

RD: Here we have 4 more pp. on the ideal of reason, handwritten, schematic. All of these are on reverse of discarded pp. on cognitional theory (A435a). It is important to note that this item is dated **Feb 27 1961**, and so belongs earlier than 43400DTE070.

(page 1)

There are syllogisms where, once the principles have been posited, the conclusions follow necessarily. There are principles, and so there remains the classical notion of science, at least as a stable center, and abstract universal.

(1) Math:  $\alpha$  there are hypothetico-deductive systems  
     $\beta$  axioms are sought: axioun (Greek verb)  $\equiv$  postulates  
     $\gamma$  Math (i) does not ask about foundations  
        (ii) should be much more exigent – princ. med. exc. [?]  
        (iii) should remain in contact with cultural movements [RD: see Lonergan's account of the Gonsseth-Tarski debate]

(2) Physics: [from?] observations to laws; [here a diagram with plotted curves]; in the final analysis, the ultimate criterion of physical science is elegance, simplicity.

(3) Academicism [?]: (a) what is science is what is learned in seminars, communicated in congresses, accepted among the 'competent'; (b) the ultimate criterion is the complex of conventions; these are not subject to crisis, and are not exactly formulated; (c) much less than in math and physics, in the human sciences questions are reduced to philosophical issues, and these are insoluble.

(4) Ritualism: the norms are taken from customs [the rest not clear].

(page 2)

(5) Contemporary Scholastic philosophers: *Crise de la raison* 1960, Desclée. (a) R. Verneaux: p. 39, thesis; 39-43 Leibniz; 43-45: Garrigou[-Lagrange], Maritain, Descoqs; 48: there is not a sufficiently clear distinction from the principles of identity and causality. (b) S. Breton: p. 120 defines the crisis; 181 ML Roure, *Logique et Métalogique* (Lyon-Vitte, 1957, 99-140), 'every Thomist should meditate on this': the principle of identity seems to admit no satisfactory formula; 182: conscience [consciousness?] and the transcendent in all their objectifications. Contrast assumption of Verneaux and p. 182 of Breton: Is there or is there not a definitive irreformable metaphysics? Are there or are there not exact definitions, axioms, conclusions? [BL:] Minor: premises are principles – distinguish: irreformable as exactly formulated, I deny; reformable as inexactly formulated, I distinguish; so that there remains the fundamental line of the perennial philosophy, I affirm; so that this does not remain, I deny.

[RD: Thus far, one difference from the earlier course 'De Intellectu et Methodo' is that Lonergan read this 1960 book in between the two courses. Again, his review in CWL 20 may help here:

'Roger Verneaux speaks from a traditional context but only to conclude that the principle of sufficient reason is not a principle: it is not self-evident but false; what is self-evident is its negation; the alleged principle is merely a rationalist postulate that is to be abandoned along with rationalism (p. 38) ... Stanislas Breton sets forth the changes that have occurred in mathematics, logic, and natural science. These changes, he insists, are neither the result of this or that discovery nor the work of this or that school. Rather they are the crumbling of an *ancien régime*, the outcome of a many-sided and complex historical process, in which events and discoveries occurring independently and in

different fields have led opposed schools of thought and different climates of opinion to analogous conclusions. For while the conclusions differ with the schools and climates, still they agree in their opposition to the idea of necessity. Once enshrined in Euclid's *Elements*, Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, Laplace's hypothetical demon, and most philosophies, once the self-evident and necessary essence of science, necessity has become a marginal idea.

'There has been a concomitant change in philosophy. There is a lack of interest in the possible and the a priori, a distrust of the universal, a devaluation of the impersonal. Philosophy has ceased to be the work of solitary thinkers deducing the world, and it has become the common task to be promoted by personal contact and dialogue, and to be achieved not by proof but by persuasion. *Erklären* has been left to the scientists; *verstehen* has become the heritage of philosophers, and its basic requirement is an openness to all the surprises that reality offers. So fixed systems give way to manifolds of intentional horizons which are to be, not justified but described; description goes back to genesis and motivation, but its aim is not criticism but comprehension; there slips away the *zoon logikon* whose mind corresponds to things and whose things imitate the Idea; there emerges the community of self-constituting spirits aware of a responsibility for what they make of themselves.

'So too *La crise de la raison dans la pensée contemporaine* is a collaborative effort. Its aim is not to work out the systematic solution of the issues it raises, but to portray persuasively the situation within which our thinking in fact occurs. There is, of course, no heroic *epokhe* precluding any suggestion of what is to be done, but the suggestions that are made do not fall within a discernible pattern. It would be hard to reconcile Verneaux and Breton, Trouillard and Dubarle. Still, there is a single direction to Barbotin's, Dubarle's, and Breton's papers, and one must be grateful to all of them for raising issues that in theology are very urgent. Modern scriptural, conciliar, patristic, medieval studies are 'science' not in the ancient Greek but in the modern sense of the term; and the dogmatic theologian has the task, if not of arranging for their baptism, at least of finding himself at home with them.']

(p. 3)

Scotus: science is about every possible world; the existence of the actual world is answered in a voluntarist manner. It all corresponds to a deductivist and irreformable system. St Thomas, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m: Science is a matter of drawing conclusions from premises; intellectus (understanding) grasps principles from their terms; wisdom selects, orders, and validates the fundamental terms. Wisdom is both a gift of the Holy Spirit and the metaphysics of Aristotle, though of course Thomas corrects Aristotle's metaphysics. [The boxed material here needs some work: consciousness as transcendent objectifies, insofar as 'nat. cogn. ab omnibus' and insofar as ??]

as naturally known principles [and] a natural habit of principles: being and what pertains to being

Christian philosophy (with an arrow to 're vera Blondel'): M. Nédoncelle, *Encyclo xx historicus*, pp. 65-76. Brehier: no more than a Christian mathematics or chemistry. Gilson: historically it exists, *de iure* it is an indispensable help, *de facto* it is not constitutive. Philosophy is done by man, in pure nature, about man, in pure nature.

Aquinas: [under the name are three columns:]

Theology	Theology	
Aristotelian philosophy	Philosophy per se	Existential philosophy
Aristotelian science	Natural science	Human science

If it is a matter of the concrete, the existing, then abstract deduction about natures as such and the supernatural as such is beside the point. The issue is about reformulating the notion of philosophy and science, the conflict between philosophy and ancient science, philosophy and modern science [or perhaps: between ancient philosophy and science, on the one hand, and modern philosophy and science, on the other].

(page 4)

## Theology

There remains the one God, but the theologies are many: dogmatic, speculative, moral, pastoral, ascetical & moral; and there is history that is biblical, patristic, medieval, oriental, Protestant, the history of religions. Theology is poured out on many things: concrete, historical, dynamic. Unless dogmatic-speculative theology undergoes a conversion, it cannot be either the queen of the sciences or even the queen of the theologies. [Not sure what to do with the last line: 'qui multi multis docent theologias, sicut docuit Husserl – literally, something like 'these many teach the theologies to the many, as Husserl taught].