

Method: The Problem of Method in Theology.

1. The Era of Particular Questions.

Is Christ God? Justin, Dial 58; Tert, adv Prax; Hipp. Elenchos  
Contra haereses Noeti; Orig; Dionysius Rom Alex; Arius, Euseb Caes...

Athan., de decr Nic syn (forcing Hebrew God into Gk categories  
Basil Ancyrae, George Laodicaeae: ws ouk wv alnthws uios  
Hilary: non in legendo sed in intelligendo  
Arian symbols: not two three Gods

Is Holy Spirit God? Is Xt man? (phusis: not in sense of PP)

Pelagianism

2. The Mediaeval Effort to meet the Totality of Questions.

Congar: Grammatical (Alcuin 29 360 ff)  
Dialectical (Abelard 29 364 ff)  
Metaphysical (William Auxerre, Philip Chancellor,  
Albert Great, Aquinas: 29 374 ff)

3. The Achievement and Limitations of Aquinas.

a envisages a totality of questions, and takes the steps  
needed to answer them

b he has a set of ultimate categories for dealing with the  
world qua extra-theological

c he has a transposition of Aristotelian categories for  
dealing with theological thought

d he is [from free] methodical errors; i.e., he can be  
included within a later, more developed position

e his thinking is within the logic of the quaestio; it does  
not envisage the transposition involved in the notion of method

f he built up a system and used it brilliantly; he did not  
establish the necessity, legitimacy, of some system; he did not  
justify his choice of Aristotle, his transformation of Aristotle  
Hence, Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy; splintering  
into schools; the success of the superficial view

AA controversy: real issues not grasped by participants;  
what was needed was discussion of system as such; and that discussion  
beyond the horizon of the quaestio

g a' he did not relate system to believer, revelation, dogma  
treats questions in se; not Bonaventure's more concrete  
progress of darkened human mind towards light; both, polymorphic subject

b' system is brilliantly related to revelation; but the relation  
is not effectively presented: via invent, via doctrinae

Hence, Reformation, Catholic controversialists; an appendage  
to theology; fundamental, apologetic; De ecclesia

objections considered and met: ineffective because treated  
from within system, when it is the system itself that is in question

c' he did not think historically: interrelations of revelation,  
theology, dogma in dynamic interdependence; cannot integrate  
biblical criticism, Dogmengeschichte.

Method: The Logic of the Quaestio and Theology.

1. The Xtian message gives rise to questions. De facto.
  - a Conflict with orthodoxy Jewry: St. Paul; Council of Jerusalem
  - b Conflict with heterodox Jewry: Ebionites, Elkaisites (Daniélou)
  - c Gnosticism, Montanism, Patripassianism, Adoptionism, Sabellianism
  - d Arians, Pelagians, Nestorians, Monophysites, Eastern Schism
  - e Reformation, <sup>Rationalism,</sup> Liberalism, Modernism
2. The Xtian message gives rise to questions. De iure.
  - a Selbstverständlichkeiten: Platonic Forms; fixed species: overlook the intrinsic historicity of ideas
  - b The message is expressed in terms that are in process of development:  
Xt: Acts 2; 1 & 2 Cor; Phil & Col; Hebr 1; John 1.
  - c The development occurs within an ancient and particular culture and tradition; it involved a break from that tradition and culture; the new wine was bursting the old bottles of thought
  - d The message is universalist: all nations.. all days..
  - e The message is radical: pearl of great price; he that believeth not, shall be condemned.
  - f The message is comprehensive: 2 Cor 5 15
3. To attempt to answer the questions involves one in the logic of the quaestio

In some sense answers should be orderly, satisfactory, significant, and effective

But in the measure that they are, they move away from the categories of the initial message, for that initial message was not a treatise on logic, metaphysics, epistemology, the history of ideas, or on hermeneutics

They involve a transposition of the original message into other terms and propositions and a problem of establishing the precise relationship between the new system and the original expression
4. The logic of the questions raised by the Xtian message has provided the under-tow, the ever-pressing if unnoticed vector, in the development of Xtian thought.
  - a There is the recurrent refusal to answer: scientia inflat; quod abundantius est, a malo est (Mt 5 37)
  - b There are naive answers: questions can be met in biblical terms; questions do not expand; system of categories is excessive
  - c There are evasive answers: Eunomius (his answer in biblical terms; his refutation of Semiarians (words=reality)); specialization (Kierkegaard: Non-scientific postscript)
  - d There are contradictory answers (cf 1 above).

TM Problem of Method, The General Problem.

1. A question exists if there are reasons both for affirming and for denying one and the same proposition.
2. To answer one question is to give rise to further questions: chain-reaction; tendency towards indefinite expansion.
3. Before undertaking to answer an indefinitely large set of questions, one has to take stock of one's resources, work out one's procedure, see, at least in principle, the possibility of working one's way through towards a satisfactory result

The foregoing, of course, offers no more than an extremely rudimentary and incomplete account of the notion of the subject and of the correlative notion of consciousness. It is considerably less ~~that~~ than I presumed my students to know already when I wrote my De constitutione Christi. But with these bare bones we must be content, for they are more than Fr. Perego feels he understands.

Fifthly, it is urged ~~that~~ : 'Però solo quando ~~x~~ ha luogo la riflessione formale del intelletto, il soggetto è raggiunto come soggetto e si può parlare in senso vero e proprio di coscienza psicologica.'

R.

It is perhaps worth noting that, if one grasps the notion of the subject and understands that the subject is conscious because he is the one that exercises his own acts, there vanishes the familiar difficulty about

There remains the question of fact. Are only objects known? Or is the subject known whenever he knows and by the mere fact that he knows?

~~I believe that the answer to the first question is, No.~~  
~~I believe that the answer to the second question is, Yes.~~  
~~I fail to see that Fr. Perego has proved his contention that~~  
~~my answers are inadmissible, confused, and inadequate.~~  
~~Finally, while I grant that the question of the subject is~~  
~~difficult, recent, and primitive, I also believe that, a~~  
~~failure to grasp the issues exactly fully accounts for any~~  
~~doubts that may be felt about my position.~~

I have noted that the notion of the subject is difficult, recent, and primitive. I believe that this fact accounts for the variety of opinions that have been proposed on the consciousness of Christ. I am inclined to say that, when the smoke blows away, no one will ~~be inclined to~~ doubt that the subject is known by the mere fact that he knows.

acts are known by their objects.

Thirdly, with the first step completed, ask a question. Just what is this act by which one inspects in a phantasm<sup>1</sup> the solution of a problem? One grasps the answer by noting the set of relations and differences between (1) trying to understand, (2) forming images, (3) inspecting solutions in images. This answer, if correct, will correspond ~~exactly~~ with the Aristotelian and Thomist account of understanding. The advantage, however, of working out the answer from one's own intellectual experience, will be that the Aristotelian and Thomist account ceases to be a mere set of words with unknown meaning (or worse, with a meaning reached by ~~ignorant~~ guess-work) and becomes a set of words that expresses what one knows by one's own experience and <sup>by</sup> one's own understanding of one's experience. Just as St. Thomas said that Aristotelian cognitional theory was 'secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum,' ~~it~~ so in turn one can say oneself that St. Thomas' cognitional theory is 'secundum modum cognitionis mihi expertum.'

Fourthly, the foregoing exercise is not an optional adjunct to the study of St. Thomas. It is essential, <sup>I believe,</sup> if one wishes to have any real grasp of what St. Thomas was talking about on a large variety of issues. For there is very little in philosophy that is not in some way affected by our knowledge of our own souls. But St. Thomas wrote: '... anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam.' And in this statement St. Thomas <sup>perhaps</sup> felt he was following Aristotle, for he also wrote: 'Species igitur rei intellectae in actu est species ipsius intellectus; et sic per eam seipsum



of A one knows quid sit A and in analogous knowledge of A one does not know quid sit A.

Thirdly, if the foregoing is understood, one immediately understands why St Thomas (1) states simply that we do not know quid sit Deus, ~~identifies the beatific vision~~ know quid sit Deus, (2) identifies the beatific vision with knowing quid sit Deus, knowing God by his essence, (3) concludes that we have a natural desire to know God by his essence from the fact that we ask quid sit Deus, (4) identifies perfect beatitude with knowing God by his essence, (5) asserts that perfect beatitude is natural to God alone, (6) asserts that knowing God by his essence and perfect beatitude are beyond the natural capacity of any creature, (7) denies that without supernatural aid there can be any movement of a creature's will towards perfect beatitude. On the other hand, ~~for centuries people who do not know what intelligere means and have no grasp of the significance of the question, quid sit, find St. Thomas obscure. having~~ for centuries people have been finding St. Thomas obscure, unsatisfactory, misleading, and mistaken on these matters. In my opinion the whole trouble is that they have not learnt with sufficient accuracy what is meant by intelligere and by the question, quid sit.

~~Fourthly, the relation between Christ's consciousness of himself as man and the beatific vision he enjoyed~~

Fourthly, we come to our question. What is the relation between Christ's human consciousness of himself and the beatific vision he enjoyed? The relation lies in the question, quid sit. By consciousness we know ourselves

se sentire.' In III de Anima, lect 2 §591: 'Potentia ergo illa, qua videmus nos videre, non est extranea ~~h~~ a potentia visiva, sed differt ratione ab ipsa.' So ~~p~~ corporal pain is referred to as 'experimentalis perceptio laesionis' De Ver., q. 26, a. 9 c.

~~Op. cit.~~

17) Op. cit., p. 419 f.

18) Op. cit., p. 420.

19) Op. cit., p. 421.

20) I believe there is an analogy of the type: as external sense stands to direct intellectual activities, so consciousness stands to reflexive intellectual activities. However, the analogy is not perfect. Because inquiry and understanding operate directly from phantasms, the conscious subject and his acts have to be provided with correlated phantasms. This correlation is expressed in Aristotelian-Thomist method by saying that self-knowledge ~~begins~~ begins from objects to proceed to acts. See Sum. theol., I, q. 84, a. 7 ad 3m; In III de Anima, In II de Anima, lect. 6, §304-308.

21) Op. cit., p. 421.

22) A potential subject is one that can become conscious by his sensitive and intellectual, direct and reflexive, apprehensive and appetitive activities. By the hypostatic union as such the Word does not suffer but he is able to suffer, he is not conscious by acts that are not supposed to be occurring, but he is able to be conscious by such acts and will be conscious by them  
 ^ as soon as they occur.

23) Op. cit., p. 422 f.

24) Op. cit., p. 423 f.

intellectual knowledge is ~~not~~ only knowledge of objects sub ratione quidditatis, veri, et entis.

10) In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 <sup>sol.</sup>

11) Op. cit., p. 418 f.

12) St. Thomas treats reflexive cognitional activities under the heading of self-knowledge, i.e., Whether the intellective soul knows itself, its habits, its acts of intellect, its acts of will. While this <sup>is</sup> explicit, Fr. Perego is mistaken in asserting that St. Thomas explicitly teaches such reflexive activities to be consciousness. The Thomist doctrine on consciousness is only implicit. It has to be worked out by an interpreter, and the interpreter has to have some notion of what he is looking for. Thus, I should say that St. Thomas was speaking of consciousness when he asserted that, according to Augustine, 'anima per se cognoscit se ipsam quasi praesentem, non quasi ab aliis distinctam.' C. Gent., III, 46 §6. I believe there are good reasons for my opinion. I also believe that presence without distinction provides a criterion for distinguishing between consciousness and reflexive activities. But I do not believe that even a well-grounded opinion is the explicit doctrine of St. Thomas.

13) Sum. theol., I, q. 84, a. 7 c.

14) C. Gent., II, 76 §17.

15) Sum. theol., I, q. 88, a. 1 c.

16) While Fr. Perego is correct in affirming that St. Thomas denies full reflexive activity to sense (Op. cit., p. 420, note 11), it is not to be inferred that St. Thomas denies sensitive awareness of sensation. De Ver., q. 1, a. <sup>9</sup> 9: 'Sensus... non solum cognoscit sensibile, sed etiam cognoscit

This is from the page to which Fr. Perego refers, and I beg leave to indicate the various ways in which it contradicts the interpretation.

First, I say: idem subiectum sibi innotescit tum per conscientiam divinam tum per conscientiam humanam. Fr.

P  
perego says: se si considera infatti il soggetto come astratto dalle nature in cui sussiste e dalle coscienze con cui si manifesta.

Secondly, I say unum "ego" simpliciter. Fr. Perego on the condition just quoted, says:

says: se si considera infatti il soggetto come astratto

This is the page to which Fr. Perego refers, and it seems to me to contradict rather clearly the interpretation he offers.

I consider the same subject as known by both divine and human consciousness. Fr. Perego considers the subject as abstracted from both divine and human consciousness.

Under the concrete consideration of the subject known by both divine and human consciousness, I assert unum "ego" simpliciter. Fr. Perego admits un unico "io", 'if and only if the subject is considered as abstracted from both divine and human consciousness.

I distinguish ego ut divinum and ego ut humanum, and I have already affirmed that the same subject is known by divine and human both consciousness. Fr. Perego adds to an abstract ego a concrete consideration of due "io": quello divino e quello umano.

I draw attention to the parallel between my ego ut divinum and ego ut humanum and the familiar Christus ut Deus and Christus ut homo. Fr. Perego fails to be consistent and to add due Cristi: quello divino e quello umano. Why?

I say: "ego", seu subiectum psychologicum, non solum ipsum subiectum dicit sed etiam habitudinem importat ad naturam atque conscientiam cuius subiectum est. My meaning <sup>by</sup> is that a relative name there are meant not only an absolute but also its relation, that 'subject' means not only what is the subject, ipsum subiectum, but also its relation to the nature and consciousness of which it is subject. ~~On Fr. Perego's interpretation, it seems to be presupposed that I achieve the impossible and conceive 'subject' in~~

with the sons. Similarly, a teacher of one hundred pupils is concretely, not one hundred teachers, but one teacher. A master of one hundred servants is concretely, not one hundred masters, but one master. The principium quod or the subject or the ego of one hundred immanent acts is concretely, not one hundred principia quae, not one hundred subjects, not one hundred ego's, but one principium quod, one subject, one ego.

Thirdly, what Fr. Perego is attributing to me is the above fallacious nonsense. I am alleged to hold that in the abstract apart from the two natures, apart from the divine and human consciousness, Christ is one principium quod, one subject, one ego, but that in the concrete with his two natures and his twofold consciousness Christ is two principia quae, two subjects, two ego's.

Moreover, this allegation occurs in the exposition of my views. It occurs prior to the inference explicitly made by Fr. Perego on page 413. It is presupposed by that inference. It is made with a simple reference to pages 116 and 117 of my work. It can be read by anyone that cares to do so in the last paragraph on page 412 of Fr. Perego's article. I invite anyone to read pages 116 and 117 of my work and see if they can find there the fallacious nonsense that is attributed to me. I do not claim that my pages are written elegantly. I do not claim that they anticipate and exclude the fallacy attributed to me. I do not claim that my expression is a model of clarity. I do not make these claims for my previous discussion of the question, utrum Christus sit unum ontologicè et duo psychologice (pp. 113 f.). But I do

When, then, we recite the Apostle's Creed and believe that Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord, suffered under Pontius Pilate, what we believe, what we have believed from childhood, is just what I have stated. No Catholic thinks that Jesus is God unconsciously, the way a stone is unconsciously a stone. No Catholic thinks that Jesus suffered unconsciously, as a docetist ~~we~~ might urge. No Catholic thinks that somebody else was conscious of himself as God, and somebody else was conscious of himself as suffering under Pontius Pilate. Every Catholic believes that one and the same was both conscious of himself as God and conscious of himself as he consciously suffered under Pontius Pilate. The unity of the twofold consciousness of Christ lies in the subject.

~~It was~~ Because I felt that this elementary truth of faith, acknowledged by every Catholic that says his prayers, was being hopelessly obscured by <sup>mistaken</sup> elementary blunders on the notion of the subject and of consciousness, ~~that~~ I wrote my De constitutione Christi, <sup>wrote it that I might</sup> so that I ~~could~~ the more effectively communicate to my students a theological ~~view~~ view that corresponded with their faith and with the faith of the millions. ~~With no better basis than a blunder it has been more than insinuated in a responsible quarterly that my views are Nestorian. To dispel that insinuation I have had to waste my time trying to explain things to people that~~ May I suggest that more favorable circumstances are needed, ~~if a theologian is to do his work?~~

30 29) The immediately preceding sentence reads: 'Cum igitur visus percipiat sensibile et actum eius, et videns sit simile sensibili, et actus videntis sit idem subiecto cum actu sensibilis, licet non ratione, relinquitur quod eiusdem virtutis est, videre colorem et immutationem quae est a colore, et visum in actu et visionem eius' (loc. cit.; cf. lect. 9 §724, where there is an explicit parallel with intellect's knowledge of its act). I understand these passages as ~~a~~ equivalent to the statement that the visibile in actu or intelligibile in actu corresponds to knowledge of the object, while the visus in actu or intellectus in actu corresponds to the consciousness of the acting subject. The equivalence of course I consider to lie between the inchoative and the distinctly formulated, between the implicit and the explicit. See note 21 above.

No doubt, I shall be asked whether I think such passages in the Aristotelian commentary contradict better-known statements to the effect that 'actus sensus proprii percipitur per ~~hunc~~ sensum communem' (Sum. theol., I, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3m; cf. ~~III~~ In III de Anima, lect. ~~II~~ 2 §584; lect. 3 §599).

First, then, I have no difficulty in acknowledging that inchoative thought on consciousness is not worked out clearly in all its implications and, therefore, there is a measure of obscurity in the Thomist text.

Secondly, however, I see no need to affirm a contradiction. What St. Thomas denies to sense is reflexion, and his reasons for denying it are Neoplatonist metaphysical theorems that connect reflexion with incorporeality and subsistence (see In librum de Causis, lect. 7 §189 f.; lect. 15 §310 f.).



expresses the potential range of intellect as intellect; and this potential range is proved to be unrestricted in us, not because we can succeed in understanding <sup>properly</sup> more than the quidditas in materia corporali existens, <sup>but</sup> because we want to understand more than that. In fact, we want to understand everything about everything, and so naturally and legitimately we ask quid sit Deus and quid sit ens.

A fifth obscurity follows. When one says that the formal object of intellect is ens, a conceptualist takes it for granted that the formal object of intellect is some concept. In one sense this is true: 'formal object' is a concept; and the definition of 'ens' is a matter of more concepts. But the potential range of human intellect is not unrestricted in the sense that it wants to know the concepts, 'formal object', 'ens'; it is unrestricted in the sense that it wants to know absolutely everything about everything; and it is this second <sup>excluded,</sup> sense that is significant. If this second sense is ~~excluded~~, then St. Thomas argued meaninglessly when he set up his hierarchy of intellects, ~~and~~ claimed that an intellect fully in act ~~must be~~ with respect to being must be the infinite being, and concluded that human intellect must be a passive potency.

There is a sixth obscurity. One's notion of analogous knowledge depends on one's notion of some other knowledge. If one has no exact grasp of what that other knowledge is, one does not understand (1) what analogous knowledge is, (2) what is the field of our <sup>analogous</sup> knowledge, (3) what is the <sup>field</sup> of analogous knowledge in any finite intellect, (4) what knowledge is absolutely supernatural for every finite intellect, (5) what a mystery is, and (6) what are the imperfect analogies attainable when reason is illuminated ~~by~~ by faith. But one names 'obscure' what one does not understand; and one overcomes obscurity, not by <sup>censorious or</sup> querulous gossip, but by learning, by trying and coming to understand.

...their meaning.

Which is the correct view of the subject?

The question is philosophic and psychological. As psychological, it can be settled by an appeal to the facts. As philosophic, it can be settled by being integrated within a philosophic system. Both are large questions. My opinion is quite decided.

If I have succeeded in communicating the elementary aspects of the notion of the subject, the meaning of the following statements will be clear. By the very acts, by which objects are known, there also is constituted an awareness of the subject and his act. Since a man is not always exercising cognitional acts, a man by the mere fact that he is a man is only potentially a subject. Further, whenever a man knows, he is not merely a substance that knows but also a subject that is known

## De Intellectu et Methodo.

1. Methodus est mediorum in finem ordinatio quam aptissima.

Unde concludes: ~~nam~~ quo quis melius finem cognoscit, eo aptius et efficacius media in finem attingendum ordinare potest.

2. Methodus scientifica est mediorum in scientiam inveniendam ordinatio quam aptissima.

Agitur de scientia invenienda, non de inventa apte docenda.

Agitur ergo de fine ignoto: qui enim scientiam iam habet, methodo non indiget; qui autem scientiam non habet, finem quem quaerit ignorat.

3. Quae ignorantia aut specifica est aut generica.

Specifica est ~~nam~~ in eo qui scientiam particularem vel incipere vel augere intendit.

Generica est inquantum ipsa scientiae ratio ignoratur.

4. Agitur de praesenti non de ignorantia specifica sed de ignorantia generica.

Generica ignorantia potest concipi vel tamquam totalis vel tamquam partialis; et partialis subdividitur pro ipso profectu scientiae, pro temporum saeculorumque decursu.

5. Totalis ignorantia generica non datur.

In lumine intellectus agentis omnis scientia virtualiter<sup>t</sup> est nobis indita: ponimus quaestiones; indicare<sup>a</sup> possumus utrum responsa quaestionibus satisfaciant necne.

Quod tamen intellectus agentis lumen ne in populis quidem quam maxime barbaris deest.

6. Partialis quaedam ignorantia generica manebit donec omnia scientia homini possibilis acquiratur.

Scimus enim exacte quatenam sit scientiae ratio cum claritate atque certitudine, non ex theoria quadam methodologica, sed ex fructibus: sicut in caeteris etiam hic valet illud: Ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos.

7. Minor potest esse haec partialis ignorantia generica hodie quam in saec. XIX., in saec. XIX. quam in saec. XVI., in saec. XVI. quam in saec. XIII. vel apud antiquissimos graecos.

Sed quod potest esse, non ideo est. Finis ergo huius cursus est quaedam potentiae actuatio.

Cumque primus gressus ad ignorantiam deponendam est ipsius ignorantiae notitia, ad hanc notitiam acquirendam inprimis procedemus.

## De multiplicatione ordinationum.

1. In genere, systema non est nisi ideale quoddam logicum in quod mens tendit sponte et natura sed ad illud adipiscendum non pervenit antequam novum quid inveniat; quo invento, non ad systema prius intentum sed ad aliud iam tenditur.

2. In cuius intelligentiam notate sequentia:

a Propositio quaedam,  $p$ , dicitur systematis si constat ex terminis systematis sive primitivis sive legitime derivatis.

b Ubi  $p$  est propositio systematis, ~~ex~~ existit  $Qp$ .

c Principium mediis exclusi exigit  $M \quad EpNp$ .

d Ubi existit ~~ex~~  $Qp$  et admittitur  $EpNp$ , oritur problema decisionis.

e Solvitur problema decisionis intra systema, si per solam technicam derivationis determinari potest  $p$  (aut  $Np$ ).

f De problemate decisionis multa determinaverunt logici recentiores:

I. Bochenski, Bibliographische Einführung

J. Ladrière, Les limitations internes des formalismes, Louvain 1957.

Bevi dici potest triviale esse systema in quo solvi potest problema decisionis ~~ex~~ pro omni ~~ex~~  $Qp$ .

g Scholastici communiter reducunt principium mediis exclusi ad ideale quoddam logicum.

Valet  $EpNp$ , modo non occurrat distinctio conveniens, ~~quaxxxxxxxx~~ neque exigitur ut distinctio iam contineatur in terminis primitivis.

Aliis verbis, distinctionum inventio efficit transitum ~~a~~ ex uno systemate in aliud.

3. Apertum dicitur systema ubi non sine qualificatione admittitur principium mediis exclusi.

Evolvi dicitur positio ubi transitur ~~ex~~ ex systemate A in systema B ut habeatur solutio cuiusdam insoluti problematis decisionis.

Devolvi dicitur positio ubi transitur ex systemate B in systema A ut problema in B solutum fiat in A insolutum.

Bifurcari dicitur positio ubi ex systemate A in systemata et B et C ab aliis transitur ut diversimode habeatur solutio problematis decisionis in A insoluti.

Florescentia et decadentia positionis dicitur secundum quod, progrediente tempore, positio evolvitur vel devolvitur.

Positio est quod evolvitur, devolvitur, bifurcatur, florescit, vel decadentiam subit.

What I state.

Fr. Perego apparently wishes my task to be extremely difficult and complicated. Besides the smoke of his solubilia argumenta, there is the fire of a charge of unsound doctrine. If I do not like the charge, not only must I refute it; first, I must establish what precisely it is and prove that I have done so correctly. If what he attributes to me is not what I state<sup>d</sup>, then I must prove I <sup>did</sup> do not state it, and explain how it is that Fr. Perego thought that I did. If what he attributes to me, is not what I state<sup>d</sup> but what he thinks I <sup>ied</sup> imply, then I must establish what implication he thinks to be present, and show that his thinking so is erroneous. When I have done all this, he can complain that my answer is extremely complicated and obscure, that he finds it as incomprehensible as he finds my views on consciousness; <sup>He can</sup> ~~he~~ begin to urge that I have exaggerated this and misunderstood that complicated and obscure; he can insinuate that he finds it as incomprehensible as my views on the nature of consciousness; complicated without explaining that the complication arises from his strange procedure.

what I state.

Apparently, then, Fr. Perego expects me (1) to determine just what the charge against me is, (2) to prove that that charge is made, (3) to determine whether the basis of the charge is what I state or what he thinks I state, (4) to prove that that determination is correct, (5) to determine whether the charge is implied by what I state

(11) Fr. Perego attributes to me the view that the only unity in Christ is an abstraction. He is insistent that the only psychological unity is an abstraction. He at least suggests that the only ontological unity is an abstraction.

R. Three questions arise. Do I state that the only unity in Christ is an abstraction, that ~~the~~ in the abstract Christ is one, but in the concrete he is two? Next, do I provide a major premiss from which Fr. Perego might come to this conclusion? Thirdly, do I also provide a minor premiss to justify Fr. Perego's conclusion? I shall distinguish my answers by the letters, A, B, C.

A. Do I state that the only unity in Christ is an abstraction? I do not. Do I state that Christ is one in the abstract and two in the concrete? I do not.

B. Do I provide a major premiss for such an inference? Fr. Perego believes that I do. He finds it in my treatment of the question, *Quid in Christo homine significetur ut principium quod operetur*. ~~My answer~~ My answer is that the principium quod is to be conceived as the divine person, not apart from the natures, but with the natures. He notices that my first argument is that, to consider the person apart from the natures, is to consider an abstraction; abstractions neither exist nor operate; therefore the principium ~~quod~~ quod is not to be conceived as the person apart from the natures. From this he concludes ~~that~~ that, since the Word never operates apart from its natures, it is a pure ~~abstraction to think of the Word with reference to the~~



the Incarnation is a recent development. Developments take time to mature, and they should be allowed time to mature. According to a well-known principle theologians are not to demand of ~~each~~ one another more than the Church demands of all.

Such, to my mind, was and is the situation. My supplementary notes, De constitutione Christi, were concerned with the resultant speculative issues. There I distinguished two types of theory of consciousness: conscientia-experientia and conscientia-perceptio. On the former type of theory the subject is conscious because he is the one that exercises his own <sup>1</sup>sensitive and intellectual, direct and reflexive, apprehensive and appetitive acts. On the latter type of theory there is not any subject at all but ~~at~~ only a substance that knows; that substance is said to be conscious inasmuch as he becomes the object of some of his acts. I noticed that the former type of theory was held by Fr. Ternus but the latter was commonly assumed (without awareness of the existence of the former) by most theologians that had written on the issue. I did not attempt to settle the issue on philosophic or psychological grounds. I ~~■~~ set forth the ~~■~~ theological implications, first, of assuming consciousness to be experiential (pp. explained the meaning of saying that consciousness is experience and deduced its theological implications (pp. 83-128); I also revealed the influence of the view that consciousness is a perception on a series of authors (pp. 128-145); I had no doubt that merely exhibiting the two sets of consequences <sup>settle</sup> would set the issue (p. 83); I still have no doubt. The only way in which the parallelism of the ontological and the psychological statements can be maintained is to admit the existence of the subject.

De generali quaestionum consideratione in medio aevo.

1. M. J. Congar DTC 29 distinguit tria stadia theologiae mediaevalis.

- a) sub regimine grammaticae: ab Alcuin, col. 360 ss.
- b) sub regimine dialecticae: ab Abaelardo, col. 364 ss.
- c) sub regimine metaphysicae: col 374 ss.  
ultimum incipit cum Gulielmo Altissiodorensi, Philippo Cancellario; perficitur cum Alberto Magno et maxime Aquinate.

De quaestionibus quibusdam particularibus a PP consideratis.

1. Quam primum ponitur vel unica quaestio, logice iam implicatur totum illud quod de notione quaestionis exposuimus.

Attamen, nisi tempore longiore, hoc totum non perspicitur: apud PP generatim, ponuntur quaestiones particulares, quibus solutis oriuntur superiores et particulares

Neque ante medium aevum, neque in ipso medio aevo sine labore et maximo et diuturno, ad totalitatem quandam quaestionum considerandam perventum est (sunt sane initia quaedam, uti Ioan Dam, de fide orthodoxa).

2. Quaestio recurrens: an sunt duo dei.

Iust., Dial 58

Tert., adv. Prax.

Hipp., contra haer. Noeti

Orig., In Ioan., II 2

Novatianus

Dion. Rom., DB 48-51

Arius

Euseb. Caes.

Athan., de decr Nic syn, necessarium erat relinquere verba SSscr conciliabula ariana vel minus orthodoxa

*Helary, non in legendis sed in intelligendis - Eusebius: in legendis - ubi dicitur ad destinationem - hanc*

3. Quaestiones subintrantes: an Spiritus sanctus sit Deus?

An verbum Dei etiam sit homo? An habeat duas naturas, duas

voluntates, duas operationes, duas scientias, libertatem humanam?

An Spiritus etiam de Filio procedit?

4. Pelagianismus: tota series quaestionum; omnia quae respiciunt ordinem supernaturalem, methodum theologiam, libertatem, divinam providentiam, praedestinationem, reprobationem

Nisi in medio aevo non sunt inventae distinctiones systematicae evolutae inter habitum et actum, naturale et supernaturalis Gratia operans Theol Stud 1941, 1942

## De Notione Quaestionis.

1. Existit quaestio ubi adesse videntur rationes cogentes tam ad affirmandam quam ad negandam ~~unam~~ eandemque propositionem.

Ita Gilbertus Porreta, cf alios <sup>apud</sup> Congar DTC 29 371.

Etiam dici potest existere quaestio, ~~in~~ ubi ex una parte habetur fides certissima, et tamen ex alia parte habentur rationes insolutae ex ipsis fidei fontibus haustae.

2. Quaestio ita intellecta re vera est quaestionum quaedam series, neque resolvitur nisi per seriem quandam responsionum.

Non enim sufficit dicere, Est, est, Non, non; sed nisi rationes solvantur, conciliantur, quaestio manet; fides quaerit intellectum, etiam quando credit. Mt 5 37

Historice in ecclesia semper fuerunt qui respondere quaestionibus noluerunt;

tollitur haec dubitatio per concilium Vaticanum, DB 1796, inquantum rationalis est vel pia.

3. Quod valet de prima quaestione, non minus valere solet de quaestionum serie;

qui incipit quaestionibus respondere, vel sibi vel posteris quaestionum multitudinem parat;

quare, verbum Dei scriptum et traditum "tot tantosque continet thesauros veritatis, ut numquam reapse exhauriatur" AAS XLII(1950), 568

4. Responsa inter se ordinata distinguuntur inter terminos primitivos et derivatos, inter propositiones primitivas et derivatas. Technicam quandam adhibet derivationis: definitio ut ~~positio~~ termini ex primitivis derivantur; deductio ut ~~propositiones~~ ~~positio~~ ex primitivis derivantur.

Systema = primitivi termini, primitivae prop., technica derivat

5. Responsa inter se cohaerent quatenus, ~~in~~ ubi existit p?, non pari ratione affirmari possunt et p et  $\bar{p}$ .

6. Responsorum totalitas aut est clausa aut aperta.

Clausum est, si pro qualibet p?, aut concluditur p, aut concluditur  $\bar{p}$ . Scilicet, sine ulteriori distinctione, semper applicari potest principium medi ~~exclusi~~.

Aperta est si non excluduntur distinctiones superiores forte necessariae. Quo in casu ipsa responsorum totalitas revisioni cuidam subesse potest.

7. Responsorum totalitas habet sensum realem, ~~in~~ ubi ~~non~~ modo fundato distinguuntur entia realia et entia rationis, distinctiones reales et distinctiones rationis.

Semantica, metaphysica.

Secus, nihil refert utrum affirmatur p vel  $\bar{p}$ .

Scientia: concluditur.

Quaestio: introducitur.

1. Finis erat quaedam ignorantiae notitia. Consideravimus sex quae communiter asseruntur vel potius assumuntur. Omnia veritatem quamdam habent, et omnia qualificationem, reservationem quamdam[postulare videntur complementum quoddam].

2. Attamen hactenus non consideravimus nisi ignorantiam genericam: ut problema nostrum plenius cognoscamus, etiam ignorantiam specificam considerare debemus. Quare, agemus

a de notione quaestionis

b de quaestionibus quae ex doctrina NT oriuntur.

c de quaestionibus quibusdam particularibus a PP consideratis

d de generali quaestionum consideratione in medio aevo

e de problematibus quae ex medio aevo supersunt et etiam hodie radicalem solutionem seu methodolicam vix acceperunt

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First, what is our consciousness of our identity? Most of us have felt pain and decided to see a medical doctor. We are conscious of the pain, because we are the ones that exercise the act that is painful. We are conscious of our decision, because we are ~~them~~ ones that exercise the act of deciding. But how do we know, not by inference, not by any reflective process, but immediately that it is one and the same fellow that exercises both acts. After all, the acts are very different; feeling a pain is a sensitive and corporal act; making a decision is an intellectual and spiritual act; nor is the subject conscious of himself apart from his acts. Surely, ~~it is a very different thing~~ to be the subject of the misery of a pain is something altogether different from being the subject of an intelligent and reasonable <sup>e</sup> decision. Do not the facts force us to acknowledge two subjects: the subject in pain, and the subject deciding? After all, there never is any experience of a subject apart from some act; and so we arrive, not at the mere fallacy of relative names, but at the concrete problem of the phenomena of consciousness. ~~The experience~~

Criterion ordinationis novae.

1.      Concepimus ordinationem logicam scdm sequentia:
  - a      in omni actuali propositionum totalitate
  - b      supposita technica derivationis (definitio, derivatio)
  - c      distingui possunt terminos derivatos et non derivatos
  - d      distingui possunt propositiones derivatas et non derivatas
  - e      colligi possunt non derivata et nominari possunt primitiva
  - f      unde concipi potest systema seu totalitas virtualis propositionum quae determinatur per primitiva mediante technica derivationis eaque sola.

2.      Sed ulterius procedi potest ut concipiamus non solum systema sed etiam aliam totalitatem quae quaestionibus constat.

- a      Dicatur  $p$  propositio systematis si constat terminis systematis sive primitivis sive derivatis.
- b      Circa omne tale  $p$  quaeri potest utrum sit verum an falsum; quare, ubi est  $p$ , etiam est  $Qp$ .
- c      Unde concipi potest alia totalitas,  $SQp$ , quae omnibus quaestionibus in systemate possibilibus constat.
- d      Et comparari potest haec totalitas,  $SQp$ , cum totalitate systematis,  $SRp$ , quae his quaestionibus  $\propto$  respondet.

3.      Unde definitur systema clausum, ubi omnis quaestio possibilis resolvitur sive enuntiando propositionem primitivam sive applicando technicam derivationis eamque solam.  $SQp = SRp$ .

Et etiam definitur systema apertum, ubi plures sunt quaestiones possibiles quam responsa.  $SQp > SRp$ .

4.      Si scholasticos respicias, difficile determinatur quando fit transitus ex alia in aliam ordinationem.

Non enim explicite ponunt ordinationem logicam, sicut quodammodo fecerunt Euclides et Spinoza, enumerando primitivos terminos et primitivas propositiones, accurate determinando technicam derivationi terminorum et propositionum, et quaestiones solvendo per solam technicam derivationis. Systema logicum est aliquid implicitum, potentiale. Unde I BochenSKI opinatus est commissionem specialistarum intra duo vel tria saecula posse Summa<sup>m</sup> theologiae formalizare.

Admittunt principium medii exclusi (EpNp), hac tamen lege ut semper admittitur distinctio conveniens. Utrum vero distinctio praecontineatur in terminis primitivis, an nunc primo introducatur vix dici potest, cum enumeratio completa terminorum primitivorum non praesto est. Uti patet, per tales distinctiones fieri posse transitum realem ex una ordinatione in aliam.

Criterion ordinationis novae.

1. Concepimus ordinationem secundum sequentia:

a supposita technica derivationis (definitio, deductio)

b in omni totalitate propositionum actuali distingui possunt (1) termini primitivi et derivati (2) propositiones primitivae et derivatae [primitivum = non derivatum]

c unde concipi potest virtualis propositionum totalitas quae determinatur per primitiva (term et prop) mediante technica derivationis eaque sola. Quae totalitas nominatur systema, Sp.

2. Quibus positis, alia totalitas virtualis concipi potest, nempe, quaestionum, SQp.

a sit enim p propositio systematis si constat terminis systematis sive primitivis sive derivatis.

b circa omne tale p quaeri potest utrum sit verum vel falsum; non enim datur tertium, supposito EpNp seu principio medii exclusi. medium

3. Unde ulterior quaestio poni potest, nempe, utrum systema sit clausum an apertum.

Clausum est systema, ubi  $SQp = Sp$

Apertum est systema, ubi  $SQp \supset Sp$

Aliis verbis, systema est apertum vel clausum secundum quod intra systema poni possunt quaestiones quae intra systema vel solvi non possunt vel solvi possunt.