

this difficulty as best we may, we propose to begin from a note on linguistic differences and then proceed from more integrated to more atomistic views.

Linguistic differences reduce to the principle that the part is not the whole. When an Aristotelian denies that prime matter is a thing, he does not mean that prime matter is nothing; he means that it is a part but only a part of a thing, and that a part is not the whole. The same principle has the same consequences, when knowing is believed to have a structure. For on that view it is not this or that cognitional activity that is knowing but only an appropriate combination of cognitional activities. Where a cognitional atomist would say that seeing is knowing, understanding is knowing, conceiving is knowing, and judging is knowing, because on his atomistic view knowing is a name denoting a common feature found in each and every cognitional activity. Thus, a cognitional atomist would have to say that either conceiving is knowing or else it is not a valid cognitional activity; for on his view, the name, knowing, denotes a common feature found in each and every cognitional activity.

It remains, then, that the source of structural differences in cognitive theory has to be sought in the account of cognitive acts. And while, as we have already intimated, the ultimate source of such difficulties lies in theories of objectivity, still this fact will be all the clearer if we begin by noticing other, minor sources of disagreement. These minor sources are of two kinds: the first is the difficulty of the inquiry into cognitive acts; the second is the use of mistaken methods.

A first difficulty is ~~xxx~~ the psychological fallacy. When a psychologist describes, say, an emotion, his description is conceptual; the psychological fallacy is to conclude that emotions are concepts or conceptual; they are nothing of the sort. Similarly, when a cognitive theorist describes experience or consciousness or inquiry or understanding or reflection or grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence, the description necessarily is ~~a~~ conceptual; the psychological fallacy is to conclude that these activities are conceptual; they are nothing of the sort. So it is that people with merely bookish knowledge of knowledge are apt to think it ^{or mostly} entirely as a matter of concepts. ~~xx~~ When they write books and treatises on rational psychology, the simple and obvious facts of inquiry and insight, of reflection and reflective understanding, simply have vanished. Experiencing, ~~understanding~~ thinking, and knowing are, for them, all instances of knowing. To see colours and hear sounds is not just experiencing; it is knowing colours and sounds; thinking is not just thinking, but it is knowing what is possible or else knowing essences; nor can they manage to get straight the difference between grasping a synthesis, as in propounding an ~~a~~ hypothesis or

in reciting another's opinion without judging it and, on the other hand, positing or rejecting, affirming or denying a synthesis, which alone is judgement.

A second difficulty is connected with the first. To avoid the psychological fallacy in reading a psychologist's description of an emotion, one has to interpret his concepts in terms of one's own emotive ~~xxx~~ experiences; to avoid the psychological fallacy in reading a description of colour and seeing, one has to interpret the concepts employed in the description in terms of one's own visual experiences; to avoid the psychological fallacy in reading a description of insight, one has to interpret the concepts employed in terms of one's own experience of understanding. This, of course, is easy when the topic is ^c colour and seeing, for one can procure or banish it oneself the experience at will by the simple business of opening and closing one's eyes. But it is not easy ~~x~~ when the topic is understanding: if we take ~~xxxx~~ instances that habitually we understand, then it is extremely difficult to notice the act of understanding and to distinguish it from other concomitant acts; and if we take instances that we do not habitually understand, then we have to go through the laborious process of learning. By far the simplest course is either to disregard understanding altogether or else to relegate it to the limbo of disputed questions. In the latter case, understanding, however interesting and stimulating a topic it may provide, at least cannot ^{be considered} provide a solid basis for a sane philosophic position. This latter case, however, arises only if one refuses to take the trouble to learn something fresh for the sake of a clear experience of understanding.

A third difficulty rises on the second. Knowing our knowledge is involved in a ~~system~~ species of vicious circle. If one knows that our knowledge is a structure of acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging, then one easily concludes that to know our cognitional acts one must ~~must~~ operate, first, on the level of experience by adverting to different types of act occurring in consciousness, secondly, on the level of intelligence by grasping and defining the partial and ~~simple~~ complementary functions of the different types and, thirdly, on the level of rational reflection by asking and determining whether the account of the structured whole at which one has arrived is true. However, this excellent programme can be outlined, not by an inquirer into human knowledge, but only by someone that already knows very precisely what human knowing is. The inquirer is in a very different box. Because he does not yet know the structure of human knowing, he will be likely to use the verb, know, indiscriminately. For him to know his cognitional activities, it will be quite enough to experience them more or less distinctly. Since by experiencing them he knows them, understanding will not be for him an essential part of human knowing. Since he does not have to understand to know, he will make no effort to grasp the partial and complementary functions fulfilled within human knowing by sense and consciousness, by ~~xxx~~ inquiry and insight, by thinking and reflecting, by grasping the sufficiency of the evidence and judging. ~~xx~~ So it is that ignorance of the structure of human knowledge blocks the discovery of that structure.

Besides these three difficulties, there is another minor source of difference in cognitional theory. It is the use of mistaken methods. Just as a blind man by inference and analogy can arrive at some knowledge of seeing and colour, so a misguided man will ~~man~~ attempt to know his own intelligence and rationality as though he were determining the nature of the divine or the angelic intellect. He proceeds by inference: there are universal terms; therefore there must be universal concepts; there are universal propositions; therefore there must ~~x~~ occur a putting together of universal concepts; but sense does not know the universal; therefore there is an intellect. He proceeds by analogy: as sense stands to particulars, intellect stands to universals; as sight sees colours, so intellect analogously may be said to see both universals and the nexus between ~~x~~ universals.