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


ready to affirm an intuition for which there is no evidence,  
one cannot say that we intuit existence. Unless one is ready  
to accept materialist or pragmatist or existentialist views  
on ~~the~~ existent<sup>t</sup>, what alternative has one left but to acknowledge  
once more the finality of the light of intellect within us,  
which is a participated similitude-of the uncreated light,  
and, like all the rest of creation<sup>\*</sup>, has a natural appetite for  
God. I thank you.

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
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H.B.

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In Insight you will find this radical rejection of essentialism worked out in detail. Judgement is, not synthesis, but positing or rejecting synthesis; it is not merely compositio vel divisio, but compositio per affirmationem vel divisio per negationem. Moreover, this positing or rejecting, this affirming or denying, always rests on contingent and concrete matters of fact. A necessary nexus does not suffice for an analytic principle; the terms of the principle in their defined sense, <sup>must</sup> ~~such~~, also occur in concrete judgements of fact. It follows that not only our knowledge of the concrete universe but also our knowledge of metaphysics is factual. And the theory is sufficiently refined to be able to do exact justice to <sup>the problems raised by</sup> ~~such apparent exceptions as~~ symbolic logic, mathematics, <sup>probable</sup> principles in the sciences, and the ontological arguments for God's existence.

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are presented to a subject, but also the presence of the subject to himself. One has to advert that cognitional activity is not merely a parade of objects, that there must also be a spectator of the parade, that to be the spectator it is not necessary to be one of the objects in the parade. Indeed, even when the spectator does become an object in the ~~parade,~~ parade, still he must remain spectator as well.

The presence, then, that is the most elementary aspect of consciousness is the presence of the spectator, the existence of the subject as subject. That presence is had, whether or not the subject also happens to be an object, whether or not the spectator, while remaining spectator, is also an object in the procession of objects.

I have been attempting to elaborate, to reason to, the concept of ~~experiential~~ presence. I have been doing so because we can communicate only through concepts. But, having done so, I must ~~now~~ draw attention to the psychological fallacy. Psychological description can occur only by using concepts, judgements, words; but it does not follow, indeed it is the psychological fallacy to assume that it does follow, that what the psychologist describes is a matter of concepts, judgements, words. Accordingly, while I have been using the tools of conception, judgement, and language, still the presence I have been attempting to indicate is the presence not of what is conceived, affirmed, spoken of, but the presence of the one who conceives, affirms, speaks.

