

Let us begin from the latter part of the objection.  
If these acts included an actuation in the intentional order  
with respect to the Word, they would reach God sicuti est,  
and so they would be supernatural acts.

I distinguish. The acts would reach God as object,  
I deny. By the acts a divine person as man would be conscious  
of himself, I grant.

I grant that my account of the human consciousness of Christ is an impossibility on the supposition that only objects are known. I deny that supposition. Human psychological operations are actuations, not exclusively of objects, but also of the subject. ~~Sensibile in actu~~  
The sensible in act is the sense in act; the intelligibile in act is the intellect in act; and it is not sense or intellect that knows but the man by his senses and by his intellect, so also it is not sense or intellect that experiences itself knowing but the man by his acts of sensing and understanding.

Now,  
~~St.~~ St. Thomas maintained that the mind knows itself,  
 not by its own essence as do God and the angels, not by  
 any similitude or species abstracted from itself <sup>or</sup> from  
 sensible presentations, <sup>6</sup> but by its act. How can the act  
 reveal the mind to itself, when the species determining the  
 act is not a similitude of the mind? Because the mind  
 is revealed to itself, not by knowing itself as object,  
~~by~~ but by knowing any object whatever. No matter what one  
 understands, one has evidence for affirming the existence  
 of one's own intelligence and ~~one~~ has data for an investigation  
 of the nature of intelligence. <sup>7</sup>

(2) <sup>A</sup> ~~His~~ second reason for maintaining that my view of con-  
 sciousness is ~~incomprehensible~~ inadmissible, is that it  
 cannot be intellectual. The objects of intellect are ~~the~~  
~~res~~ quidditas, verum, and ens. But I emphatically deny  
 that consciousness is knowledge sub ratione quidditatis,  
sub ratione veri, or sub ratione entis. Therefore, on  
 my view, consciousness cannot be intellectual. <sup>8</sup>

I should say that the conclusion would follow, if  
 and only if intellect knew nothing but sub ratione objecti.  
 But, <sup>A</sup> ~~once more~~, this condition is not fulfilled. <sup>9</sup> By intellect we not  
 only know the nature and existence of things and the truth  
 of our knowledge; we also experience ourselves as intelligent  
 in act and rational in act. As St. Thomas might put it,  
~~for knowledge of nature, existence, truth non sufficit~~  
~~praesentia rei quolibet modo; sed oportet ut ait ibi in~~  
~~ratione objecti, et exigitur intentio cognoscentis.~~  
 On the other hand, ~~'in omni intelligibili videtur lumen~~  
~~intellectus agentis, non tamen in ratione objecti sed in ratione~~  
~~medii cognoscenti.~~

## De explicito et implicito.

1 Explicitum est quod (2) clare distincteque concipitur, (2) aut affirmatur aut negatur, et (3) propriis nominibus verbisque directe enuntiatur.

Quare explicitum est et explicite cognitum et explicite dictum.

Implicitum ita explicito opponitur ut tamen suo modo vere adsit tam in notitia quam in expressione.

Distinguuntur modi quattuor fundamentales quo implicitum invenitur: nempe, litterario, logico, psychologico, et gnoseologico; de quibus post alii modi componuntur, nempe, historicus, religiosus, theologicus.

2 Litterarie implicitum dicimus quod ratione expressionis est implicitum.

Est ergo quod non propriis sed translatis nominibus verbisve dicitur, quod non in recto sed in obliquo ponitur, ad quod fit allusio, quod innuitur, quod paucis tamquam notum recolitur, quod suggeritur, quod intenditur et intelligitur quin tamen dicatur.

3 Logice implicitum dicimus quod cognoscitur in alio explicite cognito.

409 (9) Finally, Fr. Perego considers my view assari originale,  
418 ingegnosa, nuova, personale.

If these remarks are intended as a compliment to me, they are not a compliment to contemporary theology. All I did was to attempt to state in Scholastic terms and to apply to the question of Christ as subject what, in competent philosophic circles, would be considered neither original, ingenious, novel, or personal. Thus, in the current number of the Revue philosophique de Louvain, Georges Van Riet, the well-known author of L'épistémologie thomiste, can base an argument on a notion of consciousness that corresponds to my own <sup>31</sup> without *entertaining* any suspicion that there exist potential readers <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ would be mystified by his statements. I should not say that theologians ought to accept as true such a view of consciousness; but it does seem to me lamentable that, ~~they~~ without even understanding it, some ~~theologians~~ should attempt to settle the exact nature of the consciousness of Christ.

De explicito-implicito.

Explicitum est quod (1) clare distincteque concipitur, (2) aut affirmatur aut negatur, et (3) nominibus verbisque enuntiatur propriis.

Explicite ergo cognoscitur quod sub ratione entis, intelligibilis, et veri attingitur.

Explicitum addit super explicite cognitum, nempe, expressionem adaequatam, propriam.

Explicite cognitum est quod (1) intellectu (2) ex parte obiecti cognoscitur: obiectum enim intellectus est ens, verum, intelligibile.

(1) It might be thought impossible to conceive knowledge that is not knowledge of an object. Such at least seems to be Fr. Perego's first reason for regarding my view of consciousness as inadmissible.<sup>3</sup>

I should say that every act of knowing includes knowledge of an object. I should deny that in any act of human knowing nothing is known except the object.

The general principle is, not unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est obiectum, but unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. The ~~gax~~ general principle is, not that the cognitional act is exclusively the act of the object, but that it is the act at once of the object and of the subject. 'Sensibile in actu est sensus in actu; intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.' Hence, whenever there is knowledge of the sensible or intelligible object, there also is knowledge of the sensitive and intelligent subject.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if anyone understands this argument, not only does he grasp an intelligible object, but also he has evidence for affirming the existence of an intelligent subject. That evidence is consciousness; and as consciousness it is knowledge, not of the argument that is understood, but of the subject that understands.<sup>5</sup>

To put this elementary point differently, actus specificantur per obiecta. The object of the act, then, is the reality whose form is similar to the species received in the potency.

for knowledge of objects 'non sufficit praesentia rei quolibet modo; sed oportet ut ~~non~~ sit ibi in ratione obiecti, et exigitur intentio cognoscentis.'<sup>10</sup> For consciousness, an appropriate presence suffices.

(3) A third reason for regarding my view of consciousness as inadmissible ~~inadmissible~~ claims to be based on the explicit teaching of St. Thomas, namely, that human consciousness, psychological and moral, consists exclusively in intellectual acts and, further, that these intellectual acts are reflexive and distinct from direct acts.<sup>11</sup>

I grant (1) that St. Thomas affirms the existence of reflexive cognitional activities, (2) that these activities are intellectual, (3) that they regard psychological and moral questions, (4) that when they regard moral questions, they are named, conscientia, (5) that when they regard psychological questions, they are distinct from direct acts, (6) that when they regard moral questions, they may be distinct from direct moral activities. At the same time, I deny that these doctrines of St. Thomas contradict my position.<sup>12</sup>

~~On the other hand, I grant that St. Thomas would explicitly contradict my position, if he explicitly taught that the occurrence of psychological or moral acts (direct or reflexive, apprehensive or appetitive, sensitive or intellectual) ~~was not experienced and could be known only in some subsequent, reflexive act of intellect. At the same time I deny that~~~~

On the other hand, I grant that St. Thomas would contradict my position, if he explicitly taught that the occurrence of psychological or moral activities (direct or reflexive) was



But a psychological subject differs from an ontological subject by being known in consciousness; moreover, this 'being known' is intrinsic to the very notion of psychological subject.

Therefore, it is impossible for Christ to be identically one and the same psychological subject in both his divine consciousness and his human consciousness.

R. I grant the validity of the objection ~~ix~~ if consciousness is knowledge of an object; but it is not I but Fr. Perego that holds consciousness to be knowledge of an object.

On the other hand, if consciousness is knowledge of the subject, if in consciousness the subject is known as subject by the fact that it is he that exercises his own acts, then no matter how different the acts are, it remains that it is one and the same subject that exercises them. ~~Further, as it is one and the same subject that exercises them, so this 'being the one and the same' is also known by the subject and known immediately; for the subject is not partly ontological and partly psychological~~

Further, it is a fact that by immediate consciousness we know that we are identical subjects of our many acts. It is not one ego that sees and another that understands and a third that judges and a fourth that wills and a fifth that suffers and a sixth that enjoys. Nor is any process of <sup>our</sup> inference involved in our knowledge of identity. Explanation of the fact may be difficult; explanations of the fact may differ; but the fact remains.

Hence, while we cannot positively understand the psychological side of the mystery of the Incarnation, still we have an imperfect human analogy for affirming that not only is there one subject exercising divine and human acts but also that he exercises them as a conscious identity.

I grant that the human operations envisaged do not regard the Word as object, and similarly I grant that any operation that reaches ~~W~~ the Word qua Word as object is a strictly supernatural act.

However, while I grant that actus specificantur per obiectum, I deny that actus specificantur per subiectum.

Similarly,

There remains the reason Fr. Perego offers for his terminological proposal, and this seems to ~~be~~ me to raise a question of fundamental importance. He states, 'Però solo quando ha luogo la riflessione formale dell'intelletto, il soggetto è ~~raggiunto~~ raggiunto come soggetto...' This remark, it seems to me, not only affirms what is quite true, but also suggests a complete failure to grasp the one essential point I ~~am~~ endeavored to make about the consciousness of Christ.

The remark is quite true in the sense that when 'subject as subject' is taken to mean the reduplicatio familiar to Scholastics, then only in reflexive intellectual activities is the 'subject as subject' known.

However, one may speak of the 'subject as subject', not in the sense of the Scholastic reduplicatio, but <sup>concretely</sup> in opposition to the 'subject as object.' Thus, I may attend to myself, understand myself, conceive myself, affirm ~~maxx~~ myself, speak about myself. Then the subject as object is what is attended to, understood, conceived, affirmed, spoken about. But the subject as subject is the one who attends, understands, conceives, affirms, speaks. From this viewpoint, the subject as subject is precisely what never is an object, either in direct or in reflexive activities. From this viewpoint, the subject as subject never is known by human knowledge in the full sense of <sup>human</sup> knowledge, for that is knowledge of an object sub ratione quidditatis, veri, et entis. From this viewpoint, the subject as subject is constituted by his consciousness and is known only by his consciousness.