

philosophies. For the general principle of realism is the affirmation of truth as the correspondence between knowledge and reality. But one and the same principle of correspondence yields quite different consequences

Fifthly, the structure of knowledge and the structure of objectivity are no less relevant to understanding the multiplicity of realisms. For, obviously, this multiplicity cannot be derived from a plurality of real worlds, so that Thomism would be true of one real world, Scotism of another real world, etc. Again, the multiplicity cannot be derived from any dispute about the definition of truth:
~~noncorrespondence between knowledge and reality~~: all realists define truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality. It remains, then, that differences between realists are, at root, differences in cognitional theory; and major differences in cognitional theory

Fifthly, the structure of knowledge and of its objectivity is relevant to an understanding of the multiplicity of realisms. For, obviously, this multiplicity does not arise from a plurality of real worlds, so that Thomism is true of one real world, Scotism is true of another real world, etc. Obviously, again, the multiplicity does not arise from any dispute about the definition of truth: all realists define truth as the correspondence ~~between~~ of knowledge to reality. It remains, then, that differences between realists are, at root, differences in cognitional theory; and, as shortly we shall see, differences in cognitional theory can be reduced to the opposition between structured and atomistic accounts of human knowledge.

Sixthly