Such propositions or truths, however, fall into two classes. Some are per <u>s</u> se nota quoad nos; others are per se nota not quoad <u>nos</u> but only <u>quoad se</u>. For a proposition or truth to be <u>per se</u> <u>notum quoad nos</u> two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the predicate must be <u>de ratione subjecti</u> and (2) we must know <u>de praedicato</u> <u>et subjecto quid sit</u>.

Now both the propositions, <u>Deus est</u>, <u>Verbum est</u>, are <u>per se nota</u>. For in both the predicate is <u>de ratione subjecti</u>. As God is identical with his <u>esse</u>, so also the divine Word is identical with the same <u>esse</u>.

However, in this life we do not know <u>quid sit Deus</u>, for that would be to know God by his essence, and to know God by his essence is to enjoy the vision of the blessed in heaven.¹¹ But the divine Word is God. Hence, as we do not know <u>quid sit</u> <u>Deus</u>, so also we do not know <u>quid sit Verbum</u>.

Accordingly, for St. Thomas, just as <u>Deus est</u>, so also <u>Verbum est</u>, is indeed <u>per se notum</u> but only <u>cuoad se</u> and not <u>quoad nos</u>. Moreover, as all pure perfections are identical with God, so there can be no valid ontological arguments based upon any pure perfection: we can have analogical knowledge of pure perfections but, in this life, we cannot know <u>quid sit</u> <u>perfectio pura</u>.

There can be, I believe, no doubt that the foregoing answer is adthentically Thomist. At the same time if it invites a few reflections that take us beyond comparison with the <u>Proslogion</u> to a comparison with the <u>Monologian</u>.

First, there are operative in the Thomist text propositions that are per se note not only guoad nos but also guoad set. Aquinas was a theologian and he wrote not anthropocentrically

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There can be no doubt, I think, that the foregoing answer is authentically Thomist. The interesting fact is that it reveals the difference not only between Thomist thought and the onitological argument of the Proslogion but also between Thomist thought and the trinitarian speculation of the Monologion. St. Anselm and, it would seem, Dom Vagaggini did not advert to the distinction between guidditative and analogous conception or knowledge. For Aquinas a truth is per se nota quoad nos only if two conditions are fulfilled and, moreover, the second condition is never fulfilled once one moves beyond the range of the proper object of human intellect in this life, the guidditas seu natura in materia corporali exsistens. 12 Neither in our natural knowledge of God nor in our theological knowledge do we know <u>quid sit;</u> all we have is (1) analogous concepts, (2) the prima principia intellectus, (2) demonstrations from effects, and (4) congruent suppositions that are demonstrable neither on the basis of natural knowledge nor on the basis of revealed knowledge. Because all our knowledge of God in this life is limited by its use of analogy, it follows rigorously that "tanto in hac vita Deum 🛊 perfectius cognoscimus, quanto magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu comprehenditur. Because trinitarian speculation is entirely a matter of advancing congruent hypotheses, it is demonstrable neither on the basis of rer natural knowledge nor on the basis of revealed knowledge; for a demonstration argues: if P then Q; but P; therefore Q; but a congruent hypothesis cannot do better than: if P then Q; but Q; so perhaps P.14

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It is true, of course, that one has to be a technically competent Aristotelian to understand what Aquinas means by quid sit.

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