

omnes quaestiones quae oriuntur quando supponitur falsum,
uti ~~conferi~~ conscientiam esse obiecti perceptionem, conscientiam
esse introspectionem (reflexionem), conscientiam esse quamlibet
sui cognitionem, subiectum psychologicum identificari cum
natura subiecti, subiectum psychologicum non identificari cum
persona. Falso enim supposito, sequitur quodlibet.

In the sixth place, there are systematic misinterpretations of the history of doctrine. ¶ Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur. If one considers the ratio necessaria to be the sole type of intelligibility, one is hard put to ~~try~~ interpret Crede ut intelligas as anything but Crede ut demonstras. One can hardly envisage the possibility that Crede ut intelligas relates faith to the natural ideal of understanding. One will not be prone to regard an author's search for rationes necessariae as an unfortunate effect of his age in which ^{not only} the general level of learning and of technical competence was low, ^{but also} ~~in which~~ fundamental theorems regarding the entitative distinction between faith and reason, grace and nature, ~~charity and human good will, merit before God and the good opinion of men,~~ had not yet been developed and formulated. Such complexity is all a little superfluous in a mind that sees no difference between intelligibility and necessity. Rather one will tend, when one finds anything that looks like a syllogism, to conclude that the author must be attempting to set forth a ratio necessaria, to proceed from philosophic premisses to philosophic conclusions. What else could he be doing? It may happen that the author in question says he is doing something ~~is~~ quite different. But the fact ~~that~~ that he says so only provides a contradiction to be explained.

~~But perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the Thomist doctrine of intellect, of human understanding and its expression in inner words, not only may prove to be extremely rich in its content and implications but also may be found to differ somewhat from the views that at times are assumed to be Thomist.~~

5. Quinta quam defendimus sententia (1) negat conscientiam esse perceptionem, (2) distinguit (a) conscientiam, (b) introspectionem sive vulgarem sive methodicam, (c) cognitionem sui, (3) identificat personam et subiectum ^{dormientem}psychologicum in potentia, (4) identificat personam vigilantem et subiectum psychologicum in actu