


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is the whole issue. For what they consider essential to realism, I consider a blunder; and as they are unable to grasp or ~~x~~ state what my position is, they conclude that it must be idealistic.

### A Basis of Discussion

To reach a basis of discussion is not easy, but the following should serve. It ascribes to realism ~~three~~ ~~an~~ components: a material, a formal, and an actual component. The material component is any suitable set of judgements. The formal component is supplied by the implications of two Scholastic definitions: veritas est adaequatio inter intellectum et rem; and veritas formaliter est in solo iudicio. The actual component is the truth of the judgements affirming the ~~definitions~~ two definitions and their implications and, as well, the truth of judgements supplied by the material component.

As a sample of the material component, consider the judgements: There are tables and chairs, horses and cows, dogs and cats, pigs and chickens, men and women, etc. The tables are not the chairs, the chairs are not the horses, the horses are not the ~~xxx~~ cows, etc. Note that the sample is in no way restrictive. It happens that I have illustrated the material component with judgements that are eminently simple and obvious. But it can be expanded indefinitely by adding all the materially true judgements of common sense, of scientists, and of philosophers.

The implications of the formal component are (1) that there is no true judgement without a corresponding state of <sup>true</sup> affairs, (2) that for every judgement there is a corresponding state of affairs, (3) that for every selection of true judgements there is a corresponding selection of states of affairs, and (4)



Now I do not think it will be disputed that these three components are necessary for an explicit and effectively acknowledged realism. Without the material component there could be a true theory of truth, but it would not be clear that the relevant truths are as numerous and various as the realities realism asserts. Without the formal component there could be an implicit realism, but only per accidens<sup>5</sup> would realism


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(5) By including the formal component among the suitable set constitutive of the material component.

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be explicit. Without the actual component there would be missing the explicit assertion that ~~realism is not~~ the view of knowledge and reality named realism is not just an opinion but the truth.

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multiplicat<sup>i</sup>atem actuum importat, et *realem tamen dependentiam dicit.*

Porro haec conceptualizatio etiam theoria est. Ex hoc enim fundamento ordientes duas et tantummodo duas concipimus processiones in divinis, quantum altera vere generatio est et altera non est; unde ~~nam~~ et concipimus quattuor relationes reales et subsistentes, quarum tres realiter inter se distinguuntur, quae praeterea ratione <sup>a</sup> divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum eadem identificantur; unde et concipimus tres personas proprie etsi analogice dictas, <sup>s</sup>aeque non secundum rationem metaphysicam tantum sed etiam ut subiecta conscia; et similiter de caeteris.

Iam vero haec conceptualizatio atque theoria stricte scientifica est, scilicet, legem parsimoniae observat secundum quam theoria scientifica nihil datis addit nisi ipsam eorum immanentem quamdam intelligibilitatem. Quo sensu scientifica non erat opinio Cartesii de vort~~ic~~ibus, et scientifica erat theoria newtoniana de gravitatione universali. Qu~~o~~ Quo sensu scientifica etiam est analogia psychologica, si quidem neque processionibus neque relationibus neque personis neque proprietatibus neque actibus notionalibus neque missionibus (omnibus aliunde notis) quidquam addit nisi intelligibilitatem illam imperfectam atque analogicam quam docet c. Vaticanum.


Quibus positis atque rite intellectis, quaeri potest

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Non sane intelliguntur ex hac brevissima indicatione sed tantummodo ex diligentiori studio operis supra citati.

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utrum haec conceptualizatio atque theoria sit tantummodo conceptualizatio atque theoria an etiam forte vel probabiliter vel certo vera.



But if this is true of ocular vision, the same will be true of the analogous seeing of the mind. The proper conclusion to be drawn from the analogy will be not realism but relativism. Just as ocular vision, so too the analogous <sup>seeing</sup> assing of the mind is a function not merely of the things to be known but also of the orientation of the mind. Manifestly, the mind has a far greater independence of the things to be known than has ocular vision of the things to be seen. Men can agree on colours and shapes, but in more important matters quot homines, tot sententiae.

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Fourthly, there are a number of legitimate questions that can be asked about the objectivity of ocular vision. But if one holds that ~~the~~ human knowledge is like ocular vision, it follows that the same questions can be asked about human knowledge. Moreover, while the human mind, as different from ocular vision, as possessing its own specific nature and capacities, can raise and discuss and solve all such problems, the mind as similar to ocular vision is no more capable of discussing a question that than ocular vision is.

For instance, there is, it seems, a notable difference between the seeing of an artist and the seeing of the average man. The artist sees the shapes that are visible, and they change with every change of perspective; he sees the colours that are visible, and they change with every change of lighting. But the average man sees, not visible shapes and visible colours, but "real" shapes and "real" colours: he sees the parallel lines and right angles that govern the making of buildings and boxes, and <sup>they</sup> do not change with changes of perspective; he sees the things in the colours they have under a typical lighting, and he sees those colours no matter what the lighting is. Why? Because ocular vision is not simply a function of what is there to be seen; it is also a function of the orientation of consciousness, and that varies not only from man to man but also in the same man from one mood to another.

~~Now if a philosopher makes the mistake of conceiving the objectivity of the mind on the analogy of ocular vision, it will follow that the mind's analogous seeing varies not only with changes in the object analogously seen but also with changes in the orientation of the analogously seeing mind.~~

