

denies the identity but asserts the correspondence of activities and objects; from correspondence there follow both the need of an argument, for there are two structures, and the validity of the argument, for activities correspond ~~not~~ to their objects. The argument breaks down only if ~~not~~ there is no structure in human knowing, as in cognitional atomism, or if activities and objects ~~not~~ do not even correspond, as in scepticism.

Objectivity

We have spoken of structure, cognitional structure, subject and object, and so we have arrived at the question of objectivity, of the relation between subject and object, of valeur. At once we must note that the question can be taken in many ways.

The key question is why are "is known" and "is" equivalent, or why are "is known to be so" and "is so" equivalent. This question ^{regards} ~~is~~ the truth of rational judgement. A realist will contend that veritas formaliter est in solo iudicio intellectus and that veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Together these affirmations imply that, when one judges truly, then one is entitled to say not merely that this horse is known to exist but that this horse exists, or again not merely that this horse is legitimately affirmed to be black but that this horse is black. No doubt, we naturally assume that whatever we know, if truly we know, really is. The key question of objectivity regards the validity of that assumption.

This question can be answered ontologically. One presupposes an ontological theory both of our knowing and of the universe. From that theory one deduces both the possibility of a correspondence between the reality of things and the activities of knowing and, further, the precise causal process in which that correspondence

occurs. Such an answer need not detain us: on the one hand, it is ~~the only~~ an essential part of a complete answer for without a theory of the universe one cannot assign the ultimate ground of the possibility of a correspondence κ between finite knowledge and reality and, further, without an ontological account of cognitional activity one cannot treat of cognitional activity as part of a causal process. On the other hand, an ontological answer presupposes valid knowledge of ontology, and valid knowledge of ontology presupposes valid knowledge. The key question is prior to ontology and the answer to the key question has to be presupposed by an ontology.

Secondly, the key question can be raised and answered in purely cognitional terms. Such a treatment presupposes the transition from substance to subject and a theory of knowledge based on the reality of the subject as subject and of his acts as conscious events. Within that precisely delimited field one can distinguish three meanings of the term, objectivity. There is an experiential objectivity and it is manifested by the appeal to data. You say, for instance, that my hand is white; look, it is pink. There is a normative objectivity and it is manifested by an appeal to rules, canons, necessities, inevitabilities. You say, for instance, that no valid proposition regards all classes; but what you say is a proposition, and it regards all classes; therefore it asserts its own invalidity, and so it is self-destructive. Finally, there is an absolute objectivity in the order of matters of fact. You say, for instance, that this is a ~~wolf~~ wolf. But are you certain? Might it not be a dog?

Thirdly, the key question can be transposed to the level of symbolic thought. Reality lies outside. Knowing occurs inside. What is the bridge over which one marches when one passes from ~~knowing to being, from "is known" to "is"?~~ ~~As the question, so also the answer will be symbolic~~ inside to outside? As the question is symbolic, so also is the answer. The purely ontological and ~~is~~ the purely cognitional aspects of the issue merge. It can and does happen that the symbol is identified with the symbolized and, at that point, we pass from symbolic to mythic thinking. Arguments and counter-arguments continue, and so mythic thinking becomes ideology.

Earlier we asked a number of questions about valeur. It is now possible to indicate our answers. First of all, just as ~~our~~ our knowing is a structure, so also the objectivity of our knowing has distinct and complementary aspects: objectivity is not just a matter of data, nor just a matter of norms, nor just a matter of ~~an~~ an absolute, but a structured compound of all three. Secondly, what is not objective, is not cognitional; ~~and what is not cognitional, has no bearing on the purely cognitional question of objectivity.~~ This mutual conditioning is the trap that tends to make mistakes incorrigible: overlook an aspect of objectivity and you exclude the cognitional character of an activity, pay no attention to the activity, and so have no chance to discover the aspect of objectivity that you overlooked; inversely, overlook ~~an~~ a component in cognitional activity and you exclude an aspect of objectivity; then, even if you advert to the activity, your

Symbol, Myth, Ideology

A symbol is an affect-laden image that conveys^y a meaning and thereby mediates an apprehension of values. Myth consists in the abuse of symbols. Ideology is system reached by the use of rational techniques (logical, scientific, philosophic) to expand a myth. Counter-ideology is another system, opposed to the ideology,