

(51800DTE060) Regis 69 2B¹

Each phase has four specialties, according to the ends proper to these levels of consciousness. So we have our normative pattern of recurrent and related operations, operating in two phases, and in four ways in each phase, according to the different levels in that pattern. And with that explanatory account of the division, you can go on; you have, in your own self-appropriation, the principles on which to decide just what to do in each one of these specialties.

4 The Need for Division

What is the need for this division? I said that it has arisen already spontaneously insofar as we have people who do research – for instance, the magnificent indices in the Berlin edition of Clement of Alexandria; we have people who do exegesis; we have people who give us histories: history of dogma, history of theology, history of the Church; we have people involved in controversies, apologetics, something like dialectic; and we have fundamental, dogmatic, systematic, pastoral theology; these are like the last four specialties. Those differences emerge spontaneously; but now we have them as interrelated, interlocked functional specialties. And the need is not just for convenience. Field specialization arises because it is too much work for one man: but it is the same sort of work, roughly. There is not an awful lot of difference; the field specializations are rather close to one another. Subject specialization also arises because one man has different subjects, or

¹ The second part of the second lecture and the discussion period of the second day.

Audio recording 51800A0E060 contains the lecture and part of the discussion. The entire discussion is found on audio recording 536R0A0E060.

the subjects divide, become more complicated, bringing in different professors. But this is difference not for the convenience of the individual, but different tasks. There is nothing intrinsically impossible, absolutely impossible, about one man having competence in all eight. What is important is that he do different things in each. It is one thing to use the four levels of intentional consciousness to make data available, and it is something else to find out their meaning, and it is a third thing to use these meanings to arrive at history, and it is a fourth thing to iron out the differences between different historians and different exegetes and different pieces of research, different orientations of research. Those are different tasks, and to distinguish the tasks is to eliminate confusions.

I first tumbled onto this notion, my first discovery of it was when I wrote *Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica*. I was doing systematic theology, and you do not know this through scripture, and it is not defined by the church, so what makes it theology? You may return to understand, well, what's understanding? And I had to more or less sell this idea in Latin, to be able to write the book, to say what I was doing.

If you have a method in theology in which these things are already familiar even before you start systematic theology, they will know at least what is being done here; what they are doing is seeking to understand. They are not trying to be certain. We are not interpreting scripture. We are trying to understand something, and just that. It is a specific purpose; and people can be pulling you off to any one of the other seven, if you haven't got these distinct. If you do scripture, well, what about the Fathers? And if you do the councils, well, what about the scriptures? And if you say, well, this is absolutely certain, yes, but I do not understand it, it's just words; and you say, well, here's how you can understand it, well is it true, is it certain? Has it been defined? These are different questions, and they are handled in

different ways, and you have to keep them separate. If you do not keep them separate, you just get a blur. You neither understand nor are certain. And so on for the other distinctions. Furthermore, insofar as you have them distinct, then you can see clearly the steps to be taken in each one, and you won't be distracted by the others.

Further, it is necessary to curb totalitarian ambitions. There are systematic theologians who think that is the whole of theology; and dogmatic theologians who think that Denzinger is the whole of theology. Rahner dubbed them 'Denzinger-Theologie'; the whole thing is to be certain – copy out the documents of the church, or only in the scriptures. This has been going on for centuries: lopsided theologies. You have to curb these totalitarian ambitions. Yes, you are doing excellent work, but there are seven other jobs too that are also important. You are doing one thing: well, how do you tell this to the people? There is the specialty 'communications.' If you want one man to do everything, you get something that is very mediocre as a result.

Not only is there a need to curb totalitarian ambitions, but the need to curb excessive demands. If a man makes a serious contribution in some area to one of these eight specialties, he is doing something worthwhile. At the present time, there are no omniscient theologians. No one at the present time knows all mathematics, or all physics, or all chemistry, or all biology, or all history, or all philosophy; and the same is true of theology. There are no omniscient theologians. A science today is not a habit in somebody's mind; it is something possessed by the scientific community. I think Karl Rahner made the remark that while you can get complex work written by several men that will cover a question thoroughly, still you need another group to be able to read it and understand it. Theology is a community effort at the present, and you have to curb excessive demands;

and to curb excessive demands, let one man do one thing and do it well, in one of the eight specialties. If he wants to do more, fine; but you do not have to force him to do more; do not oblige him constantly to extend himself beyond what he can do. What destroyed dogmatic theology was the idea that one man – because *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus* is Catholic truth – consequently one man, if he knows that, he will understand all the writings of the Old Testament, all the New, all the Greek Fathers, all the Latins, all the Scholastics and so on, insofar as they are right. And one man went right across the board, and was expected to.

5 A Dynamic Unity

So much for the need for this division. There arises the question of unity. And there are two kinds of unity. There is static unity, and dynamic unity. You have a static unity when all terms are sharply defined, all propositions are clearly enunciated, all principles are definitively established, and all conclusions are rigorously defended. That is the ideal set forth in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*: true and certain knowledge of things through their causes. The causes are necessary; the effects cannot be other than they are. It is an ideal based on what Aristotle conceived mathematics to be, but modern mathematicians have a different idea. At the present time, there are few theologians who are really expert in Aristotle; still, there is a neurosis-like conflict in people's minds: they think that a science really should be like that ideal of a static, fixed thing. And we have to think of the unity that we are concerned with as the unity of a process, namely, the development is from undifferentiated or less differentiated operations through differentiation and specialization, towards the integration of the specialties. Initially there was just the Christian religion; there was no distinction between religion and

theology. How did this distinction arise, in what does this distinction between religion and theology consist? It is a process of differentiation and specialization. And it has to head towards an integration.

How does this differentiation arise? Well, the principal part of human living is when you are awake. And when you are awake, your living is informed with meaning. You are properly a man, not when you are in a dreamless or in a coma, but when you are awake, intending, speaking, doing. The principal part of any human movement is a common meaning. And the more the movement spreads, the longer it lasts, the more it is forced to reflect on its common meaning, to distinguish it from other meanings, to guard it against aberrations, to prevent it from being captured by other movements. As rivals come and go, as circumstances and problems change, as issues are driven back to their presuppositions, and decisions to their ultimate consequences, there emerges in any field – artistic, literary, scientific, religious, political, philosophical, theological – what Georg Simmel has called *die Wendung zur Idee*, the turn to the idea, the shift toward system.

The meaning has to become more thematic. There was the age, the apostolic age of the New Testament; but it was immediately followed by the apostolic Fathers. They were not content to keep on repeating the New Testament. And the apostolic Fathers were followed by the apologists, who were interested in talking Christianity to a broader public. And so on. That meaning of Christianity was re-expressing itself in different milieus, for different purposes. They went into one literary style at Antioch, another literary style at Alexandria. It had its crises, and its councils, etc., but the meaning is the thing that is going on, and that meaning, and thematizing of that meaning in each age, in view of the problems of that age, is differentiation, a twist, a turn in the religion towards reflection on itself,

re-expression of itself. And so, by the Middle Ages, you had a terrific pattern; it is the first time that the whole of Catholic religion became thematized. Really, Abelard took over from the Canonists this business of reconciling the opposed canons: he was reconciling opposed scriptural and patristic statements; he posed arguments in his *Sic et Non*: and that supplied the first element in the technique of *quaestio* — statements on one side: *Videtur quod non ...*; and statements on the other side: *Sed contra est* And you see that not just as a formality, but as a technique that is doing something, in St Thomas in *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 12, Thomas is changing the opinion he had held in the Sentences, and he has twenty-two authorities on the one side, and eleven on the other, and the article runs to about eight or nine pages in the newest edition. But there the technique of the *quaestio* is really at work. You have the authorities on one side and authorities on the other, the principles of the solution in the *corpus articuli*, and then application of the principles of the solution *ad primum, ad secundum*, etc. To handle a series, a whole series, of questions coherently, not merely to resolve a particular point, but to do so in a coherent manner, was what necessitated bringing in a systematic thinker like Aristotle. Then you can have coherent answers to a whole series of questions, not just the setting up of more difficulties. There you have theology at work, and you have a real theological method. It had one flaw: it arrived merely at a logical coherence; it did not use history to explain differences, and that is the fundamental shift in theology that has been going on in this century.

You have this differentiation between theology and religion. Now, is this theology just an academic superstructure? A lot of people will say it is something alien to religion. Well, there can be good theologies and bad theologies, and bad theology is distinctly alien. Good theology is quite distinct from religion, but is related to it in symbiosis, mutual influence;

religion, religious living grounding theology, and theology illuminating religious living. In other words, you have to distinguish between people with differentiated consciousness, and people without it.

What do I mean by differentiated consciousness? I mean Eddington's two tables; one was made of wood, solid, brown, occupied so many cubic feet, etc.; and the other consisted of wavicles, too small to be imagined and they were so far apart that really the table consisted mostly of empty space. One is the table apprehended by common sense, the other is the table apprehended through theory.

There is an apprehending of the world through theory and an apprehending of the world through common sense: it is the same world. Plato thought they were distinct, that's where he got the Ideas as separate entities apart, by themselves. Aristotle divided the two into the *priora quoad se* and the *priora quoad nos*. Now, when a person can live in those two worlds, the world of theory and the world of common sense, it requires a special development of consciousness, education, culture. If a person has not got that differentiation of consciousness, you're wasting your time talking theology to him. You have to communicate the theology to him in his way.

On the other hand, if a person has got differentiated consciousness, and if religion is just a commonsense apprehension through symbols, metaphors, and all the rest of it; if he feels good sometimes because of it, and other times feels bad; well, without theology, he will be tempted (though God's grace may prevent it) he will be tempted to drop this stuff as childish, or all right for uneducated people. Theology becomes a necessity when you have people with differentiated consciousness. On the other hand, to impose it on other people is something that is going to be alien to them.

What has theology got to do with real religious living? It depends on whose real religious living you are talking about. If you are talking about the real religious living of the primitive mind, certainly theology is quite alien to it. But if you are talking about the real religious living of the cultivated mind, theology is usually very appropriate.

Finally, the differentiation of theology and religion occurs only for a return. Theology ends up with its eighth specialty, communications. In Toynbee's *Study of History*, the section on withdrawal and return, human life is in a rhythm. There is a time for prayer, a time for laughter, and all the rest of it.

Differentiation, then, first of all, of religion and theology, is something that arose very slowly in the Church over centuries. As for differentiation within theology itself, we have distinguished phases: there are two phases, and four parts to each phase. We will consider first of all the unity in the first phase, then the unity in the second, and then the relationships between the two.

Unity in the first phase: the four specialties in the first phase stand to one another, not as premises to conclusions, not as particulars to universals, not in any logical relationship. They are concerned to set up four partial objects, four elementary objects that complement one another and together form a compound object. The compound object is the Body of Christ over the last two-thousand years: first on the level of data, then on the level of meaning, thirdly on the level of history, and fourthly on the level of personal encounter. This structure is essentially open; experience, as theology goes on, remains open. Experience is open to further data; understanding to greater penetration; judgment to more detailed information, more nuanced pronouncements, more adequate perspectives; dialectic to the elimination of mistaken issues, the clarification of real conflicts.

The interdependence of the four is reciprocal. Interpretation depends upon research: upon critical texts, etc. And inversely, the research will depend upon interpretation. History depends upon research and interpretation. But research and interpretation depend upon history. You need history to identify your authors, to transfer, to extradite the Pseudo-Dionysius of the first century and put him in the fifth because he quoted Proclus, and so on. History provides the perspective within which you do your research and your interpretation. Dialectic depends upon research, interpretation, and history. But, in turn, if you are going to have a good historian, he will be all the better, he will know himself all the better, if he studies and becomes familiar with the conflicts that are making the historians disagree with one another.

Now the reciprocal dependence is most easily achieved when one man does all four specialties. But the more the specialties develop, the more refined their techniques, the more numerous and delicate the operations they perform, the less possible it is for one man to do all four well. And then you have to have recourse to teamwork. And the basic thing about teamwork is understanding the fact of reciprocal dependence; one has to be familiar with what already is achieved, to be able to grasp new developments, to be in easy and rapid communication: the university, periodicals, books, congresses all help communications – they are essential.

In the first phase, unity is from the almost endless multiplicity of data, through many interpretative unities, to more comprehensive narrative unities, to the dialectical oppositions running through interpretations and histories.

In the second phase, you move down from a grounding horizon, through doctrines and systematic clarifications, to communications to almost endlessly varied sensibilities, tastes, mentalities, ages. Again, in the second

phase, the process is not deductive, it is not from premises to conclusions, from universals to particulars. It is a movement through successive and more fully determinate contexts. Foundations provides a basic orientation. Applied to conflicts of dialectic and ambiguities of history and interpretation, it becomes a principle of selection that results in doctrines. Doctrines tend to be regarded as mere verbal formulae until their ultimate meaning is worked out and their coherence is assured by systematics. Systematics reveals what there is to be communicated, but there remains the problem of the creative use of available media, the task of finding the appropriate approach and procedure, to convey the message to peoples of all cultures and all classes within these cultures.

This dependence is not in one direction. Questions for systematics can arise through communications. Doctrinal formulations can draw on systematics. Conversion, formulated as horizon in foundations, has not only personal, but also social, historical, and doctrinal dimensions.

So much, then, for the interdependence in each phase. Each of these specialties is a matter of a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations, with cumulative and progressive results. But in each case you are either in one phase or the other, and you are specializing on the end proper to one level of consciousness.

What about the relations between the different phases? Well, obviously the second phase depends on the first. The first is mediating theology; its object is the Body of Christ as it has existed and operated down the ages, mediating, manifesting itself. The second is mediated theology: theology as of God and of all things in their relations to God: the conflict between the two objects of theology, one in one phase, one in the other. The first is theology as field specialization, rising up four levels; the second is theology as subject specialization, descending from horizons of conversion,

through doctrines and systematics to communications. And the second manifestly depends upon the first, for the second is facing the future in the light of the past, making one's encounter with Christ and witness to Christ the basis of one's witness.

You'll ask: Does the first phase depend upon the second? It does; but here the greatest care must be exercised to exclude undue influence. Undue influence would tend to set up the second phase as independent, as cut off from developing attentive understanding of data. You can use the second phase in a way that settles questions that should be settled in the first phase by the means of the first phase. And when you start doing that, you get your theology off in a corner. Theology was very real when the data were supplied by Peter Lombard in the books of the Sentences, and the theologians wrote commentaries on them: the way those commentaries changed, from decade to decade, reveals the way theology developed. But when they took as the basis of doing theology the writing of commentaries on a speculative work like St Thomas's *Summa*, theology was cut off from its sources. Peter Lombard was just a collection of *Sententiae*, from scripture and the Fathers. So Capreolus wrote a commentary on the the Sentences, but Cajetan wrote on the *Summa*, which is a strictly systematic work, and it got cut off. And when theology paints itself into a corner in that way, well, things are going wrong.

The first questions of the first phase have to be met, not by appeal to the second phase as an a priori, but out of the resources of the first phase itself. It is easy enough to spot bias from positivism, existentialism, etc., in another's work, but the effective answer is not content with this. It will go back over the sources; it will pin down just what is overlooked; it will do the long, painstaking scholarly job that just ends the matter. What is meant by that? See Stephen Neill's *Interpretation of the New Testament over the Last*

Hundred Years, his section on Lightfoot. Baur has dated all the New Testament in the late second century. Lightfoot went to work and determined which of the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch were genuine. He then proceeded to date them, then show which New Testament writings were quoted by Ignatius. In this way he finished Baur, just demolished him completely. And it is that sort of work that really counts, that really moves the thing on. When you settle something as fact, then there is no further discussion about it. And it is done from the resources proper to that type of work. You could answer Baur by saying, well, all the authorities agree right along, all the books written in the first century, and so on. But there is an answer to be had from the techniques proper to the discipline, and that is the answer that will settle the matter definitely. In other words, you have to respect the techniques of the first phase, and use them to handle questions in the first phase. When you start doing that, you are playing the game, you are working on the ball.

Now, there is an interdependence of doctrines and doctrinal history. You cannot write a history of mathematics unless you know mathematics, or a history of physics if you do not know physics, or a history of chemistry if you do not know chemistry, or a history of medicine if you do not know medicine. If you do not know your subject you will omit what is important, what is epoch-making; you will miss the point all along the line. On the other hand, you will be treating as important things that are routine, of no great importance.

Similarly, you cannot write a history of dogma unless you understand the dogma, or a history of doctrines unless you understand the doctrines. And the better you understand them, the better the history you can write, because you know where the turning points really were. So it is true that to understand the doctrines you have to know the history, and it is also true that

to understand the history you have to know the doctrines. So, there is an interdependence there. Still, history has its own techniques, and you have to use historical method if you're going to get history.

Again, there's an interdependence of dialectic and foundations. Foundations objectify conversion. And while there may be more than one account of authentic conversion, still they tend to a certain similarity, and they should tend to reduce the multiplicity that is brought to light by dialectic and to weaken its merely polemical tendencies. So, while foundations gets its problem from dialectic, still it gives a solution to problems in the dialectic, and it can have a beneficial influence on it.

In view of the interdependence, I spoke of the interdependence in general of the first phase on the second phase, and the second on the first. There is a special interdependence between dialectic and foundations, between history and doctrines. From these two interdependencies (between the phases and between those two disciplines) there follows the interaction of the two phases with the eight functions. Further, there is the interaction of theology and religion, and there is the interaction between religion and the world. The church is the pilgrim church; the kingdom of God is something for all mankind. The Church has to mediate the kingdom of God, bring about the kingdom of God in the world.

6 Conclusion

We have been using method, the notion of method, to form a concept of what theology is. We have conceived theology not as a logical structure, but as an ongoing dynamic structure that will work on materials. Different theologians will make different selections: some will say, only scripture, others scripture and tradition. Some will say, scripture and tradition up to

the sixteenth century, things went bad after that, etc. But we have a general concept of theology as a methodical concept. It depends on what you do when you are doing theology, or what the theological community does when it is doing theology, because it has to be teamwork. And we note that one gets different concepts of theology according to what modes of specialization one is thinking of. If you conceive theology in terms of field specialization, you get biblical, patristic, medieval, reformation, contemporary theologies. If you conceive theology in terms of subject specialization, it gives you theology as a science that has God and all things in their relation to God, and then broken up according to the different aspects of the matter. And you tend, in the first case, to minimize the doctrinal, systematic, communicative aspects of theology; and in the other, you minimize the role of the sources. Conceiving theology in terms of the functional specializations, of the process from data to ultimate results, you start communicating freely. You bring these two together, you include both field specialization approach and the other. Further, by conceiving foundations as the objectification of conversion, it keeps very clearly in mind the distinction between one's religious life and one's theology. The two are interdependent. Theology depends upon religion, and religion is helped by theology insofar as you have differentiated consciousness. But don't confuse the two. If I came in here and prayed, well, you wouldn't stay. There is a relation between the life of prayer and doing theology, but that relationship may incidentally come to light in the classroom, but the classroom is doing a different job. Theology and religion are interdependent, but they are distinct. The study of theology is one thing, the pursuit of religious development is another. Theology may help, but it is not pursuing religious development as such. And, to conclude, things flourish; the relations between things become clarified when the things are

distinguished. And when the relations are clarified the things will flourish. But if you drop the distinctions, the things become blurred, and the performance becomes sporadic.

[There follows the question session on the evening of the second day. Part of this was recorded with the lecture, but the entire session was recorded separately at 536R0A0E060.]

Are theological foundations or horizons superior to or normative of other life horizons that a person might have?

Yes, but in what way they are superior will come up when we get around to the fifth chapter on religion. Fundamentally, the horizon is Romans 5.5, through the Holy Spirit given to us, God's love that has flooded our hearts.

What is the functional relationship between dialectic and foundations?

In dialectic you are not taking sides; you are clarifying issues. Dialectic wants ... We have the Secretariat for Christian Unity and the Secretariate for non-Christian religions, etc., and our theology has to be able to reach out and listen to all these people. [There is a good article in an Italian journal on the subject of dialectic.] Even if the man with whom one is dialoguing is considered to be mistaken, still it isn't because it is a mistake that he is holding that view. In the dialogue you try to discover the truth that he is really trying to sustain. That is what I mean when I conceive dialectic as apologetic in an ecumenical perspective.

What about foundations?

In foundations you introduce your fundamental perspective, your religious conversion, which implies a moral conversion and, at least in the Roman Church, an intellectual conversion if you are going to accept the dogmas.

Are dogmas merely the consensus of systematic theologians?

Oh, no. It is the Church; it is the thought of the Church resolving its issues down through the ages. A fundamental problem at the present time is how are you going to say that people are not Catholics because they haven't got a correct philosophy. There are all kinds of philosophies that people can hold but they do not allow for the acceptance of dogmas on the basis of them, they just won't have any meaning. And that is the fundamental problem at the present time, and it is a religious problem. The genesis of the decree of Nicea illustrates in what sense there was philosophic involvement in that. In other words, there are a succession of christologies in Tertullian and the earliest Fathers. There is the influence of Stoicism in Tertullian; for him anything real was a body, and he meant that literally. It was the Alexandrians that introduced the idea of God as spirit; and you get that very strongly especially in Origen. But Origen was under the influence of Platonism; to get the distinction of the Father and the Son, they had to be different ideas. The Father was divinity itself, goodness itself; the Son was not divinity itself, or goodness itself; this is part of Origen's commentary on the gospel of St John. The Son was the word itself, truth itself, redemption itself, resurrection itself, etc. And the semi-Arians in the Arian controversy were followers of Origen.

In those cases Greek philosophy was influencing the Church. But you can't find anything equivalent to *homoousion* in any Greek philosophy or any Gnostic philosophy in the sense in which it is used at Nicea, which is the sense of the Trinitarian Preface where the same affirmations are made about the Father and the Son. In Athanasius's formula (the same things are said of the Father as of the Son, except for the name 'Father') it is a matter of the word of God as true. And that is what they were defending (*Si quis dixerit*), but they were also going into something like a technical account of what

they meant. Now, to put that sort of weight on language and justify it calls for a highly critical realism; it is not the sort of thing that people will come to easily. There is a fundamental development. Dogmas are not a matter of systematic theologians agreeing. Systematic theology arises out of trying to account for the dogmas.

What constitutes differentiated consciousness in theology?

In Aristotle or Aquinas differentiated consciousness is being able to deal either with the *priora quoad nos* or the *priora quoad se*: explanatory knowledge, the *priora quoad se*, or ordinary commonsense knowledge, the *priora quoad nos*. The difference between these two is that commonsense knowledge does not proceed in terms of universal principles. Common sense is a core of insights to which by adding one or two more you are able to size up a situation and know what to say and do in the given situation. Common sense expresses itself in proverbs, and proverbs hedge: look before you leap; he who hesitates is lost; too many cooks spoil the broth; many hands make light work; and so on. Common sense is a specialization of intelligence in the concrete and the particular. It is a matter of understanding other people, people who come from different social classes, different countries, etc. They are strangers because their brand of common sense is not the same as yours. People with the same cultural, class, educational background understand one another very easily.

That commonsense type of development is one thing, but there is another type of development of intelligence that is systematic, that moves away from the immediate to things that are not immediate; and in these terms one is able to account for all kinds of things. Mass is not the same as weight, and it is not the same as momentum; it is not as such a datum of experience. Temperature is not a datum of experience. This pole and this

table are the same temperature but the metal feels colder. Temperature is not the same as feeling how hot things feel or how cold things feel; it is not something you feel. And, of course, the fundamental concepts of electromagnetics are just out of this world as far as ordinary explanation goes. There are very complicated differential equations that define the concepts; everything is worked out in terms of them and they are able to be handled; we get to the moon – and back, we hope.

This is an entirely different type of thinking; it is systematic thinking. We have heard of the contrast between cosmological and anthropological approaches. Medieval theology put the whole of subjectivity into an objectified, systematized system. You thought of yourself fundamentally in terms of metaphysics, in terms of substance and accidents, potencies, habits, and acts. When this was well done, as in Thomas, there was a lot of psychology guiding the discussion; but thought of the subject fundamentally was metaphysical. Similarly, God was placed in the field of objective theory; he was the first cause of this objective world. That is the cosmological approach. Why it is superseded at the present time is because we have further realms of meaning. Besides the realm of common sense and the realm of theory, there is the realm of interiority. To describe what happens when you have an insight, one wants people to experience, to identify in their own experience their acts of understanding; what leads up to understanding and what follows from it; and go on to reflection: Is that true? What do you mean by that? or what is involved there? And how do you decide whether you have sufficient evidence for something or not, what is meant by 'sufficient'? And so on. Interiority wants a description of one's feelings from experiencing the feelings. What Carl Rogers wants one to do with regard to feelings, I want one to do with regard to insight and judgment, etc. Rogers' idea of therapy, as far as I understand it is to help people let

their feelings occur, identify them, let them know what's going on inside themselves. Those feelings get bottled up. Operating on their own, people have difficulties. That world of interiority is something distinct from the world of theory and the world of common sense. It's the world of self-appropriation, and you can use that as a basis for setting up a method, for relating theory and common sense. I contrast theory and common sense in terms of the way of operating. The way you go about common sense development, having a fundamental core of insights to which, in a given situation you are able to add a few more insights to be able to deal with it; and theory is something quite different, an entirely different structure. You can talk about the structures if you really get hold of this interiority. The fourth of these realms of meaning is transcendence. We will go into that more when we talk about religion.

Now, that is what differentiated consciousness is at the present time: to know the difference between those four realms of meaning, to know that you can move yourself from one to the other by changing your mode of operation, know how to relate one to the other, know where one is good and to be used and where the others are to be used. Those relations are not logical. They are different realms. The shift from one to the other is like changing gears, so to speak.

The notion itself of transcendental method, and in what sense you use 'transcendental' in this context, and especially the question to what extent these four levels function in science and what revisions have to be made when you move to other fields.

The sense in which I use the word 'transcendental' has to do with conditions of possibility. It's conditions of possibility not merely of empirical knowledge, but of the whole of human knowledge, including the knowledge

of the heart. 'The heart has reasons that reason does not know.' Pascal. This further knowledge is quite distinct from the type of knowledge that is knowledge of facts. That comes up on the fourth level, where you're making judgments of value. We'll be talking about value tomorrow.

Consequently, you can say it's transcendental, a transcendental philosophy or theory of action. It's the conditions of possibility of human action, which includes coming to know, but also includes deliberation, evaluation, decision, action. It's those conditions of possibility in their most general form, their most radical form.

Now, the second question, How can one know this, and what further developments can occur?

Well, how do you come to know it? I start out in *Insight* with mathematical examples, because they are clear and distinct. The mathematician knows precisely what he's doing. You can pin right down what the insight adds, how you have insights, how you express them. And especially is Euclid's geometry, because Euclid has insights that he doesn't acknowledge. Modern Euclidean geometers express themselves in an entirely different way.

Then I went on to physics, in chapter 2. There we see insight, understanding, as a developing process, the ongoing process, heuristic structures, classical heuristic structures and statistical heuristic structures, what kind of world results when both are available – emergent probability – and questions of that type up through chapter 5. Then chapters 6 and 7 we studies common sense in its various aspects – an entirely different way in which intelligence develops. Then chapter 8 treats things, unities, which we had not bothered to mention up to then. Chapters 9 and 10 treat judgment, and in chapter 11 there is an example of a true judgment that you make. And so on.

Now, there is to that setup an element that cannot be revised, namely, the conditions of the possibility of any revision. If you're going to have revision, there are going to be data that were overlooked in the earlier view. Consequently, you need the level of experience. For the revision to be effective you have to have a new understanding that accounts for all that the old understanding accounted for and for the new data as well. And so you have to have the level of understanding. And you have to be able to show that this understanding does fit the fuller range of data, at the level of judgment. And you go about this work of revising with some method you choose, so you have the level of decision. So insofar as anyone says this is just a hypothesis that can be revised, one asks, 'Well, what do you mean by a revision?' and if he uses this analysis to tell you what a revision is, then he's contradicting himself. There's that to it. There's a built-in catch. In other words, talk about revision always presupposes some determinate cognitional theory.

Now, what more can be added? What you can add on is further details. *Insight* just sketches broad lines. But the fundamental problems are not problems of detail. The fundamental problems are the problems of total orientation.

You mentioned that you choose the method. How do you distinguish decision there and the third level, where he knows what he is doing?

Well, on the fourth level you're deciding what you're going to do. The data for your motives will be on previous levels. The idea of method and the understanding of different methods will be understanding and judgment of fact. But when you decide what you're going to do, you're on the fourth level.

What you speak of action –

Developing a science is an action, a very significant action. It's insofar as a person is in the Aristotelian approach, in which a science is a matter of self-evident principles and necessary conclusions, that you can leave the subject and his choices and decisions out of account. But when science becomes, not knowledge of what's necessary but knowledge of verifiable possibilities – the law of falling bodies could be something else; it is what it is because that's the one that has been verified for four centuries; it's de facto true not necessary – when your science becomes knowledge not of what is necessary but of possibilities that are verified you are in a different world. If science is of the necessary and self-evident, then no matter how prejudiced you are, you can't avoid seeing what's self-evident and you can't evade a necessary implication.

I still don't see how the fourth level fits in here.

Well, the fourth level is the level – we'll be talking about it all day tomorrow. But if a man goes about trying to revise a previous position, he's pursuing the good, the good of science.

In the eight functional specialties that you mentioned this morning, starting with research, where you work on the data, is there a place for scripture in this working the various data?

Yes. You reflect on the total religious phenomenon. The materials that you do research on, if you're a Christian, are the Body of Christ from its beginnings to the present time. Now, in that there are privileged areas – obviously scripture, obviously tradition, the magisterium, and so on. You won't deduce the dogmas from the scripture, but you'll show that they do develop legitimately. You'll explain what happened, pretty much as I did in my *De Verbo Incarnato* and *De Deo Trino*, except that I wasn't able to talk

about in methodical terms because I didn't have that sort of thing yet to help me express myself.

Something that you mentioned just now: the Body of Christ as the total object – is that too limited?

The Church through history is one aspect of it. St Thomas distinguishes between what actually belongs to the body and what potentially belongs, and so on. You can use that series of distinctions until we get something better.

Would you relate it in any way to the Trinity?

Well, yes, but that's doing theology, answering theological questions. Method in theology doesn't answer theological questions. It tells you how you go about answering them, and on the formal side, the dynamic side: what are your operations rather than the materials on which you operate. As soon as you start discussing the materials on which you operate, you have Christians divided, haven't you? And you're doing theology. You're saying, This is a privileged area. It's the same with the man who studies the New Testament in the same way as he studies Ignatius of Antioch and the man who says there's a canon and we interpret John in the light of Paul and Paul in the light of John, and so on.

Another question has to do with commonsense meanings as the presupposition of the human sciences.

It's Dilthey's notion. Dilthey discovered the problem created by the German Historical School. They were in revolt against Hegel's attempt to deduce a priori the meaning of history, to provide a theoretical account of history without too much study of history. Their contention was that the meaning of history is something that comes out, is revealed by, historical study. They were empirical in that sense. But they were anything but empiricist. They

were full of notions from Hegel and the Enlightenment, and Dilthey wanted to figure out the possibility of historical knowledge, the conditions. He wanted a critique of historical reason, to discover the conditions of the possibility of there being history and in general human science. One of his being formulae was that the data of human science are not just data; they are expressions. In other words, behind them there is what someone is up to, what he means. And because the data of human science are expressions, you have meaning as a fundamental layer in every human science. Once that's recognized, you have the human sciences cut away from the natural sciences in a radical fashion. Insofar as human science tries to break away entirely from empirical science, it's apt to be captured by some philosophy. And that's the weakness of the German *Geisteswissenschaften*. They are involved in philosophy. And if you go to the other extreme and become a behaviorist, you have a psychological explanation if you get a robot to do it. You empty meaning and value out of the object of your human science.

How do foundations lead into the formulation of doctrines as such? What is the relation between those two?

You have a preparation for doctrines in your interpretation, in your history, and in your dialectic. In dialectic the issues become clear and defined. They're not settled there, but they are clear and defined. Just what the issues are is clarified by the histories behind them, the historical movements behind them. Precisely what is involved is clarified by interpretation. Your foundations based on the objectification of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion makes you take sides that you hadn't taken in the dialectic. And when you've taken sides, you are on one side of the issue and not on the other. You're preferring one type of historical interpretation to another. You're preferring one type of exegesis to another on controversial texts, and

so on, so that the foundations provide a principle of selection. I don't say that they resolve every case. But if you admit that intellectual conversion brings you to a critical realism that knows the real through knowing the true, then you're going to have a much easier time with dogmas than if you're a pragmatist or an empiricist or an idealist or an existentialist or a personalist, or so on. And that's just one sample of it.

Why is the clarification of issues that takes place in dialectic placed on the fourth level?

Because it's the level of decision, the level of encounter with other persons. What you're encountering is the past, and that means the people down the ages that have been witnesses to Christ – whatever principle of selection you may have in your church. Fundamentally, that whole first phase is an encounter with persons, a learning from them, carrying on a religious tradition in a very serious way that the study of theology is. But on the level of research you're really not dealing with person, but with data expressed. And on the level of interpretation you're going on to what they meant, perhaps changing yourself, realizing that besides understanding the author and so on the real problem is that you have to understand yourself. And on the level of history, what was going forward? There is understanding why things should be said differently in one period from the way they are said in another. But besides data and their meanings and movements, you're also meeting persons, and you're being confronted with the problem of decision and commitment, because they are opposed to one another. You're clarifying for yourself the nature and the alternatives of the commitment you're proposing to make, and that's what makes it the fourth level. And you're making judgments of value, too. History conceived as an empirical science doesn't make judgments of value. But perhaps the greatest thing

about history is that it teaches you to make judgments of value. Carl Becker says that the value of history is not science but morals. It enables us not to control the future but to meet it. And so on. That's more or less my reason.

Does conversion have to mediate between dialectic and foundations?

No. It's a religious event. It can be before you do research.

Yes, I know that, but would it have to have occurred?

Yes. In other words, it will be revealed whether has occurred or not.

Where does it happen that one names one position heresy or counterposition and other position?

That results from foundations. In dialectic you're not taking sides but clarifying issues. Even if you think the other person is wrong, you're understanding why he thinks he's right and holds that position.

What's in the first phase is also in the second but sifted through your foundations, right?

Yes.

You seem to me to be supposing positions on theological questions such as the nature of God and the nature of the Church, the relative value of scripture and tradition, the role of the magisterium. All of these are points of theology, and you are presupposing them.

I'm presupposing the last two thousand years, that's all.

Isn't it possible that there would be serious questioning of your positions within that two thousand year period?

Yes, but it will be by attending to the data, making acts of understanding.

Right, but you seem to be saying you will not be doing theology while you are setting up the method.

I'm saying that to set up a method is one thing and to do theology is another, and I'm doing the methodology at the present time.

But that's presupposing a position on many, many theological questions.

Well, if I'm asking theological questions, I have to give theological answers. But I haven't been making theological assertions in setting this up.

Well, for example, your understanding of what doctrine is is a theological position, isn't it?

Well, are we going to eliminate doctrines altogether? Eliminating them is a doctrine. You're saying what's so: there are no doctrines.

Well, I'm curious how you would react to the article by Fr Dulles in Theological Studies last summer, which has a very different position from that which you are maintaining, and to say that before you can establish a methodology you would have to take a position on that question.

Well, what I propose to do is to make my proposal. I don't expect to shove it down peoples' throat. If there are people that are interested in it, they can carry it out. It's a start. You can't set up a methodology on the basis of universal consent, because there isn't that consent. If someone else wants to set up another method, fine. It will just make the dialectic more complicated.

Would a Buddhist theologian would use your method?

In general, the method can be employed by anybody who is studying the past with attention to the future and who is fully conscious of what he is doing.

That would mean, then, that this method does not presuppose a position on doctrine.

Well, wait a second. If you have judgments, you have doctrines. If you say you're not going to make any judgments, then you don't even have the doctrine that there are no doctrines.

On the matter of horizon and foundations. Take Heiler's position on the characteristics of the higher religions. You anticipate this sort of theological question. Does this give us a position that is not yet explicitly Christian but that gives us a position on a valid horizon?

Well, that's perfectly true. In my chapter on religion, I will relate Romans 5.5 to Rudolf Otto's *mysterium fascinans et tremendum* with Heiler's seven areas common to the world religions, and so on. And that is what's meant by religious conversion.

In an earlier, less systematized form of this, in De Deo Trino, volume 1, when you put out the two volumes together, you went through a lot of specializations, and you had systematics, and you had a way of putting each person in his proper place, so that you had a specialty for method itself. Since you are acting as such now, which one of the functions covers the methodologist?

Well, the methodologist is talking about all eight. He's not doing theology, he's doing method.