

philosophies. For a realist philosophy posits a correspondence between human knowing and reality. But human knowing may be thought to be structured and it may be thought to be atomistic. The two views of human knowing differ all along the line. By the realist principle of correspondence there will follow quite different views of reality. Realism, then, is a genus of philosophies with the common ~~xx~~ feature

philosophies. For the general principle of realism is the affirmation of truth as the correspondence between knowledge and reality. From this principle of correspondence as major premiss and from a minor premiss, such and such is knowledge, one reaches the conclusion, such and such is reality.

Fifthly, the structure of knowledge and of objectivity is relevant to an understanding of the multiplicity of realist philosophies. For, obviously, this multiplicity does not arise from a plurality of real worlds, so that Thomism is true of one real world, Scotism is true of another real world, etc. Obviously, again, this multiplicity does not arise from any dispute about the definition of truth: all realists define truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality. The many realisms result from many accounts of knowledge and the many accounts of knowledge result from cognitive atomism. universal objects.

For example, we think ~~about universal realities~~. But a cognitive atomist has to affirm that such thinking is objective knowing or ~~x~~ else he must deny that thinking is a cognitive activity. It follows, on the first alternative, that thinking universal objects is knowing universal realities; on the second alternative, it follows that thinking is not a cognitive activity. A structural view of knowledge eliminates the dilemma: thinking is a cognitive activity with its proper objectivity, which is normative; but thinking is not knowing but only a component within knowing.

Again, we think of particular objects that do not exist. On cognitive atomism, such thinking has to be an objective knowing, or else thinking cannot be a cognitive activity. On the former alternative, there follows the view that there are non-existent realities, namely, the possibles.

Again, not only do we know that X exists when we make a true existential judgement, but also, prior to making that judgement, we think about the existence of X and ask whether X does or does not exist. On cognitive atomism, either thinking

philosophies. For the general principle of realism is the affirmation of truth as a correspondence between knowing and the real. But this general principle has quite different consequences when different accounts of knowledge arise. Thus, if human knowledge is structural, then there will be one and only one principal meaning of the word, real; that meaning will be id quod est; and every other meaning will be in terms of that principal meaning, so that ens est cui suo modo competit esse. On the other hand, if human knowledge is atomistic, then every distinct cognitional activity ~~has~~<sup>an</sup> must be objective knowing to which corresponds an appropriate reality; basically, the words, real, reality, are equivocal; and it is the task of ontology to proceed from that set of equivocations to the apprehension of a single real world.

Thus, we have quoted M. M. Gorce to the effect that sensible knowledge possesses an absolute value, a value independent of the mind of man. Now every cognitional atomist that accepts the realist principle of correspondence has to agree with that view. Either sensitive activity is knowing or it is not; either that knowing is objective or it is not. Both disjunctions are complete on atomist suppositions

Fifthly, there follows the possibility of many realist philosophies. Obviously, this possibility cannot be derived from a plurality of real worlds, that there is one real world of which Thomism is the correct account, and quite another real world of which Scotism is the correct account. Again, this possibility cannot be derived from different views about truth: in general, realist philosophies all acknowledge that truth is the correspondence of knowledge to reality. It remains, then, that the many realist philosophies result from different accounts of what knowledge is