

**(51600DTE060) Regis69 1B<sup>1</sup>**

Similarly, there are qualitative differences in the object on the different levels. The intending of sense is receptive and formative, not creative. If you're creative on the level of sense, you're suffering from hallucination. It's receptive but it's also formative. It's always in a Gestalt. You perceive what has some sort of shape or meaning. If it's meaningless, if it's just a jumble, you can't repeat it. You can't repeat the noises you hear in the street, but you can repeat a melody. On the level of imagination, it's representative and creative. Understanding is not the given at all. Sense and imagination presents it, but intelligence grasps not what is but what possibly is relevant, a possibly relevant unity or relationship. Intelligence is essentially hypothetical – our intelligence. It grasps possibly relevant unities and relationships in the sensible data. Judgment: what you grasp is the unconditioned: what is so, what is not so, because you have hold of an unconditioned, not what you feel or imagine or think, or what seems to you or what you are trying to say. You get out of yourself: it is through the unconditioned: you reach an absolute. Now even you yourself are one of the conditions: it is so. And finally, on the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision: on the level of judgment you have cognitional self-transcendence, but on the level of evaluation and decision, you reach real self-transcendence. When something is worthwhile, when you say something is worthwhile, truly good, you are not talking about satisfaction, pleasures or pains, personal or group advantage: you are talking about what is good. And insofar as

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<sup>1</sup> The second part of the first lecture and the discussion period of the evening of that day. The lecture begins in mid-sentence, completing a summary of the qualitative differences on the side of the subject. Audio recording 51600A0E060 contains the lecture and part of the discussion. The entire discussion can be found on audio recording 535R0A0E060.

you are able to make such judgments and live by them, you become a principle of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine collaboration, of true love.

Now, we have to draw the fundamental distinction between the categorial and the transcendental; if you talk about ‘transcendental method,’ you have to try and find out what you mean by ‘transcendental.’ Categories, then, are determinations; they have a limited denotation: they do not signify absolutely everything. They vary with cultural variations; and they can be illustrated in various ways: Levi-Strauss’s totemic operator. How do you distinguish different groups of men who all look alike? Well, you relate this group to the bears, and that group to the cows, and so on: parts of the group to parts of the animal: a mode of classification, categories. Aristotle’s so-called categories, which are explicitly called categories: substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, habit, and posture; or what are not called categories but also are categories: his four causes: end, agent, matter and form. Or the logical categories: genus, difference, species, property, accident. Or the categories of modern physics: mechanical categories, electric categories, thermodynamic categories. Categories of chemistry: periodic table. The evolutionary tree of the biologists. Heidegger’s existentials. All of these have limited denotation; they vary in cultural variations; they are determinate.

Transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, and invariant through cultural change. Transcendentals are found in questions as such. You need categories to make your questions and your answers determinate, but the question as such reveals a transcendental, a transcendental notion. Intelligibility is a concept that expresses what you are seeking when you ask what and why and what for and how: when you ask those questions, you are seeking intelligibility, but that seeking intelligibility, the *Vorgriff* as opposed to the *Begriff*: the ability to put the question for intelligence is the transcendental notion,

the operator that lifts you up from the empirical level of sense to the level in which you are trying to understand; that is the transcendental notion. When you get hold of it and express it in a concept, you have a transcendental concept.

Transcendental concepts change: you formulate it differently, you divide it up into different aspects, different types of intelligibility. But the transcendental notion is that part of you that moves you from the level of sense to the level of trying to understand.

That notion is unrestricted in denotation. It is not tied down to any genus or species, any intelligibility. And it is not abstract, it is comprehensive: it wants all the intelligibility that is there. That is why questions keep on coming; that is why you intend ever so much more than you will ever know. It is the transition from ignorance towards knowledge; it is the pure intending, undetermined by categories.

Again, when you move from the second level to the third, Is that so? Is it true? that question can be objectified in the concepts truth, reality, being. But what counts is the question itself: you are reasonable, you want to know what is so; you demand an unconditioned before you say yes or no; and you would be silly if you did not. That negation of silliness that is constitutive of you is the transcendental notion: it can be objectified in a transcendental concept of truth, reality, being. And it is not abstract; Scotus and Hegel thought that being was an abstraction; Hegel rightly concluded: just 'is,' there is nothing that merely 'is,' so being is nothing but the same: put them together and get 'becoming.' Being is not abstract. What do you mean when you are talking about the concrete? You are talking about being. Being includes everything about everything.

Finally, when you move from the third level to the fourth: Is it worthwhile? Is it truly good? you have the transcendental notion of the good putting the question, and you can objectify that notion in the worthwhile and the truly good,

and you get the transcendental concept. But the transcendental notion is not abstract; the good is never anything abstract; it is always something concrete.

Finally, those transcendental notions do not change; they are the cause of cultural development and cultural change; they are the movers; they are what lifts consciousness up from the empirical level to the intellectual, from the intellectual to the reasonable, from the reasonable to the being responsible: they are the causes of cultural development, they do not change with cultural development; they are invariant over time, over history, over culture. Their expression, the ability to pick them out and say what you mean by them, can vary.

So much for the distinction between the categories and the transcendentals. Transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over time. Categories are determinate, limited in connotation and restricted in denotation, and changeable with cultural change.

Now, we have done analysis; and if you have done analysis you also have to do synthesis. We have distinguished different levels of operation, and now we have to talk about elementary and compounded operations and objects. As on the level of sense an object is given, when you understand sensible data you start compounding the object; you put together what is grasped by sense and what is grasped by understanding. You get a compound object. When you say, 'It is so,' you add a further dimension to your object; it is in the world of being, the universe of being. And in the fourth level, you add on good, limited goodness, open to criticism. You compound your object. While it is just intelligibility grasped on the second level, and just givenness on the first, and just 'is so' on the third, and 'is good' on the fourth, still all of these are determinations of one object. What you experience is what you understand, what you understand is what you affirm, what you affirm is what you know is good or evil. You are intending; there are different levels, but still you are one subject, and the unfolding of a single subject with

respect to single objects; so that you have a compounding of the partial objects of the different levels into one compound object. And again the compounding of the operations: one and the same object is experienced. I see it. I understand this (microphone) will magnify my voice. It is really there, it is not just imaginary: the voice does get louder; and it is a good thing. You get compounding of operations and compounding of objects. And so intimate is that connection that you have to do the analysis to get the distinction. For undifferentiated consciousness, those things are so much one that people will not know what you are talking about, if you start distinguishing them.

Finally, this pattern is dynamic. It is dynamic in two senses. It is dynamic materially: it consists of operations, just as a dance or a song consists of operations. And it is dynamic formally: it puts itself together, it is self-assembling; no one has to tell you to do it; doing it is not something you learn, it's something that comes naturally. So it is dynamic formally, inasmuch as it assembles itself, inasmuch as it is open-eyed, something that is attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. That is its nature: the four in one. And consequently, *ens, unum, verum, bonum* convertuntur: because any object that you know is involved in all those.

Now, so much for the basic pattern. We will move on to the notion of transcendental method very easily, because this basic pattern satisfies our definition of a method. It is a set of operations, they related to one another, they form a unity, they are recurrent, it is normative. If you are being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, that is the right way to do things, it is normative: a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations, with cumulative and progressive results. We do learn in the course of time. So that pattern is a method. And that method is transcendental: it is not restricted to any given field of objects; it is not just physics or chemistry or biology or psychology; you do that no

matter what you are knowing, you are deciding. So it is a method, because it satisfies our tentative definition; and it is a transcendental method, because it is not restricted to any category of objects. It is both foundational and universally relevant: it is foundational, because if you know the pattern of cognitive operations, you know what is common to all scientific methods, and also to common sense too. It is universally relevant because it is always worthwhile to know precisely what you are doing: the man who does not know what he is doing is in difficulties. What are you doing when you are knowing? If you know it, you will do a better job of it, you will do it more consciously and more accurately.

### **3 Transcendental Method**

In a sense, everyone knows and observes transcendental method. Incidentally, there's a book by Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method*, translated from the German; in it he considers all the people who, for instance, thought in terms of the transcendental method, and moves toward what is common to all of them: and he gets a very abstract notion of the transcendental notion; and, while that is possible, it is not what I mean by transcendental method. What I mean is precisely this pattern that anyone can find in himself if he knows how to go about self-appropriation, and actually does the job in himself, for himself: no one can do it for you. Then everyone knows and observes transcendental method, inasmuch as everyone is to some extent attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible: they are the conditions of the possibility of being a person, being a human being. But in another sense, it is quite difficult to be at home in transcendental method, because that is not achieved by reading books or listening to lectures, or analyzing language: it is a matter of heightening one's own consciousness; and heightening it

so as to objectify it, saying, ‘That was an insight I had,’ and know precisely what happened when you had it.

What is meant by the objectification of one’s own consciousness? We said that these operations are both intentional they make objects present – and conscious – insofar as the operations are performed, the subject is aware of himself and of his operations. Objectifying the operations, objectifying the pattern, is a matter of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious. It is a matter, then, of experiencing (first level) one’s experiencing, one’s understanding, one’s judging, one’s deciding. It is a matter of (second level) understanding one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. When you have understood it, it is a matter of affirming the reality of one’s understood and experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. You apply the operations to the fourth level: it is a matter of deciding to observe the norms immanent in one’s affirmed, understood, experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

First, experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Experience is just consciousness. All these operations are intrinsically conscious as well as intentional; one cannot perform them without some consciousness of them, but that consciousness may be just peripheral. You attend to the attended, without adverting to yourself attending: the subject is peripheral. But if you broaden the span of consciousness, both the attended to and the attending come into view. And it is insofar as you can do that broadening that you can get hold of yourself, have self-appropriation of yourself not merely as feeling, seeing, hearing, but also as understanding, working out definitions, formulating, pinning things down: what precisely do I mean? And then, Is that right? judging, and so on.

Secondly, understand one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. Operations are to be experienced, not only singly, but in their relations. It is not only conscious operations, but conscious process. In this business here, one thing leads right on to another. Consequently, understanding this pattern, the relations between the operations, is not a matter of creating an intelligible pattern to be imposed on something; it is a matter of analyzing what is already a functioning unity, discovering the relations in that functioning, between the different elements. Sensitive process is spontaneous: light and sight; intellectual process is the intelligent search for the intelligibility of the sensible. And in that, the exigencies of intelligence come to light: no, that is not it, that will account for that, and so on. Rational process is the critical demand for evidence for the intelligibility of the sensible. Deliberative process is the responsible determination of actions on things, and in that responsible process, I am making myself, I am becoming what I am to be.

The operations occur in a context, as we said before, that is formally dynamic: it calls forth and assembles its own components. Just so, attentively, intelligently, rationally, responsibly, the intelligible unity is given in consciousness, given as spontaneity on the level of sense, as intelligence on the second level, as reasonableness on the third, as freedom and responsibility on the fourth. There is a unity and relatedness and interdependence that exists and functions before we advert, before we understand it, before we objectify it; and when we do objectify it, we know that we are not uttering something novel, we are just describing routines that go on within us, and to which we can advert. Consequently, it is a unity and a relatedness that is something quite different from the unity and relatedness you find in, say, physics, where the data are just given, and the activity of the subject discovers a possibly intelligible unity and relationship. Here, there is intelligence at work, and that intelligence at work is



what accounts for the operations on the second level. It is reasonableness at work on the third level, and responsibility at work on the fourth.

Thirdly, one has to affirm one's understood relations of experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Do these conscious and intentional operations occur? No: some people will say no. But unless one has been deprived of some sense organ, one is not going to say he never saw anything, or heard anything or smelled anything or touched anything or tasted anything; nor will one say, Well, I do these things perhaps, but I do them the way a somnambulist does them; I have no consciousness of what is going on; I walk around, but I do not really know what is going on, it is just appearance, I only seem to see and hear, and so on. No one prefaces his lectures with the statement that he personally never has the most fleeting experience of intellectual curiosity, of inquiry, of striving and coming to understand, of expressing what he has grasped by understanding: if he did, then people would say, Well, why should we listen to you? You obviously are worse off than stupid people, who occasionally do understand, and seem very happy about it. If there are people who have no experience of making judgments, at least they do not preface their articles and books with the reminder that never in their lives did they experience anything that might be named critical reflection; they have never paused about the truth or falsity of any statement they make, that if they ever seemed to exercise rationality by attending to evidence and weighing it, still that was mere appearance, it was not what they were really doing. Again, if there is anyone who never had the experience of making a decision, at least they do not tell us; they do not preface their books with the reminder that never in their lives have they acted responsibly, and least of all that they are never conceived of achieving something worthwhile in writing the present book. Anyone who wants to deny his awareness of the occurrence of such operations in himself is ruling himself out of court; he is a

somnambulist on the sensitive level; he understands nothing; he never pauses to doubt whether any statements are true or false; and he is completely void of any responsibilities of any kind.

That's one question, do they occur? Second, do they occur in the pattern? And here we have to distinguish between the pattern itself, and the account of the pattern. The pattern itself is what constitutes us as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible beings. The account of the pattern is something that can be improved indefinitely. If people are poor in their self-appropriation. They can give you a fuller account of how a physicist operates, how a psychologist operates, etc., or how the artisan operates: there is room for indefinite improvement in accounts about the pattern, the interrelations of the operations. But we want raise the question, Can that pattern be revised? It can be revised in the sense that it remains, and it still can be stated more fully, more accurately, more entirely. But there is a sense in which it cannot be revised. Namely, a revision has a determinate meaning. There can be a revision insofar as further data are brought to light; the further data involve a different understanding; the different understanding is judged to be truer, nearer the truth than the previous understanding; and someone considers it worthwhile to go ahead and perform this revision. That is what you mean by revising. Consequently, the existence of that pattern is presupposed by the very notion of revision: you revise insofar as you follow that pattern. And the more precise your notion of revision is, the more complicated the pattern which you are presupposing. Consequently, there is a sense in which this pattern is not open to revision. It is presupposed by the very notion of revision. Consequently, we have something fundamental; we have got a basic invariant structure that, while statements about it may be revised, itself is not revisable.

#### **4 The Functions of Transcendental Method**

We now treat, very briefly, some functions and properties of transcendental method.

First, it is normative, not just because of authority, not just because it is expected to work, but because it is constitutive: the norms are norms immanent in the human person; the conditions of the possibility of being a human person are: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.

Secondly, it is critical: it is critical in the sense that it goes to the root of the scandal noticed by Kant: the scientists agree, the philosophers disagree. People can have different views on what human knowledge is, but they cannot perform differently from that. Compare what they say knowledge is and what they actually do themselves, and you get a contradiction. So this sets up a critical method. Hume said that the human mind consists in associating by custom elements of experience. Hume himself was a very original person; his thoughts were not just what people put together by custom; they were very original. So Hume's account of the human mind is one thing, and Hume's own mind is something else. That sort of critique of theories of knowledge can be pushed all along the line.

It is dialectical. People can vary from that pattern in all sorts of different ways, and they do so. There is not just the perennial philosophy that is realist, there is the perennial philosophy that is idealist, the perennial philosophy that is materialist or pragmatist, and so on, and the movement from one to the other. You can line up the positions that come out of that pattern, and the counterpositions and contradictions, and set them up in a series.

It is systematic. It sets together a basic set of operations; corresponding to the operations is a basic set of objects. And from that you can get a systematic set; your thought is systematic insofar as your terms are defined by basic relations, and

your basic relations are defined by your basic terms: the whole forms a set, a pattern, a related set. Insofar as you are talking out of such a related set, you are talking systematically. People talk about the simple Gospels, and you find down the centuries endless commentaries explaining what they mean. And people find Euclidean geometry so boring, so difficult, so abstract; and it was written over 2300 years ago, and people will agree with it or disagree with it on certain points, but there is no hermeneutic literature on it whatever: it is perfectly clear what it means. Whether it is right or wrong is another question. When you are systematic, you eliminate hermeneutic problems, and that is the point to systematic thinking. You not only mean it, but you know exactly what you mean.

It gives you continuity without rigidity. The transcendental is invariant through cultural change; but the account of this pattern can keep improving indefinitely. So, you do not have rigidity because the basic account can develop; but it will be continuous because it runs over time.

It is heuristic. Your transcendental notions (questions for intelligibility, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation) confront you, give you what you mean by the intelligible, by the true, by the real, by the good. You intend without knowing yet: you intend the intelligible before you actually understand. And you know what you mean by intelligible in that transcendental notion: intelligible gets its meaning from your question. And similarly, you intend the true, you intend truth and being before you know it, before you know the truth. You intend the good before you have settled what the good is. That pure intending of the transcendental notions is the basis of all heuristic structure. Method is a matter of picking out unknowns, and finding the way to arrive at knowing them. And this transcendental method is the fundamental business in setting up a heuristic structure. In algebra, 'What is the number of ...?' let  $x$  be the number; then you write down equations in the light of the properties, you solve the

equation, and you have the number: it's a heuristic procedure. Similarly, in physics, what is the empirical law? Well, this must satisfy certain conditions that you express in differential equations, and you solve the differential equations, and you get the law. The heuristic structure: picking out your unknowns, what you are trying to find out, setting up steps to arrive at knowing it is the heuristic procedure. 'Heuristic' from the same word as Archimedes' 'Eureka!' And the -'tic' at the end means what causes you to find.

It is foundational. Special methods are derived from experience in given fields. But transcendental method is the core common to all methods. And, insofar as you have transcendental method, insofar as you have that core, you have the key to unified science. Sciences are not unified by their objects: they are developing all the time, they are ongoing processes. Unification of the sciences comes through unification of their methods: what is common to their methods, and where they differ.

It is relevant to theology. Theologians have minds and use them. Introducing transcendental method as basic to theology is not bringing something new into theology: theologians always had minds, and always used them. It is just helping theologians to know better precisely what they are doing and how to go about getting the ends they want. The objects of theology are not beyond the reach of transcendental method. Intelligibility, truth, reality are comprehensive. Beyond them there is nothing.

Finally, transcendental method abrogates the old metaphor that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. It is just a metaphor. The theologian needs transcendental method to know what he is doing when he is doing theology; and insofar as he has got hold of his own cognitional procedures and what they imply, the epistemology they involve and the metaphysics they involve –the objects of

these operations give you a metaphysics (metaphysics in *Insight* is defined as the integral heuristic structure) – he has all the philosophy he needs.

## Questions<sup>2</sup>

*There was a question that went beyond what you were talking about this morning, but we seemed to return to it, namely, the question of where theology is going to start, the problem of faith, and how faith or revelation or the data that provide the starting point of the specifically theological reflection can be related to human insight in the schema you were developing.*

The first five lectures are fundamental ideas: method, specialization, values, meaning, and religion. With that you will be able to take one by one the functional specializations. What we are setting up – different theologies will have different sets of data; some will want only scripture, some scripture and tradition, etc. We are setting up a schema that we can apply to different faiths. It's abstract in that it is a set of operations that you are concerned with. The answers to those questions will appear in due course.

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<sup>2</sup> There follows on this recording a portion of the first discussion period. The transcript is here supplemented by a more complete recording (535R0A0E060). The discussion was held on the evening of the first day. Lonergan began with a request that the morning lectures not be tape-recorded and that people refrain from smoking. The participants were divided into groups, and Lonergan suggested that the best way to proceed would be to have the leaders of the groups begin with the questions from the groups and then to let others ask questions on the spot.

*How is transcendental method open to theology?*

The openness required is that you be open to all the data that are relevant. You must be open to any understanding that you can get; the more you understand the more refined your judgments become. There is the fact of having a heuristic structure; the fundamental point is that intending goes beyond knowing; you can ask more questions than you can answer. That is how one knows that human knowledge is limited. The fundamental openness is the openness of the intending. You are closed insofar as you rule out questions. Ruling questions out arbitrarily is obscurantism. Now, this does not mean that we are open to more than mystery, that we can achieve more than an imperfect understanding, etc. We are presupposing the whole of traditional theology.

*Is advertence to transcendental method any more transcendental than advertence to types of dogs is animal psychology?*

It is a method because it is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. It is a pattern; it is normative. It is not merely the way you can go if you decide. Intelligence is something built in; if you asks, why? you don't ask why you ask why. That is the norm, the fact that you do this. This norm also knows what a satisfactory answer will be. If there are any further relevant questions, then the answer is unsatisfactory. This also regards questions for reflection and deliberation. All the notes of that provisional definition of method are satisfied by that structure. But that structure by itself is not confined to any determinate category of inquiry. It is employed by common sense in one fashion; in natural science in another fashion; in the human sciences in a third fashion; in philosophic reflection in a fourth; in theology and history in a fifth and a sixth, and so on. One introduces further determinations when one states that this is the way one uses the structure in doing history, in doing exegesis, in

doing physics, and so on. You are beginning to categorize; you introduce categories. But the method as such is undetermined; it is not determined by any particular field.

*But there is the actual difficulty of appropriating the structure.*

Oh yes, there's no doubt about that. That's the whole difficulty. That's why *Insight* is a book that some people have read many times. You don't get it on the first time. I first started on this at the time I was teaching theology at L'Immaculée Conception in Montreal. A friend of mine was starting an adult education center, and I gave a course on Thought and Reality. The core of the people were school teachers. We started out with about thirty-five. The course went from September to about Easter. About five people dropped out. I realized this was something that could be taught. About the fifth or sixth night, after I did diagrams with insight and so on, someone said 'I've got it!' It's a real discovery, finding out what exactly goes on. You don't get it waiting around for something to happen. You have to slave at it. A former student of mine has written a dissertation on consciousness in the *De Trinitate* of Augustine. You'll find another way of going about the appropriation of consciousness in Augustine. And, of course, it was Augustine who thought this out in terms of the Trinitarian analogy. I studied it in *Verbum* and transposed it into the context of modern science in *Insight*. But, for example, Kant does not know about insight, and neither does Maréchal. Rahner – Bernard Tyrrell is writing his dissertation at Fordham on Rahner and myself on the philosophy of God. Rahner asks, what does this mean, this *emanatio intelligibilis*? It is the action of an intelligence. A person, insofar as he is acting intelligently, rationally, responsibly, is a principle of something else that occurs because this is intelligent, or because this is rational, or because this is the responsible thing to do. So you have causality in the material order, and you have 'be-causality' in the order of the



mind, the order of the spirit. And because is because. So don't be discouraged if you don't get in there right away; but it is worth the effort, the labor of getting in. The whole point to method is to know what you are doing when you are doing theology, or doing physics, or whatever it is. And the fundamental thought on method is, What happens when I get hold of an idea? That's what makes a science an ongoing process.

*The third group: The questioner comments on how Lonergan seemed more explicit on the relation of ens, unum, verum, bonum to the points made in Insight.*

I am talking about elementary objects and compound objects. The elementary objects are the objects of operations on any given level; they are partial objects; and they come together. What is experienced is what is understood; what is understood is what is affirmed or denied. Beyond is the question, Is it worthwhile doing that? In other words, what is the one? The one is what you know by understanding. Understanding grasps in the data either a unity or a relationship. That is because of that; that is an intelligible relationship; this is what it is for. Unity is grasped on the second level. On the third level, insofar as you know you are right, it is a matter of getting the truth. And through truth you know what is real, what is, being. On the fourth level you come to what is worthwhile, and you pronounce on the good. And since all those are partial objects, all four refer to everything you are going to know positively. So you can see metaphysics coming out of cognitional theory: ens, unum, verum, bonum – I've also taught this stuff in Latin!

*A question about Heidegger on judgment and truth. He seems to say that truth may be there prior to this third step of judgment. How would you relate these two positions?*

It's the relation of position and counterposition. This *alētheia*, unhiddenness – I'm not an expert on Heidegger but as far as I can see his connection to the cognitional process is two levels: experiencing and understanding. And knowing something, a *Seiendes*, is to combine the two; just that; he is like Aristotle. What is judgment? It is a composition of concepts or a division of concepts. For Kant, *Verstand* is the faculty of judgment. For me, understanding is not the faculty of judgment. The second level does not judge; it formulates hypotheses. You have all kinds of concepts put together in the hypothesis, in a system. And you are not saying of things that that is so. You get the third level in Augustine when he talks about *veritas*, in Thomas when he talks about *esse*, in Newman when he talks about the unconditional character of assent. It is positing the synthesis, regarding that synthesis as something unconditioned, as something that does not depend on me. It is a matter of what is so. It is the subject getting beyond the subject, transcending himself cognitively.

For an account of what I mean by the unconditioned, see *Insight*, chapters 9, 10, 11, and especially 10. But this other approach is the fundamental block. There is empiricism on the one hand and idealism on the other. If you try to walk somewhere between those two you get a position something like Heidegger's. As far as I can make out Heidegger's *Sein*, it is what I mean by intelligibilities.

For the naive realist the real is what you can put your paws on. Macbeth speaks of the 'sure and firm-set earth on which I tread.' When you have your feet on it, you have something real. This is all right in distinguishing reality of waking experiencing from dreams and optical illusions. But it isn't a philosophic account of how you know what is real. Sensation by itself is diffuse. It is only by understanding and conception that what you mean becomes something precise. Language, of course, aids enormously. If the real is what one knows *only* in judging, one is a critical realist. If your real is on this level of data, you are some

kind of materialist, empiricist, naive realist. If you say that's what is meant by the real but it isn't what we know when we know, because there are all sorts of intellectual activities coming in, well that's what the idealists do. They throw out reality because it isn't what we know. What we know is the ideal because there is so much understanding involved in human knowing. Most philosophers don't get beyond these two levels. Bringing in the third level, the level of judgment, as something entirely distinct makes critical realism something totally beyond any empiricism or idealism. To say, I know the real only when I arrive at a judgment, when you first get that idea, you feel that you are an idealist, because you're no longer relying on what you can put your paws on. The whole complaint about theology being abstract, technical, useless – the basic problem was getting rid of naïve realism, which was very common until recently among Scholastics. There was no real problem of knowledge at all; it was just too plain. You know. Well, how do you know that you know? Well, you know. Why bother about the subtleties!

The fourth group: a question about theology and faith.

*We will have a section on religion and faith, Friday perhaps.*

*The gap between theology and philosophy --*

The relationship between philosophy and theology has been metaphoric – philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Philosophers don't like that. And there are all sorts of complaints about too much philosophy stuck into the theology. Let's cut that out and maybe get rid of the dogmas, too. The philosophic knowledge that is essential to the theologian, as distinct from the stuff that can be useful in certain contexts – if you want to read Tertullian, you had better know stoicism; if you want to read Origen, get on to middle Platonism; if you want to read Aquinas, you have to know your Aristotle and Avicenna and Averroes. This is knowing

philosophy for specific tasks, knowing the background of different writers at different times. But philosophy as something essential in theology, to my mind, can be reduced to method as I'm understanding it. Know through self-appropriation what goes on inside you. That's the question of cognitional theory. What am I doing when I'm knowing? There's the epistemological question: Why is doing that knowing? Why isn't it just something that goes on inside my head? And finally there's the metaphysical question: What do I know when I do it? And by metaphysics I understand something like general semantics. What's the use of metaphysics in theology? It's so you'll be able to say, 'These two statements have exactly the same meaning or they don't have the same meaning.' The fundamental use of metaphysics in theology is, What are the real conditions of the truth of this statement? And you have to have a list of what real conditions are. In other word, the symbolic has a big role in religion, but as the authors of a book entitled *Convictions* remarked some years ago in their preface, 'The people in the pews like to know if there's any fire behind this smoke that they can see coming from the altar.' People want to know what this means. It's beautiful to know that he's the Son of God and all the different titles that you can given him in the NT, but what do they all add up to? Do mean he's God, or do you not? Once those questions are raised, you can't eliminate them. To be able to handle questions like that – this [method] of course only founds the philosophic part. We have to introduce religious experience to get theological categories. We won't do that till Friday.

*Is this the same kind of method that is used in the empirical sciences?*

In the natural sciences, data are simply what is given. You move a step beyond that when you move to the human sciences. You have a datum for the human sciences when, to what is given, there is added a commonsense meaning. Take a law court. All the physicists, chemists, and biologists you wish, with all the equipment they

want, and they can count and measure and weigh and dissect and analyze to their heart's content, and they'll never discover the law court. But if they ask the porter on the way in, 'What's going on here?' he'll say, 'A trial.' And that is essential for it to be taken as a datum for the human sciences. It's just commonsense knowledge. It isn't scientific knowledge to know what a trial is. And that's true for every aspect. Hermeneutics is a fundamental tool in the human sciences. Now, as long as you're just on the level of interpretation, you're not concerned with whether these people are right or wrong or mistaken. You understand what Plato meant, and you don't have to agree with him. But to interpret correctly, you have to know what he was thinking. Religious studies – why do we have the element – we'll see tomorrow experience, understanding, history on a third level, and there's also a fourth level, dialectic, where questions about values arise, and among the religious studies, and there's the question of conversion, and we'll work that out gradually. But it's not simply a matter of imitating the methods in any natural science. We use natural science simply to set up a preliminary notion of method as a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. Then we went behind any particular science to the general pattern of all human operations. And theologians have minds, and they use them. Insofar as they are competent theologians, they are using their minds in a very cogent fashion. There is the level on which God operates and grace operates. That's the fourth level. But what the theologian has to do is to show people how to integrate that with the rest of their lives, with operations involved in the other three levels. The answers to those general questions can only come out as we gradually move on step by step. There's always a strategy in learning: before you get to answering the interesting questions, you have to answer a whole lot of previous questions that are less interesting but that have to be answered for the answers to the later questions to be given. We need a general circle of ideas first. Method is

what you do when you're doing theology. Now, we're going to have eight different types of tasks performed. Those eight will be introduced tomorrow. But before we can talk about any of them, we have to deal with some fundamental ideas such as values, meanings, and religion. And with that setup of basic ideas, we'll be able to move on next week to the specific tasks. And we won't do them all equally because I haven't finished yet!

*Group 5: The application or use of the transcendental method with regard to the science of history.*

We will have two lectures on history, the first on History and the second on History and Dialectic. It's very interesting that the historians at the present time, since 1910 in fact with Carl Becker in the United States, have been very critical of an empiricist approach to history, very critical about the kind of certitude that historians reach. What's true in that and what isn't true in that is the sort of thing that will come out of this transcendental method. I spoke about philosophy being limited to the first two levels of operation. Problems in that all recur as soon as you start doing something like history or hermeneutics. Carl Becker, a professor at Cornell, in 1926 twice gave a paper entitled 'What Are Historical Facts?' He was never satisfied with it. He never published it. But it has been remarked that if it had been published in 1926 it would have created as big a sensation as quantum theory caused in 1926. Besides Becker in the States, you have Collingwood in England, Marrou in France, and so on. What this does is enable you to see what the historians are arguing about when they are talking about how you do history. That's its main relevance.

*The word 'normative' seems to imply the pattern one should follow, ought to follow, even must follow. But couldn't you refuse to follow it and accept another method? That's the usual sense of 'normative.' But when it's used of*

*transcendental method, where natural structures of knowing are involved, we move to another sense of 'normative,' because no one could choose not to understand or prefer not to know whether something is true or false, and so on.*

The word is being used in a radical sense. The normative elements here are the transcendental notions, the notions that are revealed in questions: questions for intelligence on the second level, questions for reflection on the third, and questions for deliberation on the fourth. It's a very strong sense of 'normative.' While it is true that that pattern does hold for actual thinking, still it is not true that everyone who tries to tell you what goes on in human knowing knows about that pattern, and you get conflicts – in *Insight* there's the method that consists in drawing up positions and counterpositions. Someone in a counterposition has a view of knowledge, objectivity, and reality that's at variance with the way his mind actually works. You can show him that. It's the fundamental method in philosophy. Coreth does precisely the same thing and calls it the transcendental method: the opposition between the *Begriff* and *Vollzug*. The *Vollzug* is what goes on, while the *Begriff* is the notion you have of it. That's the fundamental dialectic in Coreth. In general what we're doing is not based on the general usage of words. It's based on what you find out when you have self-appropriation.

*[Interchange impossible to follow because of tampering with microphones.]*

Carpentry has not got cumulative and progressive results. They keep on turning out tables and chairs. It's method in the sense of New Method Laundry. They always starch your shirts. But method in this more dynamic sense is ongoing, cumulative: it synthesizes all previous results and adds something new on; progressive: what it adds on is better than what they had before. That's the sort of thing that people who are not ready to talk about insight – and an awful lot of people are not – just have – what do they do with this sort of thing? Well, they talk about inductive

logic, that sort of thing. What's inductive logic? Inductive logic is the logic of what you don't *deduce*.

*Is the objectivity that you speak of really possible in the light of all our biases or is it just an ideal we shoot for?*

It depends on the matter. Take the example I give in *Insight* of the fellow who left his home in the morning and everything was in perfect order, and he got home at night and there's smoke in the air and water on the floor and windows broken, and so on, but he doesn't jump to the conclusion that there was a fire, but just 'Something happened.' I think you can show that that's virtually unconditioned. But you analyze a judgment. A judgment can depend on insights that have been accumulated over a lifetime, such as Albright, who was able to sift the clay through his fingers and tell you what century and perhaps what decade that jar had been made. The expert, the troubleshooter – they know all sorts of things and they're right on the nail. To analyze that sort of judgment is almost impossible. You'd have to reconstruct his whole life. With regard to unconscious motivation, and so on, they reveal themselves by a certain tension or tenseness, and so on. You know there's something queer. There are biases. The biases are difficult to break loose from. Intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is the only solution to that, and becoming ever more perfect. But 'the virtually unconditioned' is just a formula to explain what happens when people think they are objective. In general, people don't make so many certain judgments. But they make a few, and they're not wrong.

*What is an operator?*

An operator changes the level, starts something entirely new. A question for intelligence, inquiry about the data of sense, sets you off to operating on the second level; a question for reflection moves you from the second to the third; a question



for deliberation moves you from the third to the fourth. But that's just schematic. De facto, when something new occurs on any level, you get adjustments all over. And the order in which they happen depends on which are the easiest ones to do.

*Are you taking the term from mathematics?*

Yes. There it's what changes one function into another function.

*[Again, question interfered with]*

'Transcendental' is the conditions of knowing an object insofar as the knowing is a priori. The conditions I'm giving you are not logical conditions but real conditions. The conditions of the possibility of being a human person, on this fourth level.