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In our chapter 'From History to Dialectic,' we have already considered two sections and a half: Three Handbooks, Data and Facts, and part of Three Historians.

The issues that concerned Carl Becker in the United States also concerned R.G. Collingwood in England. Both insisted on the constructive activities of the historian. Both attacked what above I named the principle of the empty head. But the epitome of the position Becker attacked was the view that the historian had merely to present all the facts and then let them speak for themselves. Collingwood attacks the same position under the name of 'scissors-and-paste history.' In his book *The Idea of History*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1946, he treats 'scissors-and-paste' history, pp. 257-63, 269 f., 274-82, also a description of it on p. 234. It is a naive view of history in terms of memory, testimony, credibility. It gathers statements from sources, decides whether or not they are to be regarded as true or false, pastes true statements in a scrapbook later to be worked up into a narrative, while it consigns false statements to the wastebasket. It was the type of history alone known in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages. It has been on the wane since the days of Vico. While Collingwood would not venture to say that it has totally disappeared, he does assert that any history written today on such principles is at least a century out of date.

There has been, then, a Copernican revolution in the study of history inasmuch as history has become both critical and constructive. This process is ascribed to the historical imagination and, again, to a logic in which questions are more fundamental than answers. The two ascriptions are far from incompatible. The historian starts out from statements he finds in his

[1] The first part of the lecture of the eighth day. The audio recording can be found at 52900A0E060

sources. The attempt to represent imaginatively their meaning gives rise to questions that lead to further statements in the sources. Eventually he will have stretched a web of imaginative construction linking together the fixed points supplied by the statements in the sources. However, these so-called fixed points are fixed not absolutely but relatively. In his present inquiry the historian has decided to assume them as fixed. But, in fact, their being fixed is just the fruit of earlier historical inquiry. If the statements from which the historian proceeds are to be found in Thucydides, still it is historical knowledge that enables the historian to go beyond mere odd marks on paper to a recognition of the Greek alphabet, to meanings in the Attic dialect, to the authenticity of the passages, to the judgment that on these occasions Thucydides knew what he was talking about and was trying to tell the truth.

It follows that, if history is considered not in this or that work but as a totality, then it is an autonomous discipline. It depends upon data, on the remains of the past perceptible in the present. But it is not a matter of believing authorities, and it is not a matter of inferring from authorities. It is not a matter of proving, either. It is proceeding from data through understanding to judgment. Critical procedures decide in what manner and measure sources will be used. Constructive procedures arrive at results that may not have been known by the authors of the sources. Hence '… so far from relying on an authority other than himself, to whose statements his thought must conform, the historian is his own authority and his thought autonomous, self-authorizing, possessed of a criterion to which his so-called authorities must conform and by reference to which they are criticized.'

Such is the Copernican revolution Collingwood recognized in modern history. It is a view that cannot be assimilated on naive realist or empiricist premises. As presented by Collingwood, unfortunately, it is contained in an idealist context. But by introducing a satisfactory theory of objectivity and

of judgment, the idealism can be removed without dropping the substance of what Collingwood taught about the historical imagination, historical evidence, and the logic of question and answer.

Issues raised in the United States and in England also were raised in France. In 1938 Raymond Aron portrayed the historical thought of Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, and Max Weber and, as well, in another volume set forth his own developments of German *Verstehen* that in French was named *comprehension*. My present concern, however, is not with theorists of history but with professional historians, and so I turn to Henri-Irénée Marrou, who was invited to occupy the Chaire Cardinal Mercier at Louvain in 1953, and used this opportunity to discuss the nature of historical knowledge.

The following year there appeared his *De la connaissance historique.* It is concerned, not with theoretical issues, but rather with making a systematic inventory, a reasonable and balanced synopsis, of conclusions that historians had reached on the nature of their task. The nature of that task, he felt, was as well established as had been the theory of experiment in the days of John Stuart Mill and Claude Bernard. Incidentally, Marrou was a bit over-optimistic about the consensus of the historians. In the second edition, there is an article of his in which he responds to his critics, which is rather humorous. So it is that Marrou treated all the general issues of historical investigation and did so both with a grasp of theoretical opinions and with all the sensitivity of a Pieter Geyl to the endless complexity of historical reality.

Out of this abundance, for the moment, we are concerned only with the relationship between fact and theory, analysis and synthesis, criticism and construction. M. Marrou treats the two in successive chapters. His views on criticism, he feels, would make his old positivist teachers turn over

in their graves. Where they urged a relentlessly critical spirit, he calls for sympathy and understanding. The negative critical approach, concerned with the honesty, competence, and accuracy of authors, was well adapted to specialist work on the political and ecclesiastical history of western Europe in the Middle Ages, where there was a rash of secondhand chronicles, forged charters and decretals, and antedated lives of saints. But the historian's task is not limited to eliminating errors and deceptions. Documents can be used in a great variety of manners, and the historian's proper task is to understand his documents thoroughly, grasp exactly what they reveal directly or indirectly, and so use them intelligently.

As M. Marrou calls for a shift from mere criticism of documents to understanding them, so too he stresses the continuity and interdependence of coming to understand the relevant documents and coming to understand the course of events. The historian begins by determining a topic, assembling a file of relevant documents, annotating each on its credibility. Still, this is merely an abstract scheme. One advances in knowledge along a spiral. As knowledge of events increases, new light is thrown on the character of the documents. The original question is recast. Documents that seemed irrelevant now acquire relevance. New facts come to light. So the historian gradually comes to master the area under investigation, to acquire confidence in his grasp of the meaning, scope, worth of his documents, and to apprehend the course of events that the documents once concealed and now reveal.

So much for our three historians, Becker, Collingwood, and Marrou. Our next section is entitled 'Verstehen.'

Already I have mentioned Droysen's notion of historical investigation as *forschend verstehen* – by research, come to understand – and Raymond Aron's introduction of German historical reflection into the French milieu.

To that reflection we have now to revert, for it was empirical without being empiricist. It was empirical, for it was closely associated with the work of the German historical school, and that school's charter was its protest against Hegel's a priori construction of the meaning of history. It was not empiricist, for it was fully aware that historical knowledge was not just a matter of talking a good look, that, on the contrary, it involved some mysterious, divinatory process in which the historian came to understand.

This need for understanding appeared in two manners. First, there was the hermeneutic circle. One grasps the meaning of a sentence by understanding the words, but one understands the words properly only in the light of the sentence as a whole. Sentences stand in a similar relationship to paragraphs, paragraphs to chapters, chapters to books, books to an author's situation and intentions. Now. this cumulative network of reciprocal dependence is not to be mastered by any conceptual set of procedures. What is needed is the self-correcting process of learning, in which preconceptual insights accumulate to complement, qualify, correct one another.

Secondly, the need for understanding appeared again in the irrelevance of the universal or general. The more creative the artist, the more original the thinker, the greater the genius, the less can his achievement be subsumed under universal principles or general rules. If anything, he is the source of new rules and, while the new rules will be followed, still they are not followed in exactly the manner of the master. Even lesser lights have their originality, while servile imitation is the work not of mind but of the machine.

Now this high degree of individuality found in artists, thinkers, writers, though beyond the reach of general rules or universal principles, is within easy reach of understanding. For what in the first instance is understood is what is given to sense or consciousness or, again, what is

represented in images, words, symbols, signs. What is so given or represented is individual. What is grasped by understanding is the intelligibility of the individual. Apart from failures to control properly one's use of language, generalization is a later step and, in works of interpretation, usually a superfluous step. There is only one *Divina commedia*, only one *Hamlet* by Shakespeare, only one two-part *Faust* by Goethe.

The scope of understanding, the range of its significance, was gradually extended. To the grammatical interpretation of texts, Schleiermacher (1768-1834) added a psychological interpretation that aimed at understanding persons, and especially at divining the basic moment in a creative writer's inspiration. August Boeckh (1785-1867) a pupil of Friedrich Wolf's as well as of Friedrich Schleiermacher's, extended the scope of understanding to the whole range of philological sciences. In his *Enzyklopadie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* the idea of philology is conceived as the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit. What Boeckh did for philology, Droysen would do for history. He moved the notion of understanding from a context of aesthetics and psychology to the broader context of history, first by assigning expression as the object of understanding, and second by noting that not only individuals but also such groups as families, peoples, states, religions express themselves. Note that this *Verstehen* is not the general thing that understanding is in my book *Insight*. It is an activity with respect to human expression. What is understood is expression. It's understanding words, interpreting texts therefore. It's understanding persons. Especially in Schleiermacher, the creative moment in an artist's development, with Boeckh it's closely related to the whole range of philological sciences, and with Droysen it's extended to history: peoples express themselves.

With Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) there is a further broadening of the horizon. He discovered that the German historical school (von Ranke, Von Savigny, the Grimm brothers, the constellation of people who reacted against Hegel and decided that the meaning of history is not settled in a priori fashion by some philosophical dialectic, but the meaning of history is discovered by doing historical work, empirical stuff), while it appealed to historical fact against a priori idealist construction, nonetheless in its actual procedures was far closer to idealist than to empiricist ideas and norms. With remarkable astuteness he recognized that the success of the historical school, like the earlier success of natural science, constituted a new datum for cognitional theory. On that new datum he proposed to build. Just as you had a basis for understanding what human knowing is in the success of natural science, with Newton, so you had a new basis for understanding what human knowledge is from the success of the historical school, particularly of von Ranke. Just as Kant had asked how a priori universal principles were possible and so provided foundations for physics, Dilthey set himself the question of the possibility of historical knowledge and, more generally, of the human sciences conceived as *Geisteswissenschaften*.

Dilthey's basic step may be conceived as a transposition of Hegelian thought from idealist *Geist* to human *Leben*. Hegel's objective spirit returns, but now it is just the integral of the objectifications effected in concrete human living. Living expresses itself. In the expression there is present the expressed. So the data of human studies are not just given; by themselves, prior to any interpretation, they are expressions, manifestations, objectifications of human living. That's the fundamental distinction between human and natural science. The data of natural science are just given, but the data of the human sciences are expressions. They convey a meaning; they represent values. Further, when they are understood by an

interpreter, there also is understood the living that is expressed, manifested, objectified. So 'living' is the big word, the main thing, in Dilthey. Finally, just as an interpretation expresses and communicates an interpreter's understanding, so too the objectifications of living are living's own interpretation of itself. Living interprets itself by its expression, and the interpreter understands the expression and expresses what he understands. *Das Leben selbst legt sich aus*.

In the concrete physical, chemical, vital reality of human living, then, there also is meaning. It is at once inward and outward, inward as expresssing, outward as expressed. It manifests need and satisfaction. It responds to values. It intends goals. It orders means to ends. It constitutes social systems and endows them with cultural significance. It transforms environing nature.

The many expressions of individual living are linked together by an intelligible web. To reach that intelligible connectedness is not just a matter of assembling all the expressions of a lifetime, as in an empirical science you would assemble all the data. Rather, there is a developing whole that is present in the parts, articulating under each new set of circumstances the values it prizes and the goals it pursues, and thereby achieving its own individuality and distinctiveness. Just as human consciousness is not confined to the moment but rises on cumulative memories and proceeds in accord with preference schedules towards its hierarchy of goals, so too its expressions not only together but even singly have the capacity to reveal the direction and the momentum of life.

As there is intelligibility in the life of the individual, so too is there intelligibility in the common meanings, common values, common purposes, common and complementary activities of groups. As these can be common or complementary, so too they can differ, be opposed, conflict. Therewith,

in principle, the possibility of historical understanding is reached. For if we can understand singly our own lives and the lives of others, so too we can understand them in their interconnections and interdependences.

Moreover, just as the historian can narrate an intelligible course of events, so too human scientists can proceed to the analysis of recurring or developing structures and processes in individual and group living. So far from being opposed, history and the human sciences will be interdependent. The human scientist will have to view his data within their appropriate historical context, and the historian can fully master his materials only if he also masters the relevant human sciences.

It can be said, I think, that Dilthey did much to meet his specific problem. Decisively he drew the distinction between natural science and human studies. Clearly he conceived the possibility of historical knowledge that conformed neither to the a priori constructions of idealism nor to the procedures of the natural sciences. However, he did not resolve the more basic problem of getting beyond both empiricist and idealist suppositions. His *Lebensphilosophie* has empiricist leanings. His history and human sciences based on *Verstehen* cannot be assimilated by an empiricist.

Two advances on Dilthey's position have since developed and may be treated briefly. First, Edmund Husserl by his painstaking analysis of intentionality made it evident that human thinking and judging are not just psychological events but always and intrinsically intend, refer to, mean objects distinct from themselves. Dilthey considered Husserl a terrific person to have made that clear. It isn't just the intending of objects distinct from the acts. [unclear] Secondly, where Dilthey conceived expression as manifestation of life, Martin Heidegger conceives all human projects to be products of understanding; in this fashion *Verstehen* is *Dasein* insofar as *Dasein* is man's ability to be. Where in Dilthey you had *Verstehen* and

Auslegung, understanding and interpretation in the interpreter and in life and its expression, in Heidegger, instead of life and its expression, you have understanding and its projects, so that hermeneutic structure – understanding and interpreting – is also the basis of human living. Again, it is *Verstehen* and the projects that you carry out. It's also the structure in St Thomas, as I argued in *Verbum*: *intelligere* and *verbum*. There follows the universality of hermeneutic structure: just as interpretation proceeds from the understanding of an expression, so this expression itself proceeds from an understanding of what it can be to be a man.

A few comments are now in order. First, our use of the terms, insight, understanding, both is more precise and has a broader range then the connotation and denotation of *Verstehen*. Insight occurs in all human knowledge, in mathematics, natural science, common sense, philosophy, human science, history, theology. It occurs (1) in response to inquiry, (2) with respect to sensible presentations or representations including words and symbols of all kinds. It consists in a grasp of intelligible unity or relation in the data or image or symbol. It is the active ground whence proceed conception, definition, hypothesis, theory, system. This proceeding, which is not merely intelligible but intelligent, provided the human model for Thomist and Augustinian trinitarian theory. Finally, the simple and clear-cut proof of the preconceptual character of insight is had from the modern reformulation of Euclidean geometry. Euclid is right, but he doesn't prove. You have to have different concepts to make him logically coherent. Euclid's *Elements* depends on insights that were not acknowledged in his definitions, axioms, and postulates, that easily occur, that ground the validity of his conclusions, that cannot be expressed in a strictly Euclidean vocabulary.

Secondly, experience and understanding taken together yield not knowledge but only thought. To advance from thinking to knowing there must be added a reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned and its rational consequent, judgment. There is an insufficient awareness of this third level of cognitional activity in the authors we have been mentioning and a resultant failure to break away cleanly and coherently from both empiricism and idealism.

Thirdly, over and above a clear-headed grasp of cognitional fact, the break from both empiricism and idealism involves the elimination of cognitional myth. There are notions of knowledge and of reality that are formed in childhood, that are in terms of seeing and of what's there to be seen, that down the centuries have provided the unshakable foundations of materialism, empiricism, positivism, sensism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, pragmatism, and that at the same time constitute the notions of knowledge and reality that idealists quite rightly assert are nonsense. In that more restricted use of *Verstehen* that you have in that German tradition, understanding, insight, is associated with, first of all, human expression, empathy, feeling, and so on – it isn't sharply set out. The importance of that word 'understand' is, of course, What does the interpreter or the historian do? He does not set up general laws.

Next, section 5, perspectivism.

In 1932 Karl Heussi, at that time Rector of the University of Tübingen, published a small book with the title *Die Krisis des Historismus*, The Crisis of Historicism. The first twenty-one pages reviewed the various meanings of the term, Historismus. Out of many candidates Heussi selected, as the Historismus undergoing a crisis, the views on history current among historians about the year 1900, in other words, as he put it, the views on history of the previous generation of historians. These views involved four

main elements: (1) a determinate but simple-minded stand on the nature of objectivity; (2) the interconnectedness of all historical objects; (3) a universal process of development; and (4) the confinement of historical concern to the world of experience.

Of these four elements, it was the first that occasioned the crisis. Around 1900, historians, while they emphasized the danger of subjective bias, assumed that the object of history was stably given and unequivocally structured. Men's opinions about the past may keep changing but the past itself remains what it was. In contrast, Heussi himself held that the structures were only in the minds of men, that similar structures were reached when investigations proceeded from the same standpoint, that historical reality, so far from being unequivocally structured, was rather an inexhaustible incentive to ever fresh historical interpretations.

While this statement has idealist implications, at least Heussi did not wish it to be interpreted too strictly. He immediately added that there are many constants in human living, and that unequivocally determined structures are not rare. What is problematic is the insertion of these constants and structures into larger wholes. The fewer and the narrower the contexts to which a person, a group, a movement belongs, the less the likelihood that subsequent developments will involve a revision of earlier history. On the other hand, where different worldviews and values are involved, one can expect agreement on single incidents and single complexes, but disagreement on larger issues and broader interconnections.

There is, however, a more fundamental qualification to be added. Heussi's basic point is that historical reality is far too complicated for an exhaustively complete description ever to occur. No one is ever going to relate everything that happened at the battle of Leipzig from October 16-19, 1813. Inevitably the historian selects what he thinks of moment and omits

what he considers unimportant. This selection to some extent goes forward spontaneously in virtue of some mysterious capacity that can determine what is to be expected, that groups and constructs, that possesses the tact needed to evaluate and refine, that proceeds as though in one's mind there were some governing and controlling law of perspective so that, granted the historian's standpoint, his milieu, his presuppositions, his training, there must result just the structures and the emphases and the selection that do result. Finally, this result cannot be cannot be described as a mere rehandling of old materials; it is something new. It does not correspond to the inexhaustible complexity of historical reality. But by selecting what from a given standpoint is significant or important, it does purport to mean and portray historical reality in some incomplete and approximate fashion.

It is this incomplete and approximate character of historical narrative that explains why history is rewritten for each new generation. Historical experience is promoted to historical knowledge only if the historian is asking questions. Questions can be asked only by introducing linguistic categories. Such categories carry with them their host of presuppositions and implications. They are colored by a retinue of concerns, interests, tastes, feelings, suggestions, evocations. Inevitably the historian operates under the influence of his language, his education, his milieu, and these with the passage of time inevitably change to give rise to a demand for and supply of rewritten history. So excellent historical works, composed in the final decades of the nineteenth century, had lost all appeal by the nineteen-thirties, even among readers that happened to be in full agreement with the religious, theological, political, and social views of the older authors. They were just not interesting.

The reason why the historian cannot escape his time and place is that the development of historical understanding does not admit systematic

objectification. Mathematicians submit to the rigor of formalization to be certain that they are not using unacknowledged insights. Scientists define their terms systematically, formulate their hypotheses precisely, work out rigorously the suppositions and implications of the hypotheses, and carry out elaborate programs of observational or experimental verification. Philosophers can have resort to transcendental method. But the historian finds his way in the complexity of historical reality by the same type and mode of developing understanding as the rest of us employ in day-to-day living. The starting point is not some set of postulates or some generally accepted theory but all that the historian already knows and believes. The more intelligent and the more cultivated he is, the broader his experience, the more open he is to all human values, the more competent and rigorous his training, the greater is his capacity to discover the past. When an investigation is succeeding, his insights are so numerous, their coalescence so spontaneous, the manner in which they complement or qualify or correct one another is so immediate and so deft, that the historian can objectify, not every twist and turn in the genesis of his discovery, but only the broad lines of the picture at which eventually he arrives. (I presented my doctoral dissertation to my director, and he said, 'Well, you can't take people up and down all these back stairs, you know.')

In saying that the historian cannot escape his background, I am not suggesting that he cannot overcome individual, group, or general bias, or that he cannot overcome individual, group, or general bias, or that he cannot undergo intellectual, moral, or religious conversion. Again, I am not retracting in any way what previously I said about the 'ecstatic' character of developing historical insight, about the historian's ability to move out of the viewpoint of his own place and time and come to understand and appreciate the mentality and the values of another place and time. Finally, I am not

implying that historians with different backgrounds cannot come to understand one another and so move from diverging to converging views on the past.

The point I have been endeavoring to make is what is called perspectivism. Where relativism has lost hope about the attainment of truth, perspectivism stresses the complexity of what the historian is writing about and, as well, the specific difference of historical from mathematical, scientific, and philosophic knowledge. Perspectivism does not lock historians up in their backgrounds, confine them to their biases, deny them access to development and openness. But it does point out that historians with different backgrounds will rid themselves of biases, undergo conversions, come to understand the quite different mentalities of other places and times, and even move towards understanding one another, each in his own distinctive fashion. They may investigate the same area, but they ask different questions. Where the questions are similar, the implicit, defining contexts of suppositions and implications are not identical. Some may take for granted what others labor to prove. Discoveries can be equivalent, yet approached from different sets of previous questions, expressed in different terms, and so leading to different sequences of further questions. Even where results are much the same, still the reports will be written for different readers, and each historian has to devote special attention to what his readers would easily overlook or misesteem.

Such is perspectivism. In a broad sense the term may be used to refer to any case in which different historians treat the same matter differently. But its proper meaning is quite specific. It does not refer to differences arising from human fallibility, from mistaken judgments of possibility, probability, fact, or value. It does not refer to differences arising from personal inadequacy, form obtuseness, oversights, a lack of skill or

thoroughness. It does not refer to history as an ongoing process, to that gradual conquest that discovers ever new ways to make potential evidence into formal and eventually into actual evidence.

In its proper and specific meaning, perspectivism results from three factors. First, the historian is finite: his information is incomplete; his understanding does not master all the data within his reach; not all his judgments are certain. Were his information complete, his understanding all-comprehensive, his every judgment certain, there would be room neither for selection nor for perspectivism. Then historical reality would be known in its fixity and its unequivocal structures.

Secondly, the historian selects. The process of selecting has its main element in a commonsense, spontaneous development of understanding that can be objectified in its results but not in its actual occurrence. In turn, this process is conditioned by the whole earlier process of the historian's development and attainments; and this development is not an object of complete information and complete explanation. In brief, the process of selection is not subject to objectified controls either in itself or in its initial conditions.

Thirdly, we can expect processes of selection and their initial conditions to be variables. Historians are historical beings, immersed in the ongoing process in which situations change and meanings shift and different individuals respond each in his own way.

In brief, the historical process itself and, within it, the personal development of the historian give rise to a series of different standpoints. The different standpoints give rise to different selective processes. The different selective processes give rise to different histories that are (1) not contradictory, (2) not complete information and not complete explanation,

but (3) incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality.

Is then history not a science but an art? Collingwood has pointed out three differences between historical narrative and literary fiction. The historical narrative regards events located in space and dated in time; in a novel places and dates may be and largely are fictitious. Collingwood remarked of *Wuthering Heights* that the place names are all in English, while the scene is laid in hell. Secondly, all historical narratives have to be compatible with one another and tend to form a single view. Novels need not be compatible, and do not form a single view. Thirdly, the historical narrative at every step is justified by evidence; the novel either makes no appeal to evidence or, if it does, the appeal normally is part of the fiction.

On the other hand, history differs from natural science, for its object is in part constituted by meaning and value, while the objects of the natural sciences are not. Again, it differs from both the natural and the human sciences, for its results are descriptions and narratives about particular persons, actions, things, while their results aim at being universally valid. Finally, while it can be said that history is a science in the sense that it is guided by a method, that that method yields univocal answers when identical questions are put, and that the results of historical investigations are cumulative, still it has to be acknowledged that these properties of method are not realized in the same manner in history and in the natural and the human sciences.

All discovery is a cumulation of insights. But in the sciences this cumulation is expressed in some well-defined system, while in history it is expressed in a description and narrative about particulars. The scientific system can be checked in endless different manners, but the description and narrative, while it can came under suspicion in various ways, is really

checked only by repeating the initial investigation. Scientific advance is constructing a better system, but historical advance is a fuller and more penetrating understanding of more particulars. Finally, the scientist can aim at a full explanation of all phenomena, because his explanations are laws and structures that can cover countless instances; but the historian that aimed at full explanation of all history would need more information than is available and then countless explanations. No universal explanation will do [unclear].

Let us now revert, for a moment, to the view of history commonly entertained at the beginning of this century. From what has just been said it is plain that its error was not precisely where Karl Heussi placed it. The past is fixed, and its intelligible structures are unequivocal; but the past that is so fixed and unequivocal is the enormously complex past that historians know only incompletely and approximately. It is incomplete and approximate knowledge of the past that gives rise to perspectivism.

Finally, to affirm perspectivism is once more to reject the view that the historian has only to narrate all the facts and let them speak for themselves. It is once more to deplore the scissors-and-paste conception of history. It is once more to lament with M. Marrou the havoc wrought by positivist theories of 'scientific' history. But it also adds a new moment. It reveals that history speaks not only of the past but also of the present. Historians go out of fashion only to be rediscovered. The rediscovery finds them, if anything, more out of date than ever. But the significance of the rediscovery lies, not in the past that the historian wrote about, but in the historian's own self-revelation. Now his account is prized because it incarnates so much of its author's humanity, because it offers a first-rate witness [end of recording].