

## Regis69 3A<sup>1</sup> (51900DTE060)

Chapter 3 is on values. We have six topics: (1) the structure of the human good; (2) development as operational; (3) development and feelings; (4) progress and decline; (5) the notion of value and judgments of value; and (6) beliefs.

### 1 The Structure of the Human Good

The purpose of this topic is that you can have something more concrete in mind than the traditional definition, *bonum est id quod omnia appetunt*, which makes things a little too simple. What we propose to do is to relate some eighteen terms:

Individual		Social	Ends
(Potentiality)	(Actuation)		
capacity	operation	cooperation	particular good
need			
plasticity	development	institutional frameworks	good of order
perfectibility	skills	roles and tasks	
liberty	orientation	personal relations	terminal values
	conversion		

What we want to do is to set up a structure in which the terms are understood through their relationships and the relations are understood through the terms: it's a basic scheme. Individuals: potentiality; capacity and need; plasticity and perfectibility; liberty. Individual acts: operations; development of skills; and then orientation and conversion on the level of

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<sup>1</sup> The first part of the third lecture. Corresponds to audio recording 51900A0E060

liberty. Social: cooperation; institutional roles and tasks; personal relations. Particular good, good of order, terminal values.

First, relate four terms from the first row: capacity, operation, particular good, and need.

Individuals have capacities for operation, for operating. Operations procure instances of a particular good. By an instance of the particular good is meant any entity, any object or action, that meets a need of a particular individual at any given place or time: my breakfast this morning; or my education. Needs are to be taken, not in terms of necessity, but in the broadest sense, wants of every kind.

Second, let's take four terms from the third column: cooperation, institution, role, and task. People live in groups; their operating commonly is cooperating. And operating becomes cooperating because there is some sort of pattern linking together the operations of different individuals. And that pattern is something that is commonly understood and accepted. An institution is the commonly understood basis, the commonly understood and commonly accepted basis, of cooperation. Institutions are illustrated by the family, marriage, society, education, the state, the law, the economy, the technology, the church or sect: they are all institutions, namely, commonly understood and accepted bases of cooperation. In the institutional framework individuals have roles: father, mother, teacher, pupil, etc.; foreman, worker, etc.; and perform tasks: so operation becomes cooperation insofar as it is assuming roles, performing tasks, within an institutional framework. Institutions change slowly, because while breakdown can happen quickly, a change has to be commonly understood and commonly accepted, and people don't start understanding something new quickly, accepting it quickly. If you propose something new there will be a lot of resistance. So institutions change slowly, breakdowns happen quickly.

Third, there remains some terms in the second row: plasticity, perfectibility, development of skills, and good of order. Because individuals are plastic and perfectible – the human infant has practically no skills and can acquire endless skills: the skills of the acrobat, the person who plays the piano, etc., language – in their capacities for operating, they develop skills, and the skills they develop are the skills demanded by the roles and tasks of the institutional frameworks. Besides the institutional basis of cooperation, there is also the concrete manner in which the cooperating de facto is working out. You can have the same economic setup, one time leading to the good times, prosperity, and another time leading to a slump, recession. The same institutional setup at one time can be working out well, at other times not. And that is a matter of the good of order: the way the mode of cooperation de facto is working out. The same concepts and norms of married life in one instance produce domestic bliss, and in another domestic misery. The good of order is the way the thing works out in the concrete.

Again, the same constitutional and legal arrangements can work out very differently in different countries: quite different political life, quite different administration of justice, although the concrete institutional structure is the same. This concrete manner in which cooperation actually works out is the good of order. It regards instances of the particular good, but not singly: it's not just my breakfast this morning but everyone's breakfast every morning, not one man's education but education for everyone that really wants it. It regards, then, instances of the particular good, not singly, but as recurrent. And it regards them as recurrent, that recurrence having a basis in an order that sustains it. The operations have to be so ordered that they are de facto cooperations; and they insure the recurrence of all effectively desired instances of the particular good. What the order is you'll find in *Insight's* description of emergent probability,

schemes of recurrence; and in that scheme of recurrence, the if-then relationship linking one man's operations to another, and the benefits of the operations going to the individuals that are entitled to them in various ways. The good of order, then, is not some scheme for utopia, not some theoretic ideal, not some set of ethical precepts, not a code of laws, not some super-institution. The good of order is quite concrete. It is the actually functioning or malfunctioning of the set of if-then relationships guiding the operators and coordinating cooperators. It is the ground whence recur or fail to recur whatever instances of the particular good are recurring or failing to recur. It has its basis in institutions, but it is the product of much more: of all the skill, know-how, industry, resourcefulness, ambition, fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency to disorder, breakdown.

That is a concrete, dynamic apprehension of what is sometimes vaguely spoken of as the common good.

We have treated terms on the first two levels, and now we have the fourth. Liberty means not indetermination, but self-determination. Any course of action is finite; it is open to criticism; it has alternatives, limitations, risks, drawbacks. The process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself decisive. We experience liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating a process of deliberation, settling on one possible course of action, and proceeding to execute it. The experience of liberty is on the side of the agent. And note, we are not talking on the basis of some faculty psychology. Faculty psychology presupposes a metaphysics of some kind. It talks about intellect and will and gets into difficulties over questions of precedence. Are you an intellectualist? A voluntarist? etc. What we have been doing is an analysis of intentional consciousness, on different levels,

performing different acts, acquiring habits. And our top level is the level of action, deliberation, evaluation, decision, etc.

Insofar as this thrust of the self makes a decision freely, insofar as it regularly opts not for the merely apparent good, but for the true good, the self is achieving self-transcendence. It is opting for what is worthwhile, for what is objectively good, not just what I might prefer; deciding, not in terms of pleasure and pain, satisfactions and dissatisfaction, advantage for the individual or the group, but in terms of what is worthwhile. That is a real self-transcendence. As in cognitional activities, one attains a cognitional self-transcendence, one moves toward what is so as distinct from what seems, what one thinks, what one imagines, etc. What is so: one attains independence of the self, cognitively; but the real independence, the real self-transcendence is on the level of decision, when one opts for what is worthwhile.

Achieving real self-transcendence means existing authentically; he is constituting himself as an originating value; and he is bringing about terminal values, namely, particular goods and the good of order that is truly good, that is worthwhile. On the other hand, insofar as decisions have their principal motive, not in the values at stake, but in the calculus of pleasures and pains, one is failing in human authenticity, one is not existing in a human manner, one is not an originating value, and one is not producing terminal values but disorder.

Liberty is exercised within a matrix of personal relations. In the cooperating community, persons are bound together by their needs and by the common good of order that meets their needs. They are related by commitments freely undertaken and by expectations aroused in others by the commitments, by the roles they have assumed, by the tasks they need to perform. These personal relations are alive with feeling, and individuals

have common or opposed feelings about qualitative values, scales of preference; they have mutual feelings; one responds to another as an ontic value as distinct from a qualitative value or, on the other hand, simply as a source of satisfactions.

Beyond feelings there is the substance of community: people are joined by common experience, by common or complementary insights, by similar judgments of fact and of value, by parallel orientations in life. They are separated, estranged, rendered hostile when they get out of touch, misunderstand one another, judge in opposed fashions, opt for contrary social goals. So the personal relations vary from intimacy to ignorance, love to exploitation, respect to contempt, friendliness to enmity. Personal relations bind the community together, or divide it in factions, or tear it apart. (On these personal relations, on a very concrete level, see Rosemary Haughton's *The Transformation of Man*, Geoffrey Chapman in London, and Templegate in Illinois. There is Hegel's dialectic of master and slave on personal relations. And on the religious level see Gaston Pessard's *De l'actualité historique*, on Jew and Greek, with regard to Christianity.)

Terminal values are values that are chosen. They are true instances of the particular good, true good of order, true scale of preferences regarding values and satisfactions. Correlative to the terminal values are the originating values that do the choosing, authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices. Originating and terminal values can coincide since man can know and choose authenticity and self-transcendence; when each member of the community wills authenticity in himself and promotes it in others as far as he can, then the originating values that he chooses and the terminal values that are chosen overlap and interlace.

Presently we shall speak of the orientation of community as a whole. At the moment our concern is the orientation of the individual in the

orientated community. The root of the orientation are the transcendental notions that enable us and require us to advance in understanding, judge truly, and respond to value. This possibility and exigence become effective only through development: one must acquire skill and learn it, becoming a positive human being in some walk of life; one has to grow in sensitivity and respond to this list of values if one's humanity is to be authentic.

Development is not inevitable, and so results vary; there are human failures, mediocrities. The continually developing person – Abraham Maslow says that it is less than 1% of the population – will vary in achievement according to initial background, opportunities, luck in avoiding pitfalls, and the pace of the advance.

Orientation is the direction of development. Conversion is change in development. Just as there is the development of skills, so there is the orientation and conversion, the actuation of liberty. Conversion is a change in direction, and a change for the better. One frees oneself from what is unauthentic, one grows in authenticity; harmful, dangerous, misleading satisfactions are dropped, fears of discomfort, pain, and privation have less power to deflect one's course; values are apprehended where before they were overlooked; scales of preference shift and are refined; errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall, and leave man open to what he should be. On various aspects of the growing individual see Abraham Maslow's *Toward a Psychology of Being*.

The human good, then, is at once individual and social. Individuals do not just operate to meet their needs; they cooperate to meet one another's needs. As the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so the individuals develop skills to fulfil roles and perform tasks set by the institutional framework. Though the roles are fulfilled and tasks performed that the needs be met, still all is done not blindly but knowingly, not

necessarily but freely. The process is not merely the service of man, but it is above all the making of man, his advance in authenticity, the fulfillment of his affectivity; it is the direction of his work to the particular goods and the good of order that are worthwhile.

So much for the apprehension, a schematic apprehension, of what is meant by the human good. It has many aspects and many dimensions; and, of course, that is just a scheme for the investigation of the concrete good in the concrete situation.

## **2 Development as Operational**

Secondly, the notion of development as operational, Piaget's notion. That diagram is a structure of the human good, a structure that can exist at any time. Institutions may be highly developed or very rudimentary, and you still have that same fundamental scheme. Now, there's also the time element. And so we talk about the development of operations, the development of feelings, and then – those are both individual – in the third place, of the group: progress and decline.

Piaget conceived learning as, in each instance, an adaptation to a new object or a new situation. And the adaptation is conceived to have two parts: assimilation and adjustment. It is assimilation insofar as the operation you would perform, dealing with a somewhat similar object, or in a somewhat similar situation, is tried out. And the adjustment is that, by a process of trial and error, you change that operation to make it deal with this object or in this new situation more efficiently. Now, as people adapt to dealing with more and more objects, in more and more different situations, the number of different operations they can perform increases; and again, the combinations of different operations increase. The baby develops oral, visual, manual,

bodily skills, and masters an ever greater variety of combinations of the operations in different forms. Piaget has two volumes are on the operations of his own children in the first two years of their lives.

The next notion is the notion of group. As the number of different operations that can be performed increases, and the combinations of operations performed increase, you move, there are a series of plateaus. And it is in discovering these plateaus that Piaget was able to develop his theory of child development and education; he has these plateaus worked out up to about fifteen years of age. And the English and Americans, who were mostly good empiricists, paid no attention to Piaget's theory, though they performed the experiments, and found they were working. At a certain age one would be able to do this and do that, and it worked out. But the idea behind these plateaus was the idea of a group; it is a mathematical notion, but its fundamental characteristic, the one that Piaget goes by, is that every operation is matched by an opposite operation, and every combination of operations is matched by an opposite combination, so the operator – anything he can do he can come back to his starting point. And when you have that ability to come back to the starting point from wherever you are, then you have mastery of a certain range of operations or combinations of operations. Piaget's illustration is of a little toddler, his mother sitting here and the father sitting there; he is with his mother and the father invites him, he goes over there, then the mother invites him, he goes back again, but he doesn't know he is going back: he is just responding to another invitation. But when he has mastered his movements in space, he does know he is going back. And the thing he can do when he does know he is going back is that he has got control of all his movements in space, and is able to relate any movement to any other movement, going where he wants, and all the rest of it, he has got mastery over spatial displacement.

By distinguishing different groups, different levels of groups, and grouping them – the baby acquires oral skills, feeding at the breast: he is expert pretty well at that within twenty-four hours, though very clumsy at the start; then he starts using his eyes, focusing his eyes, and getting things to his hands, reaching for them, finding things are too far away. Then combining: at this third stage, everything he sees he puts his hand out for, and puts it in his mouth, combining oral, visual, and manual operations: grouping.

The third notion is the notion of mediation. Operations are immediate if their objects are present: seeing is immediate to what is seen, hearing to what is heard, touching to what is touched. But by imagination, by language, by symbols, we have compound operations. Immediately we operate with respect to the image, the word, the symbol, and mediately with respect to what is represented, signified. Thus, besides operating with respect to what is present, we become capable of operating with respect to what is absent, past, future, merely possible, ideal, normative, fantastic. By learning to speak, the child moves out of the world of immediate surroundings to the larger world revealed by memories of other men, the common sense of community, the pages of literature, the labors of scholars, the investigations of scientists, the experience of saints, the meditations of philosophers and theologians. This distinction between immediate and mediate operations has a broad relevance; it provides the basis for a distinction between lower and higher cultures. In the lower culture, there is a world mediated by meaning, but there is no effective control over the meanings. And the lack of control over the meanings results in myth and magic: they are not able to eliminate those mistakes because they haven't got control. The higher culture not only has mediate operations, but also operates with respect to its mediate operations. Alphabets replace vocal

with visual signs; dictionaries fix meanings; grammars control inflections and compositions; logic promotes clarity, coherence, rigor, discourse; hermeneutics determines the relations between meaning and meant; philosophies investigate the basic differences between different worlds mediated by meaning: it is a series of controls over acts of meaning; hence the Greek miracle of logos supplanting mythos is an instance of this control over meaning. Finally, among the higher cultures, you can have two types of control: there is the classicist type of control, control by the fixed, eternal truths, things that don't change; and the modern type in which the controls themselves are something on the move, something developing.

Thus, with this, we can note something on the differentiation of consciousness, the different ways in which the world mediated by meaning can be employed, and again the different ways of pulling out of the world mediated by meaning.

The subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction from the world as he grows in control of his actions and the like. And as he does so, he begins to move through different patterns of experience. When children imitate or play, they're doing it just for fun, and not for real: they know the difference between their games and being themselves; their elders shift to worlds mediated by reflexive techniques, to operate on the mediating operations. They feel they are shifting out of real life and dealing with abstractions; but this shifting out is very important to control over their mediate operations. Again, listening to music, gazing on a tree or landscape, you can be stopped by beauty; and that being stopped frees sensitivity from routines, from the readymade man living in his readymade world: the light goes red and he steps on the brake, it goes green and he steps on the accelerator, etc. , the automatic response. Sensitivity has its own flows and rhythms, etc. And the aesthetic experience liberates sensitivity, takes it out

of these routines. The mystic, insofar as he's out of this world, has dropped the world mediated by meaning, pulled away from it; he is held by something else; his subjectivity is out of the world mediated by meaning and in a mediated immediacy of his subjectivity reaching for God.

The relevance of Piaget goes well beyond the field of educational psychology. It enables one to distinguish stages in cultural development, man and man's breaking away from it – his play, aesthetic experience, contemplative prayer. Again, it provides a tool for the analysis of any technical proficiency; the concert pianist's skill is a matter of having grouped an enormous range of different combinations of differentiated operations: all the different ways of sharpness or softness in which a piano piece can be set, the combination of all the different tones, etc. It's just a matter of operational development. Again, if you take St Thomas, in the *Contra Gentiles*, and read successive chapters, you will find that the same arguments are recurring in slightly different forms: you will have one topic with 26 arguments, and the next chapter you have 32, in the next you have 30, etc.; and as you read along, you find the same arguments recurring all the time, but in different forms, used and applied in different ways; you have sets of operations that are differentiated and combined in different ways to meet different issues. That gives you a much more realistic apprehension of what Thomas was doing. If you try to think of him on a deductivist model, he just doesn't fit.

Again, what applies to the proficiency of an individual can also be applied to the proficiency of a team – a group of artists, skilled workers learning, doing a job with one another: the coach, the impresario, the entrepreneur making new combinations of skilled people for different ends. So much for operational development.

### 3 The Development of Feelings

This will depend principally on Dietrich von Hildebrand's *Christian Ethics*, New York, McKay, 1953; also Manfred Frings on Max Scheler, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, 1965. Von Hildebrand distinguishes nonintentional states and trends and, on the other hand, intentional responses. Nonintentional states: fatigue, irritability, bad humor, anxiety; nonintentional trends or urges: hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort. These things have causes and they have goals; but to relate them to objects, you have to discover that the 'trouble with me is, I'm hungry, I'm thirsty,' because we are feeling the hunger, etc., but not adverting to food if you are in need of food. They are states, emotional states, emotional trends.

On the other hand, there are intentional responses. In this case, the feeling is related to an object. Either it calls forth the image that you want, or, on the other hand, it responds to the image or to the apprehension of the object. The intentional responses, then, answer to what is intended, represented. Feeling relates, not to cause or end or goal, but to objects. And it gives to intentional consciousness its mass, drive, momentum, power. Otherwise knowing or deciding is paper thin. What makes people operate in a world mediated by meaning is that the meanings are charged with these feelings and correspond to feelings. Through feelings we are massively and dynamically orientated in a world mediated by meaning. Through our desires and fears, our hope and despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are orientated massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We construct that world mediated by meaning, and we are in it dynamically through feelings. Feelings for persons, for our respective situations past, present, and future,

for evils to be lamented and remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished.

Intentional responses regard two main classes: the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying; on the other hand, values, the ontic value of persons, the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, truth, virtuous acts, noble deeds, great achievements. And responding to values propels one to self-transcendence, and it selects the value to which one responds. On the other hand, response to the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous: the agreeable may be the true good, and it may not. Most people have to put up with a certain amount of pain, privation, work they don't like, etc., without too much self-centered lamentation. In other words, the agreeable and disagreeable is not a sure criterion with regard to value. On the other hand, values are.

Feelings not merely respond to a value. They respond to comparative values: the feelings involve a scale of preference. One prefers vital values: health, strength, grace, vigor rather than the work, effort, pain involved in acquiring them, or restoring them. Social values are the group conditions of the vital values; and the social value is preferred to the vital values of the individual members. Cultural values: the meaning and the value that are given to the society and its achievements. They presuppose the vital and social, but they rank higher: not on bread alone does man live. He also needs the meaning of his life and the values he holds. Personal values consist in the self-transcendence of the person: his loving and being loved, in his being an originating value, inspiration and invitation to others to self-transcendence. And finally, there are the religious values, which are the heart of meaning and value, of man living in man's world, and we will speak of them in chapter 5.

Like skills, feelings develop. Fundamentally, they are spontaneous; we don't control them the way we control the moving of our hands; they are not directly under our will. But once they arise, they can be encouraged, reinforced, or curtailed. Advertence may bring approval or distraction; and in that way, one can modify a spontaneous scale of preference, one can enrich and refine feelings; and a main part in education is to set up a kind of human discernment in which people learn all these different refinements, and so on, there are to feelings and to the values to which we respond.

Feelings as intentional responses are not merely transient: they are not limited to the time of apprehending a value; many, of course, are transient; they come and go; they come easily and go easily. And there are also the feelings that get repressed; they snap off to proceed to an underground life, to provide unconscious motivation. But feelings that are fully conscious can be so deep and strong, especially when reinforced by free choice, that they channel attention, shape horizons, and direct one's life. So the love of a man and a woman: being in love, that love is efficacious at all times. There are particular acts of loving, but the being in love is a dynamic state; and it's the fount of all their actions; it makes them not just an I and Thou, but a 'we,' and all their thinking and doing is concerned with that 'we.'

There are aberrations of feeling. Nietzsche borrowed from the French the word *ressentiment*, and Scheler took it over from Nietzsche but gave it a whole new interpretation. According to Scheler, *ressentiment* is a re-feeling of a specific clash with someone else's value qualities, the value qualities of someone superior to oneself physically, intellectually, morally, spiritually: in any one of those ways, not necessarily all; a value quality of which one despairs of acquiring oneself. And one doesn't attack it directly; there's no aggressivity. But it can extend over a lifetime; it is a hostility and a smoldering anger that is not rejected, repudiated. It attacks the value quality

of the superior person by continuous belittling; and its worst feature is that it distorts a whole scale of values; it throws the preferential scale of values out of line, it distorts it. And it can afflict a whole social class, a people, an epoch; and it becomes a tool of a sociological analysis.

In general, as the psychologists tell us, it is better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, no matter how deplorable; it gives the possibility of knowing oneself; it uncovers inattention; and corrects aberrant attitudes, when you ... Otherwise, left in twilight, they are conscious but not objectified. (We've distinguished: everyone is conscious of the insights, judgments, etc.: but to objectify them is a thing for understanding.) And you can get a conflict, set up a conflict, between the self as subject and the self as objectified, because part of the self is not objectified. And that conflict, as in Karen Horney's analysis of neurosis, [leads to all sorts of trouble.]