderns have two reasons for such an elevation: the supernaturalness of the act and the theory of vital act according to which 'willing' is 'causing.' It does not seem that Aquinas departed from Aristotle to the extent of positing the theory of vital act. [The question is put in note 17, pp. 25-26 in *Grace and Freedom*, q.v.]

Next, still under the discussion of explanatory work, there are comparative, connective, and genetic methods. Reference is made to the *gratia operans* articles, where there is a series of differences: (1) to avoid sin (2 Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2; *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 12; (2) proportion to grace (2 Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 4; *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 15; (3) one grace in one person (2 Sent., d. 26, q. 1, aa. 5, 6; *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 5; (4) Pelagianism; (5) predestination; (6) the apprehended desirable moves the appetite; (6) liberty (can be affirmed together with necessity); (7) God operates in every operator. (A) there is the study of the whole movement: Augustine, Anselm, Lombard: Lottin and Landgraf; (B) there is the investigation of vocabulary, not from manuals and commentaries [but from the texts themselves?].

The discussion moves to the history of A, the immediate data of everyday living: buildings, monuments, works of art. Schliemann, *Archeologia*, 2 vols.

Accepted and expressed reasons: ? Babylonia Sumeria; Pylos – Nestor – Linear B.

Letters of messages: Ranke Ross ?

Liturgies, rites, myths

Is it *ex pede Herculem*? ? Sitz im Leben community composes ?

Gerhardson – Manuscript and Memory Uppsala 1961

Harold Riesenfeld – The Gospel Tradition and Its Beginning London 1957

Next, there are the crises of these various histories. *Minor criticism* demonstrates that they have not adequately applied principles or have omitted this or that; as it were, a spontaneous evolution of the science itself, to which there is joined a sort of spontaneous progress in method. Hegelians gave rise to the Historical School: Niebuhr, Ranke, Grimm, von Savigny, etc. Droysen.

*Major criticism* has two aspects. First, there are fundamental terms by which the investigator thinks and to which what is investigated is reduced. Commentaries of Thomas on scripture, on Aristotle, Dionysius, Boethius, Lombard. Bultmann's

existential interpretation *sōma*. A. Descamps, *Sacra Pagina*, I, 132-59. Second, there is the question whether the questions regarding the true, the good, the false, the evil enter in the object to be investigated and in the judgment about the investigation; in the object to be investigated: (a) you can interpret Plato and Kant equally well whether you teach that they were wrong or not; (b) Collingwood – whether to believe the witnesses; in the judgment about the investigation:

positivistic: *die Rechtigkeit, die Wahrheit ? Existenz*;

Perspectivism: *materia prima* – multa ? visionis, tota statia – pariter valent  
H.I. Marrou, *De la connaissance historique* Paris 1954

R. Arnou, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* Paris 1938

H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* Tübingen 1960

**55000D0L060** March 12 1963

Human science: proper data – what is given with meaning (reference to *Merchant of Venice*)

the level of investigation, what is investigated, how it is investigated:  
descriptive (quis, quid, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando); explanatory  
(comparative so that the question arises from the data, connective, genetic)

Descriptive: what is best known by contemporaries, who are immediately involved with the things themselves. (a) Memories of the apostles: are the gospels ours? Almost everything in the New Testament is cited in the second century but the gospels are not cited [three uncertain words]; (b) symbols of the apostles: Council of Florence; the Greeks say they ignore such a symbol.

Explanatory: what is rarely known by contemporaries: the economic crisis in imperial Rome; the Sabellian, Arian, Nestorian, Monophysite controversies; the Augustinian-Aristotalian controversy. [Marginal: self-consciousness, self-knowledge].

*Ultima vice* (1) complexionis maioris

(2) complexionis homogeneitas: seu theologi S Thomas

cum philosophic scholastica posteriori

(3) the movement itself is apprehended more clearly and more certainly

one grace in one person: 2 d. 26, q. 1, a. 6; *De ver* q. 27, a. 5

whether without grace mortal sin can be avoided: 2, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2x; *De ver* q. 24 a. 12x

whether we need grace to prepare ourselves for grace: 2, d. 28, q. 1, a. 4; *De ver* q. 24, a. 15; [*C. Gent.* III, 149x]

whether there is a certitude to predestination: 1, d. 40, q. 3; *De ver* q. 6, a. 3; *C. Gent* III, 94



operative and cooperative grace: 2, d. 26, q. 1, a. 5; *De ver* q. 27, a. 5 ad 1m; 1-2, q. 111, a. 2

the concept of Pelagianism from [2, d. 28, q. 1 a 2x] *Quodl*, a. 7.

(4) Lexicon: not what 'everyone says': uninterrupted tradition

Fundamental – from use: sayings are cited among the authors ?? Oxford Dictionary

E.g., Scotus: in 15 ways; Thomas: in two ways, in three ways.

Human science and truth:

(a) truth in the data themselves

(b) truth at the descriptive level

(c) truth at the explanatory level

(a) truth in the data themselves: (1) the data are given, not suppressed or omitted; they are to be explained either as fact or as fiction; consciously or unconsciously; (2) the historian does not believe the data; Collingwood, *Idea of History*; Greek fables: all the witnesses are lying, all the clues are fabricated; (3) on the other hand, the historian does not exercise Cartesian doubt.

(b) truth at the descriptive level: (4) slowly there is constructed an arrangement that is firm enough that nobody thinks of destroying it or of replacing it with something new; did there exist Mycean civilization? Fr. Wolf – collection cantuum inde a Schliemann Phygias – Evans Minos; Linear B = scriptio syllabica graeca Knosos, Pylos, etc. (5) It is more difficult to attain consensus when there are stronger motives for doubting. There is little doubt about Virgil, Horace, Cicero, 325 Constantine, persecutions, etc.; about the gospels, although the apocryphal and canonical are distinguished, how do you know that nothing fabricated is in the canonical writings? Substantially the version may be authentic but there remains the freedom to doubt concerning some particular element. Well selected doubts make the whole ?

(c) truth at the explanatory level: in general. the concern is not with the truth of what the author meant but with whether the author meant it. The rules of hermeneutics apply equally well to Plato, Aristotle, Romans 6, and Aristotle; specifically, slowly there are accumulated reliable information about the chronology of writings, the meaning of the vocabulary, the general connections, and what is known in particular questions. The more frequently and longer the work is cited, the better it is. *Cicero et ses amis: [Etude sur la société romaine du temps de Cesar]* |GASTON BOISSIER

$A_1, B_1, E_{ijk}, F_{ij}$

$F_i$  Minor criticism is carried on in the field  $E_{ijk}$

(a) this was omitted, or this was less clearly and exactly explained;

(b) tranquil advance of methods, so that ignorance is disdained by all or is mercifully overlooked. What once happened does not happen today except occasionally out of ignorance. Experience is the best teacher, without theoretical, philosophical, methodological disputation; apart from the division of schools. Manuals: Langlois-Seignobos, Bernheim, Bauer (2nd ed., 1928). The art is learned in seminars under the best teachers.

Theological problem: (1) *Deus scientiarum Dominus* from without; (2) theology did not involve itself in historical schools for three or four hundred years.

F<sub>j</sub> Major criticism: is grounded in minor criticism, is hardly at all engaged in by historians, and poses philosophical problems.

(1) the old Tübingen school – Hegelian dialectic in history

(2) the Historical School: Niebuhr, Ranke, Droysen: legal and political history; von Savigny, law; Grimm, popular literature. “No philosophical presuppositions.”

(3) In fact there were philosophical presuppositions: from illuminism, Romanticism, Hegelianism.

The positivist tendency: these and other presuppositions are eliminated; Marrou; logically leads to edit? And to other historical arguments.

The relativistic or perspectivist or [praecissiva] tendency:

Relativist: Dilthey, Troeltsch, Rothacker; what is sought is not truth but correctness;

Praecissiva: different conclusions for different presuppositions; history insofar as it does not disrupt [dirimit?]

Perspectivist: data are *materia prima*, from various points of view, standpoints, things are variously illumined, everything can be ‘objective.’

The existentialist or transcendental tendency: that which can be scientifically determined, *Wissenschaft*; that which can be mythically or existentially interpreted; the *existentiell* kerygma is what is to be responded to.

Problem: at least under a theological aspect: (a) concerning ultimate terms: it is avoided in Descamps, with his knowledge of the contingent and only in the commonsense mode; it is assumed in Bultmann and differently in Thomism; ultimate terms can be considered in accord with A<sub>i</sub>, B<sub>i</sub>, E<sub>ijk</sub>, F<sub>ij</sub>. The problem of contexts and transposition. (b) concerning philosophical differences: perennial philosophy is not one but many and opposed.

### 55100D0L060 March 15 1963

Major criticism already enters into the theological field. A<sub>i</sub>, B<sub>i</sub>, E<sub>ijk</sub>, F<sub>ij</sub>; F<sub>i</sub> = E<sub>ijk</sub> as f(A, B, E<sub>ijk</sub>),  
F<sub>j</sub> = f(A<sub>i</sub>, B<sub>i</sub>, E<sub>ijk</sub>, F<sub>ij</sub>).

E.g., the history of dogmas from the process from the New Testament to Nicea:

the ancient process: traditional aspects A<sub>i</sub> and writings, tendencies, schools B<sub>i</sub>

the modern process: from Petavius to Daniélou, Orbe, etc.

E<sub>ijk</sub> writes a new history of the process, choosing, selecting, perfecting; judging the ideas in E<sub>ijk</sub> from A<sub>i</sub>, B<sub>i</sub>.

F<sub>i</sub> is contained in that E<sub>ijk</sub>.

F<sub>j</sub> notes the same problem in E<sub>ijk</sub>, which exceeds the method: data, descriptive stage, explanatory stage (comparative, complexive, genetic). (1) the problem of transposition or of basic terms; (2) the problem of dialectic. These problems are connected with criticism.

Regarding transposition or fundamental (basic) terms: There exists a multiplicity: Judea-Christians, Gnostics, Apologists, Heretics, refutation of heretics. Petavius and all moderns: Daniélou, Orbe/Bultmann, Jonas.

What is it that enables these very diverse figures to be considered together, whether one is reduced to another or some are reduced to one? Cf. Measuring as comparison without a standard and with a standard. (1) It happens tacitly, without any explanation or justification. (2) such a process is implicitly criticized, in Descamps. (3) the explicit consideration of this question is necessary for history and especially for Catholic dogmatics. DB 2314: the most noble task of the theologian. If the same thing can be found in Nicea, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Trent, Vatican I as in the sources, then there is required the possibility of this identification being clearly and exactly apprehended.

Concerning Dialectic:

The explanatory stage: comparison – similars → connection, dissimilars → genetic and dialectic

(1) Dialectic has to do with irreducible opposites which do not enter into one connection, and which do not pertain to the genesis or development of one connection. (2) These opposites are so far from being eliminated that, once they have been overcome in one form, they return in another. We hear about *philosophia perennis*, but there is not one *philosophic perennis*. There is perennial empiricism, idealism, realism. We hear about one Lord, one faith, one baptism, but there are perennial heretics as well. (3) This opposition, even if it manifested in contradictory propositions, still more deeply is rooted in existential orientation itself. This is the reason it is perennial; this explains why it is found in the past process concerning which the history is written and in the histories themselves; this is why it is found between authors, tendencies, schools, but also within the same author, the same tendency, the same school. (4) It is found within the field of the data, of description, comparison, connections, genesis. And in the subject to whom the data are given, the subject who describes and explains. But it cannot be adequately investigated by an empirical or descriptive or explanatory method. It remains beyond the horizon of methodical consideration, since it deals not with the predicaments as such, but with the transcendentals that are present in every predicament. It has to do with the openness of the mind, with being, with the true, with the good. (5) And so it pertains not only to  $B_i$  and  $E_{ijk}$  and  $F_{ij}$  but equally to  $A_j$ . Christ is the sign of contradiction: greater love over against hate, much fruit over against murder, 'that they might have life' over against death. On the law of transformation, see *De Verbo Incarnato*, thesis 17. (6) It removes questions from the field of growing intelligence (description, explanation) to the field of judgment. It does not make a formal judgment: I must decide about my own existence. But it illuminates the act of judgment and reduces opposites to their principles.

Concerning fundamental terms:

(1) There is no single connection of fundamental terms. Rather there are as many opposed connections as there are oppositions, opposed positions, in dialectic. The fundamental terms are antithetical: the same word with radically opposed meanings.

(2) The terms, the opposed meanings, are not only in the logical or conceptual order, but this order is an expression of a fundamental existential orientation. The issue is more existential than it is conceptual. Consciousness transcends expression of itself. Breton, the possibility of exactly

formulating first principles [RD: See Lonergan's review of Edmond Barbotin, Jean Trouillard, Roger Verneaux, Dominique Dubarle, Stanislas Breton, *Le crise de la raison dans la pensée contemporaine* in *Gregorianum* 44 (1963) 372-73; reissued in CWL 20, *Shorter Papers*.]

(3) The transcendentals insofar as they are preconceptual, insofar as they determine the dramatic-practical life, the theoretic life, the interior life, insofar as they are manifested in various ways and in various cultural stages.

(4) The potential: from these historical data there comes a determination.

### **55200D0L060: March 22 1963**

Dialectical analysis.  $A_i, B_i, E_{ijk}, F_{ij}$ .  $E = f(A_i, B_i)$ .  $F = f(A_i, B_i, E_{ijk}, F_{ij})$ .

The problem of transposition: What probability is there of F when we are treating simultaneously minds so different in time and the way of speaking and in goal? The form is particular. K. Barth, Römerbrief (with an arrow to J.D. Smart, *The Interpretation of Scripture* (Problem of Transposition) SCM London 1962; Ernst Fuchs, *Hermeneutik* 1954; Zumhermeneutischen Probleme in der Theologie, JCB Mohr 1958.

The problem of radical opposition is not solved genetically. The opposition is such that what comes later simply repeats what came earlier but in a fuller and more accurate and deeper manner. Nor is it solved as the omission or overlooking of data [are solved]. The data are acknowledged but explained differently.

The existential analysis of the New Testament leads to demythologization. The existential analysis of contemporary man is so that he understand himself and become open to the New Testament.

Dialectical analysis (1) moves from the opposition between actors and authors to its root, its cause in any actor or author. (2) This root or cause in general is very well known. Dialectical opposition arises from the data because it not solved by appealing to the data. It arises because 'whatever is received is received according to the mode of the one receiving.' But this generic solution is useless until specifically and in the individual the mode are known and judged.

(3) schematic overview:

(a) the mode [of receiving] can be coherent in itself, position P', or self-contradictory, counterposition Q'; coherent with that which is received, position P'', or contradictory to that which is received, Q''.

(b) the division of modes can be scientific and philosophic or theological, insofar as that which is received includes or does not include life in Christ and the life of God;

(c) applying this division, we get  $A_i$  becoming  $A_iP, A_iQ$ ;  $B_i$  becoming  $B_iP, B_iQ$ ;  $E_{ijk}$  becoming  $E_{ijk}P, E_{ijk}Q$ ; and  $F_{ij}$  becoming  $F_{ij}P, F_{ij}Q$ .

(d) dialectical seriation: positions are advanced, counterpositions perpetuated.

What is the mode of receiving? Horizon.

The notion of horizon:

literally;

phenomenologically – the fact of attention;

psychologically – the efficacy of attention;

socially – the utility and possible fruitfulness of attention;

cultural history – clarity and distinctness in attending

transcendental (natural) – what is worthy of attention

existential

In general:

Horizon is determined by the pole and the field; the pole is that from which the field is attained; the field is that which is attained from such and such a pole.

The field and formal object: the formal object is the object under the formality under which it is attained; the field is concrete, the totality of objects.

Pole and habit: habit is the first act from which second act proceeds promptly, easily, expeditiously; the pole is the subject operating in such a way.

[‘Horizon’ is header]

Literally, horizon is the bounding circle. The pole is the place where one stands, the point of vision. The field is the totality of visible things, those things that are selected by the pole.

Phenomenologically, a move from ocular vision to de facto ‘attention.’ The field is what can be apprehended and desired, to which attention is paid from a given pole. The shadow is in no way attended to; the penumbra is not seriously attended to (stereotypes, ‘they’); the luminous center is fully attended to. The pole is concern, *Sorge*, interest.

[‘Horizon’ is header]

Psychologically, the field of proximately possible operations, by reason of

place: I can make a journey, and after the journey something is proximately possible; but I cannot simultaneously make many journeys; I would consume my whole life in journeys.

time: I cannot act on the past or immediately on the future or on what is awaited;

dexterity: I can play the organ, and I can type, but I ought to learn art; it takes time, and I cannot acquire all skills.

intellectual habit: I am able to learn the Hebrew language and mathematics. But much time is demanded, and unless I give myself totally, I will make little progress.

habit in the will: if I persuade myself, I will do it; but first I need to be persuaded.

J. Piaget: operation that is undifferentiated, spontaneous, poorly adapted to the object, laborious, inefficacious through differentiations is adapted to diverse objects. Through combinations of differentiated operations it arrives at a totality of combinations, at a group of groups.

Aristotle’s distinction is more classificatory than explanatory: the problem of the unity of habit.

[‘Horizon’ is header]

socially: the field of useful and opportune operations  
pole – the subject in a given social ambience.

	Potency of subject	Act of subject	Social mediation	Object
I	need-capacitas	operation	cooperation	Particular goods
II	perfectibility	specialization	institutions	Good of order
III	liberty	orientation originating value	Interpersonal relations	Terminal values

I. The particular good: a particular object de facto good for a particular subject; this dinner, this education of this person; operation, cooperation, Robinson Crusoe;

II. The good of order:

materially: the people desiring; the series of cooperations, the series of particular goods  
formally: the order itself, interconnection, interdependence, conjunction because of which de facto the series of particular goods is continued

This is not a question of an ideal order or a utopia or of a juridical or ethical or theoretic order, all of which are a good of reason (cf. ‘ens rationis’); but [a question of] the order that de facto is found, from which de facto there is a series of particular goods.

Institutions: family, community, customs, education, status, law, economy, technology, church. These are commonly acknowledged goods, therefore changed only with difficulty, to which specializations are applied, in which cooperations take place; whence the generic determination and limitation of an actual good of order.

[‘Horizon’ is header]

socially (2)

III. (1) The actual good of order is never the only one possible. The cooperation of many and the continuous seriation of particular goods can be attained in several ways. Even within the same stable institutions there is a great variety in the actual good of order, e.g., family, education, economy. And the institutions themselves can change and do change for better or for worse.

(2) The orientation of freedom, conversion: originating value; nothing is *simpliciter* good except a good will. This is the point of application of ethical, juridical, social, historical doctrine. Dialectic between the converted and unconverted; criticism: Negatively: the drifter, inauthentic man, who wants what others want, and they similarly want what all the others want. Positively: one wills the good of order, which incorporates some ideal – numerical, aesthetic, intellectual, moral, religious: e.g., Bentham’s ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.’

(3) Terminal value, which is objectified, incorporated, in the good of order: capitalism-socialism, democracy-father of the fatherland; Christian marriage-serial monogamy.

(4) Interpersonal relations: the concrete mode of apprehending institutions, specializations, cooperations;

from the institutions: the good of order, the ideal;

from orientation  
 Hegel: master-slave, the *Phenomenology*  
 Fessard: Jew-Greek, *Actualité historique*  
 Religion of the Old Testament, and in Christ

[‘Horizon’ is header]

socially (3)

The field is of what is opportune, to which attention is usefully, fruitfully paid. The pole is one acting socially or acting socially under conditions.


Opportune: what can immediate be done. Roosevelt: ‘a bomber an hour.’ Or what can be done mediately: through the mediation of the liturgical movement, a Council decree on the liturgy can be done; through the mediation of *Deus scientiarum Dominus*, the whole complexion of the ordination of priests can be changed; through the mediation of industrialization, Russia has become a world power. Typography, universal education, Marx.

55300D0L060      March 26

J.D. Smart, *The Interpretation of Scripture* SCM London 1961

The problem of transposition (with an arrow to Smart)

$A_i$ $B_i$ $E_{ijk}$ $F_{ij}$	problem of transposition [and] dialectic arises from the data themselves
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irreducible oppositions    within  $A_i$   
                                       within  $B_i$   
                                       within  $E_i, E_j, E_k$   
                                       within  $F_j$

where  $E = f(A_i B_i)$   
 $F = f(A_i B_i E_{ijk})$

- (1) All are human beings.
- (2) all hear, speak, do

not only documents, monuments, of interpretation, history, doctrine, but also hearing, reading, inspecting, interpreting, narrating, teaching

(3) all interpretation, narration, doctrine proceeds proximately from experience, understanding, judgment, decision of the interpreter, narrator, teacher

(4) thus we distinguish *exercite* and *signate*.

*exercite*: interpreting, narrating, teaching, qua experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding

*signate*: interpretation, narration, doctrine

(5) transition from opposition between what is signified by authors, by Paul, Peter, John, Silvanus, etc., to a comparison between *exercitum* and *signatum* in individual authors.

(6) comparison is twofold: the same person (A) *exercite*, (B) *signate*: A and B agree = position; are opposed = counterposition.

(7) counterpositions are of two kinds:

(a) insofar as *exercite* means natural operations, with determinate properties, in a determinate structure, there is had something normative, concrete, existing, real, which is signified in many ways depending on the diversity of place, time, culture, but in itself is the same because it is rooted in nature. Where *signate* is opposed to *exercite normative*, we have human inauthenticity. General method, philosophical crisis, *Insight 14*, Coreth, transcendental method.

(b) insofar as *signate* means the word of God, a member of Christ, to whom there is *exercite* opposed, the word of God judges such a person, interpreter, narrator, teacher, whence we conclude to what *exercite* is in accord with the word of God.

(8) Dialectical analysis

(a) discerns authors and agents about whom authors write

(b) leads to what is *exercite normativum, erroneum, pecans*

which is transcultural, for in itself it is not signified, but consciously lived

(c) which grounds transpositions

regress to *exercitum*

there is revealed a likeness between positions and counterpositions in the first century, the fourth, etc.



(d) this has transcendental implications: what is normative concerning experience, understanding, judgment, decision, also is normative concerning everything that is signified and happens.

(e) this grounds progress: positions are to be advanced, counterpositions reversed.

(f) this grounds practical transposition: Barth, Epistle to the Romans.

55400D0L060      Dated March 26

The discussion of method and horizon continues in these two pages. Data, then understanding both *in* and *from* the data are mentioned. The understanding can be descriptive or explanatory. If it is descriptive, it tells who, what, how, etc. Explanatory understanding can be comparative, complexive [complexiva], genetic, or dialectical. Comparative understanding is with regard to the data as they are given and insofar as they are attended to in relation to all the differences that appear in them. Complexive understanding with regard to the individual yields a psychological horizon, and with regard to the community a social horizon. [RD: in 55700D0L060 and throughout the 1964 Georgetown discussion, this category will be 'relative horizons.'] He does not yet have complementary, genetic, and dialectical, as in *MiT*.] Genetic understanding studies individuals and communities of different times with respect to cultural horizon, as the move is made from undifferentiation through differentiation to integration. Dialectical understanding discerns transcendental horizons in the individuals that have been investigated ( $A_i$ ), in the communities that have been investigated ( $B_i$ ), in the histories doing the investigating ( $E_{ijk}$ ), and in the critical work doing the investigating ( $F_{ij}$ ), in accord with the developing complexifications of each.

There is a problem of irreducible opposition and of transposition. Insofar as one has solved one's own existential problem properly, not notionally but really, one knows what a transcendental horizon is, how it manifested, and what follows upon conversion. Insofar as one has developed culturally, so as to inhabit the differentiated worlds of the sacred, the intelligible, the interior, as distinct from the profane, the perceivable, and the external, one has in oneself the capacity through the negation of differentiation to reconstitute prior undifferentiated stages. And insofar as one understands psychology and society, one can proceed from the relations by which one lives to other matters, all of which form a directive part of method from above, while the described data form the part from below. For example, in physics, mathematics from above and the data from below yield the empirical laws.

Still treating the notion of horizon, we turn to cultural development. Development is from undifferentiation (1) through differentiation (2) to integration (3). (1) It is not from the unknown, but from global operations with regard to objects so as to reach to distinct complexions of combined operations with regard to clear and distinct objects. (2) Differentiation *in fieri* is a breakdown of a previous integration. A stable new integration is not possible until complementary differentiations have been completed. (3) Where these differentiations involve different states of the subject, integration on the part of the subject is through a sort of oscillation: practical life, intellectual life, introspection, mysticism. [RD: see the 1962 course 'DMT' where this is a major theme.]

The fundamental differences in cultural development may be spoken of in terms of spheres or worlds: the profane world (1) and the sacred world (2), the perceivable world of community (3) and the intelligible world of science (4), the exterior world (5) and the interior world (6). With respect to (1) Lonergan has 'proper object'; with respect to (2) he has 'formal object insofar as it exceeds the proper object'; with respect to (3) he has 'the dramatic-practical subject, *quoad nos*, common sense'; with respect to (4) he has 'the theoretic subject, *quoad se*, scientific understanding; with respect to (5) he has 'objects'; and with respect to (6) he has 'the subject: immediate (present to self) and mediated where the mediation can be through human works, through other persons, in relation to God, moral, or intellectual.

Development *in fieri* is considered spiritually, intentionally, temporally, in terms of freedom, and historically. 'Spiritual' means the negation of matter; the soul is neither material in itself nor intrinsically dependent on matter; the spiritual is the subject positively becoming known immediately and mediately. 'Intentional' means not the thing 'in itself,' not the known in itself but in the knower; not the beloved in itself but in the lover; it is the spiritual positively intending, intending both in relation to what is intended and intending and in relation to what is intended and not intending. 'Temporal' refers to time as the number and measure of movement *secundum prius et posterius* (Aquinas, Newton, Kant, Einstein) and in relation to temporality (as in a symphony); the identity of the conscious subject through time, the memory, knowledge, anticipation, and deliberation of the subject above time, connecting the past and the future; the decision and act of the subject that is in time but in such a way that it remains always true what I myself have done and that I am responsible for myself.

[The date shifts to March 29]

‘In terms of freedom,’ where ‘liberum’ means (a) immunity from force and necessity and (b) something positively spiritual, where the total situation, all the determinations of the subject, and the subject himself give rise to the act happening because I myself will it. ‘Historical’ refers to deeds of the past, outstanding examples, the education of political man; but also it means that just as I am responsible for myself, I make myself, I determine what kind of person I am, so collectively human beings make, destroy and remake the human world constituted by meaning. All of this involves persons and things; what is appropriate and what is out of date (cf. modernism, *aggiornamento*); *Existenz* knowing one’s autonomy and assuming responsibility for oneself; and historicity, being a historical being inserted within a network of psychological, social and cultural realities, acknowledging history and the human world as a human work, and assuming responsibility regarding this human work.

This development *in fieri* is in the world of interiority. The subject is known through the subject. Other things are known through the subject and in relation to the subject. It is antithetically opposed to the perceivable world, which is apprehended by the superficial and the inauthentic: historicism, without much exaggeration, and positivism, with [cum?] exaggeration. It is also antithetically opposed to the intelligible world as the latter is apprehended in extrinsicism, whether the extrinsicism of truth or that of concepts. Again, it is antithetically opposed to the intelligible world as the latter is apprehended by scientists who are stuck in positivism (no metaphysics), pragmatism (it works), and secularism (the profane). It is easily put together with the world of the sacred, provided one attends to the interior life and not to dogma and propositional truth (cf. Marcel). The descriptions by which God is apprehended are not metaphysical but a matter of religions and social experience. God is a person, a subject. Before God we come to ourselves as subjects. Our life is not absorbed in time, but through temporality we turn to and attain to the eternal. By the grace of God I am what I am, and without grace the sinner does not long avoid mortal sin. God is the Lord of history.

This development *in fieri* is particularly unfolded in an immanentist ambience: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Heidegger, Jaspers.

In this development it is not a matter of a choice between fragments or of a mere combination of fragments. Under the latter Lonergan mentions Bultmann’s distinction of the Jesus of history (science) and the Christ of faith (myth and extrinsicism, or demythologized for *Existenz*). It is rather a matter of the openness

of the spirit, so that the inauthentic open themselves to the world of interiority, the intelligible world, the world of the sacred; the scientific open themselves to the world of interiority, to metaphysics, and to world of the sacred; extrinsicists open themselves to the world of interiority, the perceivable world, the scientific world; and immanentists open themselves to the intelligible world, the perceivable world, the objective sacred.

This openness of the spirit can be grasped in two ways, one literary and the other analytic, systematic, and synthetic.

The literary way is in the perceivable world but proceeds from interiority and aspires to the intelligible and the sacred. Augustine and Newman are examples. The *Confessions* express religious conversion, the *Contra Academicos* intellectual conversion, *De necessitate gratiae* moral conversion, *De Trinitate* God, and *De civitate Dei* history. The analytic, systematic, synthetic way is grounded in the world of interiority and by way of method has an influence on the intelligible world, the perceivable world, and the world of the sacred.

This openness we now see *in fieri* in differentiations and the problem of integration. Already it has been at play in a literary movement in humanism, the Renaissance, in modern languages and literatures; in a philosophic movement in the epistemological problem; in the movement of natural and human science; in the opposition of church and state, church and sects; in industrialization, print media, radio television, universal education. And where one locates a beginning, one can also find precursors.

A prior differentiation is found in the move from primitive society to the ancient high civilizations (Jaspers' *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*). The field of the proper object in the perceivable world continued to grow and the affective sphere of myth and magic receded. An intelligible world is acknowledged within the perceivable world. Voegelin has studied this. In the end, there is myth that is at once political, cosmogonic, and religious. Then mythos gives way to logos, both in the perceivable world and in the intelligible world.

There is a genetic part in the problem of transposition, from integration to differentiations not yet integrated, to undifferentiated. The Greek and Hebrew mentalities are not ultimate irreducible atoms. (RD: Here there is a reference, I think, to Rossi de Gasperis and interest in *Insight* in Japan.)

55600D0L060      Here the dates are not certain. March 22, 26, with a question mark from BL himself.

The item has to do with dialectic, basic terms, basic sets of antithetical terms. The first page mentions first the real, knowing, objectivity. With regard to the real, there are the perceived (experienced), the understood, the affirmed. With regard to knowing, there are experience, understanding, and judging. If one stops at experience, one is an empiricist; stopping at understanding, there are Platonists, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel; moving to judgment we find realists, Augustine, Aquinas. With regard to objectivity, there are the given, the coherent, and the posited. Next mentioned on this first page are the worlds of community, theory, interiority, and religion, their integration by oscillation, and their differentiation and integration, with the comment 'part for whole' Obscurantism is also mentioned, and it can be worldly or pious. Then Horizon: literal, psychological, transcendental.

The second page is headed 'Horizon 1.' It has basic terms and transposition, and dialectic, with these in reciprocal relation to 'horizon.' With regard to horizon there are listed literal, phenomenological, psychological, sociological, transcendental, and methodical. Horizon is determined by pole and field. The pole and the field are correlative: the field contains everything that can be attained from a given pole, while the pole is the subject operating in such a way as to attain a given field. One line relates the field to the formal and concrete object, the thing itself, not the *ratio rerum*, and another relates the pole to habits and the concrete subject.

Literally, horizon is *ho horizōn kyklos*. The pole is the place where one stands, the point of vision, insofar as it relates to visible things. The field consists of the visible things insofar as they can be seen from such a standpoint.

Phenomenologically, the field has to do not just with visible things but with everything that can be apprehended and desired, insofar as attention is de facto paid to these. There is a shadow where there is no attention, no apprehension, no care whatsoever. There is a penumbra of things surrounding that are indefinitely apprehended: 'they,' concerning which there is no serious concern. And there is the field, what is clearly and exactly apprehended, about which there is serious concern, interest. At the bottom of the page, 'Sorge.'

The next page is headed 'Horizon 2' and is concerned with the psychological contribution to the notion of horizon.

Psychologically, there is the fact of habit and the genesis of habit. Regarding the fact of habit, we do operate sensitively and corporally, intellectually, volitionally. And we are able to operate because of prime potency and because of second potency, which is first act. There is the phase before: if we acquire the necessary dexterity, if we learn, if we are persuaded; thus the infant is able to walk; we can play the organ; we can type. There is the phase after we have acquired the dexterity, and have learned, and have been persuaded.

As for the genesis of the habit, there is a process from the spontaneous, global, undifferentiated operation to differentiated operations adapted to objects, and then to combinations of differentiated operations, and then to a certain totality (group of combinations). Piaget avoids the problem of the unity of habits and of merely descriptive classifications because he proceeds from the concrete, the very mode of operation. The field that is attained by such habits and the pole that is the subject adorned by such habits yield the possibility of attention.

The next page is ‘Horizon 3’ and is concerned with the social contribution to the notion of horizon. Here we have the structure of the human good.

	Potency of subject	Act of subject	Social mediation	Object
I	Need-capacity	operation	cooperation	Particular good
II	Perfectibility	specialization	institutions	Good of order
III	Liberty	orientation	Interpersonal relations	Terminal values

The particular good is this particular good thing for this person: this dinner for the person, this beatific vision for this person. ‘Operation’ is exemplified in the primitive spontaneously taking the fruit he finds, in Robinson Crusoe. But there is also cooperation heading for the particular good.

The good of order materially consists in the people who desire, and a series of cooperations, and a series of particular goods. Formally it is that order from which de facto the series of particular goods flows. We are not concerned with some ideal, utopian, theoretical, juridical, ethical, etc., all of which are beings of reason. We are speaking of institutions such as the family, the community, customs (not ethics), education, status, law, economy, technology. These are commonly acknowledged bases that are slow to change, whence the good of order flows, in which cooperations take place, and for which specializations are developed.

The next page continues the header 'Horizon 3' and continues to be concerned with the social contribution to the notion of horizon.

The actual good of order is never the only one possible. The cooperation of many and the continuous seriation of particular goods can be attained in many ways. Even within the same institutions, the possible good of order is multiple. But the institutions can and do also change for better or for worse.

The orientation of liberty has to do with originating value, as opposed to the drifter, the inauthentic person. A given good of order is preferred because it incorporates a certain ideal, be it aesthetic intellectual, moral, or religious. For example, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the hedonistic calculus.

Terminal value is a matter of, e.g., capitalism or socialism, democracy or 'pater patriae' (leader, tyrant, etc.); Christian matrimony [or serial monogamy].

Personal relations can develop from institutions: the role of father and mother, professor and student, etc. They can develop from orientation: thus Hegel's master-slave or Fessard's Jew and Greek. These relations are connected with the concrete mode of apprehending institutions, the good of order, specializations.

The next page does not have a header, but continues to be concerned with the social dimension.

From the social perspective, the field consists of the opportunities to which it is useful to pay attention, and the pole is the social actor. The factors have to do with what is proximately possible and with what is proximately not possible but remotely possible if certain changes are introduced. What is proximately possible has to do with the what and how being known, with the presence of those who can learn quickly and be persuaded quickly. The category of 'What is proximately not possible but is remotely possible given certain changes' generates a list of different things: railroads, automobiles, industrialization in Great Britain, in Russia, the invention of printing, universal education, *Rerum novarum*, *Quadragesimo anno*, *Deus scientiarum Dominus*, liturgical change.

The next page has the header 'Horizon 4' and is concerned with the transcendental aspect.


Explicit attention may be paid to horizons, and judgments and decisions are made in their regard. There is deliberate omission of what lies beyond the horizon. This

is omitted because no attention is paid to it. Thus from a practical standpoint there is omitted what is useless in itself or because nothing can be done about it. From a metaphysical standpoint there is omitted what is not real, beings of reason, what is mythical fiction, false, illusory, legend, deception. From a critical stand point there is omitted what is not knowable, the Ding-an-sich. From a scientific standpoint there is omitted what cannot be scientifically determined by scientific method. From the standpoint of historical consciousness there is omitted that which is antiquated.

The transcendental dimension is present implicitly, with regard to the *ratio* of horizon, when no explicit thought is given to horizon, but explicit thought concerns utility, reality, knowability, opportunity, science. This holds for every philosophical, theological, methodical position. This is true when the discussion is not technical but symbolic and indirect, suggesting, in symbols, works of art, literature, propaganda.

The radical fundamental transcendental aspect is grounded in the individual, social, historical development itself of the subject. This foundation is objectified in symbolic, philosophical, theological, methodical reflection. It asserts its effects in the phenomena of horizon either immediately or mediately in symbols, philosophy, theology, method.

The next page continues this discussion. It is headed ‘Radical transcendental horizon.’ It begins with the following diagram.




(note by RD: ‘eth’ above should be ‘rat’ (rational))

The page goes on to discuss rationalism and materialism. Rationalism excludes faith, mysteries, hope. It wants charity but on a humanistic foundation. Materialism rejects ideological superstructures. It can be collective, individual, dogmatic, skeptical, ontological, gnoseological. There is the intellect, there are customs, values are not absolute but are means only. Reductionism always labors under this difficulty that it proceeds *by reason*. A closed reductionism is directed to what is below, while a closed aetherialism is directed to what is above.



The next page has the heading ‘the pole of the methodical horizon.’ It begins with the following diagram.



Then there is a chart contrasting the pole itself *exercite* and *signate*. The pole considered *exercite* is the conscious being that lives, knows, and choose. The pole considered *signate* is the conscious being that knows himself or herself to live, to know, and to choose: what is the subject, what is the act, what are the objects.

The development of the pole is considered in its individual aspect: the age of reason, the autonomy of the adult. But it is considered also in its socio-historical aspect: (a) from a primitive stage to the ancient high civilizations; (b) the classical age: philosophy, science, history, individualism; (c) historical consciousness: man acknowledges and assumes his own autonomy and historical responsibility. All of that has to do with the spontaneous unfolding, but there is also a deliberate unfolding, where the development is from the global through differentiations to integration. Here the center moves from what above is the ‘subiectum psychicum’ to the ‘subiectum intellectual, rationale, ethicum.’ This shift happens either *exercite* or *signate*: *exercite* in attending to objects; *signate* when the subject’s notion about the subject influences the development of the subject. That is, the subject constitutes himself not only consciously but also rationally and deliberately.

There is mentioned also the fragmentation of development. Differentiation: differentiation out of undifferentiated operations needs complementary differentiations for integration to take place. Differentiations proceed from the pole *exercite* more easily in concrete matters, but *signate* with erroneous knowledge, ineffective will, so that integration is not possible without a reorganization or revolution. The critical moment is reached when there is an opposition between the spontaneously functioning pole and the pole as *signatum*, as objectified.

The next page starts out with the affirmation that the transcendental is the total horizon outside of which either there is nothing or there is nothing that I can know.

In Scholasticism this affects the meaning of the transcendentals: being, one, true, good, and from there it affects the meaning of all the categories.

From an absolute standpoint, the horizon is transcendental; it affects everything, even if it employs a Scholastic way of speaking. The meaning of being, one, true, good is affected even if it is denied that there is any sense of speaking of being, one, true, and good. For example, for

Kant the horizon has to do with phenomena to be ordered by ideas and categories, and the noumenon is the limit-concept that names what lies beyond the field of possible knowledge.

The psychological horizon is not attended to but its reality is not for this reason denied. The transcendental horizon can be attended to but cannot be acknowledged. the idealists know very well the objects of common sense, but they affirm that common sense indulges in illusions.

The final page in this item treats 'horizon methodicus,' methodical horizon. Materially, it consists of all transcendental [psychological] poles and all transcendental [psychological] fields. Formally, it can be considered heuristically or programmatically insofar as these have been genetically or dialectically ordered.

The process: (a) the fields themselves; (b) the polymorphic human subject; (c) the field determines the pole; (d) fields are to be ordered genetically and dialectically to one another insofar as the poles are ordered genetically and dialectically to one another.

From above we have Newtonian mechanics, Einstein, quantum physics, Mendelieff; from below, empirical laws. Together they yield systems.

55700D0L060            March 29 and April 2

A roughly identical version of these notes is typed out in 55800D0L060, headed April 3.

The first page is headed 'Transcendental horizon.'

1 Man not only develops psychologically, socially, culturally, but also is converted religiously, morally, intellectually. Development has conditions in man himself but is more determined from without: psychologically by education, socially by the society in which one is born or to which one has migrated, culturally by the epoch to which one belongs. Conversion has external conditions in education, society, and culture, but happens from the individual and in the individual, pertains to one's self-constitution; one makes oneself such and such a human being not *per accidens* and apart from one's intention; one is present and knowing. Conversion is existential.

The next page is headed 'HT2.'

[2] The horizon that results from psychological, social, cultural development is relative. It does not deny the existence, value, and knowability of what lies outside the field, whether that knowability be scientific or otherwise. The horizon that results from conversion or non-conversion is absolute. What lies beyond it, as far as existence is concerned does not exist; there is nothing to be attended to; and as far as value is concerned, is of no value and so is not to be attended to; we should ignore it; to ignore it does not conflict with perfect openness; and as far as knowability is concerned, it cannot be known; talk about it is necessarily illusion, deception, fiction, myth, legend, pseudo-science, pseudo-philosophy, pseudo-theology, ideology.

The next page is headed 'HT3.'

[3] Consideration of transcendental horizon is complex because of the two time, namely, before and after the question of conversion has arisen. Thus we distinguish the originary and the existential pole and the field as it is *exercite, implicite*, and the field as it is *signate, explicite*.

The *originary* pole is common to everyone. It is the possibility that one can be converted, can constitute oneself. It is the very structure of human consciousness.

The *existential* pole is proper to each individual. It is the subject insofar as it has been constituted as such by itself, whether by knowing and willing oneself to be such or by avoiding and fleeing oneself and the self-constitution of oneself.

The field, *signate et explicite*, is philosophy, theology, method.

The field, *exercite et implicite*, is present in the assumptions, presuppositions, orientation of the subject. It is manifested in one's judgments and decisions about the real, about values and ends, about possibilities, about legitimate methods.

The next page is headed 'HT4.'

By definition, pole and field are correlative. The field is what is attained by such and such a pole, and a pole is that by which such and such a field is attained.

By intention the explicit field and the originary pole are correlative. Method, philosophy, and (supposing faith) theology are not the expression of a personal choice but intend to determine that to which existential choice should be conformed.

From the nature of things the implicit field and the existential pole correspond to each other. Who I am and what the world is to me are correlative. 'Qualis quisque est, talis finis videtur ei.'

In the authentic the existential pole is true knowledge, sincere recognition, faithful appropriation, assumption, acceptance of the originary pole in accord with the demands of the originary pole itself. At the same time the implicit field and the explicit field either coincide or tend to coincide.

The next page is headed 'HT 5.'

Inauthenticity is either radical or derived, and derived inauthenticity is either by way of rationalization or by way of obnubilation.

Radical inauthenticity is a divergence between the originary pole and the existential pole. Derived inauthenticity presupposes radical inauthenticity and includes it. Rationalization refers to false philosophy, theology, method – the explicit field conforms to the implicit, which corresponds to an inauthentic existential pole. Obnubilation refers to a philosophy, theology, method that might be true but is understood in such a way that a meaning is attributed to them such that they express an implicit field that corresponds to an inauthentic existential pole.

The next page is headed 'HT 6.'

3 The ordinary pole: (a) levels of consciousness: there is the consciousness of dreams – I am present to myself in dreams; there is empirical consciousness – I am present to myself in sensitive actions and passions; there is intellectual consciousness – I am present to myself as inquiring, understanding, conceiving; there is rational consciousness – I am present to myself as doubting, pondering evidence, judging; there is self-consciousness – I am present to myself as taking counsel, deliberation, choosing, action, disposing of objects, and disposing of myself.

(b) 'present to myself': not local presence, like that of a statue in a room; not the presence of an object that is apprehended or desired; but the presence of the subject as the constitutive condition of oneself as apprehending or desiring. Not only is there the spectacle but also the spectator. The spectator is not conscious because he is part of the spectacle, for the spectacle is not conscious.

In radical rationalized inauthenticity, knowledge is like ocular vision, the known is like the seen, what is conscious is known, and so it is like seeing. If it were like the seen, it would be per se unconscious.

It is not [constituted] through introspection or reflection. If it were, it would be something unconscious on which to reflect or into which to introspect.

The next page is headed 'HT 7.'

(c) Consciousness is advanced from level to level: normatively from 1-2 by alertness, from 2-3 by inquiry, from 3-4 by doubting, and from 4-5 by asking what is to be done, what will I myself do about the object and about myself.

(d) There is a qualitative difference of levels. Each of us can experience in himself or herself, and unless we experienced in ourselves these could not be known: (i) sensitive spontaneity: it cannot be avoided; I see a large dog on the loose, perhaps ferocious, and this leads to fear; I fear not because it is rational, but even if I know that fear is stupid and foolish; (ii) intelligible clarity: when there is understanding it leads to consciousness itself by the power of intelligent consciousness forming definitions, hypotheses, explanations, theories; this is normative; (iii) also normative – rational necessity: when it is grasped that the evidence is sufficient, consciousness itself by the power of the consciousness grasping evidence posits a judgment absolutely; (iv) also normative – moral necessity: when it is judged that something can and should be done by me, consciousness itself by the power of consciousness affirming an obligation, correctness, fittingness, excellence, makes a choice. The latter involves experience in the agent, not in what is done, of responsibility, liberty, and morality.

The next page is headed 'HT 8.'

(e) The unity of consciousness. On the side of the object: we inquire about what we experience; we understand that about which we inquire; we conceive that which we understand; we doubt about that which we conceive; we weigh the evidence concerning what we have doubted; we affirm or deny that about which we weigh the evidence. The composition/unity of the object:

experience – potency (matter); understanding – form; conception – form and matter = essence; judgment – essence + existence. Knowledge, abstractly, is any cognitive act, but properly it is the acts of experience, understanding, conception, judgment composed into one. Thus consciousness is knowledge from the abstract point of view but not properly; it is the experiential part in self-knowledge.

The unity of the subject is a fact, not just a logical condition of possibility. I cannot inquire about that which no I but you have experience. I cannot understand that about which not I but you inquire.

The next page is headed ‘HT 11,’ but seems to follow on the preceding.

4 The existential pole. (a) The development of the human individual entails the emergence of an autonomous subject. The infant does very little for itself, determines very little for itself, knows very little for itself. It operates by a natural spontaneity that determines what it finds pleasant and not pleasant, consciously pleasant and consciously not pleasant. Gradually the small child, the boy or girl, the adolescent is doing more for himself or herself; determining more for himself or herself, either in terms of enjoyment, as in play, or because one should; knowing more for himself or herself. The crisis of adolescence, in some sense the philosophical age: more or less ultimate questions are put, and mastery of self emerges, where one will do what one has determined to do, and one will determine to do what one has come to know for oneself. This self-mastery is in many ways complete or incomplete. It is asked what this mastery, this emergence, this self-constitution as master of oneself means.

The next page is headed ‘HT 12.’

(b) The subject insofar as one operates as poured out upon objects becomes what it becomes but *praeter intentionem, per accidens*. It becomes what it becomes since it acquires habits. But *per accidens* because it is poured out on objects, it does not attend to itself, it makes itself what it is through habits that it has acquired.

(c) The subject operating with regard to objects is mediated through the operations and objects. One reveals oneself as in a mirror operating with regard to natural things, on artifacts, with other persons, and before God. There arise practical, artistic, moral, religious, intellectual reflections.

(d) The subject thus mediated pass from consciousness of self to knowledge of self. Consciousness of self is knowledge in an abstract sort of way but not properly. Knowledge in the proper sense adds understanding of man and of oneself, and judgments about man and about oneself. This knowledge of self increases one’s consciousness of self. We are more conscious of those things that we clearly conceive and distinctly affirm about ourselves.

The next page is headed ‘HT 13.’

(e) Self-knowledge moves on to a certain choice of oneself through which one freely constitutes oneself as master of oneself. (i) The choice proceeds from *me*. I make use of a practical judgment as the principle by which there is spirated the volition or choice. ‘Thus it shall be.’

Consciousness is free, deliberate, responsible, unconditional. (ii) 'man' is *esse-possesse, Sein-Können*. Insofar as, poured out on external things, one does not think with the heart, one makes oneself against one's intention just the kind of person that, on reflection and self-knowledge, one does not want to be. One can seriously and sincerely choose to be other than one is, and discern the means toward this goal. But this present choice must always be preserved and renewed. Otherwise the chosen means are neglected. Neither here and now nor in some future here and now in this life can we enact those future renewals. Insofar as we seriously and sincerely do not determine, we remain *Sein-Können*. (iii) Thus I can apprehend, project, determine my life as a whole, myself as a whole, but in such a way that this determination is made only *per partes*. I am master of myself not as totally simultaneous toward something totally simultaneous but successively with regard to individual parts. I have a problem of fidelity and perseverance, not only of moral conversion, [but] that I be a man, that I exist.

The next page is headed 'HT 14.' Continues previous item: Here and now I cannot prevent that in the future I will will and not perform, judge that something is to be willed and not will it, or judge otherwise than I now judge.

(f) Existential decision (1) brings it about that per se, from my master of myself, I am such and such a person; (2) but does this in the way of intention, tendency, orientation, direction; (3) and brings it about that what kind of person I am is something intended and freely chosen.

(g) the existential and originary pole as orientation or consequence is intended, freely chosen; and insofar as it understands and knows itself it freely constitutes itself as what it is. There is no absolute security or certitude about the goodness of the choice. I am not unconscious. I will to be a human being. I will the limitations that come with being a human being. It is my decision. Otherwise I would not be a human being. I would be carried about by the winds. Perhaps if I had deliberated more fully or longer, I would have decided otherwise.

The next page is headed 'HT15.'

(h) The existential pole in the concrete not only has structure (orientation freely and responsibly chosen) but also content. It makes itself *such* in relation to *things* and to *persons* and to *God*: To *things*: barely content, poured out on external things, maximization, domination; to *persons* (1) charity, friendship, love, intimacy, good works; (2) indifference; (3) anger and desire, hate, suspicion, rash judgments, false testimony, injustice, injury, murder; to *God*: (1) in god's presence, through the grace of god, trusting in God, praying, mortification, Christ; (2) ignoring God in secularism, laicism, worldliness; (3) holding god in hate, ideology, militant atheism, absolute human autonomy.

Existential decision as a question of what is *true*.

The next page is headed 'HT16.'

(i) The question of the *true* (1) is not a decision.  $P \rightarrow Q$  not because I decide but because the evidence suffices unconditionally. (2) It is not a mere composition, hypothesis. (3) It is an unconditioned positing on account of grasping the unconditioned.

The question about the true is a problem: a small problem from the nature of the problem itself, but a large problem under the existential aspect. It is intrinsically small: to know is to experience, understand, judge, and the known is a proper composite. It is existentially great: whether 'the real' is 'being' = that which is; whether experience, contact, vision corresponds to the 'really real.'

Tertullian: everything real is a body. Augustine held the same thing for a long time. Plato, Scotus, Kant, Gilson: to know is to perceive. Realism: that which is; idealism: not that which is experienced, perceived; empiricism: that which is perceived in experience.

There exists the problem of intellectual conversion. It pervades everything: not only epistemology but also history and hermeneutics.

55900D0L060      April 23 (classes resume)

Theology is knowledge about God mediated by Christ and the Church. When knowledge is mediated by data qua data, we have natural science; by data as invested with meaning, we have human science; by data as invested with true meaning, we have theology.

Mediation of the object:

$A_i$       immediate human, religious, Christian living – *die Wendung zur Idee*

$B_i$       authors, tendencies, schools

$I_{ijk}$      historical works

$F_{ij}$       critical works

Mediation of the subject:

Descriptive: who, what, how, why, etc.

Explanatory: comparative: whether same or different

    organic, synthetic [RD: replaces 'complexiva']: what is coherent

    genetic: stages in organic growth and in developing synthesis

    dialectic: radical oppositions

        mutual influence

Judicative: where dialectical method is used, the investigator is willy nilly

    committed; otherwise Bultmann's notion of science.

The next page is headed 'Horizon' with an arrow to 'critica, iudicativa' and with the following in parentheses: pole and field are correlative; pole is either originary

or existential; authentic of inauthentic; inauthenticity is radical or derived; derived inauthenticity is either rationalization or obnubilation.

A Relative horizon: is different depending on psychological, social, cultural development;

Absolute horizon: is different depending on intellectual, moral, religious conversion.

B Horizon as in the object: categories which are to be determined from the data; horizon as in the subject: foundations, norms, methodical precepts.

56000D0L060      April 2, 5, 23

We distinguished the originary pole and the existential pole. The originary → the inauthentic existential → converted to authenticity.

Thus conversion is the topic. (1) First there is the differentiation of the transcendental horizon. What lies outside it does not exist, can only be attended to in myth, or through deception, illusion, falsehood, etc.; and is of no importance or value and should not be attended to; and is not knowable and so is not worth asking about.

(2) Next we are not talking about relative differentiation, which is psychological or social or cultural (in the latter instance the same field is attained more fully), but about the absolute differentiation, where the field itself is changed and the pole exists in a new way.

(3) Conversion is threefold: intellectual, concerned with being; moral, concerned with the good; and religious, concerned with God.

Next page:

It is one thing to conceive what conversion is. It is something else to be converted oneself.

(4) Intellectual conversion: the *terminus a quo* is the *natürliche Einstellung*, the spontaneous orientation. It reflects about itself in many ways and as rationalized becomes empiricism, as partly corrected becomes idealism, and as obnubilated becomes inauthentic realism: 'That which is manifest, obvious, clear, certain,



indubitable to all, and can only be doubted by the insane, namely, there is given the “already-out-there-now.” Already: before any operation of the subject; out: not merely immanent; there-now: spatio-temporal, which is divided into the real and the merely apparent. The merely apparent and the real are discriminated by vision, contact, perception, by the object revealing itself without any admixture of subjectivity. Besides the immediate vision of the real there is given also mediated knowledge, whether certain or hypothetical (a) from principles, where the terms are abstracted from the real itself, (b) if the principles are certain, the nexus between the terms is itself objectively perceived; (c) if hypothetical, the nexus is not clearly and distinctly perceived but if it is supposed it is more probably the more it is verified.

The horizon of (1) what are seen, (2) what are certainly deduced, (c) other things about which hypotheses are formed, doubtful, and (4) what are not known, yields *die durchschnittliche Theologie*, the seminary ghetto.

At the bottom of the page: ‘or some other form of empiricism.

New page: *Terminus ad quem* has two steps: (1) the openness of the mind, and (2) the discipline of the mind.

(1) the openness of the mind, of the horizon, of the field: what is attained by vision, perception, contact, by the object revealing itself without any admixture of subjectivity, is not real but only a datum, a phenomenon (where nonetheless real being is attained. The phenomenon is a datum; if ‘being’ is never attained, what is perceived in data by abstraction is a devalued datum. The real is that to which in its own way ‘to be’ belongs: the whole, the concrete, to be, being, the real is that which is intended insofar as one proceeds beyond the data.

When the datum is given I ask what it is. I am seeking something that is not given, perceived, seen, contacted, unveiled. I am not seeking some other non-datum to be given, some other non-perceived to be perceived, some other non-seen to be seen. I am seeking what lies simply beyond the field of data. I am seeking what cannot be known except by understanding. What is it to understand? Give me someone who understands and he will experience what I am talking about. Whoever experiences understanding knows that understanding recurs in the intelligent and knows that seeing, perceiving occur very well in the stupid.

New page:

(2) How large is the field of an open horizon? As large as the range of questions extends itself? But questions are endless, for when some are resolved, there is achieved only a great possibility of raising further questions. Don't confuse the field of questions with the field of responses that can be given by us. The latter is limited naturally, psychologically, socially, culturally. This is what is overlooked by those who want official philosophies and theologies: not so that there be a solid foundation from which ultimate questions can be asked but so that further questions not be put forward. This is obscurantism, obnubilation.

(3) And what exactly is the field of an open horizon? The horizon of being, where being is not what is of minimal connotation and maximal denotation, as in Scotus and Hegel, but of maximal connotation and denotation: *to pan, ta panta, omnia, totum, concretum*, everything that can ever be known about anything and everything, more than is known in the beatific vision of Christ and the saints in heaven. There are spheres: being *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*.

Distinguish notion, implicit conception, implicit knowledge, idea of being. Explicit conception: what is intended in questions, what is conceived in every conception, what is known in every judgment, a unity which is different according to the proportion of essence and existence.

New page:

(4) What is the discipline of the open mind, of an unlimited horizon?

(a) the proper proportionate object of intellect: although what is intended is beyond the data, still it is not known except through the mediation of external or internal data. (i) Intelligence, the act of understanding, understands in the sensible; we can understand nothing except by conversion to phantasm; (ii) we cannot verify anything except in data.

(b) the formal object of intellect: (i) natural knowledge of God; (ii) divine revelation.

(5) What is the difference between the open mind and empiricism or idealism? The empiricist knows *because* he perceives. The idealist would know *if* indeed he did perceive. For the idealist everything is immanent. He does not know being *in se*. The empiricist, whether rationalized or obnubilated: always one can uncover in the critique of empiricism all the diverse criteria of knowledge, objectivity, reality not

only in philosophy but also in natural science, human science, history, exegesis, positive theology and systematic theology.

EITHER CONVERSION OR NOT. IF NOT, EITHER RATIONALIZATION OF OBNUBILATION.

New page: Moral conversion.

It is one thing to know what it is, it is something else again actually to be converted.

Prenotes:

(a) actio: can mean 'act' as in 'intelligere est pati quoddam,' or the exercise of efficient causality;

(b) insofar as a finite agent acts (actus), it is perfected;

(c) this actuation pertains to the subject by nature and in accord with what is superadded; otherwise it is not the perfection of the agent;

(d) this actuation has a goal, a 'for the sake of which,' and so what is not this actuation or this act itself is not a goal for itself;

(e) in rational beings this goal is intended: not only A for the sake of B but A for the sake of an intended B;

(f) we are asking about the goal of the operator in human beings as rational, what goal is de facto intended, and what goal is distinct from the very actuation of the subject.

New page:

The terminus a quo: I live thus, I think and judge thus, there is a rupture in consciousness.

(1) The intended end is the very subject of the actuation. I am that for the sake of which I myself am perfected. My perfection is for the sake of me. My food is for the sake of me. My delight in eating is for the sake of me. My studies are for the

sake of me. My good works are for the sake of merit, and merit for the sake of rewards, and rewards for the sake of me.

(2) If it is for the sake of me, there is no need to inquire further. I have a sufficient and efficacious motive for acting.

(3) Perhaps it may be added that an ulterior end for the operator *cannot* be given. The good is the desirable; for it to be able to be desired, it has to conform to appetite; where it conforms to my appetite, it conforms to me. To assign any other end is hypocrisy, delusion, vain speculation.

(4) Either this is reflexive, theoretical, the object of contemplative love, or the ultimate end is MY happiness. Other things are chosen as means to attain this end.

New page:

The terminus ad quem:

(1) Natural appetite: does not suppose knowledge in any way, or knowledge of the end to which it tends. Elicited appetite: supposes knowledge whether sensitive or intellectual.

(2) The question about the end of the one operating regards man as rational. It is a matter of the end intended by the rational agent as such.

(3) This intended end is good in an absolute fashion, what by reason of itself is good, what is good of itself, *value*.

An objection: the good should conform to appetite, and so in order to be a good that is intended it should be good in a relative sense.

Response: what is good in relation to a rational appetite is absolutely good. A rational appetite is one whose object or end is good in itself and from itself. It is a transcendental appetite.

(4) The natural appetite tends to what is good absolutely and the elicited appetite intends what is good absolutely. The natural appetite that is intellectual already is an appetite from which there is a tendency (i) to the intelligible – *quid sit*, (ii) to the true and being – *an sit*, (iii) to what is good absolute – *an esse debet*. This

appetite as it were explains itself, reveals itself through operations, grounds those things of which it is the condition of possibility.

New page:

The elicited appetite operates whenever we genuinely choose, whenever the object of our choice is genuine, what is just and fair, what should be or happen. As the criterion of the judgment about being is the true, sufficient evidence, so the criterion of the judgment about the good is value.

(5) What is good absolutely is a good not to be effected but to be participated. If it were to be effected, it would be a good not from itself, by reason of itself, but from the efficient cause. It is to be participated: our acts do not create values, but values render our acts genuine.

(6) What is good absolutely is compared to other goods as the good in itself which diffuses its goodness to be participated by the others, or as what is principally intended on account of which the others are intended.

(7) The morally converted person intends as end and as that because of which he/she acts what is good absolutely. Matthew 5.6: blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice; 5.13: blessed are they who suffer persecution for the sake of justice. The person who tends to the absolute good has a far more ample practical horizon than the one who tends just to the good for him/herself: 'Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.'

New page:

With regard to objections from egoism, the end of creation is the external glory of God. To the immortal and invisible king of the ages, God alone, be honor and glory, the principle and end of all things.

With regard to the notion of the good, there are:

Particular goods: because they are only particular, they fall short of goodness or are fragments only.

The good of order: integrates the fragments, but by itself it surpasses egoism. The good of order grounded in egoism would be the organization of the universe around me as end. The good of order is the good of the human community. It is more a good for others than for me. It can demand sacrifices from me, even my life.

Value selects between the possible goods of order. It images the good of order as participation in the absolute good, that which ought to, must be.

With regard to the notions of end and means: The order between the end and those things which are for the end is twofold: When the end is a good that does not exist but is to be effected, other things are ordered to the end as means. When the end is a good absolutely, from itself, by reason of itself, it cannot be effected. Otherwise it would not be good from itself but from the one who effects it. Then those things that are for the end are not means. They are from the end and on account of the end. They are compared to the good that is diffusive of itself as derivatives, as participants in the absolute, unlimited good.

New page:

Religious conversion: conversion to God. (A) under the aspect of the implicit, conversion to God in intellectual/moral conversion, (B) under aspect of the historical and explicit, the transition from the reign of sin to the reign of God. Romans 5.21, *Regnavit peccatum in mortem*. What is implicitly intended is explicitly known by us through the mediation of the knowledge of God the principle and end of all things.

(A) Conversion to God is found implicitly in intellectual and moral conversion. In intellectual conversion: What is intended in questions is being: *quid sit*, *an sit*. Questions of themselves are not limited. They are endless. They include the question, What is God? Being of itself is not limited. Unlimited being is God. Therefore the intention of being is the intention of God.

In moral conversion: The intention of the good that is absolute is the intention of what of itself, by reason of itself, is good. Insofar as it is participated in human acts, called *honestum*, just, what must, should be, what is fitting; insofar as it is good from itself; insofar as it is not able to be effected; insofar as it is that from which all goods derive their goodness; insofar as it is not only the *category* of natural rational appetite, and the obligation of rational elicited appetite, but the *reality* of these; it is God. You have made us for yourself, Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you. *Omnia Deum appetunt* (*Summa theologiae*, 1, a. 44, a. 4, ad 3m).

New page:

So we may conclude with regard to fundamental tendencies: the natural appetite of intellect, *intentio intendens*, intending the intelligible, the true and being, the good, is a radical, natural, implicit tendency to God. Therefore, a tendency to God is (i) constitutive of the ordinary, normative, exigent pole, (ii) the condition of the possibility of conversion and of the subject constituting oneself, (iii) the transcendental ego, (iv) man as he should be according to the *sempiternae rationes*, in potency.

Therefore: knowledge of God leads to knowledge of oneself, but knowledge of oneself also leads to knowledge of God; and denial of God leads to ignorance about oneself, and ignorance about oneself leads to denial of God; again, the separation of religion and philosophy reveals inauthentic man, and the alienation of philosophy from religion or of religion from philosophy also reveals the inauthentic man; again, conversion to God leads to the authentic existential subject, and the authentic existential subject leads to conversion to God; again, turning away from God leads to the inauthentic existential subject, and the inauthentic existential subject leads to turning away from God. In brief, the transcendental horizon, the religions horizon, and the philosophy horizon 'covariantur.' Wherever this mutual variation is at stake, there is an intrinsic nexus, and it seems to be foolish to have recourse to extrinsic 'forms.' The Christian doctrine of God implies a developed Christian philosophy, and authentic philosophic development implies Christian apologetics. What was authentic in Hellenism was by that very reason the foundation of Christian apologetics, a *preparatio evangelica*. The authentic explicit development of Christian doctrine (the dogmas of Trinity and Christology) imply a Christian philosophy which philosophy was distinct from Stoicism (Tertullian), Platonism (Origen), and Rationalism (Arians, Sabellians).

New page:

(B) conversion from the reign of sin to the reign of God.

56100D0L060      April 26

Religious conversion is conversion to God, aversion from creatures; it is opposed to sin. Aversion from God is conversion to creatures. (A) There is an implicit aspect, personal, interior, individual, and (B) there is an explicit, historical, and interpersonal aspect.

New page:

Religious conversion A (implicit): There is an implicit conversion to God and aversion from creatures, an implicit overcoming of the wound of ignorance and malice (*Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 85, a. 3), an implicit attainment of reason illumined by faith, given through intellectual and moral conversion. Intellectual conversion is from the perceptionist myth to the intelligible, the true, being, the good. Moral conversion is from the good as relative to what is absolutely good. Anyone who undergoes such a conversion of the whole personality is *really* ordered to the end that is God, *implicitly* is in relation to an end that is God. *Implicitly*: we are not saying one explicitly attains immediately to the recognition of God; we do not wish now to speak about proofs for the existence and reality of God; we wish to presuppose the philosophic materials and note the fact.

New page:

In intellectual conversion, there is left behind *die natürliche Einstellung*, and one tends to understand everything, to being. (1) to understanding everything, for questions are not limited, even if answers are; but understanding everything would be comprehending the divine essence, God. This is not attained in Christ in the beatific vision. (2) to being: quid sit, an sit; quid faciendum sit; what am I able to be, what should I be, what do I want to be. This 'to be' is what of itself is not limited. Limitation is of the essence of quiddity. Coreth: unlimited 'to be' is God.

New page:

In moral conversion: conversion from the good in a relative fashion to what is absolutely good. It can be conceived as a category of the human spirit, as the categorical imperative, as the root of obligation and morality. In fact it is implicit conversion to God. Being and the good are convertible. The good that is itself, by reason of itself, is good, and by participation in which other things have value, is God. You have made us for yourself, God, and our heart is restless until it rests in you. *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m.

New page:

Corollary: There is a mutual variation among (1) what has to do with the authenticity of the person, (2) religion, (3) philosophy, and (4) theology. For the originary pole is headed toward the intelligible (quid), the true (an), being (the real of the realists), and the good. The authenticity of the person is conformity between the originary pole and the existential pole. Personal authenticity is religious and moral and version, and is implicitly conversion to God and aversion from



creatures. Philosophy regards all of being. Its condition of possibility is the originary pole. Theology is reason illumined by faith, and faith illumines in two ways: by healing the wound of nature, and by elevating to divine mysteries.

This corollary is of great importance. It has to do with the absolute transcendental horizon, the total personality, the universe, in an absolute way.

New page:

Therefore:

(1) authenticity and religion: (a) the acknowledgment of God leads to the knowledge of oneself, and the knowledge of oneself leads to the acknowledgment of God; (b) the denial of God leads to ignorance of oneself, and ignorance of oneself leads to the neglect of God.

(2) authenticity and philosophy: inauthenticity grounds philosophical errors, such as the view that 'to be' is of itself logical (Kant) or minimal (Hegel). It also corrupts true philosophy. Scholasticism becomes perceptionist, extrinsicist, partial, Talmudic [?]. It does not ask about what is and seek to understand what is. It lacks interiority. Authenticity radically removes difficulties and obscurities. It is the light that shines in the darkness. It solidly lays foundations which cannot be shaken except by turning away from the intelligible, the true, being, and the good.

New page:

(3) philosophic conversion and religious conversion: a philosophy that treats philosophic conversion also treats religious conversion, but implicitly: religion regard life, philosophy the mind. Existentialism versus positivism: the question of God is either put, at least atheistically, or is regarded as an absurdity and is not in any way even raised. Religious conversion is to the true God, not to an idol of the tribe, the market, the imagination, passion. (i) there is a homology to philosophic conversion. The law, the prophetic word, the sapiential word, the word of the gospel pertain to the order of the real good, the true, being known through the true, and are opposed to the 'already out there now' and to the 'good for me,' the merely relative good. (ii) although it is not necessarily expressed in accord with differentiated consciousness, whether classical or historically minded. What the Greeks mean by logos, the Hebrews affirm in the word of God.

New page:

Philosophy and religion: Whoever regards philosophy and religion as alien to one another has departed either from authentic philosophy or from authentic religion or from both. Beyond the moment of conversion, philosophy and theology may diverge and there can be many aberrations of both. Not everyone will be able to discern between truth and errors, but one who is not able can justly doubt and deliberate about taking up the theological task. Learning is necessary, but direction and orientation determine the fruit.

New page:

(4) Christian religion and philosophy:

(a) Philosophic conversion is not a conversion to God through Christ, except implicitly. And conversion to God through Christ is not philosophic conversion except implicitly.

(b) Still, implicitly, as the development of authentic philosophy, it is part of Christian apologetics. Whatever truth there was in Hellenism was *praeparatio evangelica*, so that the development and explication of Christian doctrine entails a Christian philosophy. Some correlations are drawn at this point. See the document, p. 9.

New page:

(5) The authenticity of philosophy – Christian religion – and theology adds the supernatural explicitly and historically. The principle of theology is reason illumined by faith. We arrive at reason through intellectual and moral conversion and through healing grace.

56200D0L060

April 30

There is a co-variation of personal authenticity, religious conversion, philosophy (critical realism, and theology (reason illumined by faith), because the transcendental horizon is common to all of them.

It is one thing to have a common transcendental horizon, and quite another to arrive at a knowledge, an awareness, an appropriation of this horizon. The latter is a matter of the development of dogmas and of theology.

The process begins from the word of God, which is spoken by the Son of God and heard in the Holy Spirit. This is the word of conversion from sin and to God through Christ in the Spirit.

The very handing on of the Word manifests the principle 'quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur.' The horizon unfolds through psychological, social, and cultural development and through intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

The exclusion of heretics from communion eliminates inept and deformed modes of receiving and manifests the mode of receiving that is conformed to the word of God.

New page:

Thus the development of dogmas: the Judeo-Christians, Gnostics, Marcionites, Adoptionists, Sabellians; the naïve realists, Platonists, Arians. Nicea gave rise to Constantinople I and to Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople III.

And from there the development of theology: (1) Abelard, *Sic et non*, 158 [propositions]; (2) Gilbert of Porrée: there is a question if and only if authorities and reasons are referred to in support of either side of a contradiction; (3) what is deduced from faith and reason is not theology but a theological problem; there follows the act of understanding, to solve the problem; and there follows wisdom, to order the problems and solutions, where what is first is what doesn't presuppose understanding something else, and what is last is what does not presuppose anything except what has been understood prior [not sure of this: *ultimum est quod nisi prius intelli[?] non supponit*]. (4) Extrinsicism is not concerned with fostering and developing intelligence, but with terms, propositions, syllogisms. Decadence: theology is about conclusions – i.e., it does not understand sources or theological principles; history is a rhetorical exercise: theses from tradition are proved from the Scriptures, Popes, the Fathers, theologians, reason.

New page:

We withdraw to a certain extent from such decadence: commonly systematic theology is despised, because it is rejected or not known, but still we seek an understanding of the sources, and with great diligence attend to the psychological, social, and cultural development of the horizon; but at the same time attention to the intellectual, moral, and religious conversion of the horizon is feared.

Everything can be asserted a priori about the authors in a superficial manner, composed of concrete details: who, what, when, how, why, when; and with psychological, social, and cultural details; but not a word is spoken about conversion of the transcendental horizon. An honorable exception is found in Bultmann and his follows, who however attribute intellectual conversion to a mythic mentality.

Anyone who wants to overlook this question is not able to speak or thing seriously about method. Religious conversion without intellectual conversion leads to a radically confused theology. Intellectual conversion without religious conversion leads to clarity and distinctness but without a soul.

56300D0L060

April 30 (2)

### Religious conversion B

Religion under the explicit, historical, interpersonal aspect is the transition from the reign of sin to the reign of God.

Sin: (a) what is said, done, desired against the law of God – formal sin; aversion from God and conversion to creatures, known and chosen (indirectly); (b) sin is known through the law: Romans 3.20; it is conversion to creatures, aversion from God preceding knowledge and choice; the wound of ignorance, malice, concupiscence, infirmity: 1-2, q. 85, a. 3; (c) thus, we are born without the virtues, the habits of good operation; until we acquire the virtues, we lack them, and whoever lacks the virtues lacks prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, the arts; in individual cases one is able through inquiry, reflection, deliberation to know and choose the good, but is not able in similar cases to inquire, reflect, deliberate. *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 12; compare *In II Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2.

New page:

The reign of sin: sin reigns in the world, Romans 6.20.

(1) this is omitted in classical philosophy, which treats of man as such and of that which is common to people asleep and awake, children and adults, wise and foolish.

(2) it is the terminus a quo of Christianity and of the NT (Romans 1.18-3.20) and the terminus a quo of apologetics, which wants to lead others to conversion. Classical apologetics: homo inquiring about a hypothetical divine revelation, and about his hypothetical obligations.

(3) it is a historical fact of the first magnitude; history that prescind from sin prescind from concrete fact, which is found always and everywhere; it is not out of humility but in truth that we pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses.' This has decisive effects under other aspects but especially under the religious aspect.

(4) the fact of sin is not omitted just because the principal element is omitted in a historical account.

New page:

What is the reign of sin? A model, that is, not a fact, a typical case that is described, but a dynamic scheme that (1) necessarily is verified, under the hypothesis of sin, (2) exhibits the indubitable consequences of sin, given sin.

'Gratia operans' *Theological Studies* 1941-42, *Insight*, especially chapters 6, 7, 18, 20, and Epilogue.

It is the reign of sin (1) because it excludes religious conversion, and (2) it distorts psychological, social, and cultural development. Thus it enters as a determination of methodical categories: comparative, synthetic-organic [N.B., earlier this was 'complexiva'], genetic, dialectical: horizon understood developmentally and in terms of conversion.

New page:

It distorts development. How does one attain to the synthetic-organic, and the genetic [development]? (a) by nature: family, hunger, thirst, fruit-gathering, fishing, hunting, cultivation of the earth, among primitives, and after a nuclear war; (b) all further matters from the data through inquiry, understanding, counsel, election, action, doing, whence at a given time the progressive process starts over again on its own. Challenge and Response as model, not as empirical generalization: Walsh, *Philosophy* 1963, *Toynbee Reconsidered*.

New page:

Insofar as sin enters (1) there enters something unintelligible, irrational, absurd, contrary to right reason. Why did Adam sin? Why did the angels sin? If there were a 'why,' it would not be sin. There are apparent reasons and excuses, but there is no *reason* why sin is, since sin is precisely opposed to *reason*. There is a radical dialectical element, a contradiction between the rational and the irrational.

(2) There enters something absurd into the *human* situation. The absurd is not found only in the inner acts of will but also in the consequent action and doing/making.

(3) The absurd enters into the human situation in a cumulating way: given the reign of sin, just as earlier so also later counsels are distorted by the absurd; in lieu of a progressive process there is had a process of growing absurdity. [Sideline: revolution, reform, *aggiornamento*]

New page:

(4) Look at human affairs with new eyes. We do not need the writings of Kafka and Camus, but just inspect those daily affairs that students and professors ask about, that the faithful ask about, and acknowledge as absurd what are absurd, ask and you will find sin, the probability of sin, the fear [?] of sin and abuse [?]. Along these lines are social, political, economic, bureaucratic, educational, legal determinisms. We are caught in snares, even after Christ, even in priestly and religious life. How much more other works, subordinates, administrators, in industry, commerce, medicine, military, diplomacy, the scientific world.

New page:

(5) Not only is the human situation cumulatively penetrated with absurdities and distorted, but also human culture makes its own compromises. Culture is a kind of superstructure. The meaning that is embodied, not in daily practical actions but in art and letters, is not necessarily corrupted by the absurdity of the concrete situation; it can oppose the absurdity, and the higher it is, the more vehemently it will do so.

But this opposition seems 'unreal,' in an ivory tower, separated and segregated from concrete life, from any possible concrete way of living. Then cultural works are 'idealistic,' and what is realistic is what displays man as he is, and what is approved is man who lives as best he can.

The reign of sin:

(1) We are not describing a particular case. Positivists describe. We are exhibiting a model, a mechanism, causes, conjoined factors.

(2) Human life is constituted insofar as *either* it becomes absolutely the same as before, the primitive state of the society, 'nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes) *or* it becomes something different when it is a matter of going from the data, through understanding and counsel, deliberation and consensus, to a change in the situation, whence new data, new understanding, etc.: a circle unfolding on its own.

New page:

(3) Given the reign of sin, there enters the absurd, the irrational, not only a stain in the will but the irrational in action itself, in the consequent situation, in the data for future understanding.

(4) The absurd enters cumulatively. The font does not dry up, as long as the reign of sin obtains. Every element, even the least, of the human situation is penetrated and corrupted by the absurd. If there occur revolution, reformation, renewal, even these are not without the absurd. The more radically it happens, the more profoundly does the absurd enter in.

New page:

(5) Once the irrational situation has taken hold, it practically forces sin to occur. Human solidarity is such that without heroic virtue we are not able not to act as others act. This is interior moral impotence: without habits we cannot act well, because we are not able always to inquire, to reflect, to deliberate. Patience is easy when others are patient, honest, urbane, truthful, prompt to help and assist, but my moral situation is different if I want to be patient, honest, urbane, truthful, prompt to help and assist, but others are angry, dishonest, boorish, mendacious, egotistical: in the family, when husband and wife do not agree on morality; in industry, when workers and employers are mutually opposed; in commerce when no one trusts anyone else; in law, medicine, the military, politics, diplomacy, the academy, the church.

New page:

(6) in the situation of the reign of sin the intellect is corrupted: (a) from the side of the will, which experiencing its own moral impotence joyfully accepts whatever moral, political, economic, etc., teaching that praises rather than reprehends this impotence; (b) from the side of the situation itself: data lead to understanding; per se this is an infallible process when the data are intelligible; but given the reign of sin, the data are penetrated with the irrational and the absurd; if no judgment, distinction, separation is made, if human nature and human iniquity are not distinguished, then the absurd itself is a datum to be interpreted, to be understood, to be considered in any taking counsel, and to be accepted in the formulation of principles.

New page:

(c) This occurs in two ways: in practical judgment, where ‘*primum est vivere,*’ and morals and precepts of the church are good for people who do not know much about human life; and in a more speculative way (i) *raison d'état, Realpolitik*; (ii) Machiavelli abandons theories about rights and determines how to proceed efficiently to obtaining and holding on to supreme power; (iii) empirical human sciences in a mechanist-determinist way reveal how to proceed efficiently toward ends that in themselves are praiseworthy; (iv) philosophies move in this direction; and it occurs through the media of communication, literary works, newspapers, television, movies.

New page:

(7) a succession of ever less comprehensive syntheses: illustrated (i) because of church corruption, the reformation took place through division; (ii) because of the wars of religion, rationalism insisted there was no positive supernatural religion; (iii) because of the disagreements of reason liberalism, tolerance take over; because of the social ineffectiveness of liberalism, there is a totalitarianism, in which reason itself is an ideology a mythic superstructure.

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May 3

Transition from the reign of sin to the reign of God is aversion from creatures and conversion to God.

(1) The perfect aversion is death: death is the wages of sin. Death takes away not only visible things but sight; not only audible things but hearing; not only



touchable things but touch. Although Christ neither committed nor had sin, he made his own the perfection which alone is possible to us; not only did he die, he suffered and died. Hebrews 2.10: It was fitting that God ... should make the pioneer of salvation perfect through sufferings. Hebrews 5.8: He learned obedience from those things that he suffered.

(2) The Christian, before dying bodily, dies to sin so as to live for God. Rolmans 6.2-11, Colossians 3.1-4. The death and resurrection of Christ, mortification and prayer.

New page:

(3) As in the epilogue of *Insight*, opposed forces: the depravation of intellect over against faith as healing and as elevating; the determinism of the will over against hope; the absurdity of the situation over against charity. 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth' is justice bringing equality, but in an absurd situation, the perpetual absurd returns over and over again. Matthew 5.30ff.

56600D0L060

May 3

(1) We have described horizon. It is differentiated relatively and absolutely: relatively, in accord with psychological, social, and cultural development; absolutely in accord with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

(2) Horizon is found both in the object and in the subject: in the object, whether this be (i) the immediate realities of living or (ii) what the one being studied writes, the tendencies he/she exhibits in common with others, the schools to which he/she belongs, or (iii) the histories he/she writes, or (iv) the critical judgments he/she passes on histories; in the subject, the one who treats the object, in the theologian, in me.

(3) As horizons vary, the field varies. Authenticity or inauthenticity, whether the authenticity be rationalized or just a matter of blindness.

New page:

(4) Method determines the horizon: Christian, the horizon of writers or theologians, or historians, of critics. This determination is factual; that is, it does not follow the way of empiricists or positivists, for facts are not known before the data are understood. The factual determination takes in everything that regards

psychological, social, and cultural development. This determination is also critical, and this means that it takes in everything that regards intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

This is the method of history, hermeneutics, positive studies. At the same time it is the method which judges, discerns the sheep and the goats, reveals aberrations and progress. It has an a priori element, which however is *ad utrumque*: either the same or different (comparative), either organic or incoherent, either developint or static, either position or counterposition.

New page:

(4) It discerns between what is of greater and of lesser moment to the theologian. The theologian especially considers the horizon as absolute, as having to do with conversion, and less the horizon as relative, as having to do with psychological, social, and cultural development.

For example, from the New Testament to Nicea, the theologian does not study everything psychological, social, cultural, but those things that have to be known in order to distinguish positions from counterpositions.

(5) Wisdom in the speculative domain, prudence in the practical. But once historical consciousness has arisen, there is a need for wisdom regarding the concrete. Wisdom regarding the concrete is understood inasmuch as it is included in method. Method is open to everything, factual, critical, evaluative.

(6) It does not bring it about that everyone thinks the same: there are as many ideas as there are horizons. It expects, explains, and judges differences.

56700D0L060

May 7

Method:

The horizon is determined: of Christians, of theological authors, of historians, of critics.

It is determined descriptively: who, what, when, how, why, where.

It is determined in an explanatory fashion: comparative (same and different), synthetic (organically connected or not), genetic (developing or static), dialectical (position or counterposition).

From this it is clear that the horizon is determined relatively according to psychological, social, and cultural development, and absolutely according to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

Method involves an a priori, which resides in questions and is *ad utrumque*.

It involves facts, since it responds to questions by judging facts. Facts are not the same as data. Human knowledge is composed.

It involves critical judgment: positions and counterpositions.

New page:

Although method of itself has to do with human science, still because it includes transcendental horizon, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, automatically it is a matter of theology. Still theology discovers in the concrete both psychological, social, and cultural development, and intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, these are not lived and expressed separately. Theology discovers them in such a way that it appears clearly that what happens in psychological, social, and cultural development is like a garment, and is relative, but what happens in accord with conversion is what wears the garment, and is absolute.

New page:

Because it attends to the transcendental horizon, it attends not only to religious conversion conceived in some vague manner but to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and their co-variation vis-à-vis one another.

- (1) It is automatically theology, and in a comprehensive way.
- (2) This method is radically opposed to any positivism, whether theoretical or practical. Theoretical: there is no valid consideration of the entire field, of the concrete field, of everything; there is no possible architectonic science. It admits of method but not transcendental method. Practical: only those questions are to be considered on which all agree. No question is scientific that touches on transcendental matters. Cf. the British Royal Society.

We proceed differently:

- (1) transcendental consideration enters into our very method;
- (2) it enters 'ad utrumque'; [or the 'ad utrumque' enters (into our method)];
- (3) the diverse views of investigators are explained by their horizons;
- (4) diverse methods are explained in terms of authentic and inauthentic horizon.

Method is such as to exhibit unity in differences, continuity in development. There is a problem of categories and a problem of transposition.

On every subject and every object there are found (1) an ordinary pole: experiencing, inquiring, reflecting, deliberation, which develops psychologically, socially, culturally, under influence – but by assimilation and accommodation (Piaget), otherwise verbalism, extrinsicism, conformism, inauthenticity; (2) an existential pole that is authentic or inauthentic in accord with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion; (3) a field, whether implicit or explicit, which is not created from nothing, but which passes from being conscious to being known when it occurs explicitly.

New page:

This unity and continuity are grounded in the transcendental element; if it is removed, all that remains are the relative differences of psychological, social, and cultural development.

Then there emerge those ultimate and irreducible things like Hebraism, Greekism, Gnosticism, Hellenisms, dogmatism, Scholasticism, none of which is truly understood; these are concluded from many fields; there is nothing but human beings and documents.

There also emerge absurd demands. (1) fidelity to divine revelation is to Judaize, to put on the Hebraic mentality, which seems to make the New Testament a contradiction; (2) the transition from the New Testament to the councils is judged to be impossible; the transition from an implicit to an explicit objective field; (3) the living church is overlooked, assimilating the new and transforming it in a Christian way.

New page:

Because the transcendental is included, there is included a radical critique. The biblical conceptions are one thing, but modern conceptions of biblical conceptions are something else. These are divided according to modern horizons, but the biblical conceptions themselves are not.

Bultmann: *soma* is my body as an object; honest, scientific, but, in my view, erroneous. Those who overlook their horizons either do not know this, and are less scientific, or know it, and are less honest.

An objection: It is impossible for experts in positive data to attend to such things. Response: in modern physics there are experiments and mathematicians. In like fashion, investigators can do their work in such a way as not to discern what is really the variety, but to offer the material to a transcendental critique.

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The dynamic aspect of horizon

The problematic has to do with the questions connected to method. Questions are divided in several ways.

First, according to material: physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, human reality, divine reality.

Next, according to the way of considering the material. Classically, there is the division of speculative and practical, and these can be descriptive, explanatory, existential, transcendental, practical, hermeneutical, historical.

Third, according to the way in which the question is put. It can simply be put; it can be put and explained; it can be put, explained, and justified. Congar *DTC* 15, 370 s. Abelard *ML* 178 1339-1610. The way it is put will vary according to cultural and ... situation. Mention of Cano, theses to be proved from theological *loci*.

New page:

Fourth, according to operations: the problem of understanding, What? Why? and the problem of fact, Whether?

Fifth, according to the connection of questions with one another. Some questions are quite independent of each other, e.g., those of physics and those of literature.

Some are remotely connected in terms of the hierarchy of the sciences. And some are proximately connected. Concerning the latter:

(A) Some problems are not solved unless others are solved first. Sometimes, as soon as some are solved, this leads to the solution of others.

(B) The task of wisdom is to order, to find that which is 'technically first,' which when solved leads to the solution of a second question, and when these two are solved, a third can be solved, and when these three are solved, a fourth can be solved, etc., etc.

The task of understanding is to treat of principles by grasping the solution to the first question.

The task of science is to solve what is explicitly consequent and connected.

New page:

(C) Systems: connected problems and connected solutions lead to connected conceptions. As solutions are derived from the first solution, so conceptions are from the first conception.

(D) Technical terminology corresponds to systematic conceptions as opposed to what is thought in a commonsense mode.

(E) The way of analysis, before the system has been reached, and the way of synthesis, after the system has been reached. In the way of analysis, the order of wisdom is not known. Beyond any intention, per accidens, one moves to the goal: it is a movement from whatever most excites one's wonder (that which is more apparent, is commonly spoken of, solemnly believed) to that which is systematically first.

New page:

(6) The temporality of questions:

(A) before – truly excites wonder

(B) after – does not excite, is a solvable argument

Solution is not known or is habitual, and if habitual is an instrument of education (via synthetic) or an object of history (via analytica, where movement is understood from the term. The understanding of doctrine and the understanding of the history of doctrine are reciprocally related.

(B) A system that has been discovered (1) can be rejected, (2) can pass into oblivion, (3) and can be renewed and perfected.

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May 10

The dynamic aspect of horizon is an intrinsic aspect. The subject is constituted, the originary pole of questions: experiencing, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating. Questions are put in three ways: spontaneously, explicitly, and scientifically (where reasons for the question are assigned).

The reasons are reduced to types: There is the problem of coherence in something; coherence is lacking, *Sic et Non*; in quo, *Libri sententiarum*. There is the problem of understanding, by analogy with what we know naturally, and the connection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end. There is the problem of fact, which is put in many ways. [RD: Note that this material is repeated in section 3 of the first chapter of *De Deo trino: Pars systematic* (1964), a part that is quite new in comparison with the earlier *Divinarum personarum* (1957, 1959). See *The Triune God: Systematics*.] The present notes may be the source of the material found there. It is the earliest mention I have found yet.]

New page:

The notion of systematic understanding: (1) connected questions, (2) the order of the solution – wisdom, (3) the understanding of the principle, (4) the knowledge (science) of conclusions, (5) the concept of a formal system, (6) technical terminology.

The Commentary on the *Sentences*, the minor collections of questions (*De veritate*, *De potentia*, *De malo*, *De virtutibus*, *Quodlibeta*); the major collections of questions (the *Summa theologiae*).

System: separated from the problem of coherence, the explanation of the sources is deduced: *Summa contra Gentiles*.

New page:

The fate of a system: theology and the life of the church

Differentiation of consciousness: (1) the subject is different (Thales and the milkmaid), (2) the apprehension of the world is different (3) the concepts are different, (4) the language is different, (5) the problems are different, the intelligible solutions are different, (6) the social community and culture (in the anthropological sense) are different, popular vs. academic.

The Christian life: bible, Fathers, Councils, liturgy, Roman breviary, lives of the saints. The theological life: the questions of assimilation, baptism, Greco-Arabic culture.

Distinguish: differentiation of consciousness and separation of cultures.

Differentiation of consciousness: religion enters, assumes its place, in the world of theology. Separation: theology is removed from the universities and taught in seminaries, the cleric has his own culture, the lay person develops a different culture. The cleric is not understood by the lay person and the lay person is not understood by the cleric. To defend differentiation is not ipso facto to defend separation. [The name of Alonzo Schökl is mentioned.]

New page:

The fate of system in the field of theology itself. It grows: through extension: system regarding Trinity, Incarnation, grace, sacraments, church; it grows through organization: common principles, philosophy is not some particular discipline it is the reflection and expression of the mind itself, of reason itself. The covariation of rational psychology, epistemology, ontology, natural theology is the same as that of authenticity, religion, philosophy, theology.

It not only grows but also is perfected, through the more complete understanding of principles, whether from the culture of Greek science or from the analogy of material nature.

New page:

The fate of the system: [RD: Note that this material on the fate of the system is also included in section 3 of chapter 1 of *De Deo trino, Pars systematica* (now *The Triune God: Systematics* 26-29.)



The system can be completely rejected. (1) What 'to understand' means is not grasped. (2) The problem of understanding is eliminated. Problems are either problems of coherence or of fact. (3) Systematic understanding is thought to be a new doctrine connected to philosophical dogmas. (4) The systematic understanding of scripture, the Fathers, the councils, the better teachers is thought rather to be a rejection of these sources. Augustine is said to mean something Augustine never thought. This can happen in a simplistic medieval sense as in Roger Marston, or in a modern and historical manner. (5) One goes back to the problem of coherence and speaks about absolute necessities and absolute possibilities, or one goes back to popular culture. Then one proceeds to the question of fact.

New page:

The fate of system

With poor understanding: (1) the understanding of the principle is not increased but decreased; (2) conclusions solve problems imperfectly; (3) there arises a new generation of problems, not simply from the fonts of revelation, the Fathers, the councils but from these along with a poorly understood system; (4) there follow a new order for the less wise, new principles for those who understand less, and new conclusions for the less scientific; (5) there follow, not once but over and over, (a) a multiplication of interpretations and schools, (b) disputations, (c) the imposition of uniformity from outside, (4) the sociology of knowledge. *DTC* [RD: BL may be referring to Congar's articles 'Théologie'].

New page:

The problem of fact

The old Protestants: De gratia, De sacramentis, De ecclesia: medieval development.

Rationalists: no positive religion, return to common principles.

Liberals: living religion is positive religion, the value of religion without dogmas, with true propositions.

Atheists: that value of religion is alienation, a projection of human excellence into the sky. Human value of acknowledged.

Historians, historical knowledge: Concerning the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, the value of the fonts; concerning the gospels, the New Testament, and the Hellenism of the councils; concerning dogmas and systematic theology; concerning the fonts and systematic theology.

Historical responsibility: systematic theology and Christian culture; Christial culture and secularized culture.

New page:

Once the problem of fact has been posed:

(1) a transition from questions to be determined to theses to be determined [?] from theological loci; (2) theological understanding is transmuted into theological reason; before, connected problems led to systematic solutions; after, systematic solutions create a proof of fact; (3) systematic solutions do not prove facts unless they are contained in the fonts; to find systematic solutions in the fonts is anachronism; Paul and John are read as if they were disciples of St Thomas; Thomas is read as if he were a disciple of John of St Thomas! Systematic solutions arise in time and develop in time, DB 1800, 2314.

Dogmatic definitions are not in the fonts. That is archaism. 'The same truth in the same sense' DB 1800, 2314; but in what way the same sense and the same truth: the dogmatic and hermeneutic problem.

New page:

Historicism: K. Heussi, *Die Krisis des Historismus* Tübingen 1932.

Historicism: a historical and historiographical conception commonly accepted around the beginning of the twentieth century. Four characteristics: (1) two remain: organic thinking (systematic) and evolutionism (genetic). (2) one thing is excluded, that there exists an objective structure of facts independently of every philosophical operation, which the historian discerns and narrates. (3) The second barely changes (History does not determine anything about deeper questions. Harnack, *Wesen des Christentums*) unless not received at the margin of historical knowledge. (4) today there is more attention paid to the history of ideas and of doctrines.

(1) whether there exists an objective structure of facts

- (2) whether the objective structure of facts is narrated, intended, in the sources
- (3) whether the historian discerns and narrates some objective structure of facts.

Connected with the inerrancy of the Bible: can biblical authors narrate an objective structure of facts? Is this presupposed by those who argue against modern exegesis?

The historical problem under the psychological, gnoseological, epistemological aspect.

New page:

Historical relativism, given the victory of historicism in Heussi's sense:

- (1) history is not yet finished; given past developments, great light is thrown onto earlier events; Rostozeff; so too with future developments;
- (2) history is *materia prima*: it consists of data; the data themselves have meaning, whether superficial or full and concrete; and for the different culture, nation, religion, education of historians the superficial sense is preserved in different ways, and the full sense is understood in different ways.
- (3) history can be right, but whether it is true is not scientifically resolved. E. Rothacker.

New page:

The existential victory of historicism, relativism:

- (1) the field of objective scientific inquiry is for those matters on which everyone is in agreement
- (2) myth in a popular form, *Weltanschauung*, and in an erudite form, in systems
- (3) demythologization, existential interpretation, reduced to the orientation of the subject
- (4) interior personal response: *existenziell*, faith

New page:

Function of Catholic biblical, archeological, patristic, liturgical, sociological, historical [studies]

Does it uniquely contribute to proving and understanding Catholic truth? Is it an essential auxiliary discipline? Does it directly contribute to Christian culture and the life of the Church? Or indirectly, so that it is present to the theologian as a medium, or so that better known analogies are present to the theologian? (Carrier concerning Congar). Or indirectly, mediating between secularized culture and theological knowledge, to take away the schism of laicism and secularism. Is biblical study etc. Catholic because it is continually occupied with adding to the proofs of faith, or because it accepts a method from the theologian which through dialectic automatically baptizes what is human? [RD: seems like a bunch of insignificant problems that Lonergan moved beyond quickly, ni fallor.]

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May 14

Theological problems:

I. The possibility of the development of dogmas and of theology. (1) Vincent of Lerins, 'quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus'; increase of understanding, knowledge, wisdom tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum et saeculorum gradibus, idem sensus, idem dogma, eadem sententia. (2) The first is more easily understood: Christ, the apostles, the church successively preach the same truth. (3) What is more easily understood, is alone understood by many. (4) Whence anachronism: if it is taught today by the church or by theology, it was always taught, if not explicitly, then implicitly. What is this 'implicitly'? What is required and sufficient that something be *always* taught but in such a way that it is *easily* understood? From this we get a systematic misinterpretation of the sources.

New page:

(5) Or archaism: what is not contained in the sources is a later corruption, or at least a superfluous addition. The dogmas developed later, and only the history of the origin is clearly and distinction easier, and so the dogmas are not in the sources. Theology presupposes not only faith but also doctrine, which is a Greek or medieval add-on; and so theological pronouncements are to be rejected or at least not paid any attention.

From this there follows a threefold effect, clearly expounded by Newman: ignorance, since what is omitted is not known; mutilation of the whole, and knowledge is of the whole not in an additive sense but in a comprehensive sense;

and the remaining parts are distorted: a vacuum cannot be retained; the other parts assume for themselves what once pertained to the omitted part; it's like the partition of Poland. If matters whose explanation is juridical or religious or systematic are not going to be acknowledged as 'juridical,' 'religious,' or 'systematic,' then they will receive some other explanation. E.g., if philosophy and systematic theology are omitted, recourse is had to historical speculation.

New page:

(6) Controversies: Anachronists give a systematic misinterpretation or inexact interpretation of the sources (scripture, the Fathers, St Thomas). Archaists ignore a part, mutilate the whole, and distort the remainder. The material for controversy from these two sources is great.

(7) Ecumenism: Christians in a laicized or secularized culture, precepts of charity and prayer for unity, diminution of the dogmatic spirit. Some understanding of development: I would not say exact, and I would deny it is needed by all.

A non-understanding of dogmatic theology

Modern science attends to the data very well, effectively promotes understanding, is most certain its negations, and is incapable of positive certitude.

Ideas are divided into opportune and surpassed, rather than into true and false.

The dogmatic theologian in modern culture is a stumbling block.

New page:

(8) One who wants a method of theology wants theology as a science in which there is a dogmatic element of judgment, of true or false, accrues to the understanding of the data without removing the understanding of the data. Such a one wants not only comparative, synthetic, and genetic study, but also dialectic. He/she is not pleased, on the one hand, with what does not think of data and understanding, and on the other with what does not consider judgment. *Glauben und Verstehen, Existentialismus*. One can believe he knows all there is to be known about method, yet not know what is intended in a course 'De methodo theologiae.'

(9) A problem: is what precisely does dogmatic and theological development consist?

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May 14

Problems

## II. History

(1) Existential history: What is to the existence of the community as memory is to the existence of a given individual. If I suffered from amnesia, I would not know that I was (a) Canadian, (b) Catholic, (c) a religious, (d) a priest, (e) a professor of theology, (f) residing in Piazza della Pilotta. Perhaps I would do some strange things. Equally a community that has no memory of itself ceases to exist. There are taken away accepted modes of acting, the foundation of mutual understanding, of common conversation, collaboration, common deliberation, common decision.

(2) Narrative history: The larger and older a community is, the less does memory suffice, the simple handing on from father to son, and the more there is needed for the existence of the community a composed and narrated history that is recited or written. This history does not intend a mere collection of facts or even principally a collection of facts, but has an existential goal: through the narrated facts it communicates the vision of the world, the *Weltanschauung*; it occupies itself with the task that is informative (*quid sit*), explanatory (*cur sit*), ethical (what is to be praised and blamed), prophetic (*quid faciendum*), apologetic, artistic. To this end it selects the facts and orders them insofar as they help bring this about. What is principally intended takes on a flow of words: *Rem tene, verba sequentur*. What is not principally intended is said with economy of words, as much as possible, within the limits of well disposed ordered speech.

New page:

(3) 'Critical' history 'Historismus' as in K. Heussi, *Die Krisis des Historicismus* (Tübingen 1932).

(a) It describes itself. (1) It intends to determine the past facts themselves. *Wie es eigentlich gewesen*, what really happened. So it is not concerned with deep causes, ultimate reasons, but with events as we all know them in our daily life. Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums* is not historical except perhaps marginally. Hegel is methodical, Toynbee Spengler. (2) It admits no presuppositions, whether

philosophical, religious, cultural, or national; it is *Voraussetzungslos*. It does not deny the historians find it difficult to free themselves from every subjective influence, but it states an ideal of objectivity. Facts are real in themselves, with interconnections, etc., and these real facts and their connections the historian wishes to apprehend as they are on the side of the object.

New page: (3) Since narrative history is not content just with the facts it creates the crisis of narrative historians. It seeks a supplement from all other remains of the past in order to narrate in an orderly fashion the facts, at least those of major importance, according to assigned times and places, persons, actions, described motives. (4) It seems obvious, sane, inevitable. Even today it is regarded and most evident and certain by all who do not think seriously about historical method. E.g., the historical Jesus: inquiry about the facts is the principal element of the history to which all else is subordinate. If one cannot determine the facts, to that extent one knows nothing about the historical reality, the deeds that were done.

New page:

(b) The fate of critical history. It is rejected as methodically erroneous in ... according to Heussi between 1920-1930. There is removed the presupposition concerning objective and structured facts to be inspected and narrated. In this there is the error, not because there don't really exist persons, actions, and interrelations, but because knowledge is mythically conceived as perception. Data give way to understanding, and this leads to judgment. Presuppositions cannot be excluded concerning common principles; *quidquid recipitur ...* But this solution presupposes philosophy. The commonly acknowledged philosophy leads to relativism: (a) presuppositions cannot be excluded; (b) but no criterion of solution is given in what is presupposed. There is a movement from truth to correctness.

New page:

(4) Historical relativism:

Either (a) on the side of the principle, philosophy etc. cannot be excluded, and *Voraussetzungslosigkeit* is a myth. Then between philosophies there is no sure selection. There is a transition from truth to correctness. Historical documents: for every assertion there is given a document; documents are critically evaluated; *quo altius exigitur monumentum, eo magis apparet subiectivitas*.

Or (b) on the part of the object: descriptively, who, what, when, how, why, when; explanatory: comparative, synthetic, genetic, but not dialectical, for then there enters judgment, which is not a matter of *Verstehen* or *Entscheiden*. It is not known by the Greeks, by essentialists, by empiricists, by idealists, by existentialists.

New page:

This element in the object is a very small problem. Tertullian employed two notions of reality. What is reality? It is essential under the dogmatic aspect. The synthetic and genetic are psychological, cultural, social, and affect the horizon as relative.

New page:

(5) History and existentialism: No presuppositions → many unknown and false presuppositions. Correctness → conventionalism. Some other words here are not clear.

Bultmann:

(1) there is a certain inductive technique by which there is attained what is acknowledged by everybody everywhere: historical-critical method is extrinsic only, in the realm of exteriority, and mundane, in the realm of the world. The historical Jesus = *historische*.

(2) There are extra-scientific assertions in the order of *Weltanschauung*, ontology, metaphysics, dogmatic theology. If these are taken literally, they are myth, systematic conception, but they admit an existential interpretation which is reduced to the subject: the *geschichtliche* Jesus.

(3) There is the question put to me to which I respond in the existenziell manner, *Der kerygmatische Iesus*. The entire question is whether there is given objective truth besides that which is attained by extrinsicist and mundane science.

New page:

For the dogmatic theologian there exists a problem regarding the very method of history. If it proceeds in accord with what are commonly acknowledged, it proceeds in accord with (1) 'critical' history, (2) historical relativism, (3) some





counterpositions of the investigator, OK; but if it is omitted or distorted, that is the place for the critical function.

(C) Data are not enough: a sea of prime matter.

(In physics) From above differential equations, from below empirical laws. Either conventionalism (Husserl *Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissensch[aften]*) or transcendental a priori.

(New page)

Existential history: Bultmann F. Eller

(1) *Historie*: There are technical history and historical critical method, which attain what is known by everybody. Just as mathematics, physics, and chemistry, so any universally accepted history. But these are extrinsically 'facts' and mundane.

(2) *Geschichte*: There are extra-scientific affirmations in the sources: *Weltanschauung*, ontology, objective theology: these are *mythos*, contra (?) philosophical immanence, But they have a true sense from the subject: *die existentielle Interpretation*

(3) *Kerygmatic*: the question is put to me about myself: *Existenziell*.

(New page)

The crisis of Bultmann's position:

Concerning 2 and 3, reducible to the crisis of immanentism.

Concerning 1: there exists a historical field of questions and answers on which consent can be presumed, consisting of matters that do not transfer directly or indirectly into questions of truth and values: whether Brutus killed Caesar, whether Jesus of Nazareth suffered under Pontius Pilate. This field is extrinsic and mundane. Its extent is judged differently by different people. Besides the mediation of the past through historical worlds, there exists a mediation of the past through tradition. The church is a historical fact which testifies about historical facts.

Gadamer, p. 255: the prejudice of the Enlightenment against prejudice is a means of destroying tradition. G. Ebeling, "Die Bedeutung der historische Kritischen; Methode für die protestantische Theologie", *Z[eitschrift] f[ür] T[heologie und] K[irche]* 47 (1950), 33. Also *Wort und Glaube*, Tübingen, 1960.

The *Historismus* of the nineteenth century, relativism. The crisis has not yet been overcome; it is a deception to think it has.

(New page)

### ***History***

#### *Hermeneutics:*

Problem of knowledge transposed into context of problem of interpretation; first solve critical problem & conclude re interpretation or tackle possibility of interpretation as practical solution to problem of knowledge

#### *History vs Nature:*

transformation of metaphysics  
on analogy of natural science  
on analogy of human science.

Not “quid” but “quis” → transformation of theological categories.

(New page)

### History

I (1) about the past as such

(2) about the past as a temporal dimension in particular human sciences

Learning from history, which is assumed as a part, aside from the problems of religion, art, literature, science, the state, the law. There arises the free subject who uses history.

(3) about the past as a temporal dimension in Catholic life.

Theology → human science

→ Catholic life                      ||technical                      kerygmatic  
| Christian culture

II Object: relatively fixed

Relatively fluid

57300D0L060      May 28

History: Gnoseology → criterion of history

Metaphysics → reality of history

as reality: it is what man does, makes;  
                  what man undoes, replaces  
homo ||se[cun]dum evolutionem: Destiny  
      |se[cun]dum conversionem: Decision

||Highest level of reflection on human action  
|concrete context of existential decision

Past: ||sets the stage: situationem  
      |provides the needs, exigences, opportunities  
      |provides collaboration & opponents

Decision, [labor] -----, meets the occasion

(New page)

### ***Nature & History***

not Hegelian – Hegel [contrasts] ||derivation of Nature  
  |account of Nature /  
  *Spirit* transcendental (missed) & transcendent (misconceived)

### ***Nature in scales of Spirit***

- 1) Polus originarius
- 2) but must add polus existentialis  
      not per se which just limits polus existentialis
- 3) Intellect & will                           Intellectuallism vs Voluntarism
  - a) highest level of consciousness is not speculative  
  not practical (classical dire[m]ptio[n])  
  but *rational self-consciousness*  
  disposing of self  
  both spec[ulative]  
  and prac[tical]
  - b) in highest level intellect can & should lead  
          reflective understanding → judg[ment] of Value → Will

### ***Hist[orical] consciousness***

||Speculative (systematic) on action: tool of practical man  
  on man: illumination of existential decision  
Catholic: faith that operates through charity

(New page)

### ***Mediatio***

relation || of the parts with one another

|between the parts and the whole

- mechanical: deest pars ||inutile |periculosa
- organic: mediates itself ||develops & maintains parts by which it functions;  
|is a mediation of the species
- human: ||*psychological* ||immediate operations;  
|mediated operations;  
|operations on the mediators: (language, math[ematics], logic);  
technically organized universe  
(nat[ural] |hum[ane] |theo[logical] sciences)—  
|subject (critical methodical existential destiny)
- |*social*: whole constituted by ||common apprehension  
|common consent
- |*cultural*: the character of apprehension  
|the [interaction] of the assent
- Catholic: Non est Iudaeus neque Graecus / a new principle transformation:  
||Jew & Greek subsidiary particularly  
|catholic, universal perpetual

(New page)

***Mediation of the New Man in Christ Jesus*** Neither Jew nor Greek Gal 3,28

Undiff[erentiated] consciousness:

- Non technical* mode of understanding in commonsense development  
immediate communication  
example, preaching, summaries (creeds, catechism), liturgy, church discipline }  
mediated communication: letters, documents, books  
V[etus] T[estamentum], N[ovum] T[estamentum], written official decisions, X[ris]tian  
litterature (sources, present kerygm[a])

Classical consciousness:

- Technical*: mode of understanding that defines terms & deduces conclusions  
mode of communication proper to a universal, perpetual church: neither Jew nor  
Greek  
*dogmatic moment*: transposition from the non-technical to the technical  
same truth, same sense but different categories & context –DB 1792, 1800, 2714  
transition from biblical to catholic categories & context  
*systematic moment*: rounds out the field of technical statement Intelligentia  
myst[eriorum]: Analogia [cum iis quae naturaliter cognoscimus], Nexus [mysteriorum inter  
se]

Historical consciousness:

- Methodical*: reflects on process ||positive, |dogmatic, |systematic, |kerygmatic  
distinguishes parts, assigns limits, determines functions of each  
relates each to the others, works out foundations, excludes radical errors



prevents confusions, mutilations, distortions  
Subject, interiority, *polus orig[inarius]*  
    *exsist[entialis]*, as foundation of all that can be ||said |known.

*N[on]–t[echanical]*: Aut Judaeus aut Graecus;  
*Tech[nical] Cath[olic]*: Neque Judaeus neque Graec[us];  
*Meth[odical]*: et Judaeus et Graecus et Cath[olicus]

(New page)

- 1) Technical expression —*homoousios, duo physeis duo thelêmata physika*—  
    |a creed,  
    |a solemn declaration,  
    |an anathema  
    Non-technical understanding: *ousia, physis* are not given a scientific explanation
- 2) *idem verum 1792 eodem sensu 1800 2314*  
    *aliae categoriae et contextus* —“implicit”
- 3) What takes place – transition from biblical to Catholic categories context  
    biblical: mentality of a given author, given milieu, treating issues for particular  
    p[urposes]  
    catholic: universal & perpetual church stating its doctrine for everyone, everywhere  
    They can know what is meant without a doctorate in Scripture
- 4) Not romantic hermeneutics – thinking oneself into the mind of Paul, John.  
    Winckelmann, Schleiermacher, Dilthey.  
    Not a deduction per se - some dogmas are, Ephesus (?) - but a transposition
- 5) How is it implicit – possibility:  
    transc[endental] always implicit;  
    less determinate implicit  
    Transcendental categories are implicit in every mind —*esse, non esse, nature, [part]*.  
    Dogmatic schemata less determinate than biblical —*infinite, finite; absolute, relative.*
- 6) Process: Is Christ the Son of God? Is it true that Christ is a) man; b) not merely a man; c) not  
    a creature; d) not the Father; e) from the Father; f) given divine predicates; g) Son in a singular  
    meaning? Did Paul, John, think of that? ||theologically infused (?) knowledge |what can be  
    proved is 1 to 7.

(New page)

### ***Distinction of Positive & Dogmatic Theology***

- 1) Olier, Congar *DTC* 29 ||scholastic vs positive  
    |dogmatic vs moral ≡ parts of Scholastic —as arising from subsequent  
    development, literary-histor[ical] studies
- 2) Development ≡ process of differentiation & integration.

Differentiation occurs, is clarified, is understood & formulated  
integration: distinct & complementary functions.

- 3) Total Method: ||description  
|explanation —comp[arative]  
|organic  
|genetic  
|dialectical.  
Horizon ||se[cun]dum evol[ution]:  
se[cun]dum con[version].

Includes ||genesis of all dogmas & all systems  
|refutation of all heresies & all errors.

- 4) Involves two types of operation  
intelligence ||developing in c[ommon]-s[ense]  
|developing in sc[ience's]

*C[ommon] S[ense]*: Transcendental implicit.

Understands things as related to us; implies relations to one another.

Understands things as related to Isaias, M[ar]k, Paul, John, Athan[asius], &c.

Does not attempt moving over to things as related to one another;

patterns independent of standpoint of Jew & Greek

*Syst[em]*: a) transcendental becomes explicit;

b) dichotomy: genera entis, divisio entis, &c;

c) understanding of relations to one another.

(New page)

### ***Dogmatic & Positive***

- 1) Differ in mode of Expression.  
D[ogmatic]: oratio recta: God the Son became Man;  
P[ositive]: oratio obliqua: John said Verbum caro...; meant ---- ---- ----
- 2) Differ in object.  
D[ogmatic]: God & all things in relation to God;  
P[ositive]: What X said, meant, re God &c.
- 3) Differ in formal object: D[ogmatic]: its own problematik questions, terms, answers, systematization;  
P[ositive] a) an author's concerns, language, horizon, synthesis Di[rect], Obl[ique];  
b) especially with regard to God.
- 4) Differ in mode of understanding:  
D[ogmatic] moves to technical & expounds theor[y];  
P[ositive] stays with particular works, authors, cultures, even technical writing studied by non-technical type of understanding: —understanding Aquinas is not a theory about Aquinas

### ***Overlapping A*** ((Need not fight))

- 1) Inerrancy of Scr[iptures] transforms *oratio obliqua* into *oratio recta*;  
infallibility of Magist[erium] transforms *oratio obliqua* into *oratio recta*.
- 2) In general, there are not exegetical problems about Magisterium.

Cicero: not just clear enough so that you can be understood, but so clear that you cannot be misunderstood (*'Quicumque'*)

- 3) In Scr[ipture] problems arise when differentiation is not understood.

### ***Exegesis //Positive /Dogmatic***

- 1) a) Dogmatic argues from Scr[ipture]. with Paul: Faith without works; and James: Faith with works. Problems of reconciliation are there from the start.  
b) Positive deals with Scr[ipture] by parts: M[ar]k, Syn[optics], Acts, Great Epist[les], Past[oral], Cath[olic] —problems of reconciliation are present usually to be settled later on
- 2) a) Dogmatic raises his own q[uestions], in his own terms, in his own context; the q[uestions] of one who learns from Scr[ipture] about God; the q[uestions] that arise in contracting transcendental finality: dichoto[my]:  
Either Jesus is God or he is not;  
the q[uestions] that are answered in Cath[olic] categories —universal perpetual Church; neither Jew nor Greek.  
b) Positive raises the question of what Paul's John's q[uestions] or concerns were, how Paul, John met his q[uestions, concerns; the synthesis in John, Great Ep[ist]les; not what should P[aul], J[ohn] also have considered, but what did.
- 3) a) Dogmatic question is not answered by finding its words in Scr[ipture] – contexts differ, categories differ; dogmatic question is not answered by romantic penetration of Paul's John's mind,  
but by analysing its question into elements that are found explicitly in Scr[ipture] merely a man, merely a creature, &c.  
b) Positive, if dogmatic done well, will not disagree about the elements; will acknowledge the validity of the dogmatic approach – learning from S[acred] Scr[ipture] will claim the validity of his own approach: putting the elements together in the manner & measure indicated by the text.
- 4) a) Dogmatic refers to positive those who wish to learn about Paul's thought.
- 5) b) Positive refers to dogmatic answers to q[uestions] of dogmatic type: "Did X[ris]t know everything?"

### ***Dogmatic Theology***

- a) [Dogmatic Theology is] Transposition from non technical to catholic statement: idem verum, eodem sensu, categoriis & contextu catholicis, with same education (media) without a doctorate in Scr[ipture].

Justification of transposition – *quomodo in fontibus contineatur* 2314

case I: dogma not reached through systematic Nic[ea]num → Const[antinopolitanum] III

case II: dogma mediated by Syst[ematic]: Florence, Trent, Vat[ican] I

case III: clearly in Scr[ipture], very little definition: Redemption, Justif[ication].

- b) [Dogmatic Theology is] Not just an aggregate of Catholic statements; admits a certain amount of ||suppositions |deducing concl[usions]:
  - 1) transcendental [meaning] explicit; includes God; superat a) verum; b) ens; c) bonum
  - 2) Problem of coherence: mysteries
  - 3) Problem of understanding mysteries:  
||analogia,  
|nexus [mysteriorum inter se];



understand the mysteries without disputed q[uestions]; else pseudo-problematic, ps[eudo]-syst[ematic].

### **Overlapping B**

- 1) Understanding the history of a doctrine  $\longleftrightarrow$  understanding the doctrine;  
understanding history (*res gestas*)  $\longleftrightarrow$  theory of history
- 2) Apply [method]  
||descr[iptive]  
|explan[atory] (||comp[arative]; |org[anic]; |gen[etic]; |dial[ectical])  $\equiv$  determine series of horizons ||se[cun]dum evol[ution] psych[ological], soc[ial], cult[ural]} |se[cun]dum conv[ersion] int[ellectual], mor[al], rel[igious]  
Includes a) genesis of all dogmas, systems, refutation of all heresies, aberrations;  
b) understanding history [put doctrines in concrete context].
- 3) Are Ibn K-----, G. B. Vico, Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Sorokin, E. Gil[il]son (*L'être et l'essence*), Toynbee, C. Dawson, historians, sociologists.  
Mgr. Descamps: Biblical theology is not a total view of Old & New Testament; some seem to think that is what it is mainly.
  - a) The questions exist
  - b) they arise when sufficiently broad & exact erudition present, compare, cultures civilizations, epochs, periods. Arise on level of non-technical understanding over sufficiently broad fiel[d]
  - c) the question can be adequately put, defined, investigated only by a transition to technical & indeed methodical thought. Toynbee's inadequacy as a methodologist. (Walsh, *Philosophy*, 1963), Spengler, Sorokin (a sociologist but brushed aside: was dominant figure).

(New page)

- 4) There exists a field - in which positive studies are relevant only as material (secondary sources); which puts its own q[uestions] in its own terms with regard to hist[orical] proce[ss]; which uses secondary sources as an aid in making its own investigat[ion]; which arrives at its own results ||methods, |criteria whose meaning lies beyond the horizon of merely positive investigation. Specifically: its results are not just a summary, synopsis, encyclopedia of postive research
- 5) this field is history (*res gestae*) ||as science (technical understanding)  
|as socially dynamic —liberalism, marxism, catholicism  
Non-recognition of this field results in its reappearance under other garbs.  
Biblical scholars are not devoted exclusively to positive studies;  
they are out to account for existence of X[ris]tianity;  
they are out to reform dogmatic theology;  
they have a message ||for mankind  
|for meeting the Church's problems ((Marxism: democracy, -----, naturalism))  
Source of wild opinions, repercussions

### **Illustrations**

**I.**

Vector 1	Intellectual development		
Vector 2	Sin, Suffering	Death	<i>Insight</i> [cc] 6, 7, 13, 20
Vector 3	Grace	Resurrection	

## II.

- a) Tert[ullianus] as perceptionist account of Trinity
- b) Orig[en] as essentialist account of Trinity  
|to be distinct the Son has to be another essence
- c) Ar[ius] as rationalist rejection of the Trinity
- d) Ath[anasius] as X[ris]tian realism.  
G[ree]k councils as foundation of X[ris]tian realism, all without explicit  
advertence → verbum Dei

## III. Development:

not just the new —mere expansion, multiplication, mounting complexity is new,  
but the transposition of the problem to a higher level. Toynbee.  
organic → problem: assimilating within the organic unity

- intellectual:*
- a) non-technical thinking: myth & magic, because non-technical thinking is not good to q[uestions] man [raises]
  - b) technical thinking]: Babel of philosophies, endless systems, alternatives can be solved empirically & quickly – emp[irical] sc[iences];  
alternatives can be solved empirically but slowly = death of civil[ization & of] cult[ure].
  - c) critical thinking: basic system on interiority. You may not assert what you cannot know

## IV. Whole & Part

- omission of part - mutilation of the whole - distortion of the remainder
- a) this part is difficult, obscure, disputed, has led to abuses, so and so's opinion, not very important, not very useful, difficult to support universally because of divided views. It is maintained by a few with conviction, by others perfunctorily; has to overcome even greater resistance; is maintained in principle but generally dropped in practice; is dropped in principle; it is excluded on principle
  - b) there is a vacuum to be filled, functions to be performed; the other parts seize the opportunity; new parts are devised to fulfil the old functions; what insoluble problems we have, how much we have doing; we must not give up looking for new devices; really to do anything but the impossible [restore the part resumed]

## V. Whole & Part – positively – The principle of mediation

The technical ||does not replace-do the work of} the non-technical

The intellectual ||does not replace-do the work of} the technical

but there is a mutual mediation of parts within a whole.

Theology does not replace human science; Human science does not replace natural sciences, but there is a mutual mediation, a setting of limits, functions, a differentiation & integration

Catholicism

transition to technical Fathers  
emergence of systematic Med[ieval]

P[atres]

technical understanding of history Mod[ern]

### ***Systematic Theology***

has to move into the field of history as science,

develop into the field of history as science

personal, existential, psych[ological], social, cultural, historical

1: Church, Prehistory, O[ld] T[estament]; Formation, N[ew] T[estament]

||History of doctrine |History of Church

2: Church & the World. It has to use the human sciences: ||psych[ology] |soc[iology]

|Cul[ture] |Hist[ory] as [the] how develops in time

There is a historical doctrine: a) illustrated by Bible, Church history to be grasped in; b)

taught by Bible, Church doctrine, P[atres] &c

→ dogmatic element → and systematic ||analogy of creature |nexus myst[eriorum inter se]

### ***Methodical Functions***

#### *2) Incidental confusion of levels*

*immediate & mediated communication:* [silence of the diplomat];

press interview: you are abruptly to explain a technical word to a person who does not really grasp w[hat] technicism is but has a nose for “interesting” journalism;

what you say to him will appear between quotes in a journal with 1,500,000 readers

Jesus words to his disciples reported in the gospels: a change of context—Mc 13,32; Mt 24,36

*mediated communication & technical statement:*

||inerrancy of S[acred] Scr[ipture]: you have to reconstruct particular situation, particular categories,

|infallibility of Dogmas: catholic categories: a universal situation;

Papal encyclicals: the questions of the day;

Papal definitions

*technical & systematic statement:* Scholastic statement intends a field of ||pressuppositions, |implications;

includes question of essence [as distinct from description];

it adds hypothetical elements (analogy is systematic; nexus myst[eriorum inter se] not reveal[ed]).

Dogmas follow from a sound system, but systems do not follow from dogmas by logical technique without use of intellig[ence]

### ***Methodical Functions***

#### *3) Systematic comparison of levels*

a) Thesis, defin[ition of] terms, sensus theseos, adversarii, nota, proof from S[acred]

Scr[ipture], Patres, Theologi, Ratio theologica. Thesis selected from ||common doctrine of Church; opinions of preferred schools

b) Deeply embedded in manuals, division of treatises, lecture system, examination system

c) Where does the whole come from? [*fait accompli* & basic irresponsibility?]

d) There are brought to bear on a single point.

- Several layers of history: S[acred] Scr[ipture], P[atres], Theol[ogians], adversaries ancient & mod[ern]. one can do justice to none of them.:

- Several layers of thought: non technical; technical & non-systematic; technical & systematic ((distinction now drawn))
- rat[io] theol[ogica] = arg[umentum convenientiae?] = arg[umentum] quod non probat; proof of system is 1) it covers the field; 2) it is the only possibility. System as whole cannot appear; q[uaestiones] about its value cannot be discussed

#### 4) Contemporary problems

A) on the level of non-technical communication:

- the enlargement of the field of ||immediate communication —radio, television—; |mediated communication —universal education; books (19,000 England; 12,000 USA)
- the relative shrinking of impact of traditional channels
- must one speak & write as though readers could, should learn what is not learned properly by *most* priests in 6 years?
- Is there to be a *Verkündigungstheologie* [preaching theology] e.g. Scripture & Phenomenology. H. Müllen, *Der heilige Geist als Person*, Münster, Aschendorf, 196\_
- Is there to be a *Verkündigungstheologie* Teilhard de Chardin

B) <sup>{227}</sup> on the level of the relations between Dogma, Scholasticism, Church Teaching – Encyclicals

- Dogma: omnibus credendum proponitur tanquam divinitus revelatum; idem verum, eodem sensu 1792, 1800, 2314
- Scholasticism: a scientific or rhetorical integration of dogma w[ith] the total field of human thought
- Magisterium: studies of the decisions of the Magisterium. What is it? ||juridical, |empirical

C) <sup>{226}</sup> The fate of scholasticism

- 1) the ambiguities: science, decadence, old rhetoric, new rhetoric
- 2) the opinions
  - a) scholasticism is antiquated: only *Verkündigungstheologie*
  - b) scholasticism is to frozen, congealed, at what I learned when I was a seminarian. ((Historical-critical studies eliminate what people think)). 1) Spanish school, XVI, XVII 2) mediaeval: Aquinas
  - c) scholasticism is to be developed

<sup>{228}</sup> *In Animalis Rationali*

Mediatio ||sui ipsius |sui mundi |suarum operationum } per cognitionem et voluntatem

*Ecclesia*: ipsa suam vitam mediat per theologiam

*Initiale*: Iudaei & Graeci, sed transformati. Qua transformandi: Iudaei & Graeci; qua transformati: catholici

*Quo in stadio*: unus homo concretus vivit intelligit iudicat eligit qua ||Iudaeus |Graecus conversus; minime confunduntur ||judaicum |graecum et catholicum; neque tamen explicite signate technice distingunt[ur] <sup>{229}</sup>

*Stadia subsequencia*:

[In stadio] Patrist[ico]: Motus dogmaticus:

Ecclesia sese mediat. Technice, explicite, signate determin[at] quid sit esse catholicum, quid sit illud quod est *conversivum*, *transformativum*. Particularitates: rationalis, psychologicae, socialis, culturalis evolutionis.

[In stadio] Schol[astico]: Motus systematicus:

	resolutio	→	compositio
una revelatio divina	multa dogmata	→	dogmatum intelligent[ia]

	certa	→	certorum intelligenti[a]
	technica	→	technicorum   doctrina  addiscentia}
	decursu temporum	→	compendium systematicum

omissa parte systematica, pars dogmatica [=] ||multitudo, |technica, |non intellecta, |non addiscibilia, |e diversis saeculis} → biblicismus

omissa parte dogmatica, non mysteria intelliguntur [pseudo-problemata, pseudo-systemata]

<sup>{230}</sup> **Gravissimum problema theologiae hodiernae:** Utrum haec omnia sint superata?

Theologia: in qualis livello: a) ||experience |understanding; b) ||non-technical [exceptis phenomenologicis], |literary, |judgment implicit, |communicable;

ex utroque testamento directe ad hominem XX saec[uli];

educatio, apostolatus: influxus realis → cultura x[ris]tiana;

massa plus non addiscit; multi sacerdotes plus non addiscunt; necessarium est...

sed etiam necessarium videtur technica ecclesiae mediatio.

Il[1]a non formant iudicium, quod est maxime fundamentale

<sup>{231}</sup> *Stadium praesens:* undiff[erentiatio] → classical → historical consciousness

classical: quid sit?

*bios theoretikos;* intelligentia, scientia, sapientia; amor universi

essentialist, deductivist, rationalist, idealist

per se, universal, abstraction, static

*bios praktilos:* prudence, iustice, fortitude, temperance,

theoretical → vulgarisation

practical → via universal, normative, juridical, legal, ideal