

## **(52300DTE060) Regis69 5A<sup>1</sup>**

### *5.2 The Greek Discovery of Mind*

There is a book by Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of Mind*, dealing with the development of Greek thought, and our second section will be the Greek discovery of mind, and it will be based on Bruno Snell's work.

As technique advances, it reveals by contrast the inefficacy of magic, and turns man in his weakness from magical incantation to religious supplication. However, if myth is to be broken, more is needed. Man must discover mind. He has to sort out and somehow detach from one another feeling and doing, knowing and deciding. He has to clarify just what it is to know, and in the light of that clarification keep the cognitive function of meaning apart from its constitutive and efficient functions, and from its role in the communication of feeling.

In the Greek discovery of mind, according to Bruno Snell, the first level was the literary revelation of man to himself. Homeric simile drew on the characteristics of inanimate nature, of plants and animals, to illuminate and objectify and distinguish the varied springs of action in the epic heroes. The lyric poets worked out expressions of personal human feelings. The tragedians exhibited human decisions, their conflicts and interplay, and their consequences. Within the literary tradition there occurred reflections on knowledge. For Homer, knowledge comes by perception or by hearsay. Man's knowledge is always partial and incomplete, but the Muses are omnipresent. They perceive everything; they are the ones that enable the

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<sup>1</sup> The first part of the lecture of the fifth day on what was then conceived as chapter 5 of *Method in Theology*, 'Religion.' The audio recording can be found at 52300A0E060.

bard to sing as if he had been present or as if he had heard the tale from an eyewitness. But for Hesiod, the Muses do not inspire but teach, and they are far less trustworthy than Homer claimed. They may teach the truth, but they may also teach plausible falsehood. They singled Hesiod out on Mount Helicon and taught him not to repeat the folly and the lies of his predecessors, but to tell the truth about the struggle in which man ekes out his livelihood. Xenophanes was still more critical. He rejected the multitude of anthropomorphic gods; for him, god was unity, perfect in wisdom, operating without toil, merely by the thought of his mind. In contrast, human wisdom was imperfect, caught in semblance, but still the best of the virtues, and indeed to be attained by long seeking. Similarly, for Hecataeus the stories of the Greeks were many and foolish. Man's knowledge was not the gift of the gods. Stories of the past are to be judged by everyday experience; one advances in knowledge by inquiry and search, and the search is not just accidental, as it was in Odysseus, but deliberate and planned.

This empirical interest lived on in Herodotus, in the physicians and the physicists, but a new turn emerged with Heraclitus. He maintained that the mere amassing of information did not make one grow in intelligence; where his predecessors were opposed to ignorance, he was opposed to folly. He prized eyes and ears, but thought them bad witnesses for men with barbarian souls. There is an intelligence, a *logos*, that steers through all things, that is found in god and man and beast, the same in all though in different degrees. To know it is wisdom.

Where Heraclitus emphasized process, Parmenides denied both multiplicity and motion. Though his expression revived the myth of revelation, his position at its heart was a set of arguments. While he could

not be expected to formulate the principles of excluded middle and of identity, he reached analogous conclusions. For he denied the possibility of 'becoming' as an intermediary between being and nothing; and he denied a distinction between being and being, and so precluded any multiplicity of beings. While his specific achievement was only a mistake, still it proved a carrier for a breakthrough. Linguistic argument had emerged as an independent power that could dare to challenge the evidence of the senses. The distinction between sense and intellect was established; the way lay open for Zeno's paradoxes, for the eloquence and skepticism of the Sophists, for Socrates' demand for definition, for Plato's distinction between eristic and dialectic, for the Aristotelian *organon*.

Earlier, we had occasion to speak of the limitations of early language. Because the development of thought and language depends upon insights, because insights occur with respect to sensible presentations and representations, early language can come to dominate the spatial field, yet remain unable to handle adequately the generic, the temporal, the subjective, the divine. But these limitations recede in the measure that linguistic feedback is achieved, that is, in the measure that linguistic explanations and statements provide the sensible presentations for the insights that effect further development of thought and language. Moreover, such advance for a time can occur exponentially: the more language develops the more it can develop still more. Eventually, there begins the reflex movement in which language comes to mediate and objectify and examine the linguistic process itself. Alphabets make words visible, dictionaries collect their meanings, grammars study their inflections and syntax, literary criticism interprets and evaluates composition, logics promote clarity, coherence, and rigor, hermeneutics studies the varying relations of acts of meaning to terms of

meaning, philosophers reflect on the world of immediacy and the many worlds mediated by meaning.

To grasp the significance of this superstructure, one must return to the limitations of mythic consciousness. As Ernst Cassirer states, mythic consciousness lacks any clear dividing lines between mere representation and clear perception, between wish and fulfillment, between image and thing. He goes on immediately to mention the continuity of dream and waking consciousness, and later he adds that no less than the image the name tends to merge with the thing. It would seem to be the same absence of distinction that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl wished to describe when he spoke of a law of participation governing common representations and the institutions of primitives, a participation that made the content of their representations appear mystical while it made revelations between representations largely tolerant of contradictions.

Now, these characteristics of the primitive mind seem very mysterious. But one is not to conclude that they argue any lack of intelligence or reasonableness on the part of primitives. For, after all, to draw distinctions is not a simple matter, and to acknowledge the import of the distinctions, once they are drawn, is not a simple matter. What is a distinction? Let us say that *A* and *B* are distinct, if it is true that *A* is not *B*; let us add that *A* and *B* may stand either for mere words, or for the meaning of words, or for the realities meant by the words; so that the distinctions may be merely verbal, or notional, or real. Let us note that the reality in question is the reality that becomes known, not by sense alone, but by sense and understanding and rational judgment. Finally, let us remark that while drawing the distinction is simply a matter of experiencing, understanding, and judging, and uttering the negative comparative sentence ‘*A* is not *B*,’

still a far greater degree of sophistication is required if one is to define what a distinction is, if one is to distinguish between real and other distinctions, if one is to explain in what sense real distinctions regard reality. So it is within the power of primitives to draw distinctions, but it is not in their power to set up a doctrine of distinctions, and to observe it consistently. As a matter of fact, Scholastics until recently when they taught the question were divided on the question whether the distinction of essence and existence was real or notional, and there was no hope of any solution. Mind has first to express itself in magic and myth, then advance to the literary portrayal of man, and finally, through the criticism of magic, move towards science, and through the criticism of myth, move towards philosophy. Snell goes on: once the philosophers came in on the scene, the serious concerns of poetry raising questions of human ? was lost. The philosophers were Sophists. And poetry move on to the bucolic stage, and talked the shepherds, the idyllic times of the past.

### *5.3 The Second and Third Stages*

The discovery of mind marks the transition from the first stage of meaning to the second. In the first stage, the world mediated by meaning is just the world of common sense. In the second stage, the world mediated by meaning splits into the realm of common sense and the realm of theory. Corresponding to this division and grounding it, there is a differentiation of consciousness. In the first stage the subject, in his pursuit of the concrete good, also attends, understands, judges; but he does not make a specialty of these activities, he does not formulate the theoretical ideal in terms of knowledge, truth, reality, causality. He does not formulate linguistically a set

of norms for the pursuit of that ideal goal; he does not initiate a distinct economic and social and cultural context within which the pursuit of the ideal goal could be carried on by human animals. But in the second stage of meaning, the subject continues to operate in a common sense manner in all his dealings with the particular and concrete; but along with this mode of operation he also has another, the theoretical. In the theoretical mode the good that is pursued is the truth, and while this pursuit is willed, still the pursuit itself consists only in operations on the first three levels of intentional consciousness: it is the specialization of attending, understanding, and judging.

Now, just as the second stage comes out of developments occurring in the first, so the third stage comes out of development occurring in the second. Accordingly, it will help clarify what is proper to the second stage if at once we characterize the third. In the third stage, then, the sciences have become ongoing processes. Instead of stating the truth about this or that kind of reality, their aim is an ever better approximation towards the truth, and this is attained by an ever fuller and exacter understanding of all relevant data. In the second stage, theory was a specialty for the attainment of truth; in the third stage, scientific theory has become a specialty for the advance of understanding. Further, the sciences claim autonomy. They consider questions scientific if, and only if, they can be settled by an appeal to sensible data. As they have evolved, they have developed ever more effective ways of using this criterion in settling issues. In other words, they have worked out their respective methods, and there is no other higher discipline that could discover their proper methods for them. Finally, since they are ongoing processes, their unification has to be an ongoing process. It cannot be some single, well-ordered formulation; it has to be a succession of

different formulations. In other words, unification will be the achievement, not of logic, but of method.

Now the emergence of the autonomous sciences has repercussions on philosophy. Since the sciences between them undertake the explanation of all sensible data, one may conclude with the positivists that the function of philosophy is to announce that philosophy has nothing to say. Since philosophy has no theoretic function, one may conclude with the linguistic analysts that the function of philosophy is to work out a hermeneutics for the clarification of the local brand of everyday language. But there remains the possibility, and it is our option, that philosophy is neither a theory, in the manner of science, nor a somewhat technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to pre-Socratic wisdom. Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness; its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning, and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification.

But what in the third stage are differentiated, specialized, moving towards an integration, in the second stage are more or less undifferentiated. We have spoken of the world mediated by meaning splitting into a world of theory and a world of common sense. At a certain stage in Plato's thought, there seem to be asserted two really distinct worlds: a transcendent world of eternal forms and a transient world of appearance. In Aristotle, there are not two sets of objects but two approaches to one set. Theory is concerned with what is prior in itself but posterior to us, but everyday human knowledge is concerned with what is prior to us though posterior in itself. But though Aristotle, by beguilingly simple analogies, could set up a properly

systematic metaphysics, his contrast was not between theory and common sense as we understand these terms, but between *epistēmē* and *doxa*, between *sophia* and *phronēsis*, between necessity and contingency. Again, in Aristotle the sciences are conceived, not as autonomous but as prolongations of philosophy and as further determinations of the basic concepts philosophy provides. So it is that while Aristotelian psychology is not without profound insights into human sensibility and intelligence, still its basic concepts are derived not from intentional consciousness but from metaphysics. Soul does not mean subject, but the first act of an organic body, whether a plant or animal or man. Similarly, the notion of object is not derived from a consideration of intentional acts; on the contrary, it is either the cause of the act or the goal toward which it tends. Just as potencies are to be conceived by considering their acts, so acts are to be conceived by considering their objects, and the objects are causes. As in psychology, so too in physics, the basic concepts are metaphysical. An agent is principle of movement in a mover, and nature is a principle of movement in the moved. An agent is agent because it is in act, nature is matter and form, and rather form than matter. Matter is pure potency, movement is incomplete act, the act of what is in potency still.

This continuity of philosophy and science has often been the object of nostalgic admiration. But if it had the merit of meeting the systematic exigence and habituating the human mind to theoretical pursuits, it could be no more than a transitional phase. Modern science had to develop its own proper basic concepts, and thereby achieve its autonomy. In doing so, it gave a new form to the opposition between the world of theory and the world of common sense. This new form, in turn, evoked a series of new philosophies: Galileo's primary qualities which admitted geometrization,



and so were real, and his refractory secondary qualities which were pronounced merely apparent; Descartes's mind in the machine; Spinoza's two known attributes; Kant's a priori forms and a posteriori filling of the sensibility. But Kant's Copernican revolution marked the dividing line; Hegel turned from substance to the subject; historians and philologists worked out their autonomous methods for human studies; and will and decision came up for emphasis in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. Brentano inspired Husserl, and intentionality analysis routed faculty psychology. The second stage of meaning is vanishing, and the third stage is about to take its place.

#### *5.4 Undifferentiated Consciousness in the Later Stages*

So, the first, second, and third stages of meaning; finally, undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages. The stages are not things that transform individuals; they are general movements.

Our outline of the development and the eclipse of the second stage would be very incomplete if no mention were made of the mode of survival of undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages. For it is not the philosophic or scientific theorist that does the world's work, conducts its business, governs its cities and states, teaches most of its classes, and runs all of its schools. As before the emergence of theory, so too afterwards all such activities are conducted in the commonsense mode of intellectual operation, in the mode in which conscious and intentional operations occur in accord with their own immanent and spontaneous norms. However, if the mode and much of the scope of commonsense operation remains the same, the very existence of another mode is bound to shift concerns and emphasis.

It was on a rising tide of linguistic feedback that logic and philosophy and early science emerged. But such technical achievements may repel rather than impress. One may be content to marvel at the fact of language, the fact that makes man unique among the animals. One may, with Isocrates, trace cities and laws, arts and skills, and indeed all aspects of culture to man's powers of speech and persuasion. One may go on to urge one's fellow townsmen to seek eloquence through education, and thereby to excel among men in the very respect in which man excels among the animals. So, to be educated linguistically, and to become human are found to be interchangeable. So there emerged one strand of the humanism that spread from Greece to Rome, and from antiquity to the late Middle Ages.

Another strand was moral, and its name was philanthropia. It was respect and devotion to man as man. It rested, not on kinship or noble blood or on common citizenship and laws, or even on education, but on the fact that another, particularly a sufferer, was a human being. Practice of philanthropia could, of course, be quite modest: credit for it was given conquerors that showed some restraint in plundering and enslaving the vanquished. But at least it was an ideal that inspired education, and fostered the gracious urbanity, the ease and affability, the charm and taste exhibited in Menander's comedies and their Latin counterparts in Plautus and Terence.

The third strand came from the world of theory. For if creative thought and philosophy and science is too austere for general consumption, creative thinkers are usually rare. They have their brief day, only to be followed by the commentators, the teachers, the popularizers that illuminate, complete, transpose, and simplify. So the worlds of theory and of common sense partly interpenetrate and partly merge. The results are ambivalent: it will happen that the exaggerations of philosophic error are abandoned, while

the profundities of philosophic truth find a vehicle that compensates for the loss of the discredited myth. But it will also happen that theory fuses more with common nonsense than with common sense, to make the nonsense pretentious, and because it is common, dangerous and even disastrous.

Finally, literature moved into a quite different phase. Bruno Snell has contrasted the pre-philosophical with the post-philosophical poets. The earlier poetry, he remarked, was ever intent to stake out new areas of the mind. The epic sagas opened the way to history, the cosmogonies to Ionian speculation on the first principle, the lyric to Heraclitus, the drama to Socrates and Plato. The later poetry is acquainted with the literary critics and with theories of poetry. Poets have to select their genre, style, tone; they can be content as was Callimachus to be playful and artistic, or, with Virgil in his Eclogues, to express a complex civilization's nostalgia for earlier times and simpler living.

That simpler living, of course, continues. The humanism we have been describing belongs to an educated class. In a people united by common language, common loyalties, common moral and religious traditions, as well as by economic interdependence, the culture of the educated may affect many of the uneducated, much as theory affected pre-theoretical common sense. So by successive adaptations, the innovations of theory can penetrate in ever weaker forms through all layers of society, to give it some approximation to the homogeneity necessary for mutual comprehension. But such ideal conditions need not obtain; discontinuities may arise. The better educated become a class closed in upon themselves, with no task proportionate to their training; they become effete. The less educated and the uneducated find themselves with a tradition that is beyond their means; they cannot maintain it, they lack the genius to transform it into some

simpler, vital, and intelligible whole; it degenerates. The meaning and values of human living are impoverished; the will to achieve both slackens and narrows. Where once there were joys and sorrows, now there are just pleasures and pains. The culture has become a slum.

Just as philosophic theory begot humanism of common sense, so too modern science has its progeny. As a form of knowledge it pertains to man's development and grounds a new and fuller humanism. As a rigorous form of knowledge it calls forth teachers and popularizers and even the fantasy of science fiction. But it also is a principle of action; and so it overflows into applied science, engineering, technology, industrialism. It is an acknowledged source of wealth and power, and the power is not merely material; it is the power of the mass media to write to, speak to, be seen by, all men; the power of an educational system to fashion the nation's youth in the image of the wise man or in the image of a fool, in the image of a free man, or in the image prescribed for the peoples' democracies.

In its third stage, then, meaning not merely differentiates into the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority, but also acquires a universal immediacy of the mass media, and the molding power of universal education. Never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve; never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater.

So much for meaning.

## **Chapter 5 Religion**

Chapter 5 is on religion, and the divisions are, at the moment, first, the question of God, second, self-transcendence, third, religious experience,

fourth, expressions of religious experience, fifth, religious development as dialectical, sixth, the word, seventh, faith, eighth, religious belief, ninth, a technical note.

## **1 The Question of God**

The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of our universe. Such questions have been put in very many ways, and the answers given have been even more numerous. But behind this multiplicity there is a basic unity that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method. We can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worthwhile. In each case, there arises the question of God.

The possibility of inquiry on the side of the subject lies in his intelligence, in his drive to know what, why, how, and in his ability to reach intellectually satisfying answers. But why should the answers that satisfy the intelligence of the subject yield anything more than a subjective satisfaction? Why should they be supposed to possess any relevance to knowledge of the universe? Of course, we assume that they do. We can point to the fact that our assumption is confirmed by its fruits. So implicitly we grant that the universe is intelligible and, once that is granted, there arises the question whether the universe could be intelligible without having an intelligent ground. But that is the question about God.

Again, to reflect on reflection is to ask just what happens when we marshal and weigh the evidence for pronouncing that this probably is so and that probably is not so. To what do these metaphors of marshaling and

weighing refer? Elsewhere (chapters 9, 10, and 11 of *Insight*) I have worked out an answer to this question and here I can do no more than summarily repeat my conclusion. Judgment proceeds rationally from a grasp of a virtually unconditioned. By an unconditioned is meant any  $x$  that has no conditions. By a virtually unconditioned is meant any  $x$  that has no unfulfilled conditions. In other words, a virtually unconditioned is a conditioned whose conditions are all fulfilled. To marshal the evidence is to ascertain whether all the conditions are fulfilled. To weigh the evidence is to ascertain whether the fulfillment of the conditions certainly or probably involves the existence or occurrence of the conditioned.

Now this account of judgment implicitly contains a further element. If we are to speak of a virtually unconditioned, we must first speak of an unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned has no unfilled conditions. The strictly unconditioned has no conditions whatever. In traditional terms, the former is a contingent being, and the latter is a necessary being. In more contemporary terms, the former pertains to this world, to the world of possible experience, while the latter transcends this world in the sense that its reality is of a totally different order. But in either case we come to the question of God. Does a necessary being exist? Does there exist a reality that transcends the reality of this world?

To deliberate about  $x$  is to ask whether  $x$  is worthwhile. To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether any deliberating is worthwhile. Has 'worthwhile' any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant with this world? We praise the developing subject ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, responsibility. We praise progress and denounce every manifestation of decline. But is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, struggling

individually to develop and collectively to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of decline? The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers. Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?

Such is the question of God. It is not a matter of image or feeling or concept or judgment. They pertain to answers. It is a question. It arises out of our conscious intentionality, out of the a priori structured drive that promotes us from experiencing to the effort to understand, from understanding to the effort to judge truly, from judging to the effort to choose rightly. In the measure that we advert to our own questioning and proceed to question it, there arises the question of God.

It is a question that will be manifested differently in different stages of man's historical development and in the many varieties of his culture. But such differences of manifestation and expression are secondary. They may introduce alien elements that overlay, obscure, distort the pure question, the question that questions questioning itself. Nonetheless, the obscurity and the distortion presuppose what they obscure and distort. It follows that, however much religious and irreligious answers differ, however much there differ the questions they explicitly raise, still at their root there is the same transcendental tendency of the human spirit that questions, that questions without restriction, that questions the significance of its own questioning, and so comes to the question of God.

The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon. Man's transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value. The reach, not of his attainment, but of his intending is unrestricted. There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge he finds his investigation has been inconclusive. The contemporary humanist will refuse to allow the question to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.

## **2 Self-Transcendence**

Secondly, self-transcendence. Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence. One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up in oneself. A first step towards this liberation is the sensitivity we share with the higher animals. But they are confined to a habitat, while man lives in a universe. Beyond sensitivity man asks questions, and his questioning is unrestricted.

First, there are questions for intelligence. We ask what and why and how and what for. Our answers unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize. From the narrow strip of space-time accessible to immediate experience we move towards the construction of a worldview and towards the exploration of what we ourselves could be and could do.

On questions for intelligence follow questions for reflection. We move beyond imagination and guesswork, idea and hypothesis, theory and system, to ask whether or not this really is so or that really could be. Now self-transcendence takes on a new meaning. Not only does it go beyond the



subject but also it seeks what is independent of the subject. For a judgment that this or that is so reports, not what appears to me, not what I imagine, not what I think, not what I wish, not what I would be inclined to say, not what seems to me, but what is so. Still, such self-transcendence is only cognitive. It is in the order not of doing but only of knowing. But on the final level of questions for deliberation, self-transcendence becomes real. When we ask whether this or that is worthwhile, whether it is not just apparently good but truly good, then we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual or group advantage, but about objective value. Because we can ask such questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect in our living a real self-transcendence. That real self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of honest collaboration and of true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a person in a human society.

The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence. That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

Being-in-love is of different kinds. There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife and children. There is the love of one's fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human welfare. There is the love of God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength.

It is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It grounds the conviction of St Paul that 'there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths, nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord' (Romans 8.38-39).

As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life in the pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life with the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare from the conviction that the universe is absurd.

### **3 Religious Experience**

Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. All love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfilment of that capacity.

That fulfilment is not the product of our knowledge and choice. On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God

will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing.

Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, it is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Galatians 5.22).

To say that this dynamic state is conscious is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, but knowledge is a compound of experience, understanding, and judging. Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unmeasured love, the mystery evokes awe. Of itself, then, inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the gift of God's love is an experience of the holy, of Rudolf Otto's *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*. It is what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern. It corresponds to St Ignatius Loyola's consolation that has no cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner. It is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of inquiry, insight, formulating, speaking. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence, making judgments of fact or possibility. It is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift

of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the *apex animae*.

This gift we have been describing really is sanctifying grace but notionally differs from it. The notional difference arises from different stages of meaning. To speak of sanctifying grace pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of theory and the world of common sense are distinct but, as yet, have not been explicitly distinguished from and grounded in the world of interiority. To speak of the dynamic state of being in love with God pertains to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority has been made the explicit ground of the worlds of theory and common sense. In this stage of meaning the gift of God's love first is described as an experience and only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories.

Finally, it may be noted that the dynamic state of itself is operative grace, but the same state as principle of acts of love, hope, faith, repentance, and so on, is grace as cooperative. It may be added that, lest conversion be too violent a change and disrupt psychological continuity, the dynamic state may be preceded by similar transient dispositions that also are both operative and cooperative. Again, once the dynamic state has been established, it is filled out and developed by still further additional graces.

#### **4 Expressions of Religious Experience**

Religious experience spontaneously manifests itself in changed attitudes, in that harvest of the Spirit that is love, joy, peace, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control. But it also is concerned with its base and focus

in the *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*, and the expression of this concern varies greatly as one moves from earlier to later stages of meaning.

In the earliest stage, expression results from insight into sensible presentations and representations. There easily is grasped the spatial but not the temporal, the specific but not the generic, the external but not the internal, the human but not the divine. Only insofar as the temporal, generic, internal, divine can somehow be associated with or 'projected' upon the spatial, specific, external, human, can an insight be had and expression result. So it is by associating religious experience with its outward occasion that the experience becomes expressed and thereby something determinate and distinct for human consciousness.

Such outward occasions are called hierophanies, and they are many. When each of the many is something distinct and unrelated to the others, the hierophanies reveal the so-called gods of the moment. When they are many but recognized as possessing a family resemblance, then there is a living polytheism represented today by the 800,000 gods of Shintoism. When distinct religious experiences are associated with a single place, there arises the god of this or that place, for example, the God of ? When they are the experiences of a single person and united by the unity of that person, then there is the god of the person, such as was the god of Jacob or of Laban. Finally, when the unification is social, there result the god or gods of the group.

There is, I suppose, no clear-cut evidence to show that religious experience conforms to the model I have set forth, apart from the antecedent probability established by the fact that God is good and gives to all men sufficient grace for salvation. But there is at least one scholar on whom one may call for an explicit statement on the areas common to such world

religions as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. For Friedrich Heiler has described at some length seven such common areas. He has about a dozen pages on this. It's in *The History of Religions*, University of Chicago Press, edited by Eliade and Kitagawa; the first volume – there are about three volumes with that title from the University of Chicago. While I cannot reproduce here the rich texture of his thought, I must at least give a list of the topics he treats: that there is a transcendent reality; that he or it is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way to him is repentance, self-denial, prayer; that the way is love of one's neighbor, even of one's enemies; that the way is love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him.

Now it is not, I think difficult to see how these seven common features of the world religions are implicit in the experience of being in love in an unrestricted manner. To be in love is to be in love with someone. To be in love without qualifications or conditions or reservations or limits is to be in love with someone transcendent. When someone transcendent is my beloved, he is in my heart, real to me from within me. When that love is the fulfilment of my unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence through intelligence and truth and responsibility, the one that fulfils that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, goodness. Since he chooses to come to me by a gift of love for him, he himself must be love. Since loving him is my transcending myself, it also is a denial of the self to be transcended. Since loving him means loving attention to him, it is prayer, meditation, contemplation. Since love of him is fruitful, it overflows into love of all those that he loves or might love. Finally, from an experience of love

focused on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge, while love itself is a longing for union; so for the lover of the unknown beloved the concept of bliss is knowledge of him and union with him, however they may be achieved.