

and judgements. It is formally dynamic inasmuch as inquiry promotes subject and object from the animal level to the level of thought, and reflection promotes the subject from intellectual to rational consciousness and, by the same stroke, promotes objects of thought to objects of human knowledge.

Moreover, this dynamic structure is itself a factor in human knowing. We have said that the materials of sense are synthesized by understanding and thought ^{for the synthesis} to be posited or rejected by judgement. But, far more naturally, we would say that what is sensed, is to be understood; and what is understood, is to be affirmed or denied. From the beginning the end is intended, and ~~that~~ the identity of that end is the "what" that is sensed to be understood, and understood to be affirmed or denied. That identical end ~~is~~ commonly is named ens, a being, some part or aspect of the real. But what in judgement is known, in thinking is merely thought; and what in thinking is merely thought, in the initial instance of inquiry is not yet ^{even} ~~thought~~ ^{only somehow} but by conscious ignorance, intended. There is then a notion of being, a concept of being, and knowledge of being. The notion, but not the concept, is ~~had~~ ~~acquired~~ by inquiry, by the Aristotelian wonder ~~that~~ ^{it} is the beginning of all science and philosophy. The concept, but no knowledge, is had in all thinking. To know we have to judge. But what we know, when we affirm, Est, that we intended when we asked, An sit, that again we thought when we conceived id quod or id quo, and that thought we intended when, with respect ~~to~~ to the object of sense, we asked, Quid sit.

Finally, as the dynamic structure in knowledge is a factor in knowledge, so that factor can be exploited. Its exploitation is a heuristic structure. Specialized to specific

cult of sacred numbers, not only astronomy but also astrology, not only chemistry but also alchemy, not only history but also legend and, generally, not only what will turn out to be true but also ~~what~~ what will turn out to be false. If I sense and understand and think, but someone else weighs the evidence and judges, still this leaves me only with thoughts. By reflection on what I sense and understand and think, I have to take ~~me~~ myself beyond the level of mere thinking to the level of weighing the evidence and, on that basis, judging.

It would seem cognitional activity manifests a twofold structure. There is the structure of the subject. In so far as I sense, I am present to myself sensing; but in so far as I am sensing without inquiry or reflection, my presence to myself is not ^{an} more than animal's presence to itself. In so far as I not only sense but also inquire, I am present to myself not only empirically in animal fashion but also as intelligent, ~~as~~ as striving to understand. In and through inquiry intellectual consciousness ~~that~~ supervenes upon empirical consciousness, and the subject is promoted from the subjectivity of an animal to the subjectivity of a thinker. Again, in so far as I not only ~~think~~ sense and inquire and think but also reflect on my thinking, I am present to myself as rational, as seeking truth, as subject to the peculiar and exacting demands of truth. In and through reflection rational consciousness supervenes upon intellectual and empirical consciousness, and the subject is promoted from the subjectivity of the thinker to the subjectivity of the knower. Still, there are not three subjects, but only one; and there are not three instances of consciousness, but only ^{none the less, that} one; ~~xxxxxxx~~ one is not a simple unity but a structured unity, a whole.

Moreover, just as we have deduced the formal and the proper objects of human intellect from our knowledge of human knowledge, so also the structure of the ~~proportionate~~ realm of being, proportionate to human knowledge, can be deduced. For every cognitional activity has its object, and the two are correlative: one cannot define seeing without appealing to colour; and one cannot know colour without seeing. Moreover, cognitional activities are cognitional in so far as they are functional parts within a determinate structure. It follows that the objects, correlative to the several activities, will be known only inasmuch as the activities are