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I have been attributing to a single process of developing understanding a whole series of different functions. It is heuristic, for it brings to light the relevant elements, the data that might settle some historical question. It is ecstatic, for it leads the inquirer out of his original perspectives and into the perspectives proper to his object. It is selective: out of a totality of data it selects those relevant to the understanding achieved. It is critical, for it removes from one use or context to another the data that might otherwise be thought relevant to present tasks. It is constructive, for the data that are selected are knotted together by the vast and intricate web of interconnecting links that cumulatively came to light as one's understanding progressed – heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive.

Now it is the distinguishing mark of critical history that this process occurs twice. In the first instance one is coming to understand one's sources. In the second instance one is using one's understood sources intelligently to come to understand the object to which they are relevant. In both cases the development of understanding is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive. But in the first case one is identifying authors, locating them and their work in place and time, studying the milieu, ascertaining their purposes in writing and their prospective readers, investigating their sources of information and the use they made of them. In a previous section on Interpretation we spoke of understanding the author, but there the ulterior aim was to understand what he meant. In history we also seek to understand the authors of sources, but now the ulterior aim is to understand what they

[1] The second part of the lecture of the seventh day and the discussion session of that day. The audio recording of the lecture and the first part of the discussion can be found at 52800A0E060, and the full discussion session at 538R0A0E060.

were up to and how they did it. It is this understanding that grounds the critical use of sources, the fine discrimination that distinguishes an author's strength and weaknesses and uses him accordingly. It's critical precisely because of that discriminating use of sources. If you simply asked, Can this fellow be believed or not? either you use him or not – you just throw him into the wastebasket. But when you understand how good he was and where his weaknesses were, you're using him intelligently. Once this is achieved, one is able to shift one's attention to one's main objective, namely, to understanding the process referred to in one's sources. Where before one's developing understanding was heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive in determining what authors were up to, now it is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, and constructive in determining what was going forward in the community.

Needless to say, the two developments are interdependent. Not only does understanding the authors contribute to understanding the historical events, but in coming to understand the events there arise questions that may lead to a revision of one's understanding of the authors and, consequently, to a revision of one's use of them.

Again, while each new insight uncovers evidence, moves one away from previous perspectives, selects or rejects data as relevant or irrelevant, and adds to the picture that is being constructed, still what gains attention is, not each single insight, but the final insight in each cumulative series. It is such final insights that are called discoveries. Single insights are a dime a dozen. With them [the final insights] the full force of the cumulative series breaks forth and, as the cumulation has a specific direction and meaning, discoveries now are of new evidence, now of a new perspective, now of a different selection or critical rejection in the data, now of ever more complicated structures.

So far we have been thinking of structuring as the intelligible pattern grasped in the data and relating the data to one another. But there is a further aspect to the matter. For what is grasped by understanding in data, also is expressed by understanding in concepts and words. So from the intelligible pattern grasped in the data, one moves to the intelligible pattern expressed in the narrative. At first, the narrative is simply the inquirer mumbling his surmises to himself. As surmises less and less are mere surmises, as more and more they lead to the uncovering of further evidence, there begin to emerge trails, linkages, interconnected wholes. As the spirit of inquiry catches every failure to understand – and that's the main thing: know when you're not understanding, put questions there, because when you're not understanding, there's a place where understanding can emerge – as it brings to attention what is not yet understood and, as a result, is so easily overlooked, one of the interconnected wholes will advance to the role of a dominant theme running through other interconnected wholes which thereby become subordinate themes. As the investigation progresses and the field of data coming and under control broadens, not only will the organization in terms of dominant and subordinate themes keep extending, but also there will emerge ever higher levels of organization. Among dominant themes there will emerge dominant topics to leave other dominant themes just subordinate topics; and the fate of dominant themes awaits most of the dominant topics, as the process of organization keeps moving, not only over more territory, but up to ever higher levels of organization. It is not to be thought that this process of advancing organization is a single uniform progress. There occur discoveries that complement and correct previous discoveries and so, as understanding changes, the organization also must change. Themes and topics and so on become more exactly conceived and more happily expressed. The range of their dominance may be extended

or curtailed. Items once thought of major interest can slip back to less prominent roles, and, inversely, other items can mount from relative obscurity to notable significance.

The exact conception and happy expression of themes and topics are matters of no small moment. For they shape the further questions that one will ask, and it is those further questions that lead to further discoveries. Nor is this all. Part by part, historical investigations come to a term. They do so when there have been reached the set of insights that hit all nails squarely on the head. They are known to do so when the stream of further questions on a determinate theme or topic gradually diminishes and finally dries up. Further questions are an enormous range at one point, then as long as you keep on that topic, your further questions seem to relax. The danger of inaccurate or unhappy conception and formulation is that either the stream of questions may dry up prematurely or else that it may keep flowing when really there are no further relevant questions.

It follows that the cumulative process of developing understanding not only is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, and constructive but also is reflective and judicial. The understanding that has been achieved on a determinate point can be complemented, corrected, revised, only if further discoveries on that very point can be made. Such discoveries can be made only if further relevant questions arise. If, in fact, there are no further relevant questions, then, in fact, a certain judgment would be true. If, in the light of the historian's knowledge, there are no further relevant questions, then the historian can say that, as far as he knows, the question is closed.

There is, then, a criterion for historical judgment, and so there is a point where formal evidence becomes actual evidence. Such judgments occur repeatedly throughout an investigation, as each minor and then each major portion of the work is completed. But as in natural science, so too in

critical history the positive content of judgment aspires to be no more than the best available opinion. This is evident as long as an historical investigation is in process, for later discoveries may force a correction and revision of earlier ones. But what is true of investigations in process has to be extended to investigations that to all intents and purposes are completed. For, in the first place, one cannot exclude the possibility that new sources of information will be uncovered and that they will affect subsequent understanding and judgment. Archeological investigations of the ancient Near East complement Old Testament study, the caves of Qumran have yielded documents with a bearing on New Testament studies, and the unpublished writings found at Kenoboskion restrain pronouncements on Gnosticism.

But there is, as well, another source of revision. It is the occurrence of later events that place earlier events in a new perspective. The outcome of a battle fixes the perspective in which the successive stages of the battle are viewed; military victory in a war reveals the significance of the successive battles that were fought; the social and cultural consequences of the victory and the defeat are the measure of the effects of the war. So, in general, history is an ongoing process. As the process advances, the context within which events are to be understood keeps enlarging. As the context enlarges, perspectives shift.

However, neither of these sources of revision will simply invalidate earlier work competently done. New documents fill out the picture; they illuminate what before was obscure; they shift perspectives; they refute what was venturesome or speculative; they do not simply dissolve the whole network of questions and answers that made the original set of data massive evidence for the earlier account. Again, history is an ongoing process, and so the historical context keeps enlarging. But the effects of this enlargement

are neither universal nor uniform. Persons and events have their place in history through one or more contexts, and these contexts may be narrow and brief or broad and enduring with any variety of intermediaries. Only inasmuch as a context is still open, or can be opened or extended, do later events throw new light on earlier persons, events, processes. As Karl Heussi put it in *Die Krisis des Historismus*, it is easier to understand Frederick William III of Prussia than to understand Schleiermacher – Schleiermacher fits into a far bigger context – and, while Nero will always be Nero, we cannot as yet say the same for Luther. That was said in 1932, and the change in Catholic views on Luther at the present time brings that out.

Besides the judgments reached by an historian in his investigation, there are the judgments passed upon his work by his peers and his successors. Such judgments constitute critical history at the second degree. For they are not mere wholesale judgments of belief or disbelief. They are based on an understanding of how the work was done. Just as the historian, first with respect to his sources, and then with respect to the object of his inquiry, undergoes a development of understanding that is at once heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive and, in the limit, judicial, so the critics of a historical work undergo a similar development with respect to the work itself. They do so all the more easily and all the more competently, the more the historian has been at pains not to conceal his tracks but to lay all his cards on the table, and the more the critics already are familiar with the field or, at least, with neighboring fields.

The result of such critical understanding of a critical history is, of course, that one can make intelligent and discriminating use of the criticized historian. One learns where he has worked well. One has spotted his limitations and his weaknesses. One can say where, to the best of present knowledge, he can be relied on, where he must be revised, where he may

have to be revised. Just as historians make an intelligent and discriminating use of their sources, so too the professional historical community makes a discriminating use of the works of its own historians.

Early in this section we noted that asking historical questions presupposed historical knowledge and, the greater that knowledge, the more the data in one's purview, the more questions one could ask, and the more intelligently one could ask them. Our consideration has now come full circle, for we have arrived at an account of that presupposed historical knowledge. It is critical history of the second degree. It consists basically in the cumulative works of historians. But it consists actually, not in mere belief in those works, but in a critical appreciation of them. Such critical appreciation is generated by critical book reviews, by the critiques that professors communicate to their students and justify by their explanations and arguments, by informal discussions in common rooms and more formal discussions at congresses.

Critical history of the second degree is a compound. At its base are historical articles and books. On a second level there are critical writings that compare and evaluate the historical writings: these may vary from brief reviews to long studies right up to such a history of the historiography of an issue as Herbert Butterfield's *George III and the Historians*. Finally, there are the considered opinions of professional historians on historians and their critics, opinions that influence their teaching, their remarks in discussions, their procedures in writing on related topics.

Before concluding this section it will be well to recall what precisely has been our aim and concern. Explicitly, it has been limited to the functional specialty, history. There has been excluded all that pertains to the functional specialty, communications. I have no doubt that historical knowledge has to be communicated, not merely to professional historians,

but in some measure to all members of the historical community. But before that need can be met, historical knowledge has to be acquired and kept up to date. The present section has been concerned with the prior task. It has been concerned to indicate what set and sequence of operations secure the fulfilment of that task. If it is commonly thought that such a task is all the more likely to be performed well if one comes to it without an axe to grind, at least that has not been my main reason for distinguishing between the functional specialties, history and communications. My main reason has been that they name different tasks performed in quite different manners, and, unless their distinction is acknowledged and maintained, there is just no possibility of arriving at an exact understanding of either task.

Again, it is a commonplace for theorists of history to struggle with the problems of historical relativism, to note the influence exerted on historical writing by the historian's views on possibility, by his value judgments, by his *Weltanschauung* or *Fragestellung* or *Standpunkt*. I have omitted any consideration of this matter, not because it is not extremely important, but because it is brought under control, not by the techniques of critical history, but by the techniques of our fourth functional specialty, dialectic.

The concern, then, of the present section has been strictly limited. It presupposed the historian knew how to do his research and how to interpret the meaning of documents. It left to later specialties certain aspects of the problem of relativism and the great task of revealing the bearing of historical knowledge on contemporary policy and action. It was confined to formulating the set of procedures that, *caeteris paribus*, yield historical knowledge, to explaining how that knowledge arises, in what it consists, what are it its inherent limitations. If I have been led to adopt the view that the techniques of critical history are unequal to the task of eliminating historical relativism totally, I affirm all the more strongly that they can and

do effect a partial elimination. I have contended that critical history is not a matter of believing credible testimonies but of discovering what hitherto has been experienced but not properly known. In that process of discovery I have recognized not only its heuristic, selective, critical, constructive, and judicial aspects, but also an ecstatic aspect that eliminates previously entertained perspectives and opinions to replace them with the perspectives and views that emerge from the cumulative interplay of data, inquiry, insight, surmise, image, evidence. It is in this manner that critical history of itself moves to objective knowledge of the past, though it may be impeded by such factors as mistaken views on possibility, by mistaken or misleading value judgments, by an inadequate worldview or standpoint or state of the question. In brief, this section has been attempting to bring to light the set of procedures that lead historians in various manners to affirm the possibility of objective historical knowledge. Carl Becker, for instance, agreed he was a relativist in the sense that *Weltanschauung* influences the historian's work, but at the same time maintained that a considerable and indeed increasing body of knowledge was objectively ascertainable. Erich Rothacker correlated *Wahrheit* with *Weltanschauung*, granted that they influenced historical thought, but at the same time affirmed the existence of a correctness (*Richtigkeit*) attached to critical procedures and proper inferences. In a similar vein Karl Heussi held that philosophic views would not affect critical procedures though they might well have an influence on the way the history was composed; and he advanced that while the relatively simple form in which the historian organizes his materials resides not in the enormously complex courses of events but only in the historian's mind, still different historians operating from the same standpoint arrive at the same organization. In like manner, Rudolf Bultmann held that, granted a *Fragestellung*, a state of the question, critical method led to univocal results.

These writers are speaking in various manners of the same reality. They mean, I believe, that there exist procedures that, *caeteris paribus*, lead to historical knowledge. Our aim and concern in this section has been to indicate the nature of those procedures.

Our next chapter is quite long, so we better get started on it today. On history, there were three sections: Nature and History, Historical Experience – we all have historical experience, but we haven't got historical knowledge of what's gone on; the general movement is something that we have fragmentary experience of, but someone has to put together individual experiences to arrive at the data for true events. Now this is 'From History towards Dialectic.' In the main it's considering the particular works on the study of history that bring us more in contact with historians' thoughts about history. There are seven sections: the first, Three Handbooks; the second, Data and Facts; the third, Three Historians; the fourth, *Verstehen*; the fifth, Perspectivism; the sixth, Horizons; and the seventh, Heuristic Structures.

Normally historians are content to write history without raising any questions about the nature of historical knowledge. In fact, they couldn't be bothered discussion that general question. Nor is this surprising. For historical knowledge is reached by an adaptation of the everyday procedures of human understanding and, while the adaptation itself has to be learnt, the underlying procedures are too intimate, too spontaneous, too elusive to be objectified and described without a protracted and, indeed, highly specialized effort. So even a great innovator, such as Leopold von Ranke, explained that his practice arose by a sort of necessity, in its own way, and not from an attempt to imitate the practice of his pioneering predecessor, Barthold Niebuhr.

At times, however, historians are impelled to do more than just write history. They may be teaching it. They may feel obliged to defend their

practice against encroaching error. They may be led to state in part or in whole just what they are doing when doing history. Then, whether they wish it or not, they are using some more or less adequate or inadequate cognitional theory, and easily they become involved in some philosophic undertow that they cannot quite master.

This dialectic can be highly instructive provided, of course, that one is not a mere logician testing the clarity of terms, the coherence of statements, the rigor of inferences. For what the historian has to offer is not a coherent cognitional theory but an awareness of the nature of his craft and an ability to describe it in the concrete and lively fashion that only a practitioner can manage.

Our first section, then, Three Handbooks.

Handbooks on the method of history have gone out of fashion. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century they were common and influential. I shall select three that represent different tendencies, and I shall compare them on a single, but, I believe, significant issue, namely, the relationship between historical facts and their intelligible interconnections, their *Zusammenhang*.

For twenty-five years Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884) constantly revised his lectures on the encyclopedia and methodology of history. As well, he composed a *Grundriss der Historik* (an Outline of Historical Investigation) which appeared as a printed manuscript in 1858 and 1862, and in full-fledged editions in 1868, 1875, and 1882. Interest in his work continues, for a critical edition combining both the 1882 version of the lectures and the *Grundriss* with all its variants reached a fourth printing in 1960.

Droysen divided the historian's task into four parts: Heuristic, Criticism, Interpretation, and Presentation. Heuristic uncovered the relevant

remains, monuments, accounts. Criticism evaluated their reliability. Interpretation brought to light the realities of history in the fullness of their conditions and the process of their emergence. Presentation, finally, made an account of the past a real influence in the present on the future.

Now in one important respect Droysen's division differed from that of his predecessors and his contemporaries. He limited criticism to ascertaining the reliability of sources. They extended it to determining the occurrence of the facts of history. The question is, Who settles the facts, the second, critical part on the reliability of the sources or the third part? Droysen felt the position of his predecessors and contemporaries was due to mere inertia. Their model for historical criticism had been the textual criticism of the philologists. But textual criticism is one thing and historical criticism is another. The textual critic ascertains objective facts, namely, the original state of the text. But the facts of history resemble, not a text, but the meaning of a text. They are like battles, councils, rebellions. They are complex unities that result from manifold actions and interactions of individuals. They extend over space and over time. They cannot be singled out and observed in some single act of perception. They have to be put together by assembling a manifold of particular events into a single interpretative unity.

For Droysen, then, the historian does not first determine the facts and then discover their interconnections. On the contrary, facts and interconnections form a single piece, a garment without seam. Together they constitute historical reality in the fullness of its conditions and the process of its emergence. They are discovered in an interpretative process guided by the watchword, *forschend verstehen*, advance through research to understanding. The research was directed to four areas: first, to the course of events, say, in a military campaign; secondly, to the conditions forming

the context of the events; thirdly, to the character of the participants; and fourthly, to the purposes and ideas that were being realized. So historical interpretation moves towards historical reality, grasping the series of events, first in their inner connections, next in their dependence on the situation, thirdly, in the light of the character or psychology of the agents, and finally, as a realization of purposes and ideas. Only through this fourfold grasp of meaning and significance do the events stand revealed in their proper reality.

Droysen did not prevail. In Ernst Bernheim's monumental *Lehrbuch de historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Handbook of Historical Method and Philosophy of History) there may be discerned a similar fourfold division of the historian's task. But now criticism is divided into outer and inner. Outer criticism determines whether single sources are reliable as historical witnesses. Inner criticism has to settle the factuality of the events witnessed by several sources taken together. So it would seem that the historical facts are settled, before there begins the work of interpretation, which Bernheim names the *Auffassung* and defines as the determination of the interconnections (*Zusammenhang*) of the events.

It remains, however, that if Bernheim assigned to inner criticism the determination of events, still he did not consider this determination to be independent of the way in which historians apprehended interconnections. On the contrary, he taught explicitly that the determination of events and the apprehension of their interconnections are interdependent and inseparable. He even added that, without an objective apprehension of interconnections, one cannot even ascertain in proper fashion the sources relevant to one's inquiry. So there is a slight shift in Bernheim away from Droysen.

Still further removed from Droysen's position is the *Introduction aux études historiques* composed by G. Langlois and C. Seignobos and published in Paris in 1898. This manual is divided into three parts or books.

Book I deals with preliminary studies. Book II deals with analytical operations. Book III deals with synthetic operations. The analytical operations divide into external and internal criticism (like Bernheim's inner and outer criticism). External criticism yields critical editions of texts, ascertains their authors, classifies historical sources. Internal criticism proceeds by the analogies of general psychology to reproduce the successive mental states of the document's author. It determines (1) what he meant, (2) whether he had believed what he said, and (3) whether his belief was justified.

This last step was considered to bring the document to a point where it resembled the data of the 'objective' sciences. Thereby it became the equivalent of an observation, and it was to be utilized in the same manner as were the observations of natural scientists. But in the natural sciences facts are asserted, not as the result of single observations, but only when corroborated by several independent observations. So far from being exempt from this principle, history with its imperfect sources of information must be subjected to it all the more rigorously. There followed the necessity of independent and mutually supporting testimonies for the determination of historical facts.

The implications of such analysis were not overlooked. It removed the facts from their original context, isolated them from one another, reduced them, as it were, to powder (I'm quoting). Accordingly, the analytical operations of Book II had to be complemented by the synthetic operations of Book III. These were described under such rubrics as classifying, question and answer, analogy, grouping, inference, working out general formulae. But all of these risked numerous aberrations, against which warnings were sounded continuously. Indeed, so many were the pitfalls that M. Langlois

himself in later life, instead of writing history, was content to reproduce selected documents.

With Langlois and Seignobos, then, there emerges a clear-cut distinction and separation between the determination of historical facts and the determination of their interconnections. This distinction and separation has its ground, it would seem, in notions of natural science current in nineteenth-century positivist and empiricist circles. But in those very circles there were bound to arise further questions. Why add to the facts? Must not any addition that is not obvious to everyone be merely subjective? Why not let the facts speak for themselves? On that question I will cite Carl Becker. But before going on, we had better draw the distinction between data and facts.

[Next, Data and Facts.]

At this point it may be well to insert a clarification, for data are one thing, and facts are another. There are the data of sense and the data of consciousness. Common to both is that they are or may be given. They may or may not be attended to, investigated, understood, conceived, invoked as evidence in judgment. If they are not, then, then they are merely given. But insofar as they are investigated then they are not merely given but also are entering into combination with other components in human cognitional activity.

In contrast, historical facts are known events. The events that are known pertain to the historian's past. The knowledge of the events is in the historian's present. Moreover, this knowledge is human knowledge. It is not some single activity but a compound of activities that occur on three different levels. So a historical fact will have the concreteness of an object of external or internal experience. It will have the precision of an object of understanding and conception. It will have the stubbornness of what has

been grasped as approximating the virtually unconditioned and so as something probably independent of the knowing subject.

Now as an investigation proceeds, insights accumulate and oversights diminish. This ongoing process, while it does not affect data inasmuch as they are or may be given, does affect enormously data inasmuch as they are sought out, attended to, combined now this way and now that in ever larger and more complex structures. On the other hand, it is only as the structures take definite shape, as the process of asking further questions begins to dry up, that there commence to emerge the facts. For the facts emerge, not before the data are understood, but only after they have been understood satisfactorily and thoroughly.

There is a further complication in critical history, for there, there occur two distinct, though interdependent, processes from data to facts. In a first process, the data are here and now perceptible monuments, remains, accounts; from them one endeavors to ascertain the genesis and evaluate the reliability of the information they convey; the facts at which this first process terminates are a series of statements obtained from the sources and marked with an index of greater or less reliability. Insofar as they are reliable, they yield information about the past. But the information they yield is, as a general rule, not historical knowledge but historical experience, the fragments that we all experience. It regards the fragments, the bits and pieces, that have caught the attention of diarists, letter-writers, chroniclers, newsmen, commentators. It is not the rounded view of what was going forward at a given time and place for, in general, contemporaries have not at their disposal the means necessary for forming such a rounded view. It follows that the facts ascertained in the critical process are, not historical facts, but just data for the discovery of historical facts. The critical process has to be followed by an interpretative process, in which the historian pieces

together the fragments of information that he has gathered and critically evaluated. Only when this interpretative process of reconstruction is terminated do there emerge what may properly be called the historical facts.

Three Historians, third.

In a celebrated address, read twice before learned societies in 1926 but published only posthumously, Carl Becker recalled that he had been told by an eminent and honored historian that a historian had nothing to do but 'present all the facts and let them speak for themselves.' He then proceeded to repeat what he had been teaching for twenty years 'that this notion is preposterous; first, because it is impossible to present all the facts; and second, because even if you could present all the facts the miserable things wouldn't say anything, would just say nothing at all.'

Becker was not content to attack what he considered one of the fondest illusions of nineteenth-century historians. Sixteen years previously, in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October 1910, he had described with considerable skill the process that has to occur if the card cases, containing the results of historical criticism, are to lead the historian to an apprehension of the historical course of events.

> As he goes over his cards, some aspects of the reality recorded there interest him more, others less; some are retained, others forgotten; some have power to start a new train of thought; some appear to be causally connected; some logically connected; some are without perceptible connection of any sort. And the reason is simple; some facts strike the mind as interesting or suggestive, have a meaning of some sort, lead to some desirable end, because they associate themselves with ideas already in the mind; they fit in somehow to the ordered experience of the historian. This original synthesis – not to be confused with making of a

> book for the printer, a very different matter – is only half deliberate. It is accomplished almost automatically. The mind will select and discriminate from the very beginning. It is the whole 'apperceiving mass' that does the business, seizing upon this or that new impression and building it up into its own growing content. As new facts are taken in, the old ideas and concepts, it is true, are modified, distinguished, destroyed even; but the modified ideas become new centers of attraction. And so the process is continued, for years it may be. The final synthesis is doubtless composed of facts unique, causally connected, revealing unique change; but the unique fact, selected because of its importance, was in every case selected because of its importance for some idea already in possession of the field.

I have quoted this rather long passage (Carl Becker, *Detachment and the Writing of History, Essays and Letters*, edited by Phil Snyder, Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell, 1958, p. 24) because in it a historian reveals the activities that occur subsequently to the tasks of historical criticism and prior to the work of historical composition. It cannot be claimed that Becker was a successful cognitional theorist: there cannot be assembled from his writings an exact and coherent theory of the genesis of historical knowledge. Nonetheless, he was not a man to be taken in by current cliches, and he was sufficiently alert and articulate to have written a happy description of what I would call the gradual accumulation of insights, each complementing or qualifying or correcting those that went before, until, perhaps years later, the stream of further questions has dried up and the historian's information on past historical experience has been promoted to historical knowledge.

There follows the opening part of discussion 7.

The first question raised the issue of the relationship between Lonergan's distinction of historical experience and historical knowledge and the Terman distinction of Historie *and Geschichte, to which Lonergan responded that the distinction is taken in so many ways that he would need to know more about the question. He asked whether they meant the history that is written about and the history that is written (which is Lonergan's way at times of distinguishing, respectively,* Geschichte *and* Historie. *The questioner the drew the distinction that the crucifixion is a historical fact and the resurrection is not. It belongs to* Geschichte.

That is Bultmann's scientism: you have objectivity if everyone will accept it. That means that there is no such thing as Dialectic – different views, and why they differ. It is a type of reductionism. It is like saying you have scientific psychology if you can get a machine to do it.

In the light of your distinction of historical experience and historical knowledge, can we speak of the resurrection of Jesus as a fact of historical knowledge?

Consider chapter 6 of Alan Richardson's *History: Sacred and Profane*. There you have evidence for the historical fact. Richardson doesn't attempt to argue from the resurrection accounts in the New Testament. He asks for an explanation of this belief that is universal in this religion that has spread enormously. He starts you from about the year 300 and works back. What is the convincing historical explanation of that religious phenomenon? Are you going to say that all these people were duped? They all professed to believe in the Resurrection? We will say more about this tomorrow. Becker asks if historians have preconceptions. He is discussing Bernheim's rule: that if you have two independent witnesses, not self-deceived, you can establish a historical fact. He asks if historians find people self-deceived,

even though there are two-hundred. He says yes. He says if a miracle is impossible in the historian's world, then any witness to a miracle has to be self-deceived to get into that world. The historian cannot deal intelligently with the past if he is going to insert into it elements that he considers unintelligible, impossible. The historian could transform his mentality, and get himself into a world in which miracles were possible; but that would be a matter of intellectual conversion; and people don't do that sort of thing easily. Becker says that at the present time there is no room for miracles in a scientific world; but if scientists change their minds on the matter, and they may, then there will be room for miracles in the scientific world.

I think it is Collingwood – I'm not sure, it may be Marrou – who says that there is evidence of the beginning of this sort of thing at the present time. There was an Englishman who wrote on myth, archaeology, and religion; he believed in parapsychology, spiritism, and so on, and other specialists in the field did not. One was admitting the reality of ghosts, so to speak, and the other wasn't. He says that when you get that shift you will have miracles back again.

The thing is that when I said that the historian arrives at univocal results from his standpoint, once you admit that, the method will give one univocal results; anyone with that standpoint will get those results. But the purpose of Dialectic is to confront those issues; they are not going to be solved by historical evidence because the witnesses have to be self-deceived on a given a priori.

What about the development of critical method? The limits of precritical history?Would precritical history include the Aeneid*? The gospels?*
The sharp break was work that was not first class: Barthold Niebuhr, who reconstructed early Roman history: a very brilliant man, with all sorts of

languages. The man who wrote good history and did the new thing was Ranke. The other late-nineteenth-century figure was Mommsen. Ranke changed history in three fundamental ways: first, you got out of the disputes of the present, and you were not passing judgment on the past; you were telling what happened. Secondly, you based your account on contemporary sources. Thirdly, you criticized your sources; you found out where you sources got their information. Ranke did first-class criticism on sources; people who were thought to be big historians, well, he caught them out. With those three fundamental steps, Ranke made that difference in history. Really understanding one's sources, that is the business; it isn't simply criticism. Criticism was very relevant when handling political and ecclesiastical history in the Western Middle Ages, in which there was an abundance of false decretals, charters, wildly ante-dated lives of the saints, and so on. But that purely critical attitude is not what is meant by critical history properly. Critical history is: understand your sources, know where this fellow is good and where he is weak, where you can lean on him and where you better not; this very fine discrimination.

Are the two meanings of 'critical' both within critical history?
No. There is history as scissors and paste. That is a matter of memory, testimony, credibility. What is credible you put down in a scrap book and eventually work into a narrative. This idea of history is presupposed in most book on apologetics. With critical history it doesn't make any difference where the data come from; you put it in its class. The man on the lost weekend that sees the plaster break up in the corner and a monster coming out, and so on, that is a valid psychological datum for abnormal psychology. You don't deny the datum; you give it a date, and it may not be the date it claims for itself; you put it somewhere else. Carl Becker is amusing when he

talks about his notes on Russian currency and German currency. He transposed them, took them out of both centuries and put them into nineteenth-century German historical thought. That was its historical place, its historical locus, that transposition. You discover that the text has been interpolated or mutilated, and you take that into account. That is the critical movement; it is the inverse insight, pulling something out of one context and putting it into another; it is always historical evidence.

Question not clear?

The second meaning. The data always remain the datum. What the datum is evidence for is an open question or another question.

What about judgments of value in history?

Values are on the fourth level; they come up in Dialectic. Good history is concerned very much with values, and the more it is concerned with values the better it is. But this history, as a functional specialty, is concerned with facts; and the value judgments and so on are history in another sense. In other words, history, as a functional specialty, is concerned with settling what happened and how, and all the rest, in one specialty. Insofar as man is in that specialty, he is not a specialist on values; you are on the fourth level when you are a specialist on values. We will be discussing whether things are value-free, and so on. There are various senses to it, but insofar as you have Weber's distinction between social science and social policy, social policy is concerned with concrete instances of the good; and when you are in these concrete instances of the good there are all sorts of possibilities of bias in the situation. It is a much more complex thing than the scientific. An empirical science doesn't settle questions of fact by appealing to values; and there is a specialist settling questions of fact, and that is what we are dealing with.

Do you exclude values?

You don't exclude them, just as you don't exclude Research and Interpretation. Judgments of value are needed for this business of telling about the facts, and so on. You don't suppress them; you don't imagine that there is a pure intellect without a will that is going to perform scientific work. The fact is that critical history as described is always under the conditions 'from this viewpoint we arrive at this conclusion.' The spectrum of viewpoints will come up for examination in Dialectic. And from judgments on the viewpoints you will be able to select what history you consider correct.

You said that history at this level deals with fact.

Yes, it's a specialty with regard to what is so.

The man who works in the archives deals with many facts, but is not a historian. When I think of Geschichte, *I think of the fact that many people crossed the Rubicon. But the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon changed the subsequent development of the Roman Empire. That is* Geschichte

It would be the difference between chronicle and history; it would be the difference between historical experience and historical knowledge.

Does this not parallel closely your view on data and facts?

That is exactly my view.

Can you say more about value judgments made by the people you are studying on the level of history?

Friedrich Meinecke has a paper in Stern's *The Varieties of History*, on histories that can be written from two viewpoints. It can be written from the viewpoint of causality, and it can be written from the viewpoint of values. He gives a magnificent defense of history written from the viewpoint of

values; he admits that you have to have both, that you never have no value judgments whatever and on the other hand you never have only value judgments; you have both. Insofar as you are writing in terms of values you are not doing a functional specialty on the third level. You are doing a functional specialty on the fourth. The precepts that I provided this morning, the idea of writing history as critical, was not discussing values at all; it is a legitimate specialization that a historian can work at and try to solve. The value of history, according to C. Becker, is not that it is scientific and enables us to control the future, rather it is moral and helps to face the future. It teaches us something far more important, what it is to be humane. Two books have been written on Becker. The book by Charlotte Smith, *Carl Becker: History and the Climate of Opinion*, presents a sympathetic picture and an understanding of Becker. The other one is much more critical of the inadequacy of his theories. Becker was involved in this question of relativism, and so on. However, it was never really a tight issue for him, simply because his emphasis is always on values, considering history more as an art.

How does one resolve the problem of relativism (question not completely clear)?

Let everyone write history from their standpoint; and compare the standpoints in Dialectic. There is no historical scientific method for eliminating those standpoints; you would have to eliminate the education of the people; you would have to introduce the principle of the empty head – only infants can write history. A scientist operates in virtue of explicitly stated assumptions; he has a complete list of them. The scientist is setting up something in the theoretic field that is different from the commonsense field. He has special techniques and modes of operation. There are objective

controls. But in hermeneutics, in interpretation, in history, you're not aiming at general results. You're aiming at understanding individuals. The only control on the historical work is to go over the sources yourself, do the job over. There can be grounds of suspicion that are less complex, and so on, but to get a full appreciation of what's right and what's wrong in a historical work, you repeat the whole job. That has to be so, because what does the historial presuppose? He presupposes everything he's got. He's himself. As Becker puts it, it's the whole apperceiving mass that's ? And because that is the way the historian proceeds, you have to let them write in the light of their own presuppositions, and so on. But when they're finished, it's not too difficult to distinguish between changes that might take place in virtue of further data being discovered and changes that can't take place no matter what further data are discovered. As Becker says, it doesn't make any difference whether witnesses are two or two hundred. If they're saying something that's completely unintelligible, well, the man can't assimilate it. The historian has to have a world that's intelligible, and it has to be a continuation of the world he already has, something that fits in that horizon, or else he'd have to change his horizon. And the problem of his changing his horizon arises insofar as the standpoints are lined up in Dialectic and one particular horizon is opted for – basic option in Foundations. So what do we do with the question of values? We outflank it. We don't try to – People who say you'll be scientific if you do empirical science and skip the question of values; you can't – at least theology can't be done on that basis.

Question hard to decipher due to fiddling with microphone. Something to do with method.

It's an analysis of what goes on, in terms of insight. It's not in terms of concepts, connotations and denotations. It's not in terms of logic. It's in

terms of something that occurs prior to conceptualization, formally, that grounds it. It's a statement of the conditions of possibility of writing history.

Is Dialectic a matter of historians criticizing one another?
It can be. Historians criticize themselves and one another. But they're doing something different when they're on that level of viewpoints. But they know all about it and have been discussing it for some time.

Something about the control of meaning through method.
You comprehend all the meanings you have at your disposal. But for example, how many people during the Second World War were as intimate with what was going on as Winston Churchill? He was in an especially privileged position to be able to write his volumes on the Second World War. Are they going to be considered the definitive history on the Second World War? I don't think so. They'll be one source. And it's when all the results are in that you can start working at history. The history that's well known is the history of ancient Greece and Rome, because the data are practically all in. There may be further finds. The ground has been combed over and over and over and over again. The attempt to do documentary history from the French Revolution on, where everyone was amassing documents – archives all over the place, and so on – it just made documentary history a mountainous task, this present accumulation of archives, especially where they're kept but not annotated. A man was telling me at Farm Street that he finally got permission to get into some library in Bologna, and it was more or less like a church, with files all around and all the way up to the ceiling – and no index! So he left! Indexing the place would be lifetime's job.

There was a question about the theology of history. Is there any validity to this concept?

It comes up in systematic. I'd say that theology of history fundamentally is people following the transcendental precepts and man moves forward, there's progress, and they avoid them or violate them, and things to pot, and people get God's grace and they put up with the evils and overcome them: redemption. So progress, decline and redemption are three fundamental categories for the theology of history. *Insight*, chapter 20. And you can build on that. That's three successive approximations for the analysis of any situation. I'm not saying that there's progress in every situation or that any situation is all sin, and so on. But there are those three vectors, three variables.

This morning when you discussed history, you related it to what you said earlier about meaning.

That first section this morning – the difference between nature and history is meaning. Meaning is what history is about: actions informed, mediated, by meaning and regulated by values. It's all relevant. I didn't repeat my 62 pages on meaning, but when I use the word 'meaning,' what I mean is what I said in those 62 pages.

With the contemporary complexification of man and perhaps the whole question of interiority and people becoming, if not universally at least on a larger scale, more self-aware and more conscious of achieving differentiated consciousness, you might say something about the possibilities of understanding and writing contemporary history, even though we have all these fact-gathering sources – would you see it that given a knowledge of the method of history and given the data involved, it will actually become more

and more difficult and in fact make a contemporary history almost impossible.

You can have marvelously astute people, extremely well informed – Gladstone used to say, 'We'll have to ask Acton about this'; Acton was writing contemporary politics as well as knowing an awful lot of history – and people like that are in a position, as was Churchill, but people who are right in the midst of affairs can be deceived by the clichés of the day. Becker remarked about the historians that the one thing that they're not withdrawn from is the contemporary climate of opinion. And it's precisely that contemporary climate of opinion that's up for judgment in history. We don't think about the Victorians the way they did. Our thoughts may be right or wrong, but it certainly is not their idea of themselves. And what they would think of us is another question. That may be what the next generation *will* be thinking! It's those fundamental, those enormous things that are more or less the air you breathe – it wasn't a fish that invented water, as McLuhan would say. When I was young, I though the air was nothing, and another boy said, 'Oh yes, you can feel it. Move your hand like this.' I hadn't noticed the air before. I was given this experimental proof of its existence. It's these massive things that determine our lives – the impossibility of writing letters to the paper if you are in any way detached from contemporary thinking. That's a fundamental difficulty about contemporary history. The other fundamental difficulty is access to the information. The present Postmaster General in Canada at one time was head of the Department of Commerce at McGill University in Montreal, and he was all for dropping things in the Department of Commerce and balancing the books and drawing up a full statement of the year's activities, and so on, and he said, 'Until a fellow gets in charge of a business, they won't let him get near the facts, because if he had any brains, he's go out and start up another business equal to it, on his

own and make the profits. There was another friend of mine whose brother was in charge of the city branch of the Royal Bank of Canada in London, the Foreign Exchange and all that side of it. There was a Dutchman who was going on in the missions and he was going to be Procurator in the missions and wanted to learn about banking and asked this man if he could get a job in the Royal Bank for the summer. And of course he wanted to move around from one department to another to see how the thing worked, and they wouldn't let him move around, they gave him a job! Getting the information – they open up the archives fifty or a hundred years later, depending on the country, unless you happened to be defeated in war, and then they come right out! The difficulty of having the information: I had four points on it, and I remember two: the type of mentality that can stand back and see how much of this was wise and how much was foolish; who were the wise men that no one was listening to, what were the mistakes that were made, and so on? There's no information to provide information on a lot of points.

How about the influence of the future? You don't know the future, but to really grasp its significance you would have to know something that isn't here now, so you have a very fragmentary type of history. You can write with the data you have, but the –

In other words, you can't run the world on the basis of empirical science. People have to decide. I was once lecturing on existentialism, and at that time the seventh fleet (I think it was) was moved to the eastern Mediterranean. It caused a certain amount of concern, and they were asking Eisenhower, 'Isn't this risky?' And Eisenhower said, 'We have to be men.' Well, we all have birth certificates. But there's another sense of being a man, and that's the existential sense, and that's the sense in which men run history. History is men making themselves. And it's that realization of self-

transcendence that provides the real guide to history. Anything else you just build up the objective surd. The culture becomes a slum.

We were concerned about the relationship of the historian's bias to the stage of precritical or critical history.

Bias gives different standpoints, the different sets of interests, all that sort of thing. Anything that concerns the constitution of this historian as a man, pertains to his standpoint, sets the horizon within which he's going to fit a certain segment of human history. Insofar as he carries out the steps I've been speaking of, he's doing critical history. Precritical history, on Collingwood's statement is a matter of memory, testimony, and credibility. If it's believable, it goes into the book. If it isn't believable, it goes into the wastebasket. Critical history is – Dioysius the Areopagite, of course, never spoke with St Paul, but all this stuff is very interesting. It throws an awful lot of light on the end of the fifth century in a certain type of monastery. It has had a big influence on subsequent centuries. It's all data for a history of thought.

What about an apologetic Catholic history of the Reformation?

Yes, that dropping of apologetic is very recent in Catholic thought. Corbeil will say that Lebreton is too much concerned with apologetics. That is very recent in Catholic thought. And apologetic is one of the things I used to characterize the precritical. The transition is not sharp and neat in its full implications. There has been a lot of resistance in the Church to critical history, and it's been increasing. Take the *DTC*, Catholic theology from about 1904 to 1948, and compare the earlier and later articles. There's a whole change of mentality. It was going forward in that period and gradually spreading. The description I gave of precritical history was something vivid, to convey a notion that suits Livy right down to T. It's fulfilling a real

function, because to have a nation or state, you have to have a conscious identity. I remember once talking a Spanish professor of history at the Greg – I forget what his period was, but it may have been Reformation – and there was another Spaniard there visiting from Spain who had written a lot of history, and I said, How good a historian is this other man? and he said, About ten mistakes per page. And of course, there's the famous challenge of Thurston to Coulton, and he offered to find on every page of Coulton five errors of historical fact. And he wasn't taken up.