

RD: The date is Feb 24, and so this item is earlier than either 434 or 435.

The naturally endowed ideal, the speculative intellective power

- (1) needs objectification if it is to know itself;
- (2) through the mediation of objects, a lesser perfection proceeds to something more perfect: (a) myth-magic-Gnosticism; (b) Greek science: certain knowledge through causes concerning the immobile, universal, necessary, per se – theory, individualistic, of absolute value; (c) modern science: probable, cause?, concerning motion itself, concerning concrete universals, empirical intelligibility, the probable, the practical, collective, of doubtful validity;
- (3) ‘once principles are posited, conclusions follow necessarily; but there are the principles; ergo ...’ but what in fact happened in geometry: (i) the false appearance of deduction for two millennia, (2) the discovery that true deduction is not unique but multiple; (3) the principles differ, and so other geometries are equally valid. And what happened in mathematics (page 2): the question of foundations is posited and more commonly abandoned; it is posited by Russell-Whitehead, for whom there is deduction from logical principles; there is an objection regarding the axiom of infinity and regarding the hierarchy of classes [?]; it is posited by Hilbert, where there is deduction from mathematical principles, and infinite operations are admitted; validated from finite logical reflection; it is possibly refuted by Gödel – unless math is deductively formalized it is trivial, logical reflection cannot be done in finite steps; thus the question regarding foundations seems insoluble; (page 3) what happened in math: (1) N. Bourbaki (Cartan, Dieudonné): a step back from understanding in images, mathematics is to demonstrate what are implicit in axioms; where do the axioms come from? The question of foundations is not a mathematical question and is not of great importance; hypothetico-deductive; crisis: the best mathematical experiments known to date cannot apply to how mathematics itself has developed and cannot effect the further evolution of mathematics. (2) Gonseth, ‘Dialectica’: Mathematics is a part in a general cultural movement; it receives from that movement; it influences that movement; the mathematician should be [aware of?] the general culture so that he/she may grasp what the time demands and what mathematics is able to effect. (3) The intuitionists reject the principle of excluded middle; demand that mathematical concepts be essentially defined, constructible [?]; in fact this excludes a great part of classical mathematics in the nineteenth century; it is possible that further progress would include these; si fieret, mathematici ad hanc scholam tenderent.

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Ritualism -- ??? in ecclesiastical disciplines

Academicism: the more the sciences are specialized, the more they are carried out by a small and closed group, in seminars, gathering, congresses, not in accord with ideal norms but in a human sense, politically ?? Husserl, *Krisis*, roughly the first 100 pages: they are incorrigible; if anyone determines ideal norms, that is just another specialization;

Conventionalism: (1) Poincaré mathematics, (2) Lindsay & Margenau, physics is artistic

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Among Scholastic philosophers, *La crise de la raison*

Roger Verneaux      *Note sur le principe de raison suffisante*  
pp. 39-60  
p 39    thesis 39-43 Leibniz  
43-45   Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, Descoqus  
45-48   not easily distinguished from ident ?

What is to be noted is that ? supposes the possibility of philosophy, metaphysics, being logically formalized; there are definitions, irreformable axioms, so exact as to make every conclusion univocal.

S Breton p. 120 definition of crisis  
p. 181 M.L. Roure Logique et metalogique  
Lyon Vitte 1957 pp. 99-140  
'... que tout thomiste se dev et mediter'  
principle of identity seems to admit no satisfactory formulation  
p. 182 La conscience est transcendante à toutes ses objectivations

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The older Scholastics:

Scotus on possible worlds, to have an object that corresponds to a deductivist ideal;  
Aquinas, 1-2, 66, 5, ad 4m: conclusions from principles, principles from terms, terms derived wisely; what is wisdom: gift of the Holy Spirit, metaphysics of Aristotle, whom Aquinas transformed; in theology, wisdom grows in the course of time;

Christian philosophy: A question posed by Blondel. [Margin: Nédoncelle pp. 65-76]

1928 E Brehier, 3 confl a Bruxelles, Does there exist a Christian philosophy?

1931 E Gilson: it exists historically; it is what distinguishes the natural order and the supernatural order; it has ? not as constitutive but as an effective [?] and necessary help

The real question has to do with the relation of theology to philosophy to science. [What appears to be Lonergan's suggested response has a two-way arrow between theology and philosophy and another between philosophy and natural science; a one-way arrow from theology to existential philosophy / human science; a two-way arrow between philosophy and existential philosophy/human science]

? consciousness transcends all its objectifications; it is given; general methodology → theology, philosophy, human science, natural science; the concrete = being; 'philosophy of ...'; fundamentum überhaupt, *simpliciter*.

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Someone might say this question is merely philosophical, or that the solution has existed for a long time. Someone else might say it has either not yet been seriously considered by us and someone else that it is insoluble.

There are philosophies, but philosophy itself has its own ideal. Greek and medieval philosophy are thought to be abstract, static, universal. Blondel raised the problem of Christian philosophy. Nédoncelle Existe-il une philosophie chrétienne, Encyc XX xx 10 Paris 1956

The problem: there is no relation between an abstract theology that treats of the supernatural and an abstract philosophy that treats of the natural. Philosophy is existential. The empirical human sciences treat of man as he actually is, at once natural and spiritual indigent.

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The solution (1) cannot be ahistorical; the very notion of science and of method has evolved; (2) cannot be left to historians; the history of mathematics can be written only by mathematicians; of physics only by physicists; of medicine only by doctors; unless someone thinks himself scientific in all the dimensions and especially in the dimensions of the depths of the heart. The history of the science will omit the essentials. The blind know colors only analogically. The deaf know sounds only analogically. One who has not attended to personal experiences of understanding,

etc., has no possibility except remotely and analogically of composing a science about himself or about others. The theory of true interpretation, *Insight* chapter 17.