

## **53200DTE060 Regis69 10<sup>1</sup>**

As written, this was chapter 3, but it has been transposed elsewhere.

The headings: 1. Meaning as Horizon; 2. Method as Horizon; 3. Old and New; 4. Categories; 5. General Derivation (derivation of categories based on transcendental method; 6. Special Derivation (based on religion); 7. Use of the Categories; 8. Theologians and Scientists; 9. Pluralism.

### **1 Meaning as Horizon**

In its literal sense horizon denotes the line where apparently earth and sky meet. It is the boundary of one's field of vision, and as one moves about this boundary recedes in front and closes in behind, so that for different standpoints there are different horizons.

Moreover, for each different standpoint and horizon there are different divisions in the totality of visible objects. Beyond the horizon lie objects that, for the moment, are not perceived; within the horizon lie the objects that can now be seen.

As our field of vision so too the range of our interests and the scope of our knowledge are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the range of one's interests and the scope of one's knowledge vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word 'horizon.' In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's interests and knowledge. One knows nothing about it and cares less. And what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.

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1 The final lecture in the 1969 Regis College Institute on Method in Theology. The recording may be found at 53200A0E060.

Differences in horizon may be complementary, genetic, or dialectical. Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests. They live in a sense in different worlds; each is familiar with his own world, but each also knows about the others, each recognizes some need for the others, and none is prepared to take over the others' tasks. So there are many horizons which in some measure may include one another, but for the rest they complement one another. They are then complementary horizons, because singly they are not self-sufficient, and together they delimit the motivations and knowledge needed for the functioning of a communal world.

Next horizons may differ genetically. They are related as successive stages in some process of development or decline. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them and partly to transform them. Precisely because they are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or history.

Thirdly, horizons may be opposed dialectally. Each has some awareness of the other, and so each in a manner includes the other. But inclusion is also negation and rejection, when the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, bad will, or refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable may make one furious; but again, rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling except perhaps a wan smile. Both genocide and astrology may be beyond the pale, but while the former is execrated, the later is ignored.

More important, perhaps, than differences of horizon is their inner structure and organization. The process of learning is not a mere addition to what we already know, but rather an organic growth out of previous knowing and doing. So our intentions, our statements, our deeds all occur within contexts, and it is to the context that we appeal

when we explain our deeds, clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or outline the reasons for our goals. So for Edmund Husserl, an account of even a single perception would be incomplete were there no mention of the ? horizon or world as an encompassing frame of reference.

Finally, regulative of our knowledge are our interests. We take the trouble to attend and learn, in accord with the values we respect and the satisfactions we grasp. In the measure of respect for values, the values that are respected, the satisfactions desired or preferred can differ from age to age, group to group, man to man, and in the course of each one's lifetime.

## **2 Method as Horizon**

In our opening lecture we had occasion to contrast the Aristotelian approach to method with the one we were to employ. Aristotle picked the mathematics of his time as the ideal of science, and everything else was science insofar as it approached that ideal. Insofar as it didn't approach it, it had a lower position in the pecking order.

We have now to note that this difference in approach involves a series of differences in ideals and opinions; and it is of some importance that these differences be acknowledged explicitly. For while it is true that a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's thought is rather rare among theologians today, the long-standing connection between Aristotle and Catholic theology has profoundly marked the Catholic mind, so that there is to it a good deal of unconscious or surreptitious Aristotelianism in a neurosis-like conflict with contemporary theological practice.

First, then, there is a crucial difference between the Aristotelian and the modern notion of science. The Aristotelian notion of science is concerned with the causal, the necessary, and the immutable; in the modern notion, necessity and immutability have no more than a marginal significance. Science is concerned with the intelligibility, not that

must be, but that can be. Of itself, such intelligibility is hypothetical; essentially it stands in need of the complement of verification; and any single verification yields no more than a probable confirmation, while even cumulative, indirect verification does not preclude the possibility of revision. Note that that aspect of modern science is fairly recent. In the nineteenth century, natural laws were necessary and economic laws were iron. The question of the 1929-30's depression knocked out the idea of economic necessity. That view of science as necessary was discouraged first by the recognition of the uniqueness of Euclidean geometry, by a successful use in physics of a non-Euclidean geometry, by the alternative probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and by the limitations placed on deductive systems by theorems of the Gödelian type. On those limitations, Ladrière, *Les limitations internes de formalisme* (Louvain, 1957).

The Aristotelian view of science has never been anything but an embarrassment to theology. One may still say, perhaps, that God in himself is necessary, not caused. But he need not have created anything; he could have created a different universe with different laws. The economy of man's salvation need not have occurred, and it could have occurred in a different fashion. Apart from God, all that is and occurs certainly is highly intelligible, stupendously so; but the intelligibility is the intelligibility, not of what cannot be otherwise but of what could be otherwise. It is the type of intelligibility discerned in the natural and human sciences. In those sciences it is highly prized. But in theology it has come to be called *convenientia*; and commonly enough, interest in it is mistaken for mental weakness.

To accept method in theology is to stop Aristotle's mistakes: that science is about the necessary and the immutable. For the most part, science is about contingent reality or about necessary reality whose necessity we fail to grasp. For the most part, the intelligibility of reality and the intelligibility we grasp is the type of intelligibility reached in the natural and human sciences and in systematic theology. It is not necessity, but openly verifiable possibility.

There are a few corollaries. Aristotle distinguished science and opinion. Science is of the necessary, opinion is of the contingent. Modern science regards the contingent universe that exists, and so we speak of scientific opinion, the best available scientific opinion. Similarly, Aristotle distinguished theory and practice. Theory regards the necessary, what you can't do anything about; all you can do is contemplate. Practice regards the contingent. So theory and practice are mutually exclusive; the theorist cannot change the necessary; all he can do is contemplate. But while modern science is far more theoretical than anything done by the Greeks and the Scholastics, still it is about the contingent, about things that can be otherwise. And so modern theory is eminently practical; we see its fruits all about us. In the modern context, then, theory and practice are just two moments in man's operations with regard to the same objects. Finally, as theory and practice are continuous, so our wisdom and our prudence must also run together. To play one's part in history, for all its particularity and contingency, calls for wisdom as well as prudence.

Secondly, the vehicle of Aristotelian science was naturally enough the syllogism. Syllogisms express knowledge of causes inasmuch as the middle term names the end, agent, the matter, or the form. They express necessary knowledge inasmuch as premises are first-stage predications in which essential attributes are attributed to commensurate subjects. Finally, besides the premises that may be derived syllogistically, there are those that are true, first, underlying, better known in their implications, and related to them as cause to effect. Obviously the existence of Aristotelian science depends on the existence of these basic premises in each field. But while Aristotle does describe how our knowledge of them arises, while his description fits quite accurately the manner in which scientific discoveries are made, still what scientists do discover are not necessary causes and immutable effects, but hypotheses, theories, systems, and all of them are open to revision.

To accept method in theology, then, is to drop the deductivist ideal and its presupposition of necessary first principles. It is to conceive theology as an ongoing process in two phases, each subdivided into four functional specialties. Nor need this conception of theology involve one in some radical skepticism or relativism. As has been explained already, transcendental method brings to light a secure base, and in its systematic function insures continuity without imposing rigidity. Such security and continuity are precisely what is wanted for not only theology, but also dogma and even religion, to develop.

Thirdly, truth is contextual; but it makes a vast difference whether the context is envisaged as unique and fixed or as ever subject to development and aberration. Ideally, of course, the context of any true statement would consist of all other relevant true statements. Ideally, every term would be clear and precise. There would not be even apparent contradictions; and the logical interdependence of connected statements would be exhibited syllogistically. That is what is meant by the static universe, and it arises, not because you are doing metaphysics, not because you use logic, but because you use a logical ideal in constructing contexts. If Aristotle's logic made possible this notion of an ideal context, the fault of his writing was that he insistently preached the doctrine that subject differs from the subject, and one should not expect more accuracy, coherence, rigor than any given subject permits. It remains, however, that more than excellent example is needed if one is to formulate in some manner what is the real as distinct from the ideal context of data. And one of the advantages of method is that it offers some help in this direction. Within the framework of method, the function of logic is limited. It consolidates past achievements; it reveals defects and deficiencies still to be overcome; it gives expression to an ideal towards which science advances. But that ideal is not supposed to be an already accomplished fact. The demand is not for clarity, but for increasing clarity. Understanding is expected to increase, and as it increases, concepts will become fuller, more precise, richer in implications. There is a permanent demand

for coherence, but it has to make peace with the need to retain opposed statements that have some justification, and may prove to be complementary aspects of a truth as yet unknown. Full respect is paid to logical rigor, but, when appropriate, there also is full respect for other procedures that step by step unfold an ever richer and fuller understanding.

In brief, the deductivist ideal leads to an over-insistence on clarity, consistency, and truth. Method, on the contrary, patiently accumulates a mass of evidence that cannot be compressed and made available for haughty people in a hurry. They have to learn to learn.

Fourthly, as long as the scientific ideal is conceived in terms of self-evident principles and necessary conclusions, it is manifest that one's values and choices can have very little influence on science. They would have to be extreme indeed to blind one to the self-evident, and even if they were extreme, they could hardly hide fallacy where it existed, or find it where it did not. In contrast, when the necessitarian ivory tower turns out to be a fiction and method takes over, values and choices assume a fundamental role. At the root of all scientific work is the decision to do such work, and method is the program to be followed in doing it. Moreover, the more the several methods of the various sciences are brought back to their foundations, the more their precepts are found to be articulations of the transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. At the root, then, both of science and of method is the authenticity of the existential subject, and inversely, the intrinsic value of science lies in the fact that it is one of the ways in which human authenticity may unfold and flourish and bear fruit.

Fifthly, while deductivist science encourages the view that a science is a habit tucked into an individual's mind, the modern sciences are proving so vast, so much beyond any individual's comprehension, that they are now to be conceived as parceled-out among the scientific community. No one today knows all mathematics or all

physics or all chemistry or all biology; but what is true of them also is true of theology and related disciplines: there are no omniscient theologians. The best that can be had are large teams or panels of experts, and while they can produce handbooks and encyclopedias, still it is not any individual but only other teams that can comprehend their output. So the unity of theology becomes a dynamic unity of the interplay of functional specialties. The teaching of theology becomes an initiation into the general nature of method, and into its concrete exercise in different carriers, and into a selection of topics made in accord with the future work of each student.

So much for method as a horizon.

### 3 Old and New

It will serve to define further the horizon of contemporary theology if we go back to its medieval origins. The seminal work was Peter Abelard's *Sic et non*, which listed arguments from scripture, from the Fathers, and from reason, to promote the affirmative and negative sides of 158 propositions. This set the problem of coherence in traditional teachings, and evoked the technique of the *quaestio*. This technique was to begin with a list of arguments on one side: *Videtur quod non ...*, and then with a list on the other: *Sed contra est ...*; it went on to a general response, to lay down principles of a solution, and in particular responses to apply the principles to the ideas pro and con that had raised the *quaestio*. To see this technique as something really doing the job, see *De veritate*, q. 24, a.12, where Thomas changes his mind from the position he held in the *Sentences*, II *Sent.*, distinction 28, q. 1, a.2.

The responses, however, gave rise to a new problem of coherence. Answers to a series of questions had to be coherent themselves. Thereby there arose the need for a systematic mode of conception that would provide a broad basis for solving questions, and at the same time, as it were, automatically secure coherence. The desired basis was



found in the writings of Aristotle, whose thought could be applied directly to what was termed the 'order of nature' and could be extended by analogy to treat the economy of salvation and the mysteries of faith. The result was the imposing edifice of medieval theology. Needless to say, the Aristotelian ideal of science, as found in the *Posterior Analytics*, did nothing to remedy the real weakness in the technique of the *quaestio*. For that technique, while it immersed theologians in a mass of scriptural, patristic, and to a less extent, conciliar data, was content to arrive at a merely logical coherence. It in no way envisaged the possibility of historical development underlying the apparent antinomies in theological sources. The defect was not easily remedied. The Renaissance was anti-Scholastic, but its classicism was involved in the normative notion of culture. It admired and imitated ancient ways, much more than it developed historical perspective, and acknowledged irreducible differences. The Reformation was anti-Scholastic, but it called forth the counter-Reformation to give traditional views a halo of orthodoxy. When non-Catholic scholars developed and refined historical methods, the resulting liberal Protestantism only seemed to confirm the opinion that the new methods were misleading or mistaken.

It remains that historical studies have won the day, first in patristic, conciliar, and medieval studies, and more recently in the biblical field. It is this victory that constitutes the contemporary problem of method in theology, and it will be well to list the various trends that, as it were, constitute the materials that have to be brought together or represent the dangers that such a method may face.

First, there were the schools, various schools, of which the most notable was the Thomist school, represented by Capreolus, Cajetan, Bañez, John of St Thomas, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart. Its procedure was the commentary on St Thomas, and when it shifted from commentaries on the *Sentences* to commentaries on the *Summa*, it painted itself into a corner. Commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* was a commentary on theological sources: on scripture and the Fathers. But when you start

doing a commentary on a systematic work like the *Summa* of St Thomas, you cut yourself off from the sources. Its notion of theology was deductivist; its historical perspective rudimentary.

Secondly, Melchior Cano, in *De locis theologicis*, endeavored to enrich the Scholastic tradition with the humanistic studies of the Renaissance. He conceived theology as proving traditional Scholastic teachings deductively from a series of sources: scripture, patristic writings, papal and conciliar documents, theologians, reason, etc. Historical development was overlooked.

Cano died in 1560, but about 1680 his influence crystallized into a movement that lasted into the present century. Its fruit is the manual of dogmatic theology. Such a manual consists of a set of theses in each of which there are set forth the meaning of the terms of the thesis, old and new opinions on the topic, the measure in which Church teaching is involved in the thesis, arguments in favor of the thesis from scripture, for tradition, and from reason, and finally corollaries.

While this outline sets forth what essentially is a pedagogical device that could be turned to any of a variety of ends, its basic weakness lies concealed in the fact that a single man was expected to write and teach that manual. This, of course, was possible on the mistaken assumption of *semper idem: quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*; that if possible, if one knew and understood the faith of today, one was fully competent to interpret the Old and the New testaments, the Greek and Latin Fathers, the medieval, renaissance, and modern theologians.

Thirdly, in the latter part of the nineteenth century official sanction was given to the revival of Thomism. This of course was necessary if there was to be kept intact the medieval achievement with its extensive borrowing from Aristotle. But while the movement flourished between the two world wars, it collapsed after the second. In the Middle Ages the baptism of Aristotle had been the key step in integrating, within the Christian West, a cultural invasion from Greek and Arabic sources. But in the twentieth

century Aristotelianism provided no adequate basis either for dialogues with the natural or human sciences or for the intussusception within theology of historical studies and historical perspectives.

In consequence, either theology degenerated into simply the history of doctrines and ideas in the various areas of theological study, or else theologians decided that since the neo-Scholasticism was inadequate they would have to be their own philosophers.

(In *Theology Digest*, February, 1968, p. 19; and in *Scripture*, vol. 8, pp. 68 ff., the concerns, methods, and needs of theology itself pose so many questions in philosophy and make so many demands upon philosophy of a conceptual and systematic influence, that the traditional neo-Scholastic philosophy, as it has been and still is up to the present time, is simply inadequate to meet demands. Hence, there is no alternative but to philosophize within theology itself.)

Fourthly, as we noted above, medieval theology had recourse to Aristotle to provide itself with a *Begrifflichkeit*, a system of congruence, with a systematic set of categories for speaking of the order of nature, the economy of salvation, and God. When, then, today there is urged the inadequacy of neo-Scholasticism, when increasingly theologians turn to personalist, phenomenological, existentialist, and historical sources to find ways of expressing their thought, what is at issue is the need to drop the old dependence on Aristotle and to replace it by the categories that meet contemporary exigences and opportunities.

#### **4 Categories**

Categories which would meet contemporary exigences and opportunities will have their basis in transcendental method. That method brings to light four things: (1) attending to data and questioning for intelligence, reflection and deliberation; (2) the operations that follow upon attending and questioning; (3) the structure in which these operations occur;

and (4) the objects correlative to the operations and structure, and specified, not by their own qualities, but by their correlativity. These four may be referred to more briefly as (1) the a priori, or as Karl Rahner puts it, the *Vorgriff* as distinct from the *Begriff*; (2) the operations; (3) the structure; and (4) the objects.

Now in one sense these four are not transcultural, but in another sense they are transcultural. They are not transcultural inasmuch as their explicit formulation and the subsequent developments of that formulation can occur only when a rather notable cultural development has taken place. But they are transcultural, both inasmuch as the reality to which the formulations refer precede the formulations and are to be found in any instance of *homo sapiens*, and inasmuch as these realities originate the emergence of culture, its continuity, and its changes.

The significance of deriving categories from transcendental method is of course that thereby categories have at least something of a transcultural basis. For it is only inasmuch as theology has at least one foot resting on a transcultural basis that it can reflect on a religion that has developed for two millennia, and that it can direct communications with all nations and all cultural levels in each nation. There remains of course the question of the way in which categories can be derived from transcendental method. Here a first distinction must be drawn between actual detailed derivation, which will be the work of theologians, and on the other hand general indications revealing the possibility of such derivation, which is the concern of the methodologist. To this first distinction there is to be added a second. There is a general derivation which theologians will use inasmuch as they can speak of the material universe of men. And there is a specifically theological derivation needed for specifically theological topics.

## **5 General Derivation**

First, then, the general derivation. There are at least five procedures for deriving categories from transcendental method. They consist in (1) complicating the basic structure; (2) turning to concrete instances of it; (3) filling it out; (4) differentiating it; and (5) setting it in motion. We spoke of functional specialties on the second day. There was effected a complication of the basic structure, by applying it to two distinct phases, and then specializing on the end of each of the four levels of conscious and intentional operations. We took the fundamental structure of transcendental method and set up eight functional specialties. Moreover, while our presentation was conceived with reference to theology, it could be adapted to any subject in which investigators were responding to past history and were to influence future history. Different modes of complication of the basic structure are to be found in my book *Insight*, in its treatment of common sense (pp. 173-181, 289-299), in its account of classical and statistical, genetic and dialectical methods (pp. 33-69, 217-244, 451-487, 530-594), and in its view of metaphysics as an integral heuristic structure (390-396). So one may make the basic structure complicated by directing it to different ends.

Secondly, one may proceed from a single subject of conscious and intentional operations to many such subjects, to their grouping in society, and to the historical succession of such groups.

Third, one may advance from the very general to a more detailed account of the subject and his conscious and intentional operations. This procedure is illustrated throughout *Insight*, and has been illustrated in our sections on Values, Feelings, Beliefs, Meaning, Religion. To this topic we will return. For the moment it will be enough to stress the importance of basing one's advance to a more detailed account on genuine personal experience, and of expressing it in a manner that will serve to objectify not only one's own but also the experience of others.

Fourthly, the basic structure of conscious and intentional operations may be differentiated in various ways. In *Insight*, there were distinguished a biological, an

aesthetic, an intellectual, a dramatic, and a practical pattern of experience (pp. 181-91 and 207). One can distinguish the authentic subject that is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and the unauthentic subject that fails in one or more respects. One can go on to determine the positions maintained by the authentic subject and the counterpositions by the unauthentic (*Insight* 387). One can distinguish different worlds: the world of immediacy, of what is given to sense and to consciousness; the world of common sense; the world as explained by the natural and human sciences; the world of interiority with its transcendental relevance; the world of religious experience and theology. One can distinguish between differentiated consciousness, that shifts with ease from one pattern of experience to another and from one world to another, and undifferentiated consciousness, to which the world of theory and of interiority are alien.

Fifthly, since transcendental method regards the dynamic structure of operations, there are various ways in which models of change can be set up. Thus, a single heuristic structure can encapsulate a series of different answers. The question, What is fire? has been answered by saying it is one of the four elements, that it is phlogiston, and that it is a process of oxidization; there is nothing to connect those three answers, to relate them, except the identity of the question, What is to be understood in each phenomenon referred to as fire? That question remains something permanent. Or if you are studying the notion of person in the Trinity, you start off with a purely heuristic notion: what there are three of. There are not three Gods or three Fathers or three Sons or three Spirits. What are there three of? Call them persons. And what do you mean by person? What there are three of in the Trinity. This is a purely heuristic notion, and you have it in Augustine. You start getting definitions with Boethius, with Richard of St Victor, and with Thomas. These definitions presuppose metaphysics, and to compare them you have to go on to a metaphysical idea of person; you get that with Scotus, Capreolus, Tiphanius, Suarez. With Descartes, you move on to the subject, to consciousness of Descartes's *Cogito*; and then you have the phenomenologists. And they are all answering

fundamentally the same issue. But the answers are different. And when your theology has a historical basis, you give the series of answers; you don't just have one definition, you have a series.

Again, developments can be analyzed as processes from initial global operations of low efficiency through differentiation and specialization towards the integration of the specialties. Theoretical developments of a high order can be related as the succession of higher viewpoints (*Insight*, chapter 1). The universe in which both classical and statistical laws are verified will be characterized by a process named emergent probabilities (*Insight*, chapter 4). Authenticity can be shown to generate progress, unauthenticity can bring about decline (*Insight*, chapters 7, 18, 20), while the problem of overcoming decline yields the heuristic structure that provides an introduction to religion (*Insight*, chapter 20). The problem of interpretation brings to light the possibility of a universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression, (chapter 17).

## **6 Special Derivation**

Special derivation is from the chapter on religion. There we have the dynamic state of being in love with God. Just as one has to learn to labor to bring out into the open one's experience of one's conscious and intentional operations generally, so too one has to perform a similar labor to identify in one's own horizon and in its more outward fruits what is meant by the words 'being in love with God.' Again, just as there is an intellectual and moral self-appropriation that grounds transcendental method, so too there is a religious Christian self-appropriation that grounds the extension of transcendental method into theology. Finally, as our Christianity commonly is more in aspiration than achievement, we have to have recourse to the Christian community, to its store of

experience and its traditional wisdom, to awaken what is latent in us, to stir our feelings even though our minds are only partly open, though our wills are not yet ready.

Next, just as there five procedures for deriving general categories from transcendental method, so there are a similar five for deriving special theological categories from Christian self-appropriation, or general religious self-appropriation.

First, being in love with God is something exceedingly simple and simplifying. But it also is something exceedingly rich and enriching. There is room, then, for a theology of the Christian subject. It will be a theology of grace, and at the same time, an ascetical and mystical theology. It may further develop along the lines of the human sciences, using history and fieldwork, phenomenology and psychology, and any other relevant techniques.

Secondly, from the subject one move to subjects, their togetherness in community, the history of the salvation that consists in being in love with God, and the function of this history in promoting the kingdom of God amongst men.

Thirdly, our being in love with God is God's gift to us, his gift of himself to us, his loving us and our being loved by him. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending, by speaking of the Spirit that is given us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.

Fourthly, just as one's humanity, so too one's Christianity may be authentic or unauthentic. What is worse, to the unauthentic man or Christian it is the unauthentic that appears authentic. Here, then, is the root of division, opposition, controversy, denunciation, bitterness. Here too is the transcendental base for the fourth functional specialty, dialectic.

Fifthly, as human authenticity promotes progress, and human unauthenticity generates decline, so Christian authenticity, which is the love of others that does not



shrink from self-sacrifice and suffering, is the sovereign need for overcoming evil. Christians, then, bring about the kingdom of God in the world, not only by doing good, but also by overcoming evil with good (Romans 12.21). Not only is there the progress of mankind, but also there is progress and development within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and finally, as there is decline, so there is the problem of unbelief, of overcoming evil with good, not only in the world but also in the Church.

## **7 Use of the Categories**

In this chapter, I have been indicating what are the general and the special categories from a transcendental, and so transcultural, base. The general base is the authentic or unauthentic man: attentive or inattentive, intelligent or unintelligent, reasonable or unreasonable, responsible or irresponsible, with consequent positions and counterpositions. The special base is the authentic or unauthentic Christian genuinely in love with God or failing in that love, with the consequent Christian or unchristian style of living. The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and Christian subject's effecting self-appropriation, and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and as an a priori whence one can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny.

The use of the categories and their development occur within the determinate tasks already outlined as functional specialties. They occur, then, in research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, communications. Further, the use and development of the categories occur in interaction with data; they receive further specification from the data. At the same time the data set up exigences for further clarification of the categories and for their correction and development. In this fashion there is set up a scissors movement with an upper blade in the categories and the

lower blade in the data. Just as the principles and laws of physics are neither mathematics nor data, but the fruit of an ongoing interaction between mathematics and data, so too a theology can be neither purely a priori nor purely a posteriori, but only the fruit of an ongoing process of interaction between categories and data. Finally, as the theology is an ongoing process, as religion and religious doctrine themselves develop, so the fundamental part of theology, and perhaps the *Fundamentaltheologie* that Karl Rahner desired, will be concerned with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians understand themselves, communicate with one another, and announce the Gospel to all nations.

## **8 Theologians and Scientists**

By its Christian adaptation of Aristotle, medieval theology related itself, not only to Aristotle's philosophy, but also to the extensive group of scientific investigations included in the Aristotelian corpus. While these investigations were stamped, not only with a mighty effort towards clarity, precision, and coherence, but also with far-ranging inquiry and observation, their inheritors tended to think of them, not as just a modest beginning to be further developed, but rather as a treasure to be preserved intact for all time. Such seemed to be in fact the attitudes that conditioned traditional views on the relations between theology and science. They are relations between well-ordered collections of static results. These relations are ruled by logic, which classifies collections by their formal objects, demands of each discipline that it remain within its own territory, and since two statements cannot be both true and contradictory requires all disciplines to be coherent not only internally but also externally.

But neither modern science nor modern theology are well-ordered collections of static results. They are ongoing processes, and they are ruled, not by logic alone, but by methods that regard non-logical as well as logical operations. Their common ground,

ideally, lies in transcendental method, and since that method takes its stand immanent and operative in subjects, it will link theology and science by first relating theologians and scientists.

A first task will be to overcome the birth trauma of modern science. For that science, that originated in Aristotelian soil, developed and took shape through its opposition to Aristotelian thought, and through its conflicts with Aristotelians who also happened to be theologians and even happened to be connected with ecclesiastical power. There is, then, endemic to modern science a fierce resentment against any interference from a philosophic, theological, or ecclesiastical source.

Accordingly, it will be well to be clear about possible differences between theologians and scientists. It may happen that their views are merely disparate: they are on different topics, and for that reason are not opposed. On the other hand, they may really conflict, and such conflict may arise from one or more of six sources. The theology or the science may be insufficiently developed. The theologian or the scientist may lack human authenticity. The theologian or the scientist may lack Christian authenticity.

Now if the theology or the science is insufficiently developed, the solution is further development. Such further development will not come from deducing scientific conclusions from theological premises or theological conclusions from scientific premises. It will come only from further work in the appropriate field in accord with the methods of that field. It is true, of course, that the further work can be stimulated if the theologian or the scientist draws the other's attention to the fact that it might be his subject that is not adequate. But the more this occurs in friendly dialogue, and the less that it has the air of a public denunciation, the more likely it is to have the fruit that is intended.

Next, to the theologian or scientist who is lacking in Christian authenticity, the remedy lies in God's operative grace, that plucks out the heart of stone and replaces it

with the heart of flesh. Moreover, while God gives his grace to those he pleases, it remains that he pleases to give it to those that ask for it (Luke 11.13). Finally, if the theologian and the scientist is lacking in human authenticity, the remedy lies in transcendental method. This of course is a radical cure, and it demands considerable effort on the part of an invalid unaware of his malady. Moreover, if the malady is widespread among theologians and scientists, its broad distribution makes it appear normal rather than abnormal.

Still, there are grounds for some hope. Theologians are afflicted with the problem of method. Some are ready to implement even a difficult solution. If they succeed, it can be expected that others will join them. Moreover, while the sciences flourish, the scientists are not totally complacent. The horror of nuclear weaponry has led many scientists to ask about the function of their work in human history. The pacifism of many young men is leading them away from a scientific vocation. The old mechanist determinism is out, and the new Copenhagen interpretation has its scientific opponents. Finally, the human sciences have their special problems, and many among the human scientists would welcome a line of solution. The human sciences have long be confronted with a dilemma: if they model themselves strictly on the natural sciences, then relentlessly their apprehension of man is stripped of all specifically human content. If they try to set up independent foundations of their own, they find themselves involved in the chaotic disarray of the philosophies. Neither alternative is acceptable to anyone both seriously scientific and authentically human, and fortunately the dilemma is not quite rigorous. For transcendental method is not just another instance in the species of philosophers. Though it is relevant to issues traditionally considered philosophical, its inspiration is precisely to get beyond the many philosophies, and as it is here conceived its procedure is parallel to the procedure of empirical scientists.

For empirical science appeals to the data of sense, to objectify them in an ever more comprehensive and probable fashion. Transcendental method appeals to the data of

consciousness, to objectify them in an ever more comprehensive and probable fashion. But where empirical science will not reach definitive views until all data have been accounted for, transcendental method deals with a privileged area. Its data are data on the very operations which unendingly generate and revise scientific hypotheses, theories, systems. Unless these operations are understood, one has no motivated ground for asserting that scientific hypotheses, theories, systems are perpetually subject to revision. On the other hand, if these operations are understood, and the view of science as an ongoing process is grounded, then that ground itself cannot be revised without presupposing, and so confirming, the very position it is attempting to revise.

What transcendental method brings to light cannot be considered as simply extrinsic to science. The scientist has a mind, and as a scientist he uses his mind. It is in no way alien to his vocation for him to liberate himself from the cognitional myths that afflict the philosophies by ascertaining, first, what he does when he investigates, second, why doing that leads to knowing, and third, what does he come to know when he does it. Nor will it be contrary to his scientific integrity to acknowledge the fact that a method means a choice of means with respect to an end, that to accept and follow a method is a matter of deliberation, evaluation, decision, that accordingly the pursuit of science, so far from being value free, is the deliberate effort to realize the value of science, and that deliberate effort, so far from being opposed to scientific integrity, is the condition of its very possibility.

In other words, just as the modern theologian has to break loose through from the Aristotelian scientific ideal in terms of objective necessity, so too the modern scientist has to break loose from the Enlightenment's scientific ideal in terms of objective necessity. Both have to reconcile themselves to the fact that all the operations of an existential subject occur within a horizon, and that horizons are determined by the values included in the value of knowledge that the subject effectively acknowledges.

Nor need this fact disturb them. There is no conflict between the value of knowledge and other values. All are a matter of self-transcendence. Knowledge is a cognitive self-transcendence; the acceptance of other values involves a real self-transcendence. To acknowledge this is to substitute a fact for an illusion. Objectivity is a matter of cognitive self-transcendence. Cognitive self-transcendence is not necessary; it is contingent; it occurs in the measure that the subject is authentically human, that is, consistently attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The necessitarian ivory tower has had its day.

This fact is especially significant for the human sciences. They not only are the product of existential subjects, but also are about existential subjects. Contemporary human scientists frequently are quite aware of this fact. But in the measure they come to grasp transcendental method, they will come to grasp the a priori of their field; for transcendental method is the existential subject's concern with himself. Once that basis is reached, human science can cease to imitate natural science and set up house for itself.

I have been citing general types of possible conflicts. The discussion has been, not in the old context that conceived a science as true and certain knowledge of things through their causes, but in the contemporary context in which sciences are ongoing processes, their positive results at any time are no more than probable, and where mistaken these results sooner or later will be corrected. Where the old context might lead logicians to the conclusion of the Inquisition, the new context calls for the patience recommended in the parable of the cockle (Matthew 13.24-30). Besides possible conflicts, there is the positive matter of use of theology by the sciences and the sciences by theologians.

The use of theology to science seems to be threefold. First, it enables a scientist to keep his religion on the cultural level of the rest of his mental activity. Or, inversely, it prevents his religion from appearing as something outworn, antiquated, irrelevant, childish. Secondly, it frees the scientist from totalitarian tendencies. Scientific

knowledge tends to be thought to be omniscient when clear-headed and carefully controlled scientific knowledge floats loosely in a mass of extrascientific opinions. On the other hand, in the measure that one is able to recognize philosophic and theological questions, to sketch the procedures for their solution, to respect the controls they employ, it is no longer self-evident that the only sensible way to tackle any issue is the way of science. Thirdly, the more a scientist is acquainted with first-rate theology, the better is he equipped to join with theologians in key work on the university campus, in special research projects, and in interdisciplinary publications.

The use of the sciences by theology is necessary if theology is to speak to contemporary man. Just as the Fathers justified their borrowing of a different culture by recalling the Israelites despoiling the Egyptians, just as medieval theology enriched itself by taking over the Aristotelian corpus, so a contemporary theology has to enrich itself with the surpassing wealth of modern science. The use itself is manifold, varying with the two phases, and the functional specialties in each phase. But in general, the sciences, especially the human sciences, and most of all the science of religion, can supply the theologian with information, with models for procedure, with accounts of structures, with analogies of process, with analogies that throw light on specifically theological topics. Next, in each case, the theologian has to draw on good scientific opinion on the status of the material he proposes to borrow. And he has to be able to criticize it from the viewpoint of human and Christian authenticity. Finally, he has to employ it, both to extend his data, and to make his general and special categories more determinate.

## **9 Pluralism**

Knowledge of man is knowledge of many races, peoples, states, religions, cultures, histories. Such knowledge is pluralist, both in its subject and in its object. It is pluralist in its subject, for it is knowledge that can be had, never by the individual, but only by the

scientific community. It is pluralist in its object, for the objects are many and in motion; they are the set of ongoing processes, developing, declining, recovering in different ways, at different rates, in greater or lesser degrees of interdependence.

Such knowledge of man is under the sign of method. If it uses logic to consolidate gains and to point up as yet unresolved ambiguities in its history, it does not mistake the shape of its context by projecting on it the logical ideals of clarity, coherence, and rigor with their implications of perfection and immobility. Still, though both knowing subjects and known objects are many and on the move, the resulting knowledge is not a mere many-sided multiplicity and diversity. For results are communicated in faculty seminars, congresses, periodicals, books. Methods insure progressive and cumulative results. Each investigation is the striving of a subject to bring fully to fruition his authenticity by being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in implementing and gradually improving the methods proper to his field. Finally the investigations are concerned with individuals and groups themselves in their multiform lives, bringing to fruition their authenticity or failing to do so. The process that is knowledge of man, like the process that is man, while neither static nor monolithic, possesses a dynamic unity, both in its originating source and in the progressive and cumulative character of the results obtained.

Such pluralism is characteristically modern and in sharp contrast with its classicist predecessor. Classicist culture conceives itself normatively. Its ideals were eternal verities; its classics were immortal works of art; its philosophy was the *philosophia perennis*; its religion was the one and only true religion. Finally, because it conceived itself normatively, and because it conceived norms as universally valid, it was not just one culture among many but the one and only culture. Anyone could participate, of course, if only he was ready to mount to the level of its norms and ?; but the conditions could not be satisfied by many, and so the many remained beyond the pale; at home they were named the people, abroad they rated with the barbarians.



Similarly in religious matters, the educated were confronted with the simple faithful, and true believers with the heretics and heathens.

Pluralism, then, is broader in its interests, richer in its sympathies, more zealous in its efforts to understand. It has its basis and its legitimacy in the fact that human development occurs over time in different manners, at different rates; that human horizons are determined largely by the values one appreciates and freely chooses to realize; that human unauthenticity ought not to be, but in fact exists, and that its defects are only multiplied by violence, or only removed by self-sacrifice and love.

So we find the church more authentically Christian now that it has formed its commissions on ecumenism and on non-Christian religions. So too we think theology has to enter into communication with the history of religions and cultural disciplines, but just what this means and implies had best be reserved for a later time.