

530ABDTL040

English Translation of Archive Document A53a (Batch 1-A, folder 16, item 3)

Translation by Michael G. Shields

Note: Translator's interpolations are in brackets; handwritten notations by Lonergan are in cursive script.

P. 1 (Handwritten page)

The Nature of the Beatific Vision

J. Guillet, O.P., *Arch. d'hist. litt, et doct. du Moyen Age* 2 (1927) 79-88

1. What is the meaning of 'light' in intelligibles – pp. 80-81.

In 2 Sent. d. 13, a. 2

S.T. I, q. 67, a. 1

In Joan. I, lect. 2.

A brief solution: Light is that which produces a manifestation.

2. The material element of intellectual knowledge [is] in the phantasm

The formal element is in the agent intellect itself - pp. 83-84

S.T. I, q. 84, a. 6

De Veritate, q. 18, a. 8, ad 3m

“ q. 10, a. 6

Q. D. de Anima, 10, a. 6, ad 1m & ad 2m ?

3. This holds even of intellectual habits - pp. 86-87

In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2c.

Ibid., ad 2m – immateriality as principle of knowledge

In angels, species not from things known but from intellectual light itself

In III Sent., d. 3, q. 3, ad 1m

Intellectual light \equiv principle of synthetic activity

[page 2]

The intuitive vision of God (Bibl. DC 7 2393)

Capreolus 4 dist. 49
 Caietanus In 1m q. 12
 Ferrariensis CGent 3 50-63
 Bañez In 1m q 12 (Dousi 1614)
 Joannes a S Thomas, Curs Theol, Paris 1870, tom 1 tr 1 q. 10 disp 10 a 1; q 12 disp 1-7
 Gonet Clyp Paris 1875 tom 1 tr 2 disp 1-6
 Salmanticenses Paris 1870, tom 1, tr 2, disp 1-7
 Gotti theol schol dogm Venetias 1783, tom 1, 1a tr 3
 Billuart Summa Paris 1878 tom 1 tr De Deo dissert 4 a 1-11
 Becanus Opera Omnia Mainz 1649 tr 1 cp 9
 Sylvius Comm in 1m, Anvers Paris 1714, q. 12
 Suarez De divina subst et attributis, Paris 1856 tom 1 p. 59-181
 Lessius Opusc Anvers 1626 De Summo Bono 2 cp 1-9
 Vasquez in 1m, Lyons 1700, tom 1 disp 36-56
 Molina in 1m, Venetiis 1594, q. 12
 Ysembert, in 1m, Paris 1643, q. 12 disp 1-10
 De Lugo Op omnia Venetiis 1718 tr 4 De MystInc disp 19
 Didace Ruiz de Montoya, Comment de scientia Dei, disp 6, Paris 1629 spec de incomprehensibilitate
 Frassen Scot Acad Rome 1720, tom 1 tr 1, disp 3 a. 7-8

 Petau, theol dogm, Bar-le-duc 1864, tom 1, De Deo lib 7
 Thomassini, Dogm theol, Paris 1864, tom 1, De Deo lib 6

 Francis de Sales, L'amour de Dieu, lib 3, cp 11-15
 Monsabre, Exposition du dogma, Careme 1889, Paris 1898
 Terrien, La grâce et le gloire Paris 1897, lib 9, & app 7 & 9
 Souben, OSB, Nou Theol Dogm. 9, les fins dernières, 4 Paris 1906
 Hugueney, OP, Critique et catholqie Paris 1914, tom 2 n. 108
 tom 3, no 168, 145-58; Rev Thom 1905 janv mars
 Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, tom 10, Munster in W 1904 §§ 629-33
 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Paris 1881, tom 2, § 801 2 § 164
 Schwann, Hist des Dogmes, Fr trans. Paris 1903, § 195
 de Facchini, m rev Bessarione, apr juin, 1912, pp. 156-66
 Chollet, Paris 1900, ch 6, La psychologie des elus.

[page 3]

De Visione Intuitiva Dei

Bibliographia (Michel, DTC, 7 2393)

S Thomas

1a: 12, 26.3, 72.7, 94.1

1-2: 3.5, 5.4&5, 67.5

2-2: 173.1, 175,2-4, 180.5

3a: 9.2, 10.1-4, 15.1, 34.4

Suppl 71.8; 90.3; 92.1-3; 93.2-3; 94.1-3

CGent 3; 25.50-63; 4.95

2 dist 11.2.1; dist 23.2.1

3 dist 12.2.1; 14.1.1-3

4 dist 45.3.1; 49.1 2; 50.2.4

De ver 8.1-5; 12.6; 13.2-4; 18.1-2; 20.1-5

De Malo 5.1

Quodlib 1.1; 2.3; 7.1; 3.19-20; 10.17

In Matth. 5.3 (Parm 10 p. 52 53)

In Ioan 1 lect 1 n 1; 14 lect 1 n 3; 17 lect 1 n 3

1 Cor 13 lect 3-4

2 Cor 5 lect 2; 12 lect 1-2

Comp theol 104-107; 149-150; 163-166; 216 pars 2a, 8-9

In symb Apost 12 (opusc 7)

In Boet de Trin (op 63) 1 2; 6 3

De natura beatitudinis (ed Mand, Rev Thom 1918 p. 366-371)

De Pot, 8.1

?? pp. 246, 271

De natura intelligendi

[page 4]

Visio beatifica

(a) Quodl. 1 q 1 a 1 (parum)	(1269 Paschate)
7 q 1 a 1	(1256 Nativitate Di)
10 q. 5 a 17	(1258 Nativitate Di)
qua beatitudo quodl 8 q 2 a 19	(1257 Nativitate Di)

(b) 2 dist 23 q 2 a 1 (Adam)

 4 dist 49 q. 2 a. 1 ss

(c) De Ver q 8 a 1-5

P. 5

St. Thomas on the Beatific Vision

Summa Contra Gentiles III: 53, 54.

S.T. I, 12, 2.

De Veritate, q. 10, a. 11; q. 8, a. 1, etc.

Compendium Theologiae, c. 105.

C.G. III, 53 - [The beatific vision is] impossible
 without a likeness to the form of God
 without a disposition to what is higher
 without that by which union, change, takes place
 without a strengthening of the cognitive power
 without a disposition that makes the passive intellect actually understand (it does not make what is intelligible in potency intelligible in act, as the agent intellect does, for God is intelligible in act); i.e., no impressed species.

C.G. III, 54 - it is not through a lack of distance from God, but through a power that it gets from God. The proportion is not one of commensuration, but as the proportion of matter to form, of effect to cause, of one who understands to what is understood.

De Ver. q. 10, a. 11 - Angels, however, can be seen through intelligible species that are different from their essences, but not the divine essence, which goes beyond every genus and is outside of every genus; thus no created species can be found that is adequate to represent it. Hence it follows that if God is to be seen in his essence, he will not be seen through any created species; it is his essence itself that becomes the intelligible form of the intellect of the one who sees it, which cannot happen unless the created intellect is disposed to this by the light of glory.

Cf. *S.T. I*, 12, 2, ad 3m - Just as other intelligible forms that are not identical with their act of existence are united to the intellect according to an act of existence whereby they inform the intellect and put it into act; so the divine essence is united to a created intellect as that which is actually understood, by itself putting the intellect in act.

Cf. the body of this article - always the same idea: there can be a similitude of a limited thing but not of that which is unlimited, which is essentially unique.

N.B. - It appears one must deny that any created act is superadded to the light of glory for the beatific vision to be had. It is the light of glory itself by which the vision is had. The light of glory causes the passive intellect to actually understand; the divine essence by itself puts the intellect in act.

P. 6 –

De visione beatifica == schola

Knowledge is by assimilation. Otherwise there is no guarantee that this rather than something else will be known. See

1a 85 2.

Much more if the essence itself rather than a likeness is joined.

De Ver q 8 a 1 ad 7m

Thus

4 dist 49 q 2 a 1

De Ver q 8 a 1 et ad 5m 7m

C Gent 3 51

1a 12 aa 2 5 9

Modo sit unio: ibid.

The light of glory brings about vision formally without anything being added.

De Ver q 18 a 1 ad 1m

Quodl 7 q 1 a 1 et resp (1256 Xmas)

C Gent 3 53

It is the medium ‘under which’

4 dist 49 q 2 a 1 ad 15m

Quodl 7 q 1 a 1 et resp

De Ver q 18 a 1 ad 1m

1a 12 a 5 ad 2m

The composite knows

4 dist 49 q 2 a 1 corp et a 3 ad 6m

Caetanus in 1a 79 a 2 n XIX fin de ignorantia moderna

P. 7

The Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge in St. Thomas.

[*In 2 Sent.*], dist. 3, q. 3, a. 1, body [of article]

In the divine intellect the similitude of the known is the very essence of the knower, which is the exemplary and the efficient cause of [created] things; but in the human intellect the similitude of the known is something other than the substance of the intellect and is as its form. Hence from the intellect and the similitude [of the known object] there results one complete thing, namely the intellect understanding in act; and the similitude in this is taken from the thing [known].

De Ver., q. 18, a. 1, ad 1m.

... these three are present in intellectual seeing: corresponding to physical light, the light of the agent intellect, which is, as it were, the medium under which the intellect sees; [corresponding] to the visual species, the intelligible species by which the passive intellect becomes actually understanding (the medium-by-which); and comparable to a medium, such as a mirror, from which knowledge of a visible object is obtained is an effect from which we come to know the cause; thus the similitude of the cause is impressed upon our intellect not immediately from the cause itself but from the effect in which a similitude of the cause appears; hence this sort of knowledge is called "mirror knowledge" on account of its similarity to the sight that is had by means of a mirror. Cf. *Quodl.* 7, a. 1.

[*S.T.*] I, 34, 1, ad 3m

Now Anselm incorrectly takes 'to utter' as synonymous with 'to understand.' But these are not the same. 'To understand' indicates only a relation between the understander and what is understood, without implying any notion of origin, but only a certain informing of our intellect inasmuch as our intellect comes to be in act through the form of the thing understood. But in God ['to understand'] indicates total identity, because in God the intellect and the understood are absolutely the same ... But 'to utter' indicates primarily a relation to the word conceived; for 'to utter' means simply 'to speak a word'; but through the medium of the word it implies a relation to the thing understood, which is manifested to the understander in the word that is spoken.

Ibid., ad 2m.

The intellect itself, considered as being in act through an intelligible species, is considered absolutely; and likewise also the act of understanding, which is to the intellect in act as the act of existence is to a being in act; for 'to understand' does not signify an action proceeding from the understander but one that remains in the understander. See I, 54, 1, ad 3m.

Comp. Theol., c. 83: For it actually understands a thing when the species of that thing has become the form of the passive intellect; for this reason we say that the intellect in act is the understood in act.

P. 8

The Intelligible Species and the Word of the Heart

Quodl. 7. q. 1, ad 4.

Quodl. 5, q. 5, a. 9 (Christmas 1271, Mandonnet)

I reply that it must be said, according to Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book XV, that the word of the heart indicates something that proceeds from the mind, or intellect.

A thing proceeds from the intellect inasmuch as it is constituted by its operation.

Now there are two operations of the intellect, according to the Philosopher in *De Anima*, Bk III, text. comm. xxi. One is called the understanding of indivisibles, in which the intellect forms within itself a definition or concept of some non-complex reality. The other operation is that of the intellect combining and dividing, by way of which it forms an enuntiation. And both of these, constituted by the operation of the intellect, are called a word; the former is signified by a non-complex term, the latter by a sentence.

It is clear that every operation of the intellect proceeds from it inasmuch as it is put in act by an intelligible species; for nothing operates except insofar as it is in act. It follows necessarily, then, that the intelligible species, being the principle of intellectual operation, is different from the word of the heart, which is formed through that operation. The word itself, however, could be called an intelligible form or species as having been constituted by the intellect, just as an art form which the intellect has devised is said to be a kind of intelligible species.

In reply to the first objection (that the word of the heart is an intelligible species because it is that by which the intellect sees), it must be said that the intellect understands in two ways: the first way is understanding in the formal sense, in which it understands by the intelligible species which puts it in act. In the second way it understands by an instrument which it uses in order to understand something; in this way the intellect understands by means of a word, because it forms a word in order to understand a thing.

In reply to the second objection it must be said that knowledge through an external sense is effected solely through a modification of that sense by the sensible object; hence it senses through the form impressed upon it by the object. An external sense does not fashion for itself any sensible form; this is the work of the

imagination, whose form is somewhat similar to the word of the intellect. (Cf. *S.T. I*, 78, 3: a sense is a passive potency naturally made to be modified by an external sensible object; *I*, 85, 2, ad 3m.)

Re the two words, definition and enuntiation: *In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7m; d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2m; *De Ver.* q. 5, a. 8; *De Pot.* q. 8, a. 1; *S.T. I*, 85, 2, ad 3m and passim.

P. 9

What is Understanding?

1. *In I Sent.* d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, end of body of article:

‘One must, however, bear in mind that there is a certain gradation in the operations of the intellect. First there is the simple regard of the intellect in knowing what is intelligible, and this operation does not yet qualify as a word. Next there is the ordering of that intelligibility for the purpose of manifesting it either to someone else (as when one speaks to another) or to oneself (as when it also happens that one speaks to oneself), and then for the first time the operation acquires the characteristic of a word. Thus “word” means simply a certain emanation from the intellect as manifesting.’

Experience reveals the difference between that simple regard and the subsequent mental utterance.

Take the case of one who is very intelligent, and precisely because of his profound understanding of the matter cannot yet formulate definitions and work out theses, and so cannot give accurate, clear and distinct expression to his mind. This is not because of a lack of vocabulary or a failure in imagination, but because of his inability to conceptualize in order to formulate definitions and work out theses. The most famous example of this is the young St. Thomas Aquinas, considered a ‘dumb ox’ by his fellows but as a great mind by his professor.

Others, on the contrary, are not very intelligent and what they do understand they understand very superficially. Since they have little to express or conceive, they are never at a loss for words, are very precise in everything they say, and are the admiration of fools.

2. Here, then, is the problem.

In our experience there are three elements: intuiting, or the simple regard of individual things; uttering, speaking a mental word; and the utterance or word itself.

Besides, there are two such words, definitions and enuntiations, is a clear from *De Pot.* q. 8, a. 1, *De Ver.* q.8, a. 5, *S.T. I*, 85, 2, ad 3m, *In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7m, *Ibid.* d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2m, and passim.

Let us say, therefore, that understanding is

- a) intuiting or regarding an intelligible reality
- b) uttering or speaking a [mental, or inner] word
- c) the word itself that is uttered.

P. 10

3. ‘To understand’ in the sense of ‘to utter’: hence active.

In 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, in the rejection of other opinions. Note that here ‘word’ itself is said to understand.

De Veritate, 4, 2, corp. and ad 3m and ad 5m. See q 8 a 6.

C. G. IV, 11, dealing with the Trinity; cf. Book II, where [it is treated] in an Aristotelian manner.

De Pot. 8, 1, corp.; 9, 5, corp.

S.T. I, 27, 1.

4. If [‘to understand’] is taken in the same sense as ‘to utter’, then it is not lacking a word.

De Pot. 8, 1, corp.; 9, 5, corp.; 9, 9, corp.

Hence Suarez was correct on this point.

The matter is self-evident: action is simply an effect considered as depending upon the agent; therefore if ‘to understand’ is taken the sense of ‘to utter’, it necessarily has a word.

5. In what sense ‘to intuit’ is taken to mean ‘to understand’.

S.T. I, 15, 2

S.T. I, 79, 2: our understanding is a passivity

I, 79, 8: to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth – the process that follows from this.

I, 79, 10, ad 3m: this process is described.

I, 85, 2: form – therefore formally it understands, to be known – ‘to understand’ cannot be known;

Ibid., ad 3m: Intellection is to the uttering of the word as an external sense is to the imagination.

I, 85, 6: on falsity (with a caution)

I, 34, 1, corp., 3m, and 2m

I, 56, 1 and 2; 87, 1; 89, 2 on knowledge through immateriality: a separate substance knows itself through its substance. Difficulty from I, 54, 3.

Cf. *In 4 Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 10m: a separate substance knows all things as in a beatific vision

De Ver. q. 8, aa. 6 & 7: distinction between the knowledge [a separated substance has] of itself and of other things

In 2 Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, a. 1: no mention here of knowledge of itself - an angel knows through species.

From the total silence about a word in *S.T. I*, 79, 84-89, 54-58.

Influence of Aristotle; influence of Christian speculation about the Trinity.

P. 11

6. Objections

a) It is not possible that Aquinas would have used a not fully accurate terminology.

See, 'Is the word as uttered in the divinity uttered essentially or personally?' [*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2]

In 1 Sent., dist. 27, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1m and ad 7m

De Ver. q. 4, a. 2

De Pot. q. 9, a. 9, ad 7m

S.T. I, 34, 1

Quodl. 4, q. 4, a. 6, ad 1m (Easter, 1271 - Mandonnet)

In conjunction with 'to understand' and 'to utter':

De Ver., q. 4, a. 2, ad 4m: Anselm commonly

De Pot., q. 9, a. 9, ad 8m: Anselm commonly

S.T. I, 34, 1, ad 3m: Anselm improperly

b) The intelligible species remains, but actual knowing does not remain; therefore the intelligible species is not that by which we formally understand.

That it is not that by which we formally understand *per se*, I deny; *per accidens*, I grant.

That is to say, a turning to the phantasm is required.

It is essential potency before one learns; accidental potency after one has learned.

C.G. II, 73 at end, and *passim*.

c) That which necessarily proceeds effectively from an intrinsic principle is not a vital operation.

Reply: This seems to be a Scotistic notion.

See Cajetan, I, 79, 2, nn. VIII-XXI.

page 12a

The development regarding word and understand and uttering

cp Caietanus qui notes the development xxx q. 34 a 1 in XI

(1) 1a q 34 a 1: properly attributed to the person

De Pot 9 a 9 ad 7m: it must be said of the person if used properly

De Ver 4 a 2: if properly, personally

if communally it can also be said essentially

1 dist 27 q 2 a 2: it can be used personally and essentially

cp *Sol* 1 ad 1m, ad 7m

(2) 1a 34 1 3m Anselm improperly took ‘to utter’ for ‘to understand’

De Pot q 9 q 9 ad 8m: ‘to utter’ can be taken in two ways

In one way properly so that ‘to utter is the same as to conceive a work ... In another way commonly, as when ‘to utter’ is nothing other than ‘to understand; and so Anselm

De Ver q 4 a 2 ad 4m: Anselmus takes ‘dicere’ commonly

for understand and word in the proper sense; and he could have gone the other way if he wanted to;

cp ad 5m: every act of understanding on our part is ‘to utter,’ but this is not the case for God

P. 12b

The Beatific Vision

DB 530: The blessed ‘see the divine essence in an intuitive and even face-to-face gaze, without any mediating creature in the nature of an object seen, but with the divine essence manifesting itself purely, clearly, and openly.’

It is a cognitional act:

They see, on the analogy of sense [of sight]: cognition

They see, they cannot see: act

Immediate knowledge: intuitive, face-to-face (1 Cor 13); no mediating creature (Rom 1:22 ff.); ‘in the nature of an object seen’ excludes a medium-which, *S.T.* I, 85, 2; a medium-by-which, that is, an act in the cognitive faculty, is not excluded, indeed is affirmed.

Hence it is analogous neither improperly nor per accidens, but directly, properly, and per se.

Hence [the vision] is not obscure or vague, but clear and distinct.

[page 13]

1 Whether in us ‘to understand’ is the same as ‘to utter’ (word)

1 dist 27 q 2 a 2: ‘wherever there is understanding there is a word’ ‘word or the operation of understanding itself or the species which is the likeness of the thing understood ... by which one formally understands’

De Pot q 8 a. 1 corp asserts the same thing
also there is present the previous intelligible species by which the intellect in [is] in act so that it acts De Pot, 8 a 1 corp 9 a 5 corp
no understanding without a word except an incomplete one, imperfect, in motion

De Pot, q. 8 a 1 corp

q 9 a 5 corp

q 9 a 9 corp

the principle of production of the word is *notitia*

the word itself is not properly *notitia*

it is not an act of the knowing intellect

but a consequent conception

1 34 1 corp

1 85 a 2 corp

by which one understandgs (one ‘cannot understand’)
according to which sigut sees (one ‘cannot see’)
according to which intellect understands (one ‘cannot understand’)
one understands one’s understanding (not one’s ability to understand) and the species by which one understands (not by which one is able to understand)

like is know to like – not able to be known

ad 3m: the consequent word

[page 13 b]

The objective beatitude of man is God.

(a) Created goods do not suffice to bring us beatitude.

1 The entire book of Ecclesiastes

vanity of vanities: 1, 2; 12, 8

created goods are to be used but be mindful of the commandments 12, 13.14

it is not explicitly said what beatitude is

2 Ps 72 (Heb 73)

on the pleasure of evils and the unhappiness of goods on this earth
 a false conclusion from the evils: the foolishness of acquisitiveness
 true beatitude is union with God
 see the version of Zorrell, Grampon, Pirot

3 Wisdom 2

the error of sinners

4 Mt 16, 25 what does it profit a man to gain the whole world

Lc 6, 24 Woe to the rich; 12, 20 the foolish rich man

Christ did not teach the disciples to seek honors and riches

thusd 1 Io 2, 15-17 Do not love the world– the world and the concupiscence
 there of is passing; but whoever does the will of God remains unto eternity.

[page 14]

1 a Whether understanding is causally, efficiently passive

b formally passive

a yes

b no meaning – the received form is a quality remaining within and neither
 action nor passion but quality

Caietanus in Iam q 79 a 2 in VIII – XXI

vital act – the Scholastic notion

N.B. Bañez argued from immanent act as action to demonstrate physical premotion
 nor have I found any other ? argument

Thomas de ? admits that bodies, etc., are not moved by God with a physical
 premotion but there is required only a physical premotion for immanent acts
 (if I am not mistaken)

[page 15]

[a diagram of the process: see original]

[page 16]

But another opinion has some foundation in Thomas.

1 dist 27 q 2 a 2 in the rejection of opinions

De Ver q. 4 a 2 corp & 3m, 5m

C Gent 4, 11, where the Trinity is treated - ? in lib II where intellect is treated, more from an Aristotelian point of view

eo quod immaterialis	1a 56 1 & 2 1a 87 1 corp 1a 89 2 corp	Ex the total silence about the word although it speaks mainly of intellection intellectione loquitur
vide Caietanum	1a 79, 2 ? XIII ss. de 'pati'	

P. 18

Objection: Through the intelligible species the intellect knows not in act but in habit only.

Distinction between 'in act' and 'in habit', *S.T. I, 79, 6, ad 3m*:

To the third objection it must be said that the intelligible species are sometimes in the intellect only potentially, and then the intellect is said to be in potency. At other times, however, [they are present] at the final completion of the act [of understanding], and then the intellect is actually understanding. At still other times they are in an intermediate mode between potency and act, and then the intellect is said to be in habit. In this mode the intellect conserves the species, even when it is not actually understanding.

In potency: before the agent intellect uses a phantasm as an instrument for impressing the species, *I, 84, 6*.

In act and in habit, *I, 84, 7*:

Can the intellect actually understand through intelligible species which it possesses without turning to the phantasms?

I answer that it must be said that it is impossible for our intellect in our present state of life to actually understand anything without turning to the phantasms, etc., and cf. *ad 1m*.

In essential and in accidental potency:

Before it learns--essential

After it has learned--it is in potency per accidens, requiring something to remove the obstacle, i.e., a phantasm.

In 8 Phys., lect. 8 (perhaps 4 Phys. ??)

Gent. 2, 73, at end.

P. 19

The Beatific Vision

DB 693: [To behold] God one and triune as God is

DB 530: The Blessed 'see the divine essence in an intuitive face-to-face vision, with no created thing mediating it by way of an object seen, but by the divine essence directly and immediately manifesting itself purely, clearly, and openly.'

1 Cor 13:9 ff; 1 Jn 3:2; the Fathers, theologians, etc.

It is knowledge: they see; not sense knowledge, but seeing in an analogous sense; it is not potential but actual knowledge--they see, not 'can see.'

It is immediate knowledge:

- no objective medium; that is, no other created thing besides the subject of the vision with his or her faculties and dispositions;
- no subjective medium-which, *S.T. I, 85, 2*: the intelligible species is not that which is understood but that by which [a thing is understood];
- there is a subjective medium-by-which; that is, there is some act received in one's faculty by reason of which it is true to say that 'a Blessed sees' and 'one who is not a Blessed does not see.'

It is knowledge in the proper sense, neither in an improper nor in an analogous sense. It is knowing the divine essence itself immediately.

It is clear and distinct knowledge, nor obscure or vague, but knowing purely, clearly, openly.

It is not comprehensive knowledge (knowing an object in its total knowability): '[God is] incomprehensible,' DB 428, 1782.

Eph 3:10 seems to imply that the angels do not know the whole of God's wisdom.

Fathers: see Rouët de Journel 822, 1125.

S.T. I, 12, 7, c., ad 2m, ad 3m

Also proven by reason: comprehensive knowledge of the Infinite would require an infinite act in the knower.

This knowledge is not possessed equally by all the Blessed: DB 842, Mt 16:27, 1 Cor 3:8, 2 Cor 9:6.

The Fathers, RJ series 612, appeal to Jn 14:2, ‘many mansions,’ and to 1 Cor 15:41, ‘star differs from star’ [in glory].

It is not knowledge by abstraction: *S.T. I*, 85, 1, ad 1m.

a) God is not material, and so the essence is not abstracted from material conditions.

b) God is infinitely simple, and so one who sees his essence itself sees it in its totality, not one or other part, or this or that aspect, of it.

It is knowledge that is absolutely supernatural.

P. 20

The Act of the Beatific Vision

It is an act of a spiritual cognitive faculty [potentia].

Act: a perfection limited by potency [potentia] to some determinate form.

Cognitive faculty: places this perfection in the category of knowledge. So, for example, an act in the will is by that very fact an act of willing, an act in prime matter is thereby a substantial form, and an act in a cognitive faculty is cognition.

It is a spiritual cognitive faculty, for a material faculty or power is incapable of seeing God.

It is an act of a spiritual cognitive faculty that has been determined towards seeing God.

All intellection is an act of a spiritual cognitive faculty; therefore there is required some further determination of a faculty for this act to be an intuitive vision of God and not something else. Or, if you prefer, there is required some further removal of a disposition for this act to be an intuition of God and not something else—it comes to the same thing.

This determination is necessarily proportionate to seeing God; otherwise the solution is inadequate.

The principle of sufficient reason is involved here: not any cause for any effect, but always a due proportion between cause and effect.

Yet no determination can be proportionate to seeing God as he is in himself, as is the case in the beatific vision.

For only pure act is proportionate to pure act, and there is only one pure act. Therefore a creature either becomes God or it does not see God; but no creature

becomes God (for God does not become anything), and therefore no creature sees God as he is in himself.

Put differently in S.T. I, 85, 2: knowledge is an intelligible species, a proportionate likeness of a thing received in the mind.

N.B.: *S.T. I, 85, 2* does not refer to what is called the ‘impressed species’ that is part of the process towards human intellectual knowledge and that is not in our consciousness and upon which we do not reflect--nor does it refer to what is called the ‘expressed species,’ a mental word, such as a definition, composition, or division, as is clear from the response to the third objection.

‘Upon which we do not reflect’-- not directly, that is, but by reasoning and by forming hypotheses we arrive rationally or irrationally at an impressed species.

P. 21

The beatific vision consists in this, that the divine essence is united to our intellect as
an intelligible form.

This vision is by way of union with God and not by way of the form of God--seeing in act - actuation by the Infinite;
seeing God - relation of the actuation to the Infinite. }

The question here is about the formal cause of the vision.

- not about an extrinsic cause (exemplary, final, or efficient), nor about an intrinsic principle in the line of exemplary, final, or efficient causality.

- But it is about an intrinsic cause, according to which we say that a person can understand because of his intellectual faculty or power, actually understands because of the actuation of this power, and is a rational animal because of his essence.

- It is about that reality intrinsic to the Blessed by reason of which it is true to say, ‘The Blessed see God.’

The question is not about any antecedent or any consequent.

In interpreting St. Thomas there are three difficulties:

1- In his theory of action, of instrumentality: all the confusions on this point are introduced into his theory of knowledge.

2- From the fact that the ‘formal principle’ is understood as if it were an ‘efficient principle.’ As a result, Thomas’s ‘intelligible species’ becomes the ‘intelligible impressed species’ of his commentators.

In St. Thomas it is the formal principle of cognition. In *S.T. I*, 85, 2, *quo* and *secundum quam* indicate either a formal or an efficient principle; but *forma* seems to indicate a formal principle; *similitudo* = *forma*, and it is not the similitude that is known (first), but the thing. We know a thing through a similitude of it, and if this is understood as an efficient principle, it comes down to saying that ‘through a similitude we do not know, but can know,’ and so in fact they interpret St. Thomas very badly. Their “intelligible impressed species” is that by which the intellect is rendered proximately capable of understanding (e.g., Remer).

Cf. *De Ver.* 10, 8: “intention is nothing other than the intelligible species”, that is, the intelligible species is the very operation of understanding.

3- From the fact that they confuse ‘similitude’ as an explanatory proportion (the reason why a knowledge is a knowledge of this particular thing; like is known by like: *I*, 85, 2 and *passim*), with ‘similitude’ as the sensists use it to explain knowledge as being like seeing a thing in a mirror.

Consequently, St. Thomas’s mental word, which is a definition or composition or division, derived from intellection as imagination is derived from sensation (*I*, 85, 2, *De Ver.* 8, 5), they turn into a term in which a thing is contemplated. In fact they confuse this term with the term of an action, and call it a *species expressa*--hence the dispute whether intellection is an action or a quality.

P. 22

What this extraordinary disposition is whereby the intellect understands without
being commensurate with the object known

Two answers are given, de la Taille's and that of others.

First, the others:

Impressed species not required, that is, some determination whereby something potentially intelligible becomes intelligible in act.

Expressed species not required, that is, some intrinsic term produced by an immanent act.

Intellection itself suffices. This intellection, when it produces a term, is a predicamental action--speaking, uttering a mental word (definition, composition, or division according to St. Thomas), for example, a reflex universal (B. Lonergan). When it does not produce a term it is a transcendental action in the predicament of quality.

This is the opinion of Thomists; according to Suarez it always produces a term which, however, is not a strict representation, at least in the beatific vision.

And this intellection is not strictly representational. Lennerz quotes Palmieri, *De Novissimis*, 1908, pp. 169 ff.:

‘Is it certain that the act of knowing as it prescind from the word that proceeds from it, is a similitude of the object known? I do not know how this could be proved. For that which we carry in our mind as a similitude of known objects is to be referred to the mental word which the mind forms for itself, when the object is not present or when the mind thinks of it again. And in fact, in a simple act of knowing, prescinding from the word, there appears only a vital apprehension of the thing; it is not clear why this apprehension should be a similitude; but if so, what is the purpose of a subsequent word? Hence those theologians do not admit that this simple knowing is a similitude and therefore deny that a word is produced by the Blessed, on the grounds that no similitude could represent God as he is in himself. Such are the Thomists, who do not deny to the Blessed an act of intellection.

Lennerz states that this same solution could be put forward by the Suarezians.

Nevertheless, a similitude is required; otherwise no knowing

1- Doing away with a word is pointless: St. Thomas requires a similitude in the intelligible species as he understands it, that is, in direct intellectual cognition – *S.T.I.*, 85, 2 and 3m, where the body of the article deals with the intelligible species and the ad 3m speaks of the word as something else.

“Through which the intellect understands”, “whereby it understands”: no question here about a prerequisite potency (the impressed species in the more recent sense), but about the formal cause of cognition itself.

2- A similitude is needed, otherwise there is no reason why this is known rather than that; as to a similitude on the part of the potency for the vision, cf. *S.T. I.*, 12, 2.

P. 23

Predication about Unlimited Act

1. Metaphysics is a determination of *entia quibus*, ‘beings-by-which,’ that correspond to and verify propositions.

Generically, these ‘beings-by-which’ are act and potency; specifically, they are existence and essence, substance and accident, form and matter, and so forth. Their correspondence and their verification lie in the fact that inasmuch as a proposition

indicates some perfection, there is act, and inasmuch as it indicates some determination or limitation of the perfection, there is potency.

2. Hence arises the question or problem concerning predication about unlimited act: since it is simple and absolute perfection, it admits of no determination, no potency; therefore it would seem to admit of no predication except 'it is.'

3. There are three partial solutions to this problem. The first, concerning what are really intrinsic to God; the second, concerning what are really extrinsic to God; and these two are further divided according to the issuing forth of things from God and their return to God.

4. As to what are intrinsic to God, there is the well-known distinction between those that are predicated with a basis in reality and those predicated with a basis in the predicator's way of conceiving. Hence we say that God is 'x', not that this attribute x can be distinguished from God's essence itself but inasmuch as we have a clear and distinct concept of this attribute, distinct, that is, from essence.

5. As to what are extrinsic to God in the issuing forth of things from him, we say that God knows them in his vision-knowledge (*scientia visionis*), wills them by his consequent will, and produces them in actuality (*de facto*). Not that a particular knowledge, volition, and action is considered to be really in God, but [we say this] by way of extrinsic denomination--which is the case not only with God but with any cause precisely as cause.

6. As to what are extrinsic to God in their return to him, some movements back to him do not extend to God as he is in himself, and about these there is no difficulty. But others do extend to God as he is in himself, and the question here is about them. For how can one say, 'This man is God,' 'This man sees God,' 'This man is a child of God (τέκνον θεοῦ) [e.g., Rom 8:17], a sharer (κοινωνόν) in the divine nature' [2 Pet 1:4]?

P. 24

6. (cont'd).

Two ways of communication of perfection: [1] in such a way that the perfection in itself is limited, and [2] in which the perfection in itself is not limited

An extension of the notion of act and potency is required: so that not only is there act and potency and their conjunction which is simple actuation, but also that in

the return to God as he is in himself there is a finite actuation of a finite potency through infinite act, where the actuation itself is neither a finite potency nor infinite act but a certain finite reality received in a potency whereby it is true to say that infinite act communicates itself to a finite potency.

This communication of infinite act (a finite actuation by infinite act) is sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and the grace of union (the secondary act of existence received in this human essence).

De La Taille, *RSR* 18 (1928) 253-268. *Revue Apologétique* 25, t. 48 (1929) 5-26, 129-145.

Therefore there are two kinds of actuation:

a) An act is received in potency and limited by it and therefore the potency is actuated to that particular act. This type of actuation is simply that of potency and act in real composition.

b) An act is neither received in nor limited by potency, and yet it communicates itself to the potency and actuates it to that act. This actuation involves a third thing, namely, the communication itself, which is ‘a unique being-by-which’ (*ens quo sui generis*). It is a kind of act rather than a kind of potency, is received in and limited by the potency, yet not in order to actuate the potency to itself but to actuate it in relation to another act that is pre-existent, uncreated, unlimited, and yet communicated.

N.B. This actuation, which is a communication of unlimited and illimitable act, is not an explanation; it is a metaphysical notation to denote the truth of this sort of communication.

his actuation is posited not from the light of natural reason but on the supposition of the truths of faith. In other words, from a human standpoint, apart from faith it cannot be asserted that not every truth is capable of verification, whether in the case of pure act or in the case of the composition of act and potency; but through faith we have the case in which pure act is communicated to a potency, and this calls for an enlargement, an extension, of metaphysics.

P. 25

The Light of Glory

Light: a cause of knowledge, on the analogy of sense vision.

Theologians distinguish three kinds of light: the light of nature, which is man's natural reason, the light of grace, which is faith, and the light of glory.

This last can be understood in three ways: as God himself inasmuch as he makes himself to be seen and presents himself to be seen; as the aid that makes this vision possible for a creature; and as the act of the vision itself, for clear knowledge is said to be a 'light'--the 'lights' one gets in meditation, for example.

1. Some theologians, among whom was Gregory Arimensis (1358), *In 2 Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, against the 2nd part of the 3rd conclusion (Venice, 1522, fol. 55 Q): the beatific vision is not a created but an uncreated vision, since otherwise it would be a corruptible vision and thus contrary to the very nature of beatitude. It can also be argued: a finite act is not proportionate to an infinite object; so also, perhaps, Henry of Ghent, John de Ripa, and others.

2. Thomassini, Bk. 6, ch. 6, *De Deo*: the force and power by which the vision is had is the Holy Spirit; the species in which it is seen is the Son; God alone sees God; and yet a created mind under this species and bathed in this light does see God.

3. William of Ockham, Durandus, (?Paludanus): the act by which one sees the beatific vision is created, but it is totally created by God and infused into the creature. This seems similar to the act by which, according to St. Thomas, we will the end, that is, an act in which the mind is moved but does not itself move.

Lennerz, however [*De Deo Uno* (Romae, 1948) §174], has an objection: an act produced by someone else and infused [into the subject] is not an immanent [and vital] act of the subject.

My objection: there remains the difficulty about God infusing what is infinite.

4. Some, according to Suarez (Bk 2, ch. 10, no. 9), have said that the light of glory is not a habit perfecting a potency but a new potency.

Lennerz's objection [ibid., §175]: neither is this a vital act, since for such an act it is not enough that the soul support some faculty added to it from without.

My objection: the real difficulty recurs, for it is just as difficult for the vision of God to be infused into an added potency as into one already possessed.

P. 26

Some Opinions on the Beatific Vision

1. Suarez.

There is a word that is created and representational, because of vital operation and the nature of cognition. God himself is an intelligible species, but by God's absolute power there can be given a created intelligible species for beholding God as he is.

2. Recent Thomistic school

God is both the intelligible species 'by which' and the word 'in which' the beatific vision is had. But there is required an immanent operation, which is an immanent action and therefore a quality and not a proportionate similitude.

3. Cajetan

Seems to follow St. Thomas. But he does not accept his position on the angels.

4. Capreolus ?

As knowledge, there is no other act; as beatitude, which is an operation, there is another act.

P. 27

The Objective Formal Element of the Beatific Vision (1)

DB 1795: Two orders of knowledge -

natural: its principle is the natural light of reason; its object, philosophy and science.

supernatural: its principle, divine faith; its object, the mysteries hidden in God.

DB 1796: obtaining by God's grace an understanding of the mysteries. Cf. *S.T.* I, 87, 1 at end: 'There is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge,' etc.

Hence there are two kinds of theology: positive theology, which determines what the data of revelation are (cf. observation and experimentation in science), and scholastic theology, 'faith seeking understanding' {cf. scientific theories and hypotheses}.

N.B. This latter is most fruitful 'if [it is pursued] assiduously, devoutly, seriously.'

It stays with one: Denzinger, Rouët, even Scripture can scarcely be retained in one's memory without the definitions of the theses, which presuppose speculation.

It channels the supernatural life through the intellect into the whole person, and into the direction of others (Teresa).

The contradiction of theological positivism: it uses definitions and theses; it pays no attention to the prerequisite intelligible species from which the mental word [results].

The method of scholastic theology: [it operates]

- a) from analogies with what we know naturally
- b) and from the connection between the mysteries themselves and with the ultimate end of man.

Analogy: a) various metaphors, rhetorical expressions used by public speakers - analogy improperly so called;

b) analogy in the proper sense--which is the source and criterion of all metaphors--metaphysics, which thoroughly examines all natures in one intuition, as it were.

Hence: (a) metaphysics in itself--minor analogate cf. Euclidian geometry

(b) metaphysics extrapolated to grasp the prime analogate cf. general geometry

a) Metaphysics in itself.

A question is always in the same form

Truth is the adequation between intellect and reality;

- but there exists such and such a true proposition;

therefore there is an adequate objective formal nature.

For example:

‘Socrates exists’ - act of existence limited by essence

‘Socrates can know’ - a cognitive potency in an existing essence.

‘Socrates actually knows’ - act limited by the cognitive potency in the existing essence.

P.28

The Objective Formal Element of the Beatific Vision (2)

General method in natural metaphysics:

Pure act and act limited by potency;

act limited in either essential or accidental potency

b) Transition from natural to extrapolated metaphysics.

The divine mysteries go beyond the categories of natural metaphysics--DB 1796: ‘[human reason] is never adequate ...’

Reason for this: in metaphysics learned in a natural way, actuation is the coming together of act and potency; and this composition consists in the reception of act in a potency and its limitation by that potency. Hence in a natural metaphysics there is no way whereby pure act itself, as it is in itself and so quite unlimited, can

communicate itself to creatures. For if all actuation is by way of composition, and if all composition is by way of a limitation of act, then there is no actuation through unlimited act as unlimited.

c) Affirmation of an extrapolated metaphysics.

By faith we know that pure act does communicate itself as it is:

- hypostatic union: this man is God. Hence an unlimited act of existence.
- sanctifying grace: this man is a sharer in the divine nature. Therefore there is an elevation of his essence, of a nature limited to the level of that essence and nature.
- immediate vision of God: this man sees God as he is. Therefore there is an act of a cognitive potency by which unlimited act itself is communicated.

d) Distinction between these two actuations.

a- One is a natural actuation according to which act is received in and limited by potency.

b- The other is a supernatural actuation according to which unlimited act communicates itself to a potency without being limited by it, without being formally received in it in the unity of nature. For:

- in Christ the divine and human natures remain distinct;
- in the just person, all the more so: we become godlike, but not God;
- in the beatific vision: God's knowledge does not become ours; we do not comprehend [God].

P. 29

The Objective Formal Element of the Beatific Vision (3)

Supernatural Actuation

a) We do not fully understand it - DB 1796. But we express the mysteries methodically by analogy with what we know naturally, and arrive at some understanding from the analogy itself that is thus clearly expounded.

b) And first we understand this:

If pure act is really and truly communicated to some potency, then some 'thinglet' [*entitatula*, diminutive of *entitas*] is required in accordance with which it is objectively true that pure act is communicated to this potency. For truth is the adequation between intellect and reality; therefore since the propositions, 'the Blessed see God' and 'the damned do not see God,' etc., are contradictory, there is some objective reality which by its presence or its absence grounds these contradictory propositions.

c) Next, we also understand this:

If there is such an entity, such a reality, then it is posited either in God himself or in the potency to which God is communicated;
but it is not in God, who is immutable;
therefore it is in the potency to which God is communicated.

d) Thirdly we understand this:

This entity is *sui generis*, unique. It is not simply potency, for it is received in a potency and so has the nature of act. Nor is it simply act, for it does not perfect the potency by communicating its own perfection but by communicating the perfection of another, that is, God. Neither is it simply a disposition, for other dispositions are intermediate between potency and act and are received in order for a further act to be received. But this disposition, though intermediate between potency and act, nevertheless formally constitutes the communication of this ultimate and infinitely perfect act.

If it is received, then God is now communicated and cannot be possessed in any greater measure.

If it is not received, then God is not only not communicated but is infinitely absent.

P. 30

The Objective Formal Nature of the Beatific Vision (4)

Supernatural Actuation [cont'd]

e) In the fourth place we understand this:

This thinglet is absolutely supernatural, that is, it exceeds the proportion of any creatable substance whatever.

For it itself is not a substance, but a being whereby pure act is communicated to a created potency; it supposes two substances and unites them in either the substantial or accidental order. Therefore it is not a creatable substance.

Moreover, it exceeds the proportion of any creatable substance: for every creatable substance is a limited essential potency; therefore it is not proportionate to what is unlimited, and so is not proportionate to that by which unlimited act is formally communicated.

f) In the fifth place we understand this:

It is not repugnant that this entity be communicated to a creature. For even if it exceeds the proportion of any creatable substance, it exceeds that proportion

considered in itself; but what exceeds a proportion considered in itself does not exceed God taken together with that proportion.

For example: A is not proportionate to O;
 but O is proportionate to O;
 Therefore O + A are proportionate to O.

The Connection of the Mysteries Among Themselves and With the Ultimate End of Man:

We have not only analogy with what is naturally known, but also the connection of the mysteries among themselves and with man's ultimate end.

Analogy with nature:

actuation by way of composition;
 actuation by way of communication. This communication itself takes place through the reception of an act whereby pure act is formally communicated.

The connection of the mysteries among themselves:

A human essence lacking its proper act of existence actuated in the line of existence through the communication of God: the hypostatic union.

An existing human essence actuated in the accidental order through the communication of God: sharing in the divine nature.

A human intellect actuated through the communication of God: the beatific vision.

- The first of these is for the sake of the second: incarnation for the sake of redemption.

- The second is for the third: grace in this life, glory in eternal life.

P. 31

The Objective Formal Nature of the Beatific Vision (5)

The Connection Among the Mysteries [cont'd]

The Mystical Body of Christ:

Just as the human body is the reception into organized matter of a form that is subsistent in itself (*per se*), so is the mystical Body the communication of a self-subsistent form in the Head in a substantial way and in the members in an accidental way.

Thus, the Fathers spoke of the Holy Spirit as the soul of the mystical Body of Christ, and St Thomas appeals to the reception of the soul in the body to explain the beatific vision.

This connection is not only that of the mysteries among themselves but also with [man's] ultimate end; for the ultimate end is included as the ultimate term in the connection.

Our position therefore is:

The grace of [the hypostatic] union, sanctifying grace, and the light of glory are beings by which God as he is in himself is formally communicated to created potencies as their act, an act that actuates, but not an act received in the unity of a nature nor an act limited by its receptive potency. They are beings that are absolutely supernatural; and they give us a limited yet quite fruitful understanding from analogy with what we naturally know and from the connection of the mysteries among themselves and with the ultimate end of man.

P. 32

The Objective Formal Nature of the Beatific Vision (6)

But the further question may be asked whether this entity, by which pure act is formally communicated as an act actuating a created intellect, is required in order that the Blessed really and truly see God as he is in himself.

The answer is affirmative, with these presuppositions. One of the Blessed is required as the subject or principle-which of the vision; and there is the further requirement of the intellect of the Blessed as the principle-by-which of the vision. But with these two being presupposed, only the light of glory is needed for this Blessed person to really and truly have an immediate vision of God – so long as the light of glory is defined as an entity received in the created intellect by which God is formally communicated to a potency as an act actuating that potency.

A cognitional act demands nothing but a subject, the subject's intellect, and the actuation of that intellect; these are the formal constituents of the act of a knower.

This is the teaching of St Thomas α - in general: theory of knowledge according to St. Thomas.

β - in particular: immediately below

S.T. I, 12, 2, ad 3m, 'by itself putting the intellect into act'; *C.G.* III, 53, 'by the fact that it makes the passive intellect actually understand'; *Quodl.* 7, 1, 1, ad 4m, body of article, ad 1m; *De Ver.* 18, 1, ad 1m.

The other opinions are inadequate.

2- Suarez's opinion is deficient because it does away with the distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge: if the knowledge in this vision is had through a created likeness, then, since nothing is like God (who is not in any genus), this knowledge of God does not differ from that which we have now 'through a glass darkly,' that is, from his created effects that are similar to God in an imperfect way and by way of analogy.

3- The opinion among recent Thomists has several defects.

There is no operation without a term, for an operation is simply a term as proceeding from something else. Nor is there any cognition that is not a form of the thing known, whether real or intentional; otherwise there would be no sufficient reason why one thing should be known rather than another. And it is entirely sufficient for actual intellection that the intellect be actuated by the form of the object known: the act of understanding is a passivity.

P. 33

The Objective Formal Nature of Beatific Knowledge (7)

The ancient opinion that we know God through God himself, in the sense that we know God because God knows himself, is patently absurd. We know God through God in the sense that God is the being-by-which that actuates our intellect, so that we should know God even if he did not know himself; for our position is that the immaterial form of the object known is the form of the knower. That I know because someone else knows, is false: it simply does not follow.

Objections:

2- According to what has been said, the vision of God is a passion of the intellect.

But to understand is not to be passive but to operate immanently;
therefore according to what has been said, the vision of God is not an act of understanding.

[Reply] I deny the supposition in the minor premise, namely that passivity and immanent operation are mutually exclusive. Operation of an effect: an action producing an effect. Immanent operation: the perfection of the operator, the subject, the act of a being in act. Cf. the teaching found throughout about the two kinds of

motion: the act of a being in potency, and the act of a being in act, such as sensing, understanding, willing.

Aristotle: to understand is a passivity, *S.T.* I, 79, 2;

A sense is a passive potency, *ibid.* 78, 3.

1- According to what has been said, the vision of God is God himself; but this is that ancient mistake.

[Reply] As to the major premise: that it is God himself by himself alone, we deny. That it is God himself as communicated to the intellect and actuating the intellect by an act of understanding, in the sense that God himself is the principle which understands, we deny; in the sense that God is the principle by which understanding occurs, we admit that he is--not, however, as a subjective principle by which we understand, but as the formal and objective principle by which this understanding occurs.

3- But intellection is not a passivity; here is our proof:

Understanding is a vital act; but a vital act is produced from within, not inasmuch as the subject is passive but inasmuch as the subject contributes something to that act: for example, in being lashed (transient) and feeling pain (immanent) the subject itself adds something. But, if a wall is lashed, there is no pain.

P. 34

The Objective Formal Nature of the Beatific Vision (8)

[From previous page]

Therefore intellection is not a passivity.

Reply:

(1): a conclusion that contradicts Aristotle and St. Thomas has little weight.

(2) I concede the major premise and distinguish the minor.

That the element of vitality is gauged according to the particular acts of each being by which it is alive, I deny. *S.T.* I, 18, 2, body; a. 1, ad 1m; a. 3, body. That it is gauged according to the fact that a subject by its very nature is such as to be capable of producing immanent acts, I agree.

In other words, what is alive is not this or that particular act, but the subject; and a living subject is alive not because everything in it is produced from it, but because this or that act in it can be produced from it.

The first part is obvious--a human is alive, and his intellect neither lives nor dies. The second part is easily proven: a substance is from another; existence is from another; accidental potencies are from another, for substance is not a principle of operation; accidental acts by which it produces other acts are from another, for every agent acts in so far as it is already in act, and therefore does not act in so far as it is in potency.

(3) In the case of supernatural life, our life is ours in so far as God's life is communicated to us. Hence supernatural life is gauged not according to this or that subject, but according to the whole mystical Body which is indeed alive to the fullest. For its soul is God who is a self-subsistent being [*ens a se*]; its Head and members are perfected by God himself who draws and gathers them to himself, moving all things without being moved by any other.

(4) Just as a human essence is not from a subject, so also elevating sanctifying grace is not from it; just as accidental potencies flow from the essence, not because they are produced by the essence but because they are required as being proportionate to it, so also virtuous habits in this life and the light of glory in eternal life flow from sanctifying grace, not as produced by it but because required as being proportionate to it.

To have a species is to know not in act but in habit - see the following. [?]

End of English Translation of Archive Document A53

Michael Shields

Lonergan Research Institute, 1994

Slightly revised and reformatted by the translator
Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, June 14, 2012

This printing, September 14, 2012