

balance-wheel and hair-spring is to provide a constant measure of time: in so far as their movement approximates to a simple harmonic motion, the period of the movement is constant.

The function of the ~~x~~ escapement is twofold: its action keeps the balance-wheel in motion

Between the balance-wheel and the ~~xx~~ escapement there are exerted both action and an equal and opposite reaction: the action of the ~~espa~~pe escapement keeps the balance-wheel in motion; the reaction of the balance-wheel imposes its constant period on the escapement. The function of the series of axles, each with two notched wheels, is to provide a sequence of levers: each axle is a fulcrum; a smaller force exerted on the larger of the two wheels balances a larger force on the smaller wheel; a sequence of such levers effects a balance between a very large force and a very small force. The very large force is supplied by the main-spring which, through the ~~ser~~quence of levers, is reduced to a very small force operating on the escapement and balance-wheel. But action and reaction are equal and opposite: the very small but controlled force ~~xxxx~~ proceeding from the reaction of the escapement is multiplied by the series of levers to provide the very large force needed to control the unwinding of the main-spring.

axles, each with two notched wheels, is to provide a series of ~~rat~~ levers: the axle is the fulcrum and a small force on the larger notched wheel balances a large force on the smaller notched wheel; a series of such levers balances a very large force against a very small force. The very large force is supplied by the main-spring; the very small force by the ~~escapement~~ equal and opposite reaction of the escapement. The function of the balance-wheel and hair-spring is, like that of a pendulum, to provide a constant measure of time: in so far as the movement of a pendulum or balance-wheel approximates <sup>period</sup> to a simple harmonic oscillation~~s~~, its ~~period~~ is constant. The escapement both keeps the balance-wheel in motion and is controlled by the constant period of the balance-wheel

that it is extremely imperfect, that it is essentially inadequate, that it does not qualify one to discuss human knowledge among people that have experience of their intelligence and reasonableness and so ~~x~~ are in a position to reach essential knowledge of human knowledge. I have, then, no objection whatever against analogous knowledge that knows its place and acknowledges fully and explicitly that it is analogous and all that that implies. But the difficulty that arises when one knows human knowledge only by the analogy of vision is that one has no adequate ~~x~~ notion of what essential knowledge is: understanding is like seeing, and essence<sup>c</sup> is like something that ~~is~~ is seen; having said that, one is at the end of one's tether; one may use more words but one<sup>can</sup> attain no more meaning, for the analogy of vision is the <sup>standard</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ to which knowing has to conform to be knowing. Further, with no adequate notion of what essential knowledge is, ~~one is incapable both of attaining an adequate notion of the limitations of analogous knowledge and~~ is, one is ~~incapable of~~ incapable of attaining an adequate notion of the limitations of merely analogous knowledge and, as well, one is <sup>a</sup>incapable of recognizing an instance of essential knowledge; one thinks it is just a rival analogy.

thorough incomprehension. Dr. Fay insists that human knowing is to be known by analogy and, indeed, by the inadequate analogy of ocular vision. If one insisted on knowing a watch on the analogy of a mainspring, one would completely misunderstand the hair-spring and one would have no notion of the other parts of the watch which are not ~~like~~ springs and not like springs. If one insisted on knowing the material thing on the analogy of prime matter, one would mistakenly conclude that, like prime matter, a thing is nec quid nec quantitas nec aliud aliquid eorum dicitur quibus ens est determinatum. Such is Dr. Fay's view of human knowing. St. Thomas writes volumes asking and answering questions; that activity bears no resemblance to seeing; yet Dr. Fay insists on an analogy of vision.

The analogy is not only inadequate. It also is obscurantist. Dr. Fay does not bother outlining or criticizing any of my very precise accounts of insight or judgment, even the most elementary ones. For him the analogy is normative, and it is his business is to lay down the law. What is not like seeing is not knowing. My account of human knowing ~~is~~ seems to him to be ~~unintelligible~~

understand them is not to understand what human knowing is.

It would be nonsense to say that a watch is like a mainspring. It would be nonsense to say that a material thing is like a prime matter and to argue that, because prime matter is not a substance, therefore a thing is not a ~~subject~~ substance. It is exactly the same type of ~~nonsense~~ nonsense to say that human knowing is like ocular vision or to argue that the denial of the analogy is the denial of human knowing. It is considered a very elementary lesson in metaphysics that neither prime matter nor material form nor finite existence is a thing: ipsa non sunt sed eis aliquid est. ~~But in modern times~~ It is an equally elementary lesson in cognitional theory that human knowing is not stupid gaping, that it is not understanding without judgement, that it is not judgement without understanding or without experience. But the possibility of learning that lesson is excluded by the conviction that human knowing is to be known by man, not in its essence, but by analogy and, indeed, by the inadequate analogy of ocular vision.

The word "structure" causes Dr. Fay no little trouble.  
Not only does he suppose that it refers to some rival analogy  
but also he evidently does not know what it means

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