

Critique of Pure Reason denies the absolute objectivity of mere thoughts as well as the absolute objectivity of sense; it fails to discover either the structure of human knowledge or the structure of its objectivity; it settles for the normative objectivity of a transcendental logic that is claimed, mistakenly, to validate human cognitional activity with respect to a world of possible experience.

Seventhly, confronted with phenomenism and idealism, the cognitional atomist naturally enough claims for his position the argument that it is realist.

Seventhly, confronted with phenomenism and idealism, the cognitional atomist will claim that his position is realist. Such a claim is true. But the cognitional atomist may also make the further claim that his position is the sole possible realism. Such a claim is neither self-evident nor demonstrated nor true. It is not self-evident, for cognitional atomism is no more self-evident than ontological atomism. It is not demonstrated, for a demonstration would presuppose the premise that set forth the complete list of possible philosophic positions. Such a list the cognitional atomist is not able to conceive let alone establish. Finally, it is not true, for cognitional atomism is false, and the only possible realisms are not all false would be extremely difficult to conceive and still more difficult to establish; and cognitional atomism, so far from achieving anything difficult, is essentially a matter of blurring distinctions and evading ~~avoiding~~ difficulties

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Seventhly, confronted with phenomenalism and idealism, the cognitional ~~an~~ atomist will praise his position as realist. Such praise is allowable. But he may also make the extravagant ~~claim~~ claim that his position ~~is~~ is the sole possible realism. While this claim is in character, it cannot be ~~that~~ allowed. It is in character for, like cognitional atomism, it is an over-simplification: as the cognitional atomist blandly disregards the facts of cognitional activity and can entertain nothing but the most confused notions on objectivity, so also he takes for granted that a mere imaginative scheme, placing realism as a middle between the extremes of idealism and ~~an~~ nominalism, is not a mere imaginative scheme but a self-evident or demonstrated disjunction setting forth the full range of possible philosophic positions.

idealist denies the absolute objectivity of mere thoughts to acknowledge the normative objectivity ~~as~~ expressed in a logic but, no more than the phenomenalist, does he discover rationality and rational judgement as the carrier of an absolute objectivity in contingent matters of fact. Finally, the existentialist <sup>an</sup> pulls down the idealist houses: a logic is merely ~~the~~ expression of normative objectivity, and there are many such expressions; normative objectivity itself is prior to its expressions; it lies in the exigence of the tragic subject for authentic being; but just what that exigence has to do with objectivity is not dis-covered.

Seventhly, there remains the question about the unilinear scheme. When it is asserted that realism is a middle position between the two extreme positions, idealism and nominalism, is there offered anything more than a device invented for an occasion? Or are we to consider ourselves in the presence of a definitive statement of the totality of possible philosophies