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We have seen the sections 'Three Handbooks,' 'Data and Facts,' 'Three Historians,' and 'Verstehen,' and 'Perspectivism.' There remain two sections, 'Horizons' and 'Heuristic Structures.' First of all 'Horizons.'

Sir Lewis Namier has described a historical sense as 'an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen.' He was referring, of course, to the case in which such intuitive understanding is the fruit of historical study, but our present concern with horizons directs our attention to the prior understanding that the historian derives not from historical study but from other sources.

On this matter Carl Becker dwelt in a paper read at Cornell in 1937 and at Princeton in 1938. His topic was Bernheim's rule that a fact can be established by the testimony of at least two independent witnesses not self-deceived. While he went over each term in the rule, his interest centered on the question whether historians considered witnesses to be self-deceived, not because they were known to be excited or emotionally involved or of poor memory, but simply because of the historian's own view on what was possible and what was impossible. His answer was affirmative. When the historian is convinced that an event is impossible, he will always say that the witnesses were self-deceived, whether they were just two or as many as two hundred. In other words, historians have their preconceptions, if not about what must have happened, at least about what could not have happened. Such preconceptions are derived, not from the study of history, but from the climate of opinion in which the historian lives and from

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1 The second part of the lecture of the eighth day and the discussion period of the evening of that day. The audio recording that can be found at 53000A0E060 contains the lecture and part of the discussion. The full discussion can be found at 539R0A0E060.

which he unconsciously[2] acquires certain fixed convictions about the nature of man and of the world. Once such convictions are established, it is easier for him to believe that any number of witnesses are self-deceived than for him to admit that the impossible has actually occurred.

This paper has not been published. I'm going on Smith's book on Becker, pp. 88-90.

This open acknowledgment that historians have preconceived ideas and that these ideas modify their writing of history is quite in accord, not only with what we have already recounted of Becker's views, but also with what we ourselves have said about meaning. Each of us lives in a world mediated by meaning, a world constructed over the years by the sum total of our conscious, intentional activities. Such a world is a matter not merely of details but also of basic options. Once such options are taken and built upon, they have to be maintained, or else one must go back, tear down, reconstruct. So radical a procedure is not easily undertaken; it is not comfortably performed; it is not quickly completed. It can be comparable to major surgery, and most of us grasp the knife gingerly and wield it clumsily.

Now the historian is engaged in extending his world mediated by meaning, in enriching it with regard to the human, the past, the particular. His historical questions, in great part, regard matters of detail. But even they can involve questions of principle, issues that set basic options. Can miracles happen? If the historian has constructed his world on the view that miracles are impossible, what is he going to do about witnesses testifying to miracles as matters of fact? Obviously, either he has to go back and reconstruct his world on new lines, or else he has to find these witnesses either incompetent or dishonest or self-deceived. Becker was quite right in saying that the latter is the easier course. He was quite

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2 Changed in *Method* to 'inadvertently.'

right in saying that the number of witnesses is not the issue. The real point is that the witnesses, whether few or many, can exist in that historian's world only if they are pronounced incompetent or dishonest or at least self-deceived.

More than a quarter of a century earlier in his essay on 'Detachment and the Writing of History' Becker was fully aware that whatever detachment historians exhibited, they were not detached from the dominant ideas of their own age. They knew quite well that no amount of testimony can establish about the past what is not found in the present. Hume's argument did not really prove that no miracles had ever occurred. Its real thrust was that the historian cannot deal intelligently with the past when the past is permitted to be unintelligible to him. Miracles are excluded because they are contrary to the laws of nature that in his generation are regarded as established; but if scientists come to find a place for them in experience, there will be historians to restore them to history. [Lonergan makes a reference to Becker's *Detachment and the Writing of History*.]

What holds for questions of fact, also holds for questions of interpretation. Religion remains in the twentieth century, but it no longer explains medieval asceticism. So monasteries are associated less with the salvation of souls and more with sheltering travelers and reclaiming marsh land. St Simeon Stylites is not a physical impossibility; he can fit, along with one-eyed monsters and knights-errant, into a child's world; but his motives lie outside current adult experience and so, most conveniently, they are pronounced pathological.

Becker's contention that historians operate in the light of preconceived ideas implies a rejection of the Enlightenment and Romantic ideal of presuppositionless history. On that topic, independently, Gadamer, pp. 256 ff. That ideal, of course, has the advantage of excluding from the start all the errors that the historian has picked up from his parents and teachers and, as well, all that he has generated by his own lack of attention, his obtuseness, his poor judgments. But the fact remains

that, while mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers all operate on presuppositions that they can explicitly acknowledge, the historian operates in the light of his whole previous personal development, and that development does not admit complete and explicit formulation and acknowledgment. To say that the historian should operate without presuppositions is to assert the principle of the empty head, to urge that the historian should be uneducated, to claim that he should be exempted from the process variously named socialization or acculturation, to strip him of historicity. The historian's presuppositions are not just his but also the living on in him of developments that human society and culture have slowly accumulated over the centuries.

It was Newman who remarked, apropos of Descartes's methodic doubt, that it would be better to believe everything than to doubt everything. For universal doubt leaves one with no basis for advance, while universal belief may contain some truth that in time may gradually drive out the errors. In somewhat similar vein, I think, we must be content to allow historians to be educated, socialized, acculturated, historical beings, even though this will involve them in some error. We must allow them to write their histories in the light of all they happen to know or think they know and of all they unconsciously[3] take for granted: they cannot do otherwise and a pluralist society lets them do what they can. But we need not proclaim that they are writing presuppositionless history, when that is something no one can do. We have to recognize that the admission of history written in the light of preconceived ideas may result in different notions of history, different methods of historical investigation, incompatible standpoints, and irreconcilable histories, not just perspectival differences. Finally, we have to seek methods that will help historians from the start to avoid incoherent assumptions and procedures,

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3 *Method*: inadvertently.

and we have to develop further methods that will serve to iron out differences once incompatible histories have been written.

But the mere acknowledgment of these needs is all that can be achieved in the present section. To meet them pertains, not to the functional specialty 'history' but to the later specialties 'dialectic' and 'foundations.' For any notable change of horizon is done, not on the basis of that horizon, but by envisaging a quite different and, at first sight, incomprehensible alternative and then undergoing a conversion. So much for horizons. Next, heuristic structures.

Has the historian philosophic commitments? Does he employ analogies, use ideal types, follow some theory of history? Does he explain, investigate causes, determine laws? Is he devoted to social and cultural goals, subject to bias, detached from bias? Is history value-free, or is it concerned with values? Do historians know or do they believe?

Such questions are asked. They not merely regard the historian's notion of history but also have a bearing on his practice of historical investigation and historical writing. Different answers, accordingly, would modify this or that heuristic structure, that is, this or that element in historical method.

First, then, the historian need not concern himself at all with philosophy in a common but excessively general sense that denotes the contents of all books and courses purporting to be philosophic. Through that labyrinth there is no reason why a historian should try to find his way.

There is however, a very real connection between the historian and philosophy, when 'philosophy' is understood in an extremely restricted sense, namely, the set of real conditions of the possibility of historical inquiry. Those real conditions are the human race, the remains and traces from its past, the community of historians with their traditions and instruments, their conscious and intentional operations, especially insofar as they occur in historical investigation. It is to be

noted that the relevant conditions are conditions of possibility and not the far larger and quite determinate set that in each instance condition historical investigation.

In brief, history is related to philosophy, as historical method is related to transcendental method or, again, as theological method is related to transcendental method. The historian may or may not know of this relationship. If he does, that is all to the good. If he does not, then, he still can be an excellent historian;, just as M. Jourdain might speak excellent French without knowing that his talk was prose. But while he can be an excellent historian, it is not likely that he will be able to speak about the proper procedures in historical investigation without falling into the traps that in this chapter we have been illustrating.

Secondly, it is plain that the historian has to employ something like analogy when he proceeds from the present to the past. The trouble is that this term covers quite different procedures from the extremely reliable to the fallacious. Distinctions accordingly must be drawn.

In general, the present and the past are said to be analogous when they are partly similar and partly dissimilar. Again, in general, the past is to be assumed similar to the present, except insofar as there is evidence of dissimilarity. Finally, insofar as evidence is produced for dissimilarity, the historian is talking history; but insofar as he asserts that there must be similarity or that there cannot be dissimilarity, then he is drawing upon the climate of opinion in which he lives or else he is representing some philosophic position.

Next, it is not to be assumed that the present is known completely and in its entirety. On the contrary, we have been arguing all along that the rounded view of a historical period is to be expected not from contemporaries but from historians. Moreover, while the historian has to construct his analogies in the first instance by drawing on his knowledge of the present, still he can learn history in this fashion and then construct further history on the analogy of the known past.

Further, nature is uniform, but social arrangements and cultural interpretations are subject to change. There exist at the present time extremely different societies and cultures. There is available evidence for still more differences to be brought to light by historical method. One hears at times that the past has to conform to the present experience, but on that opinion Collingwood commented quite tartly. The ancient Greeks and Romans controlled the size of their populations by exposing new-born infants. The fact is not rendered doubtful because it lies outside the current experience of the contributors to the Cambridge Ancient History.

Again, while the possibility and the occurrence of miracles are topics, not for the methodologist, but for the theologian, I may remark that the uniformity of nature is conceived quite differently at different times. In the nineteenth century natural laws were thought to express necessity – there were even the iron laws of economics up to 1930 – and Laplace's view on the possibility in theory of deducing the whole course of events from some given stage of the process was taken seriously. Now laws of the classical type are considered not necessary but just verified possibilities; they are generalized on the principle that similars are similarly understood. They are a basis for prediction or deduction, not by themselves, but only when combined into schemes of recurrence; such schemes function concretely, not absolutely, but only if other things are equal; and whether other things are equal is a matter of statistical frequencies. The scientific case concerning miracles has weakened. (All I'm saying is that there are different conceptions of the uniformity of nature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.)

Finally, while each historian has to work on the analogy of what he knows of the present and has learnt of the past, still the dialectical confrontation of contradictory histories needs a basis that is generally accessible. The basis we would offer would be transcendental method extended into the methods of

theology and history by constructs derived from transcendental method itself. In other words, it would be the sort of thing we have been working out in these chapters. No doubt, those with different philosophic positions would propose alternatives. But such alternatives would only serve to clarify further the dialectic of diverging research, interpretation, and history.

Thirdly, do historians use ideal-types? I may note at once that the notion and use of the ideal-type commonly are associated with the name of the German sociologist, Max Weber, but they have been discussed in a strictly historical context, among others, by M. Marrou.

The ideal-type, then, is not a description of reality or a hypothesis about reality. It is a theoretical construct in which possible events are intelligibly related to constitute an internally coherent system. Its utility is both heuristic and expository, that is, it can be useful inasmuch as at suggests and helps formulate hypotheses and, again, when a concrete situation approximates to the theoretical construct, it can guide an analysis of the situation and promote a clear understanding of it.

M. Marrou took Fustel de Coulanges' *La cité antique* as an ideal-type. The city state is conceived as a confederation of the great patriarchal families, assembled in phratries and then in tribes, consolidated by cults regarding ancestors or heroes and practiced around a common center. Now such a structure is based, not by selecting what is common to all instances of the ancient city, not by taking what is common to most instances, but by concentrating on the most favorable instances, namely, those offering more intelligibility and explanatory power. The use of such an ideal type is twofold. Insofar as the historical situation satisfies the conditions of the ideal-type, the situation is illuminated. Insofar as the historical situation does not satisfy the conditions of the ideal-type, it brings to light precise

differences that otherwise would go unnoticed, and sets questions that otherwise might not be asked.

M. Marrou approves the use of ideal-types in historical investigation, but he issues two warnings. First, they are just theoretical constructs: one must resist the temptation of the enthusiast that mistakes them for descriptions of reality; even when they do hit off main features of a historical reality, one must not easily be content with them, gloss over inadequacies, reduce history to what essentially is an abstract scheme. Secondly, there is the difficulty of working out appropriate ideal-types; the richer and more illuminating the construct, the greater the difficulty of applying it; the thinner and looser the construct, the less is it able to contribute much to history.

I might suggest in this connection that Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* might be regarded as a source-book of ideal-types. Toynbee himself has granted that his work was not quite as empirical as he once thought it. At the same time so resolute a critic as Pieter Geyl has found the work immensely stimulating and has confessed that such daring and imaginative spirits as Toynbee have an essential function to fulfill. That function is, I suggest, to provide the materials from which carefully formulated ideal-types might be derived.

Fourthly, does the historian follow some theory of history? By a theory of history I do not mean the application to history of a theory established scientifically, philosophically, or theologically. Such theories have their proper mode of validation; they are to be judged on their own merits; they broaden the historian's knowledge and make his apprehensions more precise; they do not constitute historical knowledge but facilitate its development.

By a theory of history I understand a theory that goes beyond its scientific, philosophic, or theological basis to make statements about the actual course of human events. Such theories are set forth by Bruce Mazlish in his discussion of

the great speculators from Vico to Freud. They have to be criticized in the light of their scientific, philosophic, or theological basis. Insofar as they survive such criticism, they possess the utility of grand-scale-ideal-types, and may be employed under the precautions already indicated for the use of ideal-types. But they never grasp the full complexity of historical reality, and consequently they tend to throw in high relief certain aspects and connections and to disregard others that may be of equal or greater importance. In M. Marrou's phrase '… the most ingenious hypothesis … underlines in red pencil certain lines lost in a diagram whose thousand curves cross one another in every direction.' Any theory red-pencils one element out of many. General hypotheses, though they have their uses, easily become '… big anti-comprehension machines,' things that prevent people from understanding or inquiring.

Fifthly, does the historian explain? On the German distinction between *erklären* and *verstehen* – I think it originates with Droysen – natural scientists explain but historians only understand. However, this distinction is somewhat artificial. Both scientists and historians understand; both communicate the intelligibility that they grasp. The difference lies in the kind of intelligibility grasped and in the manner in which it develops.

Scientific intelligibility aims at being an internally coherent system or structure valid in any of a specified set or series of instances. It is expressed in a technical vocabulary, constantly tested by confronting its every implication with data, and adjusted or superseded when it fails to meet the tests. In contrast, historical intelligibility is like the intelligibility reached by common sense. It is the content of a habitual accumulation of insights that, by themselves, are incomplete; they are never applied in any situation without the pause that grasps how relevant they are and, if need be, adds a few more insights derived from the situation in hand. Such commonsense understanding is like a many-purpose adjustable tool,

where the number of purposes is enormous, and the adjustment is based on the precise task in hand. Hence, common sense thinks and speaks, proposes and acts, with respect, not to the general, but to the particular and concrete. Its generalities are not principles, relevant to every possible instance, but proverbs saying what may be useful to bear in mind, and commonly rounded out by a contradictory piece of advice. Look before you leap; he who hesitates is lost. Many hands make light work. Too many cooks spoil the broth.

Historical explanation is a sophisticated extension of commonsense understanding. Its aim is an intelligent reconstruction of the past, not in its routines – it leaves the routines to the scientists – but in each of its departures from the previous routine, in the interlocked consequences of each departure, in the unfolding of a process that theoretically might but in all probability never will be repeated.

Sixthly, does the historian investigate causes and determine laws? The historian does not demand laws, for the determination of laws is the work of the natural or human scientist. Again, the historian does not investigate causes, where 'cause' is taken in a technical sense developed through the advance of the sciences. However, if 'cause' is understood in the ordinary language meaning of 'because,' then the historian does investigate causes; for ordinary language is just the language of common sense, and historical explanation is the expression of the commonsense type of developing understanding. Finally, the problems concerning historical explanation that currently are discussed seem to arise from a failure to grasp the differences between scientific and commonsense developments of human intelligence. With regard to that current discussion, there are twenty pages of bibliography of thought on history in Gardiner's *Theories of History*.

Seventhly, is the historian devoted to social and cultural goals, is he subject to bias, is he detached from bias?

The historian may well be devoted to social and cultural goals, but insofar as he is practicing the functional specialty 'history,' his devotion is not proximate but remote. His immediate purpose is to settle what was going forward in the past. If he does his job properly, he will supply the materials which may be employed for promoting social and cultural goals. But he is not likely to do his job properly, if in performing his tasks he is influenced not only by their immanent exigences but also by ulterior motives and purposes.

Accordingly, we are setting up a distinction parallel in some fashion to Max Weber's distinction between social science and social policy. Social science is an empirical discipline organizing the evidence on group behavior. It has to be pursued in the first instance for its own sake. Only when it has reached its proper term can it usefully be employed in the construction of effective policies for the attainment of social ends. In somewhat similar fashion, our two phases of theology keep apart our encounter with the religious past and, on the other hand, our action in the present on the future.

Next, all men are subject to bias, for a bias is a block or distortion of intellectual development, and such blocks or distortions occur in four principal manner. There is the bias of unconscious motivation brought to light by depth psychology. There is the bias of individual egoism, and the more powerful and blinder bias of group egoism. Finally, there is the general bias of common sense, which is a specialization of intelligence in the particular and concrete, but usually considers itself omnicompetent. On all of these I have expanded elsewhere, and I may not repeat myself here. *Insight*, chapters 6 and 7.

Further, the historian should be detached from all bias. He has greater need for such detachment than the scientist, for scientific work is adequately objectified and publicly controlled, but the historian's discoveries accumulate in the manner of

the development of common sense, and the only adequate positive control is to have another historian go over the same evidence.

Just how one conceives the achievement of such detachment depends on one's theory of knowledge and of morals. Our formula is a continuous and ever more exacting application of the transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. However, ninetheenth-century empiricists conceived objectivity as a matter of seeing all that's there to be seen and seeing nothing that's not there. Accordingly, they demanded of the historian a pure receptivity that admitted impressions from phenomena but excluded any subjective activity.

This is the view that Becker was attacking in his 'Detachment and the Writing of History' and again in his 'What are Historical Facts?' Later in life, when he had seen relativism at work in its crudest forms, he attacked it and insisted on the pursuit of truth as the primary value. But, as I have noted already, Becker did not work out a complete theory.

Eighthly, is history value-free? History, as a functional specialty, is value-free in the sense already outlined: it is not directly concerned to promote social and cultural goals. It pertains to the first phase of theology which aims at an encounter with the past; the more adequate that encounter, the more fruitful it can prove to be; but one is not pursuing a specialty, when one attempts to do it and something quite different at the same time. Further, social and cultural goals are incarnated values; they are subject to the distortions of bias; and so concern for social and cultural goals can exercise not only a disturbing but even a distorting influence on historical investigation.

Further, history is value-free in the further sense that it is a functional specialty that aims at settling matters of fact by appealing to empirical evidence.

Value-judgments neither settle matters of fact nor constitute empirical evidence. In that respect, then, history once more is value-free.

Finally, history is not value-free in the sense that the historian refrains from all value-judgments. For the functional specialties, while they concentrate on the end proper to one of the four levels of conscious and intentional activity, nonetheless are the achievement of operations on all four levels. The historian ascertains matters of fact, not by ignoring data, not by failing to understand, not by omitting judgments of value, but by doing all of these for the purpose of settling matters of fact.

In fact, the historian's value-judgments are precisely the means that make his work a selection of things that are worth knowing, that, in Meinecke's phrase, enables history to be 'the content, the wisdom, and the signposts of our lives.' Nor is this influence of value-judgments an intrusion of subjectivity. There are true and there are false value-judgments. The former are objective in the sense that they result from a real self-transcendence. The latter are subjective in the sense that they represent a failure to effect real self-transcendence. False value-judgments are an intrusion of subjectivity. True value-judgments are the achievement of a moral objectivity, of an objectivity that, so far from being opposed to the objectivity of true judgments of fact, presupposes them and completes them by adding to mere cognitional self-transcendence a moral self-transcendence.

However, if the historian makes value-judgments, still that is not his specialty. The task of passing judgments on the value and disvalues offered us by the past pertains to the further specialties of dialectic and foundations.

Finally, do historians believe? They do not believe in the sense that critical history is not a compilation of testimonies regarded as credible. But they believe in the sense that they cannot experiment with the past as natural scientists can experiment on natural objects. They believe in the sense that they cannot have

before their eyes the realities of which they speak. They believe in the sense that they depend on one another's critically evaluated work and participate in an ongoing collaboration for the advancement of knowledge.

Questions follow.

These questions relate to history as it's practiced by historians rather than to abstract theory. If Dialectic is to be applied to the results of different historians, is that in the hope of resolving discrepancies between historians who are working on one subject?

Dialectic does not deal with discrepancies that would be removed by uncovering further data, evidence, etc. There are discrepancies that arise from different basic options. That's what dialectic is relevant to. Insofar as the differences are the type that are fundamental – empiricism, idealism, critical realism – that is what Dialectic is relevant to.

We are interested in an example of Dialectic, and we wonder why you referred to such people as Herbert Butterfield and Peter Gay as an example of history?

I'm not sure that I used them as examples of that. I used Butterfield because he offered an idea that was very relevant to what I was talking about, namely, that to replace Aristotle was a matter of three or four centuries work; that the development of science, insofar as it was not setting up a whole new context, left the scientists at an enormous disadvantage; and it was only when the total context emerged that science could really begin to roll, be sure of itself, and so on. That was the reason for choosing Butterfield: because he has written a relevant book on the subject; and it was something distinct from the endless monographs that one gets in ISIS - treatment of particular points in the whole history of science. Butterfield illustrated my point, and I think that point is right. He illustrated my point, and I think the point is right.

Longer question that can be summed up: Is Dialectic not presupposed to make judgments of the kind that historians make, the way history is done today?
Friedrich Meinecke's distinction is between the two emphases in history: the emphasis on causality and the emphasis on values. When you are concerned with causality you don't escape value judgments entirely; but it is not what your main concern is. On the other hand, when your emphasis is on values, appreciating things, you are writing a type of history that is extremely important, and will attend to things, even though they have very little causal influence, simply because they are in themselves valuable. There are those two tendencies.

This business of presuppositions: that is a logical category, and our method's fundamental emphasis is on the pre-logical, on insight, questioning, and so on, developing insights. And the presuppositions are, How far have you got up to now? In other words, the presuppositions are concrete, they are the developing historian.

The point to Dialectic is a theological concern, fundamentally, with conflicts in the religious tradition, and the roots of those conflicts. Insofar as you have different religious traditions, you get different interpretations and different histories; and insofar as that diversity is not explained, not totally explained by the differences in the evidence produced, Dialectic becomes a necessary specialty. And it is not a difference in specialists but a difference in specialties; there are different jobs to be done.

So Dialectic should be able to lead a historian to a virtually unconditioned?

Well, it settles a certain type of issue for him, or at least it can. Dialectic only clarifies; settling something comes with Foundations. However, Dialectic does clarify certain types of fundamental issues, and it does point out the divergence between different historians.

Please comment on the sociological approach to history, which wants to find general sociological operators in the subject of study. Are they not trying to get back to an ideal of history as a matter of general laws?
Insofar as they are concerned with general laws and operators that change general laws – if that is the sense in which one uses operators – they are doing what I would call science.

They would claim they were doing history.
That is their use of the word.

What is the relationship between History and Doctrines?
I have conceived Interpretation in such a way as to make self-understanding an important factor in interpretation. Conversion gives you a different self to understand, and, consequently, insofar as it is a different self to understand and a different self operating, you will have the type of interpretation that is relevant to Doctrines.

Again, the historian proceeds from his point of view: critical historical method gives univocal results presupposing a given standpoint. And religious conversion involves a change in standpoint in a very fundamental way. And, consequently, the history of doctrines that will be useful for your Doctrines is the type of history that has that standpoint. To find what that standpoint is, well, you have Dialectic that studies conflicts and goes behind them to their viewpoints, standpoints, and so on, and finds those standpoints running through not only researchers, interpreters, historians, but the people that these people are representing and in concrete ways of living and in attitudes of mind.

What is perspectivism? Can this be related to the universal viewpoint in Insight?

Perspectivism has to do with the difference in fine points that are not going to be eliminated. There are differences between historians that will be eliminated by uncovering new evidence: history as ongoing process. There are differences that are due to radical differences of standpoint; a good Marxist doesn't write a good religious history or, at least, from a religious viewpoint. He writes a different type of history from the type of history a religious person would write. These are fundamental differences, and they are relevant to Dialectic. That's the type of thing that a universal viewpoint can set up a series of alternatives on: an ongoing series of alternatives. Perspectivism is the type of very fine difference that derives from one historian having a certain class background, having always had a comfortable life or having had to work for everything he got; slight differences in training; having studied at one university, and not at another; all this sort of thing that gives different perspectives. Both historians are looking at the same enormously complex reality; but they make different selections. They may treat the same question, but they come at it from different angles; they will be involved in differences of terminology that will lead on to different questions. It is differences in minutiae; that's perspectivism. And, of course, those minutiae can add up, and they seem to be writing quite different histories. One man will be very pleasant to read at a certain time and another later on, etc. That is the problem of perspectivism. It is a distinct problem from the problem of history as an ongoing science: uncovering further evidence and settling questions that before were not settled. Again, it is different from the problem of history as being written from a certain standpoint, with these standpoints representing rather profound oppositions.

Long question, not too clear: Do you conceive this work being done by the unconverted?

I'm not conceiving any of this work as being done by the unconverted. You don't get unconverted people to do the work of the first phase and the converted to do the work of the second. Otherwise, the second phase would have no Foundations. There would be nothing for them to work on: they would have no researchers, no exegetes, no historians, and no one doing Dialectic. The point is that we don't require people to be converted to respect them as exegetes, or as historians, or as researchers. We want everyone to put in their oar because if you only pay attention to the converted you can very easily move into an ivory tower and avoid the more difficult questions, and reduce religion to a state that will ultimately be defenseless.

Who determines what is going forward? The best available opinion is always in light of the present question.

It is a matter, in general, of having a question to ask, and that presupposes you know some history. New history comes out of old history. The more history you know the better job one is able to do. You have a certain area in which you look for evidence, in the light of your question. Insofar as something gives you an insight, that you has a surmise: it might be this – you concretize the surmise with an image of some sort; you flesh it out concretely; and you get further questions which will give rise perhaps to further insights. If it doesn't, then you are on a false trail. It can give rise to further questions and surmises and still nothing clicks. It can be that every now and then you hit something and you find evidence for it; your questions lead you on to further data and lend you support. This is the self-correcting process of learning: insight following on insight, complementing, correcting, and qualifying previous insights as you move along. This involves an expanding range of questions and answers which you try to keep on the same topic; and while further questions keep multiplying, they do so only up to a point.

There comes a point where your questions and answers form a context; they are all knit together; one question leads to another, etc. But there comes a point where questions begin to diminish and curl off. In that process you have been led out of your initial questions, the questions that you had at the start; you have found your way through the data to at least one question that was relevant to the data, and then a network that was relevant to those data; and that network of questions and answers, of insights and data, closes in upon itself; and that is what causes the ecstatic character of the investigation. People, through the investigation, move to a viewpoint that they didn't have before; they are asking questions now that they were not asking before; questions that they hadn't thought of. On the self-correcting process of learning, read the first part of chapter 6 of *Insight*, the part on the spontaneous growth of human intelligence.

How is history a sophisticated extension of common sense, and how does history make use of statistics?

A science expresses itself in general laws, in systems of laws, in operators according to which laws change, in sequences, serializations, and so on; and it has to be verifiable, valid, in a whole defined range of instances, and that is a specific type of thinking; it is the theoretic mode of thinking. It heads to a position in which all your fundamental terms are names of objects that are not given in experience. Mechanics rests upon notions like mass, velocity, acceleration, and so on; and there is no sensitive experience of those. You must know the differential calculus to understand what the definition of acceleration means; and mass is not weight, and it is not momentum. That is the systematic mode of thinking: the world of theory, a world that is quite distinct from the world of common sense. It is as different as Eddington's two tables: one table was light brown, solid, heavy, rectangular top, and so on; the other was a mass of wavicles that left the table

mostly empty space. The world of theory sets up a new language, a technical language of its own, a new society where people can talk to one another but not to others about their specialty: it is a whole world of theory. The world of common sense also is intelligent, highly intelligent; commonsense people run practically everything. Common sense has an entirely different mode of development; and history is using that type of intellectual development. It isn't a specifically different type of intellectual development that is involved in history, but it is the same general type of intellectual development as is common sense, although it is used now is a highly refined manner, in a specialized way.

What about statistical laws?

Statistical laws pertain to theory, to science. History provides the material for scientific investigation. You don't know man at the instant; you have to take him over a span of time, if you are going to study him, even if you are going to study him scientifically. By prolonging that time span, history becomes an auxiliary discipline to the science, if you want to work out something about the past. Similarly, science can be an auxiliary discipline to the historian; science can provide him with schemes, with concepts, with explanations, etc. You can write an economic history – on the basis of modern economics, one can write an economics history of the Roman Empire, and understand that economy much better than the Romans ever dreamt of doing. So history and human science can be mutually auxiliary sciences, disciplines; and each has its own specific type of goal.

Is what is going forward determined pretty much by the particular interest of the historian or the questions that come to him from the culture in which he lives that aligns him historically with his own past? Is it something that is determined by the present, or is it something that is really a matter of what the historian chooses to investigation from whatever kind of whim he might do so?

It will have its starting point somewhere in the present, because that's where the historian is. And it's something that he'd like to know, for some reason or other. But when he gets into his work, into his job, he'll find that he has a lion by the tail. And insofar as he's a good historian, he lets the lion take over. His interests are quite different from what they were at the start – his concerns, and so on. It's what Gadamer calls the *Horizontsverschmelzung*. The historian starts off with his own horizon, his own knowledge, interests, and so on. That defines his world for him. He wants to understand what was going on at a certain time in the past at a certain place. To understand that, he has to take on, make his own, the horizon of those people in the past. He does that, not by talking and acting as a fifth-century Athenian or a first-century Christian, or what you please, but just as his common sense is understanding what to say and do in any of a series of situations that commonly arise, so he'll come to an understanding of their common sense, how they would speak and act in any of the situations that arose at their time. And doing that sort of thing is the life-long task of becoming a scholar.

The relation of the economy of the Romans to the history that is written later on – is that like the relation of the vertical movement of intentional consciousness to the horizontal movement of intentional consciousness? They were doing it in their living, but they didn't reflect on what they were doing, but later a historian comes along.

Yes. In other words, they did not thematize their economy in the way a later historian can thematize it. But that isn't the same as vertical and horizontal movement of freedom.

There would be something of a relationship, though, considering the human race as a whole.

Well, perhaps. I don't see it too well.

Is your description of the ecstatic moment normative for the historian? If the historian does not achieve the ecstatic moment, does that rule him out as one who can really common on something?

It depends on – for example, a man may already be a historian and already have this understanding of other times, and so on. When a boy at school reads Homer and sees about Achilles weeping, he thinks Achilles must be rather silly. And you have to understand that these people at that time didn't have inhibitions that later became accepted, and that's moving out of one's own viewpoint a bit. Insofar as he has to learn about a past that is different from his own experience, he has to be ecstatic, provided the past is different and insofar as it's different. In other words, you haven't got a general rule that you can apply blindly.

It seems to me the subject matter of the historian is the world constituted by meaning. This morning you spoke of the world the historian studies as the world mediated by meaning.

Boeckh's definition of philology was reconstructing the constructions of humanity. Now insofar as the constructions of humanity are general, systematic, scientific, you're writing the history of science. Insofar as they regard the particular and the concrete, you're writing history in the ordinary sense. That's the fundamental definition. In terms of the world mediated by meaning – reconstructing the constructions. It's the same thing again as saying that hermeneutics is *the* thing because the structure of hermeneutics, understanding and interpreting, is the same as the structure of the living – understanding and setting on your project.

Do I understand correctly, then, that if one is trying to grapple with the world that is mediated by meaning, this means that I who am grappling with it am not the source of the meaning – I discover it rather than create it.

Insofar as it's history, it has to be discovered. It's not like writing a novel.

I'm thinking more of the distinction between constitutive meaning and the world mediated by meaning.
You're narrating, describing constitutive meanings insofar as you're talking about social institutions and cultures.

What is the relation between perspectivism and horizon as you discussed these today and your more general horizon analysis?
Horizon as described today had to do with preconceptions in history. Horizon analysis in general is a question of the range of my interests and my knowledge. I select a world. We all have our own worlds, and they may be complementary or successive or opposed.

So the horizons you spoke of today are not isomorphic with perspectivism.
No, no, no. There can be contradictory differences there. Becker was saying something that other historians didn't want to hear, when he wrote on what are historical facts and Bernheim's rule. He was smashing a few idols.

Is there something in the heuristic of history that is similar to the heuristic notion of fire?
Well, there's at least that, because they're all asking what happened. That's common. But history is written from similar standpoints. That's the group you can unify genetically; and the history of standpoints, the widening of standpoints. One man said that up until recently he thought the history of the United States was *Heilsgeschichte*!

There are some areas, like the Roman Empire, that are sealed off?
I didn't say it was sealed off. It's the most investigated. There have been so many people going over the ground and refining it, and so on. There the relevant question is subsequent events throwing new light on the past. Karl Heussi said

Nero is always going to be Nero, but the same isn't so sure about Luther. A person like Schleiermacher – there will come up things to throw new light on him, though probably not on Frederick Wilhelm III of Prussia. And so on. It's this business of the new events throwing new light on the past. As Nietzsche says, 'It's the genius that pulls the past out of obscurity and puts it in the light of day.'

Where would the biases you speak of in Insight *fit into the discussion of perspectivism and what you spoke of this morning in terms of the climate of opinion?*

Well, group bias. The Whig interpretation of history, whether it's right or wrong. You have an interpretation of history by a political party. It can be a very intelligent interpretation of history and a rather deep-thinking party simply because it *has* an interpretation of history. But it can be limited by the fact simply that it is representing that party.

Is that the same thing as standpoint?

Yes, but it's standpoint in a sense that doesn't interest theology too much, though it might be of interest to moral theology and to social work and everything like that, and to social problems, because social problems do come out of these biases. General bias: why bother your head about all these abstractions? Theory, interiority, transcendence are all abstraction. You get a bias from that. Individual bias would be the man that might make a pile out of writing a popular history and is just out for what he can get out of it. 'The climate of opinion': the term is Carl Becker's, and he was not a philosopher, but his climate of opinion is more or less what the historians at the university would suppose. There would be philosophic elements to it. There would be the *Zeitgeist*. There would be the national viewpoint. All this sort of thing. Things that everyone takes for granted. The *Selbstverständlichkeiten*. Everyone takes them for granted, no one questions them,

no one doubts them, no one thinks about them. Horizon as inherited and unexamined. When you start examining it, you ask, Do historians have preconceptions? Then you're changing it, or at least you're challenging it.

What difference does this ecstatic moment really make in doing the history, say, of the first three centuries? For example, there's a real difference between ? and Kelly. Presumably they both had this ecstatic moment.

Well, there's moving into the ecstatic element. You're not on the ball without it; you're not really talking about what was going on or what these people were thinking. Take Petavius on Justin Martyr, thinking he was a heretic because he didn't understand the development of dogma. Once you have it, it isn't the whole story. You can have it in some ways and not in others. The blocks can be quite different sorts of things. You can have different standpoints. Your ecstatic moment gives you the history insofar as your standpoint is compatible.

When you use the word 'standpoint,' are you referring to basic options a person has made or their basic horizons?

Yes. Everything like that. It's the understanding of man and the world that the historian has always thought. It may be something he's arrived by his own thinking, philosophic and religious and so on.

At what point would your standpoint preclude your writing a critical history and throw you back into precritical history? You mentioned how difficult it was for the Catholic Church to move into critical history because its standpoint was very dogmatic.

It isn't really the Catholic Church but people with a certain type of education – if they're educated in the law or if their education has been classicist, in terms of the eternal verities and the immutable norms and the unchanging example of the saints,

and so on. They’re not going to change history and make an ongoing process out of it!