

I propose to distinguish these three statements: (1) the mere occurrence of the listed acts in Christ as man contains no actuation in the intentional order with respect to the Word; (2) acts that ~~contain~~ contain an actuation in the intentional order with respect to the Word are knowledge of God, sicuti est; (3) such acts are supernatural.

With regard to the first I grant that the envisaged acts do not regard the Word as object: the Word is not seen, heard, understood, judged. On the other hand, I deny that the envisaged acts do not regard the Word as subject: the Word as man is the one who sees, hears, understands, judges, and so on. Further, I deny that being the one who sees, hears, understands, judges, and so on, is not of the intentional order; on the contrary, I maintain that to be the one who performs such operations is to be conscious, a conscious subject, a psychological subject hears, understands, judges, and so on, is not of the intentional order; to see is of the same order as to be seen; to understand is of the same order as to be understood; and so on. Finally, I ~~deny~~ that the envisaged operations are actuations

cernere and discernere, cognoscere and dignoscere, Aquinas
concluded that Augustine meant 'quod anima per se cognoscit
se ipsam quasi praesentem, non quasi ab aliis distinctam.'

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Such, I believe, is the basic issue. A few years ago I set forth for my students an outline of my position.¹ I adopted what I refer to above as the second view, and my principal concern was to present and explain it, in so far as speculative theology treats such matters. Accordingly, while I consider the first view to be psychologically mere fiction and philosophically a disastrous naive realism, I did not attack it on ~~theistic~~ such grounds, but was content to set forth its theological consequences which, I held, were damning enough.

Somewhat my booklet has come to the attention of the Reverend A. Perego, and he has regaled the readers of Divinitas with an exposition and a criticism of my views.² The criticism is to the effect that the second view of consciousness is incomprehensible, that it makes consciousness non-intellectual, that it is contradicted by the explicit ~~teaching of St. Thomas, that while a similar doctrine can be found in Suarez and later writers~~ teaching of St. Thomas, that while some type of consciousness prior to reflexive activity must be admitted, still it is not consciousness in the proper sense of the word; ~~and~~ ^{and} further, my view of consciousness is incoherent, ^{and} my account of the human consciousness of Christ is inadequate. Besides these criticisms there is also the exposition. For the sake of simplicity it omits any account of my view of the problem; no doubt, that too is incomprehensible. It follows that the ~~at~~ problem I am supposed to be trying to solve is the problem that I hold not to exist. Moreover, to add interest to the proceedings, a misrepresentation of my views is introduced to prepare the way for the final criticism, which is a veiled

F) There remains the remark, 'Questa osservazione è di fondamentale importanza per cogliere il ~~par~~ pensiero del Lonergan sull' "io" di Cristo.'

I submit that my view on the illegitimate concept of principium quod has the same minor importance in my views on Christ, as St. Thomas' view on the illegitimate concept of 'man' has in St. Thomas' ~~anthropology, and psychology,~~ ~~and~~ Christology.

I further submit Fr. Perego's mistaken deductions from my repudiation of an illegitimate concept ~~as a result~~ result in a travesty of my position of the same magnitude as the travesty of St. Thomas' position that would be produced if, every ^{on} occasion St. Thomas employed the word, homo, it were explained that what St. Thomas really meant was a merely ideal man with real flesh and bones.

12) Let us now put the problem of an identical psychological subject ~~to~~ of both a divine and a human consciousness. It does not occur to Fr. Perego to put it but, I surmise, it offers some explanation of what he was up to in objection 11) above.

An object known by divine consciousness and an object known by human consciousness cannot be more than materially identical: i. e., the same object ontologically is known, but the mode, measure, and formality of the knowing is quite different.

But a psychological subject differs from an ontological subject by being known~~x~~ in consciousness.

Therefore, since the two instances of knowing as so different, it is impossible to have identically the same psychological subject in both the divine and the human

I suggest he read once more the reasons I gave above, B) and C), ~~for calling it nonsense~~. St. Thomas considers 'man' without flesh and bones to be an illegitimate abstraction, but it is nonsense to maintain that, when St. Thomas thinks of 'man' with flesh and bones, he means a merely abstract 'man' with real flesh and real bones.

E) Let us now turn to the duality. Christ as God and man is one person with two natures. The person is real and identical. The natures are real and really distinct. The person cannot be thought apart from the natures. There is a conceptual difference with a real foundation when one ~~things~~ thinks of 'Christ as God' and 'Christ as man': the difference is only conceptual, for there is only one Christ; it has a real foundation, for there are two real and really distinct natures.

Hence, when Fr. Perego attributes to me the view that 'la dualità in Cristo del principium quod, ~~del~~ del soggetto e dell' "io", sia nell'ordine ontologico come in quello psicologico, corrisponde alla realtà,...' he is ~~again~~ accusing me of theological error, and again its basis is misrepresentation. The duality of the principle, of the subject, of the ego, is a duality of concepts; it is a conceptual duality that does not correspond to two real principles, two real subjects, two real ego's; on the contrary, it is a duality ~~introducing~~ introduced in the concepts because of the reality of two natures, and the reality of a divine and a human consciousness.

its validity. If by the duality of the principium quod, subject, ego, it is meant that ~~that~~ I state repeatedly that in Christ there is one

R. I must begin by noting that I do not emply^o such
abstract speech as the duality of the subject

F) There remains the remark, 'Questa osservazione è di fondamentale importanza per cogliere il pensiero del Lonergan sull' "io" di Cristo.' I observe (1) that it is not of fundamental importance, (2) that I did not say it is of fundamental importance, (3) that Fr. Perego offers no proof that it is of fundamental importance, (4) that Fr. Perego cannot prove it is presented by me as a matter of fundamental importance

(10) Fr. Perego further urges that, if Christ as man in exercising his sensitive and intellectual acts, is conscious of himself, then these acts must be supernatural. But I provide no supernatural elevation for these acts. Therefore, my view must be inadequate.

R. Fr. Perego needs a new principle, actus specificantur per subiectum. I do not say that Christ is conscious of himself because he knows a supernatural object. I say that Christ is conscious of himself because he, the Son of God, is the one who exercises his own acts.

(11) We now come to the accusation of heresy. It is developed ^{a veiled} in the second part of the exposition from the beginning of the last paragraph on page 412 to the middle of page 413. It is reaffirmed in the third part of the exposition in the last paragraph on page 415 running over to page 416. It is the topic of the fourth objection and the peroration on pages 423 and 424.

I note that in these passages there is not a single textual citation and there is no effort to state by formal argument the connection Fr. Perego claims to see between what I say and what he claims I mean. ^{the reader is} What I am given is a gradual transformation that begins from what corresponds to my views and ends up with statements that I did not make and I did not imply.

~~This is a source of error that is here~~

~~And this is the error of the same passages~~

of page 413 to the end of the section ~~of~~ on page 414. It forms the basis of the last objection on pages 423 and 424.

The root difficulty is, I should say, that Fr. Perego does not understand what I mean by consciousness, what I mean by subject, or how I conceive a subject to be conscious of himself. The corollary is that he cannot conceive how I conceive the subject's awareness of his own identity in his many acts. Thus, I as intelligent understand; I as sensitive feel; but how do I know that it is the same 'I' that understands and feels. On Fr. Perego's view, no doubt, I have a reflexive intuition of my identity. But on my view such reflexive intuitions are just nonsense

Perhaps ~~to~~ the only way to deal with this objection is to distinguish its various components. I shall first repeat the component and then give the distinction.

(a) ~~The~~ mere occurrence of the listed acts in Christ as man contains no actuation of the intentional order with respect to the Word.

I grant that there is no actuation in the intentional order with respect to the Word as object, as *intencio intenta*. I deny that there is no actuation in the intentional order with respect to the Word as subject, as *intendens*.

In other words, it is not contended that the Word is seen, imagined, understood, affirmed, or the like. It is contended that the Word as man is the one who sees, imagines, understands, affirms, and so forth.

Further, it is maintained that *intendere* and *intendi*, seeing and being seen, imagining and being imagined, understanding and being understood, affirming and being affirmed, are equally of the intentional order.

Similarly, it is maintained that the envisaged acts of seeing and so forth are acts, not only of the objects seen, etc., but also of the subject seeing, ~~and~~ etc.

It follows that these acts, occurring in the Word as man, are actuations in the intentional order ~~that regard~~ the subject of the acts, namely, the Word as man.

(b) An actuation in the intentional order with respect to the Word is knowledge of God, *sicuti est*.

It is knowledge of the second person of the Blessed Trinity, I distinguish, in his divine nature, I deny, in

of page 413 to the end of the section on page 414. It forms the topic of the last objection and peroration on pages 423 and 424.

I note that in these ~~pages~~ passages the views attributed to me ~~are~~ are not substantiated either by textual citations or by formal deductions from textual citations. What the reader is offered ~~is~~ is an interpretation that claims to reach the real root of my position.

I also note that the views attributed to me are phrased somewhat ambiguously: on the surface they are heretical; but Fr. Perego does not say that they are heretical, and their ambiguity leaves it open to him to claim that it never entered his mind that he was accusing a professor of theology at the Gregorian of heretical doctrine.

Finally, I note that the issues involved are quite complicated, so that all in all Fr. Perego had the best of reasons for expecting that it would be about impossible to pin him down. Let us see what can be done.

(12) ~~I quote: 'Perché è pura astrazione pensare la persona del Verbo senza riferimento alle sue nature (p. 118).'~~

R. First, I distinguish the statement in three ways, and then I offer an analogy.

One may (1) think of the person of the Word and exclude both his natures, (2) ~~think of the person of the Word and not mention his natures~~

R. The expression, subject as subject, is doubly ambiguous, and so the solution has to come in two quite different parts.

First, by subject as subject there may be meant the familiar Scholastic reduplication. If so, I deny the minor premiss. Consciousness, properly so called, is not knowledge by the reduplicated concepts of Scholasticism.

Secondly, subject as subject may be taken as a term in psychological description, and then it is used in opposition to the term, subject as object. Thus, in describing reflexive intellectual activity, I may say that John Hancock attends to himself, understands himself, conceives himself, thinks of himself, affirms himself, speaks of himself. Then, the subject as subject is the one who attends, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ understands, ~~xx~~ conceives, thinks, ~~xxx~~ affirms, speaks; but the subject as object is what he attends to, understands, conceives, thinks about, affirms, ~~xxxxxx~~ talks about.

In this usage

3. Comparantur diversa fundamentorum genera.

a) Sufficit primum fundamentorum genus,

ubi constat de primitivis terminis et propositionibus

ubi non quaeritur cur ita constet, cur mens illis assentiatur,

ubi non quaeritur quoddam Qp quod solvi non potest intra illud system

b) Sufficit alterum fundamentorum genus,

ubi constat de primis conceptibus et de primis iudiciis

ubi non quaeritur utrum primi conceptus futura evolutione non
forte sint corrigendi (eg triangulus [Euclidianus])

3. Comparantur diversa genera fundamentorum quoad sufficientiam.

a) Quamdiu inquisitio permanet in unico quodam binario eoque fixo et immutabili, quodlibet e tribus generibus sufficit

proceditur enim ex propositionibus primitivis in derivatis^a
vel ex principiis primis in conclusiones
vel in augmentum quoddam scientiae

b) Quam primum ad problemata paulo complexiora attenditur, elucet solum tertium genus sufficere posse

non existit logica
quasi mechanica
de multis simul
argumentis

- 1) ubi argumenta in unum coalescunt ex diversis fontibus
- 2) ubi intelligibilitas apprehenditur non nec essaria sed contingens et vera (empirica lex) convenientia)
- 3) ubi inquisitio est de concretis qua concretis: uti in re historica, vel in relatione inter scientiam eruditam et concretam hominis vitam magna ex parte sensibilem
- 4) ubi ordinationes sunt multae, ubi perficiuntur, ubi inter se pugnant

non nova applicatio rem
universalis
et particularis

evolventur et

c) Tertium genus concordat cum modo loquendi in Vaticano adhibito, DB 1796, 1800.

d) Tertium genus est modus procedendi S. Thomae.

Sum. theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4m

Argumenta concurrunt ex diversis fontibus: C Gent

In singulis articulis, non agitur de simplici quadam applicatione technicae derivationis, sed tota quaedam sapientia operatur ea seligens et proponens quae ad quaestionem praesentem requiri et sufficere videantur

Unde evolutio facilis: si fundamentum est sapientia, cogitatio est essentialiter dinamica, versatilis; synthesis stat, non in 24 thesibus, non in libro quodam qui extrahit essentiam cogitationis S. Thomae eamque ordine logico proponit, sed in ipsa sapientia quam habuit Aquinas.

4. Attamen sunt inconvenientia, difficultates.] ad alia scit

Sapientia omnia ordinat iudicat quia singula in se et in relatione

Si sapientia est sufficiens omnium fundamentum, tamen habetur non ante inquisitionem et investigationem sed potius post solutionem inventam et certo cognitam. Fundat enim, non per modum praeiacentis lapidis, sed per modum finis, fructus perfecti

Non enim nascimur sapientes; neque naturali quadam necessitate fimus sapientes; neque externa qualibet actione ad sapientiam acquirendam efficaciter cogi possumus.

Ergo ex insipientia in sapientiam progredimur; sed si insipientia dirigit, numquam in finem sapientiae perveniemus; quod luculenter explicat cur tot sint diversae sententiae de omni fere quaestione.

Pariter ubi ex minori quadam sapientia in maiorem progredi volumus, mensura et criterion maioris in minori inveniri non potest; secus ultra minorem numquam progrediemur.

Si sumitur sapientia pro fundamento, conversio intellectualis requiritur: non securitas in paucis quibusdam principiis bene cognitis, et iudicia temere prolata de aliis omnibus; sed desiderium ut quis fiat sapiens, diligentia in mediis adhibendis, indifferentia de laudibus multitudinis, conscientia responsibilitatis intellectualis

Problema historicitatis: radix.

1. Si conceptus procedunt ex rebus, si intelligentia procedit ex conceptibus comparatis, nulla haberi potest historicitas in conceptibus fundamentalibus.

Si autem conceptus procedunt ex actibus intelligendi, si actus intelligendi procedunt ex actibus π imaginandi, progrediēte imaginatione, proficit intelligentia, et proficiente intelligentia evolvuntur conceptus.

2. Si scientia est de universalibus et necessariis, cum historia fere fota est in particularibus et contingentibus, re vera nulla est scientia de rebus historicis et nulla concipi potest solutio problematis historicitatis.

Sin autem scientia est de concretis et convenientibus, cum historia sit in concretis et convenientibus, habetur scientia de historicis et concipi potest solutio problematis historicitatis.

NB Aristoteles docuit scientiam in potentia esse 1087a 15f de universalibus sed in actu esse de particularibus. Met M 10
Quod necessarium est cum intelligere occurrat radicatus relate ad phantasmata.

Aristoteles docuit scientiam esse de necessariis, nullam esse scientiam de 'per accidens' (Met E)

Unde recte concludi potest

- a argumentum convenientiae esse argumentum quod non probat
- b theoria^m probabilitatis non esse theoriam
- c scientias empiricas non esse scientias
- d ordinem naturalem et ordinem supernaturalem esse non solum distinctos sed etiam nullo nexu intelligibili unitos
- e mathesin modernam non esse scientiam