

The question must be met, but it is well to understand its complexity. It raises simultaneously two quite different problems, a strictly intellectual problem that can be met within the limits of rational discourse and, at the same time, a concrete human problem that is resolved only by a conversion of the subject, only by a complete and coherent rejection of Mythos and by a complete self-identification with one's own rationality

Not so long ago myth was an extinct category. It possessed a relevance to ancient history and to anthropological research. It was conceded a survival in religious opinions and passions. But it had no place in an account of the truly modern mind.

Not so long ago myth was defined as a story about the gods. It had a precise field of application in ancient polytheism and its survival in backward and decaying civilizations. It could have no relevance to an account of the modern mind, for modern man does not invent stories about the gods.

But myth has been redefined. It has been found that stories about the gods are no more than a particular case of a permanent temptation. A myth is now an affect-laden image that conveys an apprehension of values. It possesses relevance not only in anthropological research, in the history of cultures and doctrines, in the late philosophy of Schelling and his contemporary representatives, but also in depth psychology, in the techniques of advertising, in political propaganda, in the social engineering of the totalitarian state, in the sociology of knowledge, in the techniques of the advertiser, in political propaganda, and in the social engineering of the totalitarian state.

Dr. Fay asserted two basically opposed analogies, knowledge as structure, and knowledge as vision. I have denied that grasping the structure of human knowing is a matter of analogy. But I must also call in question his opinion that analogy is involved when knowing is conceived as seeing.

Analogy is a highly developed technical term. It affirms both similarity and difference between a known object and an object to be known by analogy. The known object is scrutinized carefully and defined exactly. The sense in which similarity is affirmed seeks precision: analogy of proportion and analogy of attribution are distinguished; and subdistinctions are added. The fact of difference is not camouflaged; on the contrary there is acknowledged explicitly and overtly the fact that the extent of the difference is unknown. Proofs are offered that proper knowledge of the unknown object cannot be had, that recourse to analogy is necessary, that the analogy exists and is validly asserted. Nor is there any pretence that analogy is the ^{one} ~~only~~ and only mode of human knowledge; admittedly, analogy is a pis aller.

The analogy of vision dispenses with such fussy technicalities. Jack or Jill holds up a hand and looks at it. Knowing is like the seeing. Being is like the hand. Knowing truth is seeing the conformity between the knowing and the being. That is Realism with a capital "R." The appeal is to the broad facts of ocular vision and, therefore, it is superfluous ⁽¹⁾ to discuss the fact of hallucinations and illusions, ⁽²⁾ to investigate the differences between the seeing of artists, of trained scientific observers, and of men of practical common sense, ^{or (3)} to set forth