If the main lines of cognitional process have been set down, it remains that certain fundamental and pervasive notions be clarified. Among them, in the first place, is the notion of being. It is a tricky topic and, perhaps, the most satisfactory procedure will be to begin from a definition.

Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire

to know.

By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection. It is not the verbal utterance of the vestions. It is not the conceptual formulation of questions. It is not any insight or thought. It is not any reflective grasp or judgment. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge. The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. By moving him to seek understanding, it revents him from being content with the more flow of outer and inner experience. By demanding adequate understanding, it involves man in the self-correcting process of learning in which further questions yield furt complementary insights. By moving man to reflect, to seek the unconditioned, to grant unqualified assent only to the unconditioned, it prevents man him from being content with hearsay and legend, with unverified hypotheses and untested theories. Finally, by raising still further questions for intellience and reflection, it excludes complacent inertia: for if the questions go unanswordd. man cannot be complacent; and if answers are sought, man is not inert.

1012005 Lange of the market war with the second of the sec

Because it differs radically from other desire, this desire the beam of the state of the solution of the misleading analogy of other desire, but by giving free rein to intelligent and rational consciousness. It is, indeed, impalpable but also it is powerful. It pulls man out of the solid routine of perception and constion, instinct and habit, doing and enjoying. It holds him with the fascination of problems. It engages him in the quest of solutions. It makes him aloof to what is not established. It compels assent to the unconditioned. It is the cool shrewdness of common sense, the disinterestedness of science, the detachment of philosophy. It is the absorption of investigation, the joy of discovery, the assurance of judgment, the modesty of limited knowledge. It is the relentless serenity, the unhurried determination, the imperturbable drive of question following appositely on question in the genesis of truth.

This pure desire has an objective. It is a desire to know. As mere desire, it is for the satisfaction of acts of knowing, for the satisfaction of understanding, of understanding fully, of understanding correctly. But as pure desire, as cool, disinterested, detached, it is not for cognitional acts, and the satisfaction they give their subject, but for cognitional cortents, for what is to be known. The satisfaction of mistaken understanding,

provided one does not know it as mistaken, can equal the satisfaction of correct understanding. Yet the pure desire scorns the former and prizes the latter; it prizes it, then, as dissimilar to the former; it prizes it not because it yields satisfaction but because its content is correct.

The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing. Still, the desire is not itself a knowing, and so its range is not the same as the range of knowing. Initially in each individual the pure desire is a dynamic orientation to a totally g unknown. As knowledge develops, the objective becomes less and less unknown, more and more known. At any time the objective includes both all that is known and all that remains unknown, for it is the immanent dynamism of cognitional process that both underlies actual attainment and heads beyond it with ever forther questions.

What is this objective? Is it limited or unlimited? Is it one or many? Is it material or ideal? Is it phenomenal or real? Is it an immanent content or a transcendent object? Is it a realm of experience, or of thought, of essences, or of existents? Easthese Answers to these and to any other questions have but a single source. They cannot be had without the functioning of the pure desire. They cannot be had from the pure desire alone. They are to be had inasmuch as the pure desire initiates and sustains cognitional process. Thus, if it is true that A is, that A is one, and that there is only A, then the objective of the pure desire is one. But if it is true that A is, that A is not B, then the objective is many. Which, you ask, is true? The fact that you ask, results from the pure desire. But to reach the answer, desiring is not enough; answers come only from inquiring and reflecting.

Now our definition was that being is the objective of the pure desire to know. Being, then, is 1) all that is known and 2) all that remains to be known. Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. What, one may ask, is that totality? It is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions. What the answers are, remains to be seen. What the questions are, awaits their emergence. Meaningless or incoherent or illegitimate questions may be possible, but how they are to be defined, is a forther question. The affirmation in hand is that there exists a pure desire to know, an inquiring and critical spirit, that follows up questions with further questions, that heads for some objective which has been named being.

Our definition of being, then, is of the second order. Other definitions determine what is meant. But this definition is more remote for it assigns, not what is meant by being, but how that meaning is to be determined. It asserts that if you know, then you know being: it asserts that if you wish to know, then you wish to know being; but it does not settle whether you know or what you know, whether your wish will be fulfilled or what you will know when it is fulfilled.

Still, though our definition is of the second order, it is not simply indeterminate. For mights neither the desire to know nor knowing itself are indeterminate. Inam uch as knowing is determinate, we could say that being is what is to be known by true judgments. Inasmuch as the desire to know ever goes beyond actual knowledge, we could say that being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. Hence, being at least has jone

0

rather than the act./

characteristic: it is all-inclusive. Howe, Apart from being, there is nothing. Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal. It is completely concrete; over and above the being of anything any thing, there is nothing more of that thing. It is completely universal; apart from the realm of being, there is simply nothing.

One may wonder just how all-inclusive being is. Thatwonder may be formulated in a variety of manners. But no matter how it is formulated, no matter whether it can be formulated, it can serve only to show how all-inclusive being is. For the wonder is inquiry. It is the desire to know. Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion of being. Hence, the effort to establish that being is not allinclusive must be self-defeating; for at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgment and formulation, underlying all questioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective.

None the less, it may not be amiss to illustrate this principle concretely. It will be said that there is much we do not know. No doubt, our ignorance is great, but we know that A by raising questions, we do not answer; and being is defined not only by the answers we give but by also by the questions we ask. Next, it will be said that there is much it would be futile for us to try to learn. No doubt, the f proximately fruitful field of inquiry is restricted. But we know that, by distinguishing between the questions we can hope soon to answer and these that, as yet, we are not prepared to tackle; and being is defined, not only by the questions we can hope to answer, but also by the questions whose answer we have to postpone. At will be said that there are questions that are meaningless, incoherent, ill sory, or because of their false presuppositions illegitimate. No doubt, such guestions may occur. But being is defined by the intelligent and rational desire to know that intelligently and rationally pan discern the difference between the mistaken questions, that are merg-aberrations of its own unfolding, and the valid questions, that head for knowledge of being.

such questions may occur. But the pure desire, as it is anter of to all answers, so also it is anterior to all formulated questions. As it is the intelligent and rational basis from which we distinguish between correct and mistaken answers, so also is it the basis from which we distinguish between aquestions that are valid and questions that are null. Now being is defined not as the objective of formulated questions but as the objective of the pure desire; and to say that a question is mistaken, is to say that it does not head for that objective, that it does not remard being, that if it is a more miscarriage in cognitional process.

On the other hand, it may be objected that our definition of being is too broad. There are meaningless questions, incoherent questions, ildepitimate q estions, illusory questions. They do not lead to know he may doubt that they are the products of the pure desire. Now one may doubt that they are the pure products of the pure desire for, if they were, how could they be known to be meaningless or incoherent or illegitimate or illusory; for it is only properly conducted inquiry and reflection that can yield such a conclusion, and that implies that the opposite conclusion areas from improperly conducted inquiry or reflection. In any case,

0

fact that fac Thirdly, it will be objected by many that they have no desire to know everything about everything. But how do they know that they do not already know everything about everything? It is because so many questions can be asked. Why do they not effectively will to know everything about everything? Because it is so troublesome to reach even a few answers that they are completely disheartened by the prospect of answering all the questions they could ask.

4

The attack may be made from the opposite flank. The trouble is that the definition of being is too inclusive. Questions can be meaningless, illusory, incoherent, illegitimate. Trying to answer them does not lead to knowledge of anything. Now, no doubt, there are mistaken questions that lead nowhere. But mistaken questions are formulated questions. Being has been defined, not as the objective of formulated uestions, but as the objective of the pure desire to know. Just as that desire is prior to any answer and it itself is not an answer, som too it is prior to any formulated question and it itself is not a formulation. Moreover, just as the pore desire is the intelligent and rational basis from which we discern between correct and incorrect answers, so also it is the intelligent and rati nal basis from which we discern between valid and mistaken questions. In brief, the pure desire to know, whose objective is being, is the source not only of answers but also of their criteria, and not only of questions but also of the grounds on which they are screened. For it is intelligent in uiry and reasonable reflection that just as much yields the right questions as the right answers.

Again, it may be objected that the really reak is being, and that is to be known not by inquiry and reflection but by some ordinary or mystical experience or intuition. The objection formulates, I think, a difficulty that will be treated ober we come to discuss objectivity. But as it stands

More fundamental misgivings may arise. If one pleases, one may define being as what is to be known through the totality of true judgments. But is being really that? Might it not be something entirely different? The questions arise. They may be valid or mistaken. If they are mistaken, they are to be ignored. If they are valid, then our misgivings are without foundation. For the being that might be totally different, turns out to be exactly what we are talking about. For we ask whether it might be; and the being we are talking about, is the being we ask about.

Again, might there not be an unknowable? If there is, then it is, and so in so far as it is, it is not unknow able. If there is not, then this question raises no problem. Finally, the ther one decides that the question is valid or mistaken, in either case one can see that the oure desire that grounds questions has a rather astounding range. There is no setting behind it. Thus, Plotinus conceived his ultimate, the One, as beyond being and beyond knowing. Might he not be right? There is no use the ing to determine now whether of not thet question has a meaning. The significant work is that it becomes and if it occurs, the pro-disine pulls within its range oven what by definition is supposed to lie the one lies within the range of the pure desire. But the one lies within the range of the pure desire. Fit he question is invenid, then Plotinus is, wrong. Unified, the none lies within the range of the pure desire. Fit he question is invenid, then Plotinus is, wrong. Unified, the pure desire is unrestricted; to attempt to place enviting outside it, is to make out that its that is nothing.

0

О

Again, might there not be an unknowable? If the question is invalid, it is to be ignored. If the question is valid, the answer may be Yes or No. But the answer, Yes, would be incoherent, for then one would be knowing that the unknowable is; and the answer, No, would leave everything, within the range of being.

5

Other doubts may arise, but instead of chasing after them one by one, it will be better to revert to our initial theorem. Every doubt that the pure desire is unrestricted serves only to prove that it is unrestricted. If you ask whether X might not lie beyond its range, the fact that you ask proves that X lies within its range. Or else, if the uestion is meaningless, incoherent, illusory, illegitimete, then X turns out to be the mere nothing that results from aberration in cognitional process. Not only, then, is judgment absolute, not only

does it rest upon a grasp of the unconditioned, not only does reflection set the dichotomy, Is it or is it not? But at the root of cognitional process there is a cool, detached, disinterested desire to know and its range is unrestricted. Being is the/everything that is the objective of that desire.

If we have explained what we mean by being, we must now ask what the notion of being is.

In the first place a distinction has to be drawn between the spontaneously operative notion and, on the other hand, theoretical accounts of its genesis and content. The spontaneously operative notion is invariant; it is common to all men: it functions in the same manner no matter what theoretical account of it a man may come to accept. On the other hand, theoretical accounts of the content and genesis of the notion are numerous; they vary with philosophic contexts, with the completeness of a thinker's observations, with the thoroughness of his analysis. First, we shall give our account of the sportaneously operative notion, and then we shall add a few notes on other theoretical accounts of it.

On the supposition of our analysis of cognitional process, it is easy enough to conclude that the spontaneously operative notion of being has to be placed in the pure desire to know. For, first of all, men are apt to agree that things are whether or not we know them and, moreover, that there are many things that we know only incompletely or even not at all. The notion of being, then, extends beyond the known. Secondly, being is known in judgment. It is in judgment that we affirm or deny and, until we are ready to affirm or deny, we do not yet know whether or not any X happens to be. Still, though being is known only in judging, the notion of being is prior to judging. For prior to any judgment there is reflection, and reflection is formulated in the question, Is it? That question supposes some nction of being and, strangely enough, it is prior to each instance of our knowing being. Not only then does the notion of being extend beyond the known but also it is prior to the final component of knowing when being is actually known. Thirdly, there are objects of thought. I can think of a horse and, no less, I can think of a centaur. I can think of the best available scientific opinion on any subject and, no less, I can think of all the previous opinions that in their day were the best available on the same subject. In one sense, they are all equivalent, for as long as one is merely thinking, merely considering, merely supposing, one deals with the merely conditioned and it makes no difference

0

anything and/

Knoweddle and

whether or nob its conditions are fulfilled. Thinking, then, prescinds from existing. But if it prescinds from existing, does it prescind from being; and if it prescinds from being, deesxit oes not estind from peing, then does not being prescind from with this argument is that thinking is not all thinking about nothing? The trouble with this argument is that thinking also prescinds from not existing. If I think of a centaur or of phlogiston, I prescind from the fact that they do not with exist; hence if prescinding from existence is rescinding from being, prescinding from non-existence is prescinding from not being; if prescinding from being proves that I am thinking of nothing, then prescinding from not being proves that I am thinking of something. Now this type of consideration has led many thinkers to suppose that being is one thing and existing is another, that horses and centaurs, electrons and phlogiston equally axist are, but horses and electrons exist while centaurs and phlogiston do not exist. Still that conclusion does not satisfy the facts, for it apart from the oddity of asserting that the non-existent is, there is the oversight of the dynamism of cognitional process. In a sense thinking prescieds from existing and not existing, for it is not thinking but judging that determines whether or mt anything exists. In another sense thinking does not prescind from existing and not existing, for thinking is pupposive; we think to get our concepts straight; we wish to get our concepts straight that we may be able to judge; so far from prescinding from existing and not existing, thinking ixtendsx is for the purpose of determining whether or not what is thought abes exist. Just as the notion of being is both prior to judgment (for we ask, Is it?) and goes beyond jud ment (Bor being included the unknown), so also it is xrigratoratoration goes beyond conception (for we ask whether what is thought also exists) and It is prior to conception (for the purpose of conception is to ask does exist. It follows that the notion of being goes beyond the merely thought, for we ask whether or not the merely thought all exists. No less it follows that the notion of being is prior to thinking, forwere it not, then thinking could not be for the purpose of judging, for the purpose of determining whether or not the merely thought exists. The notion of being, then, is prior to conception and goes beyond it; and it is prior to judgment and goes beyond it. That notion must be the immanent, dynamic orientation of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as operative in cognitional process. Desiring to know is desiring to know being; but it is merely the desire and not yet the knowing. Thinking is thinking being; it is not thinking nothing: but thinking being is not yet knowing it. Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments.

0

6

.

0

Q

Still, how can an orientation or a desire be named a notion. Afcasts A foetal eye is orientated towards seeing; but a foetal eye does not see and it has no notion of seeing; a notion arises only in so far as understanding discerns future function in present structure. Hunger is orientated towards food and eating; it is a desire; it lies within empirical consciousness; but a notion arises only inso so far as the orientation of hunger is understood. Purposive human action is orientated towards some end or product; cognitional elements provide the rule and gride of such action; but the cognitional elements are prior to the action; they are constituted, not by the action itself, but by the planning that precedes it.

It remains that none of these instances is exactly parallel to the relation between the desire to know and cognitional process. For the desire to know is not unconscious, as is the foetal eye, nor empirically conscious, as is hunger, nor a consequence of intellectual knowledge, as/is purpasive deliberation and choice. The desire to know is conscious intelligently and rationally; it is inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness Simply as desire, it is orientation without, as yet, involving any cognitional content or notion. Still intelligence, as obverse, looks for the intelligible, as reverse. Reasonableness of, as obverse, looks for the grounded, as reverse. More fundamentally, the looking for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is abxabservexab an obverse that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted objective nemed being. Were that heading unconsciousmass, there would be an ordentation towards being but there would be no desire to know being and no notion of being. Were that heading empirically conscious, there would be an orientation towards being and a/desire to know being, but there would be no notion of being. In fact, the heading is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an orientation towards being, not only a pure desire to know being, but also a notion of being.

Let us to try to catch this notion, this intention of being, in the act. We speak of abstraction, and commonly we mean a direction of attention to some aspects of the given with a concomitant neglect of other aspects. The geometer considers the circle as a plane figure obeying a certain rule; he disregards the size, the color, the exactizede of the figure he draws or imagines; still more so does he disregard other and more loosely connected aspects of the given. But that is not all. He disregards all other questions in geometry, all other departments of mathematics, all other fields of science, all other human occupations to which he could turn his hand. He considers only the circle. He abstracts from everything else. He does so intelligently, for though the objective of his desire is unrestricted, still he can move towards it only by concentrating off one element at a time. Again, as intelli ence abstracts, so reflection prescinds. If I am to judge whither or mot this is a typewriter, I have to prescind from all that is not relevant to that issue. I have to know all that is relevant. If I were a relativist, I would have to know the universe to know all that is relevant to that single judgment. Even though I am not a relativist, even though I find that many conditioned propositions become virtually unconditioned on the fulfilment of a manageable number of conditions, still this restriction of the relevant is accompanied by an acknowledgement of a universe of irrelevancies. from which I hold my solf abliged to prose inc

0

are/

felt/

-**U** ^

Finally, as intelligence concentrates on the significant to abstract from all else, as reflection concentrates on the relevant to prescind from all else, so further questions and further issues arise neither as a surprise nor as a new beginning. The abstracting and the prescinding were provisional; they were only moments in a larger process; not only were such successive moments acts of a single identity, but that identity is was and is intelligent and rational and unrestrictedly intending

a larger process. Nor is that larger process merely the object of introspective analysis. Immanent within it and operative of it lies an intelligent and rational consciousness that unrestrictedly intends a correspondingly unrestricted objective named being, or the all, or everything about everything, or the concrete universe. Just as the notion of the intelligible is involved in the actual functioning of intelligence, just as the notion of the grounded is involved in the actual functioning of reasonableness, so the the notion of being is involved in the unrestricted drive of inquiring intelligence and deflectives reflecting reasonableness.

Hence it is that the notion of being is all-pervasive. It under-pins all cognitional contents. It penetrates them all. It constitutes them as cognitional.

It under-pins all cognitional contents. Without the pure desire to know, sensitive living would remain in its routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, emotion and action. What breaks that circuit and releases intellectual activity isk the wonder Aristotle described as the beginning of all science and philosophy. But that wonder is intelligent inquiry. It selects data for insight and by that selecting it under-pins even the empirical component in our knowing.km Still more obviously all ideas and all concepts are responses to the desire to understand, and all judgments are responses to the desire to understand.

Secondly, the notion of being penetrates all cognitional contents. It is the supreme heuristic notion. Prior to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known through that content. As each content emerges, the "to-be-known through that content" passes without residue into the "known through that content." Some blank in universal anticipation is filled in, not merely to end that element of anticipation, but also to make the filler/part of the anticipated. Hence, when all questions are answared, being will not denote some further content but/the tated it, of the answare

Hence, prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through all answers. But, once all answers are reached, the notion of being becomes the notion of the totality known through all answers.

Thirdly, the notion of being constitutes all contents as cognitional. Experiencing is only the first level of knowing; it presents the matter to be known. Understanding is only the second level of knowing; it defines the matter to be known. Knowing been reaches a complete increment only with judgment, only when the merely experienced has been thought and the merely thought has been affirmed. But the increment of knowing is always completed in the same fashion. Experience is a kaleidoscopic flow. Objects of thought are as various as the inventiveness of human intelligence. But the contribution of judgment to our knowing is ever a mere Yes or No, a mere "is" or "is not."

0

a/

C

thinking out being. But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is known as being. Hence knowing is knowing being, yet the known is never more being, just as judgment is never a more Yes apart from any question that Yes answers.

As the notion of being panatrakesxa under-pins all contents, and penetrates them, and constitutes them as cognitional, so also it is the core of meaning.

Distinguish 1) sources of meaning, 2) acts of meaning, 3) terms of meaning, and 4) the meaning of meaning. Any element of knowledge may serve as a source of

Any element of knowledge may serve as a source of meaning. Hence, sources of meaning include data and images, ideas and concepts, the grasp of the unconditioned and judgment and, no less, the detached and unrestricted desire to know.

Acts of meaning sf are of three kinds. They are 1) formal, 2) full, 3) instrumental. The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, consid ring, defining, supposing, formulating. The full act of meaning is an act of judging. The instrumental act of meaning is the implementation of a formal or of a full act by the use of words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance.

Terms of meaning are what is meant. They are formal or full. Formal terms of meaning are what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, supposed, formulated. Full terms of meaning are what is affirmed or denied.

The meaning of meaning is the intention of being. The intention not only pervades formal and full acts of meaning, put it so pervades them that it can be contrasted with them. The formal term of meaning is, of itself, mercly an object of thought. As I can think of unicorns as well as of horses, both are equally valid as objects of thought. Still thinking is but one moment in the unfolding of the pure desire to know; the thought is but a tentative determination of the intention of being. That intention is immanent in formal acts of meaning; it heads beyond the formal term that is formally meant. In so far as I mevely am thinking, unicorns are as good to horses. But, in fact, I do not merely think; I intend being; and so the unicorns are idly thought.

Again, the full term of meaning claims to be being or a part or espect of being. Thus, the false judgment affirms what is not xan or denies what is. It is a judgment that would be true, were it its contradictory, or were the facts the opposite of what they are. But if the false judgment means the opposite of what it, that is not its intention. It intends and it ch ims to have succeeded in affirming what is and in denying what is not.

The core of meaning is the intention of being. It may be detected by contrasting true and false judgments and, to a less extent, by contracting existential and non-extential formal terms.

In a true judgment incention and meaning coincide. One intends to affirm what is or to deny what is not: and in the true judgment this intention is carried out: what it means by affirming is, and what it means by denying is not.

But in the false judgment in ention and meaning conflict. When one judges falsely, one does not intend to do so; one intends to affirm what is or to deny what is not. Entitien fact, what one means by affirming really is not, and what one means by denying really is. One means that X is; one holdst that

0

iore

or/

С

1545 trouble Activity

Now the all-inclusive term of meaning is being, for apart from being there is nothing. Inversely, the core of all acts of meaning is the intention of being.

Thus, any given judgment pertains to a context of judgments, and it is from the context that the meaning of the given judgment is determined. But why is the meaning of the given judgment a function of a context of other judgments? Because any judgment is but an increment in a whole named knowledge; because the meaning of the judgment is but an element in the determination of the universal intention of being.

that a judgment is true is to affirm the harmony that exists between what the judgments means and what by judging is intended. The judgment means that some X is or that some Y is not; it intends to judge in accord with Pact; and, in fact, X is or Y is not. But to say that a judgment is false is not to say that it is meaningless. Were it meaningless one could not say that it was false. For judgments are false inasmuch as there is conflict between what eners the judgment means and what by judging is intended. Thus, in the false judgment one does not intend to judge falsely; one intends to affirm what is, or to deny what is not; one intends being. Still that is not what one does, for the false judgment means, not what is not be, were it not false but true. means, not what is not false but true.

Again, judgments may be true or false. The true judgment affirms what is and denies what is not. In the true judgment there is harmony between what is intended and what is meant. But in the false judgment there is conflict between intention and meaning. The false judgment as a judgment intends being; it intends to affirm what is end to deny what is not. But the false judgment as false is a failure to carry out its intention as a judgment. It affirms what is not and denies what is. It means not what is bet only what would be, were it not false but true; again, in its negative form, it means, not what is not, but what would not be, were it not false but true.

Perhaps it is this internal conflict that has led some to the conclusion that a false judgment is meaningless. But such a conclusion seems astoundingly false. Were the false judgment fairs meaningless, there would be nothing to be false. The false judgment is false precisely because it means a state of affairs that is the opposite of the state one intendsize affirm, namely, the state that truly is.

On the level of conception there is a similar but less conspicuous contrast between meaning and its core, which is the intention of being. Horses and unicorns, electrons and phiogiston, may be e ually falid as formal terms of meaning. One can suppose them, consider them, define them, and that is all that is re uired of the formal term of meaning. Still, horses and electrons seem preferable as **terms** formal terms to unicorns and phiogiston. Absolutely, one can think of the latter, but there is something idle, something superfluous, something futile about such thinking. The reason for this is that thinking is a moment in the unfolding of the pure desire to know; though the thought as thought is merely a formal term of meaning, though the unicorn is just as valid a formal term as is the horse, still we do not merely think. Our thinking is purposive. It is a

0

О

lo

tentative determination of the all-inclusive notion of being. It not merely thinks the object of thought but also anticipates the object of judgment. It not merely means the formal erm of meaning but also looks ahead to the full term. Because the unicorn and phlogiston are known to be unsuccessful determinations of being, they are formal terms in which the core of meaning, the intention of being, has become uninterested.

Finally, a few words may be added on instrumental acts of meaning. Ordinary socken or written words or symbols offer no difficulty. They implement formal or full acts of meaning. They refer to formal or full terms of meaning. Nor is there required any special theory to cover the use of meatures or of demonstrative pronouns and adjectives. All that talls for remark is that the destare endeavous to units is an instrumental act presenting that directs an interlocutor of

demonstrative pronouns and adjectives. All that is needed is to draw the relevant distinctions. In every case the gest re is an instrumental act of meaning drawing upon cognitional sources on the level of sense, on the level of intelligence, and commonly on the level of reflection. In every case the gesture is operative as an instrumental act of meaning inasmuch as it directs anothers's attention to a sensible source of meaning. Finally, among empiricists the gesture has a third aspect; for empiricists consider that fulls terms of meaning and the sensible manifold are identical hence for them the festure indicates not only a source of meaning but also a term of meaning. But, as-is-clear, a theory-of-meaning lence it is that an empiricist theory of meaning makes a great deal of ostensive acts, for such acts reveal with maximum clarity not merely a sensible source of meaning but also the only valid full terms of meaning. However, until xaxkaxs gankiessed empiricist doctrine hasbeen proposed and examined, it can hardly be made the pasts of a theory of meaning; and so for the mesent we must be content with out more general theory that even include empiricist theory as a conditioned possibility.

Finally, in view of the prevalence of empiricist theories of meaning, a few words may be added on instrumental acts. Ordinary instrumental acts, are such as spoken or written words or symbols, offer no special interest. But the empiricist emphasizes ostensive acts, such as demonstrative pronouns and adjectaves and, naxlexex of course, gestures. The reason for this emphasis may be readily grasped if one distinguishes between the function of gestures in any theory of meaning and the function gestures acquire in virtue of empiricist affirmations. In any theory of meaning an ostensive act is an instrumental act of meaning; it presupposes formal or full acts of meanings, inasmuch as one knows what one means; and it refers to formal or full terms of meaning, inasmuch as all meaning refors to a meant. Again, in any th ory of meaning the ostensive act is operative inasmuch as it succeeds in drawing another's attention to a sensible source of meaning, so that by drawing on that source, by understanding, and by reflecting he may reach the appropriate formal or full term of meaning that is meant. But in empiricist opinion the ostensive act has a third function; for the empiricist identifies the valid field of full termss of meaning, with the range of sensible presentations; hence, for the empiricist, the ostensive act not merely indicates a source of meaning but also a full term of meaning. Whether or not this empiricist modification of the theory of meaning is correct, will depend on the question whether or not the set of propositions that enuntiate empiricism are to be pronounced true or false.

0

С

(1.E., the periverse of being)

O

Before going on to consider other accounts of the notion of being, it will be well to deal with a series of puzzles that seem to have a common root. Just as other concepts, the notion of being is represented by instrumental acts that are the name, being, and the verb, to be. By mistaken analogy it is inferred that the notion of being resembles concepts in their other aspects. But, if in fact, the notion of being is unique; for it is the core of all acts of meaning; and it under-pins, penetrates, and goes beyond all other cognitional contents. [Hence, to suppose that the notion of being is subject to the rules and laws of concepts in general will result in some contradiction or incoherence

to the ordinary rules or laws of concertion

contents.)7 Hence, it is idle to characterize the notion of being by appealing to the ordinary rules or laws of conception. What has to be grasped, is its divergence from such rules and laws and, to descend to details, a series of questions will be briefly considered.

First, does the notion of being result from the expression or formulation of an act of understanding?

Other concepts result from some insight either into the use of their names, or into things-for-us, or into things-themselves. The notion of being renetrates all other contents, and so it is present in the formulation of every concept. But the notion of being has cuite a different origin. It cannot result from an insight into being, for such an insight would be an understanding of everything about everything, and such understanding we have not attained. It is, as has been said, the orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness towards an unrestricted objective.

Secondly, has the notion of being an essence, or is it an essence?

As other concepts result from acts of understanding, as **Btherxeencepts** acts of understanding consist in grasping what, from some viewpoint, is essential, other concepts are essences. Moreover, as other concepts are complete prior to the question for reflection that asks whether or not any such an essence is, other ANEREXAN concepts are merely essences and prescind from existence or actuality. But the notion of being does not result from an understanding of being; it does not **ANERE** rest on the grasp of what from some vieupoint is essential; and so the notion of being is not the notion of some essence. Further, the notion of being remains incomplete on the level of intelligence; it moves conception forward to questions for reflection: it moves beyond single judgments to the totality of correct judgments; and so it does not prescind from existence and actuality.

Thirdly, can the notion of being be defined?

It cannot be defined in any ordinary manner, for it under-pins and renetrates and goes beyond the content of every definition. However, it does possess certain definite characteristics For it regards the unrestricted objective of our knowing, the concrete universe, the totality of all that is. Moreover, it is determinate inasmuch as the structure of our knowing is determinate, and so it can be defined, at a second remove, by saying that it refers to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. On the other hand, such definition does not settle which questions are appropriate to our knowing or which answers are correct. It leaves the materialist free to ch im that to be

О

C

О

is to be material. Equally, it allows the empiricist to claim that in to be is to be experienced, the idealist to insist that to be is to be thought, the phenomenalist to explain that to be is to appear, and so forth.

13

Fourthly, how can one notion have such diverse meanings?

Because it is determinate only at a second remove. The notion of being is the notion of what is to be determined by correct judgments. If the strategic correct judgments are that matter exists and nothing but matter exists, then the materialist is right. If the strategic correct judgments are that there is appearance and nothing but appearance, then the phenomenalist is right. Similarly, if the propositions enuntiating other positions are correct, then being is as such positions declare. The notion of being does not determine which position is correct; it merely determines that the intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed is **surrest** being.

Fifthly, has the notion of being any presuppositions or properties?

Other concepts are determinate essences and so they have presuppositions and implications. If X is not an animal, then X is not a man. If X is a man, then X is mortal. But the notion of being is not the notion of some essence. It becomes determined only as correct judgments are made, and it reaches its full determination only when the totality of correct judgments are made. However, the making of judgments is a determinate process, and one does not have to make all judgments to grasp the nature of that process. It is this fact that fives cognitional theory a base of operations for the determination of the general structure of the concrete universe.

Sixthly, is the notion of being univocal or

analogous?

makes/

 \mathbf{C}

O

Concepts are said to be univocal when they have the same meaning in all applications, and they are said to be analogous when their meaning varies systematically as one moves from one field of application to another. The notion of being may be named univocal inesmuch as it under-pins all other contents; for in that respect it is the one desire to know and it regards one unrestrictedobjective that is the concrete universe. Again, the notion of being may be named analogous inasmuch as it penetrates all other contents; in this fashion it is said that esse viventium est vivere; the being of living things is being alive. Finally, the notion of being may be said to be neither univocal nor analogous, for this distinction regards concepts, while the notion of being both under-pins and goes beyond all other contents. It may be noted, however, that what frequently enough is meant by the analogy of being is precisely what we mean by saying that the notion of being under-bins, penetrates, and goes beyond other contents. Seventhly, is the notion of being abstract?

For a notion to be abstract it must possess a

0

determinate content and abstract from other contents. The notion of being abstracts from nothing whatever. It is all-inclusive. However, the notion of being has an appearance of

abstraction. One can speak of being as being. Ordinarily this neans, not everything about everything, but anything in so far as it is reasonably affirmable. In other words, being as being is the concrete universe inasmuch as knowledge of it is constituted by judgment. Again, being as being can be taken as the minimum notion that under-pins all other contents; it is blank anticipation of totality with none of the blanks filled in. In either manner

¢

However, this to using this is always concrete, may have emiddent of being is electrant. For me emiddle the wear all others to enter attention at a first and masking that me, we presend your all others to enter attention at a time; and masking that me, we presend yours and to aborned your the real It's content is determined of the total total to correct sudgments A However, within that total ity there are betestaged

14

Its content is determined by the totality of correct judgments. However, there is a still larger totality of

possible judgments; within it there are strategic sets that serve to define the general character of the concrete universe in accord with the varying viewpoints of different philosophies. Such strategic sets have already been illustrated, e.g., there is matter and nothing but matter, or there is appearance and nothing but appearance, or there is thought and nothing but thought. or the structure of our knowing is determinate and so the structure of being proportionate to our knowing is determinate.

Now in virtue of such strategic sets of judgments it is possible to distinguish between the general character of the concrete universe and, on the other hand, the concrete universe in all its details. Clearly enough, a determination of the general character of the concrete universe is an abstract view of being, for it considers not the whole of being as a whole but the whole of being as fixed by some strategic part or aspect.

In this fashion one reaches a general meaning for the phrase, being as being. But to determine what being as being is in any particular philosophy, one has to examine the strategic judgments of that philosophy; and to determine what is the correct meaning of being as being, one has to examine the strategic judgments of the correct philosophy.

Eighthly, is the notion of being a genus or species or difference?

Inasmuch as the notion of being is prior to all other cognitional contents, it is like a genus awaiting division by theaddition of differences. But inasmuch as the notion of being anticipates, penetrates, and includes all other contents, it it differs from the genus which is a determinate content quite distinct from the content of its differences. Thus, being can be divided into red, green, and blue beings; and color can be divided into red, green, and blue colors. But the concept of red has a content or element of content absent in the concept of color, and so it differentiates the cenus by adding to it from without. On the other hand, the concept of red has no content and no element of content absent in the notion of being; it cannot differentiate being by adding to it from without for, without being, apart from being, there is simply nothing. Finally, the notion of being not only under-pins and penetrates all other contents but also complements them inasmuch as the "Yes" of judgment constitutes them as actually cognitional and so endows them with an actual objective reference.

Ninthly, when one thinks without as yet judging, either one is thinking of semething or of nothing. If one is thinking of being, then one does not need to judge in order to know being. If one is thinking of nothing, then all thought must be identical, for it always deals with the same nothing.

When one thinks, conceives, considers, supposes, or defines, one does so with respect to being. Hence we accept the first alternative. What one thinks of, is being. Still, to think of being is one thing: to know being is another. To think

О

mit

being/

С

С

C

C

of being is to operate on the second level of cognitional process; it is to be on the way towards a complete increment of knowing; but it is not to re have reached anything more than a partial increment that can be completed only by judging. Tenthly, to affirm an analytic processition is a;

judgment. But such judgment does not regard the concrete, for it is not abstract and universal, and it need not regard the existential, for not every analytic pronosition is an analytic principle

Tenthly, the notion of being is the notion of the concrete universe. But universal propositions are abstract and, none the less, they may be affirmed in judgment. Either, then, judgment is not about being, or else being is not concrete.

The notion of being is the notion of the concrete in the same manner as it is of the universe. It is of the universe because questions end only when there is nothing more to be asked. It is of the concrete, because until the concrete is reached, there remain further questions. Hence, it is not the single judgment but the totality of correct judgments that equates with the concrete universe that is being.

The problem of the universal proposition may be not by considering three cases of the analytic proposition. An analytic proposition is 1) a conditioned, 2) linked to its conditions by the laws coverning the coalescence of the partial instrumental meanings of words into the complete instrumental meaning of the sentence, and 3) having its conditions fulfilled by the meanings or definitions of the terms it employs. The three cases that arise depend upon the terms and relations involved for 1) then may be thour to occur in concrete judges of of lagth on a

involved, for 1) it may be known that they occur in concrete judgments of fact, or 2) it may be unknown whether or not they occur in concrete judgments of fact, or 3) it may be known that they do not occur in any concrete judgment of fact.

The first case is the analytic principle. It regards the concrete in some known instances. On the fulfilment of ascerbainable conditions it regards the concrete in an indefinite series of hypertestical-instances, other possible instances. The second case may be recorded as a tentative advance to the first. Analytic propositions are constructed in the hope of reaching analytic principles

The problem of the universal proposition may be met by distinguishing between the formal and the material aspects of the analytic proposition. Formally an analytic proposition is 1) a conditioned, 2) linked to its conditions by the laws governing the coalescence of the partial instrumental meanings of words into the complete instrumental meaning of the sentence, and 3) having its conditions fulfilled by the meanings or definitions of the words it employs. Materially analytic propositions differ inasmuch as the terms and relations employed 1) may be known to occur in concrete judgments of fact, 2) may not be known to occur in concrete judgments of fact, or 3) may be known not to occur in concrete judgments of fact.

Formally every analytic proposition regards the concrete universe inasmuch as syntactical laws are factual aspects of the coalescence of partial into complete instrumental meanings. Materially some analytic propositions regard the concrete universe either in fact, as in the first case, or tentatively, as in the second.

0

A distinction hashe been drawn between the spontaneously operative notion of being, common to all men, and theoretical accounts of that notion, that differ from one philosophy to another. Our own theoretical account has been given. It remains that further clarification be sought by contrasting it with some of the views that have been processed by others.

For Parmenides, Being was one, without origin or end, homogeneous and individible, immovable and unchangeable, full and spherical. [See F. M. Cornford, <u>Plato and Parmenides</u>, London 1939, pp. 28 ff.]

The genesis of this position would seem to be as follows. Parmenides eliminated the alternative of blank negation, and so was left with the alternative of affirming. Affirmation may be reasonably grounded, and then it is the Way of Truth, or it may lack reasonable grounds, and then it is the Way of Seeming. Parmenides arrived at his hotion of being by following the Way of Truth.

What does the choice of reasonable affirmation imply being to be? If one accepts any affirmation, one has also to accept the correct statement of the meaning, suppositions, and consequences of that affirmation. Every judgment stands in need of a context, and without affirming the context the affirmation of the initial judgment loses its meaning. Thus, reasonable affirmation has to be the affirmation of a set of judgments, which form a single whole, and so the affirmed is a corresponding single whole. As the been seen, that single whole is the concrete

universe; but to determine what the concrete universe is, one needs data and inquiry, insight and formulation, reflection and judgment. Parmenides took a shorter rate. He made the mittake of supposing that the single whole, that is the concrete universe, was to be known, not by setting cognitional process to work, but by examining the meaning, suppositions, and implications of the terms, single whole. His procedure would have been correct enough if the notion of being were prallel to such concepts as "man" or circle." But the notion of being admits no more than an definition of the second order; one coes not settle what being is by definition

What is this single whole that is affirmed to be? The proper answer is to set to work incuiring and reflecting with respect to the whole of experience. The whole to be known corresponds to the totality of correct judgments. But Parmenides took a shorter route. He did not advert to the fact that being admits no more than a definition of the second order. He treated the notion of being as though it were a concept like "man" or "circle." He supposed that it was a determinate essence with determinate suppositions and determinate consequences. Because being is, it cannot be not-being, nor becoming, nor ceasing to be. Inversely, neither not-being nor becoming nor ceasing to be are being, and so they must be nothing. Again, being cannot be differentiated; what differs from being, is not being; and what is not being, is nothing. Again, since there are no differences within being, there can be no motion or change within being. Finally, emptiness, the void, is nothing: being is not nothing, and so it cannot be emptiness; therefore it is full. It.

0

С

С

О

С

Plato's Forms were projections into a metic heaven of what is transcends ordinary, sensitive experience. The Forms, then, are the ideal objectives of 1) aesthetic experience, 2) the insights of the mathematician and the physicist, 3) the unconditioned of reflective understanding, 4) moral conscience, and 5) intelli ently and reasonably purposive living. They are a confused bag and, as it seems, the <u>Parmenides</u> marks the turning point in which the necessity of drawing distinctions and setting up a more comprehensive theory becomes evident.

In the <u>Sophistes</u> the philosopher is described as heading thro gh rational discourse for the Idea of Being (254 a). It is acknowledged that the isolation of each Form from all the others would eliminate the possibility of **discourse** which lies in the conjunction of distinct Forms or categories (259 e). There is, then, a commingling or participation among the Forms (259 a) and there is a Form of Not-being just as much as of the Great or the Fair (258 c).

The inadequacy of this position lies in its failure to distinguish between the level of intelligence and the level of reflection. Without that distinction, the unconditioned of judgment is surreptitiously attributed to mare objects of thought to transform them into eternal Forms and, inversely, the "is" and "is not" by which judgment posits the unconditioned can have a meaning only if they too are surrosed to be Forms. There results an aggregate of Forms, each radically and eternally distinct from all the others. Still they are to be reached only through rational discourse, and if d scourse is to refer to them, then there must be a commingling on their part to correspond to the synthetic element in discourse. What is this commingling of distinct Forms? It would seem better, before trying to answer so difficult a question, to determine whicheror not the justion really arises. In fact, we would argue, it does not. Until judgment is reached, the increment of knowing is incomplete. Before judgment is reached, the synthetic element is already present in knowing. All that judgment adds to the juestion for reflection is the "Yes" or "No," the "is" or "is not." What is affirmed or denied may be a single processition or the whole set of propositions constitutive of a hypothesis, for either may be regarded ass conditioned and either may be grasped as virtually unconditioned. Judgment, then, is not a synthesis of terms but the unconditioned positing of such a synthesis. Corresponding to judgment there is not a synthesis of Forms but the absolute of fact. Platonism is magnificent in its devotion to the pure desire to know. But its failure to grasp the nature of judgment resulted in a deviation from the concrete universe of fact to an ideal heaven.

Aristotle clung to the Platonist definition of judgment as a synthesis (Sophistes 263; De Anima III 6 430a 26). Still, he distinguished sharply between questions for intelligence (What is it? Why is it so?) and questions for reflection (Is it? Is it so?) [Post. Anal., II 1 89b 22ff] with the result that he had a same and clear-headed respect for fact without reaching its exact implications. He would not have agreed with the empiricist that places fact, not in the virtually unconditioned, but in the sensible fulfilment through which the conditioned becomes grasped as unconditioned. But you would put him a question he had not adequately considered, if you asked him

О

whether the virtually unconditioned was a thirdcomponent in our knowing or, on the other hand, merely a rubber-stamp of approval attached to the conceptual unification of its sensible and intelligible components.

This unresolved ambiguity appears both in his methodology and in his metaphysics. For him the supreme question was the question of existence. Still it was a question that was already answered in descriptive knowing; that answer had to be presupposed in the search for explanation; and the function of explanation was simply to determine what things are and why they have the properties they possess. The intrinsically hypothetical character of explanation and its need of a forther, verifying judgment of existence were overlooked. Again, Aristotle asks what being isz. That question expresses the demand for underst anding, for knowledge of the cause. Quite naturally Aristotle answers that the cause of being is its immanent form (Met Z 17). Primarily, being is what is constituted by a substantial form or, on second thoughts, by the combination of substantial form and matter. Secondarily, being is what is constituted by accidental forms; "white," "heat," "strength" are not nothing though they are not simply what is meant by being. Again, being is the collection of existing subst nees with their properties and incidental modifications; but though being denotes the factually existent, still existing is no more than the reality of substantial forms along with their/immanent suppositions and consequences. (See S Mansion, Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote, Louvain-Paris 1946; J Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Toronto PIMS 1951)

Quite plainly this position is going to give rise to a problem of the unity of the notion of being. Aristotle broke with his Parmenidean and Platenist antecedents by identifying being with the concrete universe as, in fact, it is known to be. But Aristotle did not break with their supposition that the notion of being was a conceptual content. He asked what being is. In other words he demanded supposed that being is some concertual content and he demanded what act of understanding occurred prior to the formulation of that content. But, as we have seen, being can be defined by us only indirectly, and so Aristotle was unable to assign any specific act of understanding that resulted in the conceptual content of being. However, the conspicuous type of acts of understanding is the skax insight that grasps intelligible form emergent in sensible data; and so Aristotle assigned de the ground of being, as the intalligible principle mannein from which the content, being resilter

the general object / lorm, as the round of being as the intelligible in include from which were results the concertual content, being the ontological principle, form, as the ground of being in things and the cognitional act of grasping form as the insight from which originates the conce tual content, being.

In this fashion mediaeval Scholasticism inherited a problem. Is the notion of being one or is it many? If it is one, is its unity the unity of a single content or is it the unity of a function of variable contents?

Henry of Ghent gaus seems to have held that the unity of being is merely the unity of a name. God is and I am. In both cases being is affirmed. But the realities affirmed are simply disparate.

Duns Scotus contended that, besides the unity of the name, there is also a unity of content. If no part or aspect of you is by identity a part or aspect of me, still neither of us

о

С

O

is nothing. There is, then, some minimal conceptual content that positively constitutes what is expressed negatively by the negation of nothing. What it is, cannot be declared by appealing to other positive contents, for it is one of the ultimate atoms of thought; it is simply simple. Still one can approach it by noting that Socrates supposes man, man supposes animal, animal supposes living antskance material substance, and substance supposes a something that is no less -verified in accidents -thanin-substances, that is even less determinate and less exclusive. The concept of being is the concept with least connection and connotation and greatest denotation. Moreover, it is essentially abstract. What it denotes, is never just being, but either the infinite or some finite mode of being, where the mode is to be viewed not as some further and distinct content but rather as an intrinsic variation of basic, indeterminate content. (See A.B.Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Dans Scotus, Washington: CUA 1946; A Marc, L'Idée de lEtre chez saint Thomas et dans la scholastique posterieure, Arch de Phil X 1933 31-49 Thomas de Vio Caietanus was notreastant no more

satisfied with Sootas a than soaths

satisfied with the Scotist view, than Scotus himself had been satisfied with that of Henry of Shent. If a single name without a single meaning will not do, neither will a single meaning that as single gananewarabe cample adaptive tracks a seems restricted to the order of thought. Accordingly Cajetan worked out histheory of the unity of a function of variable contents. Just as "double" denct es indifferently the relation of 2 to 1, 4 to 2, 6 to 3, and so forth, so b "being" denotes indifferently the proportion Of essence to existence or, as we might say, the propostion between what is formulated by thought and what is added to it by judgment. On this position the notion of being always denotes and includes some conceptual content but it may include any; again, being in act will never be known without some affirmative judgment, but the affirmation is never mere affirmation nor the affirmation of an indeterminate content; it is always the affirmation of some determinate content, and any affirmable, determinate content will do. In brief, Cajetan can grant/atomic conceptual contents are many and disparate; he can deny the Scotist view that there is some common factor, some positive counterpart of "not nothing," of absolutely universal denotation; and yet by his theory of the unity of a function of variable contents he can possess not only a single name, being, and a single notion of being, but also a single notion that is applicable to anything that in fact/exists. (A, Marc., ibid Op cit 50-66).

It is to be noted that, if Scotus stands for the Parmenidean and Platonist suppositions from which Aristotle did not free himself, Cajetan stands for the main orientation of Aristotelian thought but succeeds in doing so only by going beyond it. If conceptual contents are products of acts of understanding that grasp forms in emergent in sensible presentations. one may well expect such contents to be a disparate multiplicity. Hence, Aristotle answered the question, What is being? not by assigning a conceptual content but assigning the ground of being in the general object of understanding, form. Since forms are many, it follows that the ground of being is a variable; further, it follows that if the action of being is to be one, then its unity will have to be the unity of a function of variable contents. What, then, are the variables within the single function? One

0

that/

is known to/

0

0

C

19

Chrater XII: The Notion of Being.

0

O

С

human intellect is a potential comipstance, a <u>notone carde facore</u> of fiori. But Aquines could exploit that affirmation in a manner that would have startled Aristotle and, while he did not distinguish explicitly between the <u>Apronthe intendence</u> or notion of being and the <u>intentic intents</u> or concept of being, still he was remarkably every of the implications of that distinction.

my pg_"20"

602

First, he recomined an uncontricted densire to know. As soon as we learn of God's existence, we wish to understand His our nature and so by nature we desire what by nature we connot achieve (Sum. theol., I, q. 12; I-II, q. 3, a 8; C. Gont., III, 25 - 63).

Secondly, from the unrestrictedness of intellect there follows the determination of its object. Because intellect is notons canic fieri, its object is one (<u>Sun. theol</u>., I, q. 79, a, 7).

Thirdly, for the same reason an intellect fully in act must be infinite act and so a finite intellect must be potential (<u>Sup.</u> <u>theol.</u>, I, q. 79, a. 2; <u>G. Cont.</u>, II, 98).

Fourthly, being is <u>nor so</u> and naturally known to us (<u>C. Gont</u>., II, 65, 531; cf. <u>Encolorical Studies</u>, VIII(1947), 43 f.) and it cannot be unknown to us (<u>C. D. Go Ver</u>., q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m). Avicomma had interproted Aristotle's agent intellect as some separate, immaterial substance. Acuinae found it immanent within us because, he argued, the light of intelligence in each of us performs the functions Aristotle ascribed to agent intellect (<u>C. Gent.</u>, II, 77, 15]. Augustine had advanced that our knowledge of truth originated not from without but from within us yet not simply from within us but in some illumination in which we consulted the stornal

O

of them is form. At first sight, the obvious candidate for the other is matter. Still, if it were selected, it would follow that Aristotle's immaterial substance would not belong to the universe of being. To maintain the Aristotelian position in its integrity, it was necessary to make the second variable the virtually unconditioned grasped by reflective understanding and affirmed in judgment; this in the general case is existence, actuality, fact, that combines with pure form or the compound of form and matter to constitute a being in act.

Brilliant as it is, Cajetan's position has its short-comings. It wisks envisages an accrecate of concrete beings each of which is constituted of essence and existence. It offers as the unity of the notion of being the relation or proportion of what is conceived to its being affirmed. But it does not elucidate how that relation emerges in our knowledge as a single notion; and it gives no clue to account for the fact that by "being" we mean, not only this and that being, but everything, totality, the universe. In brief, Cajetan seems to have been more interested in explaining the unity of the notion of being than the notion itself.

To complete Cajetan's position, it is necessary to go back to his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. For A uinas, as for Aristotle, human intellect is a potential omnirotence, a pations omnin facore of fieri, But Aquines could exploit that affirmation in a manner that would have startled Aristotle.

know. As soon as we learn of God's existence, we wish to understand his nature. To achieve such understanding is beyond the power of mathe our natural capacity, yet in such achievement lips our spon-taneously desired beatitude. I 12 1 ff; I-II 3 8; 5 5.

Secondly, the unrestrictedness native to intellect grounds the affirmation that the object of intellect has to be being. Because intellect is <u>potens ownia fieri</u>, its object is

being. Because intellect is <u>potens ownia Ileri</u>, its opject is ens. I 79 7 c. Being and everything are equivalent notions. Thirdly, for the same reason, an intellect fully in act must be infinite and uncreated act. Any created intellect must in some manner be potential, and our intellects start from a zero of potentiality. I 79 2 c. CG II 98. Fourthly, none the less, being is <u>per se</u> and naturally known to us (CG II 83 §31), and it cannot be unknown to us (De Ver 11 1 3m). Avicenna had interpreted Aristotle's created intellect as some separated immeterial substance. Aquinas agent intellect as some separate immeterial substance. Aquinas found it immenent within us: the light of intelligence, which is in us, performs the functions Artstotle attributed to agent intellect and, moreover, Aristotle comvared a gent intellect to a light. CG II 77 §5. Augustine had advanced that our kno ledge of truth originated, not without out within us, yet not simply within us but in some illumination in which we consulted the ot grounds and norms of things. Aquinas explained that we consult the eternal grounds and norms, not by taking a look at them, but by having within us a light of intelligence that is a created participation of the eternal and uncreated light. I 84 5 c.

Fifthly, though being is naturally known, though J.2.1c. our intellects are created participations of uncreated light, still there is no valid ontological argument for the existence of God., God's knowledge of being is a priori; he is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything; but we advance towards knowledge by aks asking the explanatory question, Quid sit? and the factual question, An sit?

0

replaced by newbry 1 # 00 602

C

С

С

0

C

In such positions it is easy to discern nor only the justification of Cajetan's theory of analogy but also the elements which that theory tendsto overlook. Prior to conception and to judgment, there is the dynamic orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness with its unrestricted objective. This orientation is man's capacity to raise questions and thereby generate knowledge. Immanent within man, it is a spark of the divine. Cognate to God, still it is knowing, not in act but in sheer potency. As it is the common root of intelligent grasp and reasonable judgment, so also it is the root of the relation or proportion between the conceived ecsence and the affirmed existence. As its objective is unrestricted, so it regards not only sigle compounds of essence and existence but also the universe, totality, infinity. It has been noted how Cajetan saves the main orienta-

tion of Aristotelian thought by going beyond it and, though this involves still more metaphysics, it may be added how Aquinas does so. Aristotle asked what being is. But "What?" is just a disguised "Why?" What the question really asks for is the ground of being, and so Aristotle answered by indicating substantial form as the immanent cause of each being. But since his substantial form was not some unique and separate Platonic Idea, his answer gave rise to the problem of the unity of the notion of being. Now if Aquinas were to ask the same question, his answer would be that God is the ground of being; God's own being is self-explanatory and necessary; by the Aristotelian theorem of the identity of knower and known, God's being is identical with God's understanding; by that single act of understanding God understands himself, and so he understands his own power, and so he understands all that by that power co ld be produced. God, then, is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything. The content of the divine act of intellect is the idea of being and so, precisely because our intellects are potential, they can define being only at a second remove as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.

Again, both the position of Cajetan and the position of Scotus stand within the field accessible to the logician. By going behind that field to its dynamic basis, one can find the ground not only of Cajetan's p opertion but also of Scotus' minimal content. What is it that is common to every conceptual content? It is that all are under-pinned and penetrated by the pure desire's intention of its unrestricted objective. The Scotist notion of being is reached by distinguishing between the penetrating intention of being and the penetrated conceptual content; from instance to instance the conceptual content differs; but in every instance there is the anticipating, enveloping, penetrating intention, and that is the Sectist conceptual contents.

Is then the Scotiet common factor to be identified with the first half of Cajetan's functional unity? To enswer that nuestion, it is necessary to entitipate that will be said shortly on the next section, for it is with regard to objectivity that Scotus and Cajetan radically differ. Cajetan is involved in the Thomist dynamic view of knowing. He would have to agree with the Thomist statement, "Essentia dicitur secondum quod in per earn of in ea ens habet esse." For him to distinguish ens from the essence through which it has existence would be to conceive an ens that, as such, could not exist. Now what cannot exist is

Still if the intention of **being** is a common factor in all conceptual contents, it also is a dynamic factor that gespeyond them. To set aside this dynamism is to null**ify** not only what lies beyond the conceptual contents but also the intention of being itself. In a famous little treatise Aquinas had remarked, "Essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse." Itis in and through essence that being has existence. Hence, being apart from essence is being apart from the possibility of existence; it is being that cannot exist; but what cannot exist is nothing, and so the notion of being apart from essence is the notion of nothing.

It will be worth grasping why Scotus felt he could escape this conclusion while Hegel felt that he could not avoid it. Scotus felt he could avoid it because he conceived knowing, not as process that reaches a complete increment only in judgment, but as taking a look. When Scotus separated his notion of being from other conceptual contents, he also separated that notion from the possibility of judgment. Still that separation did not imply for Sc tus a separation from the possibility of knowing, for he viewed knowing, not as ultimately constituted by judging, but as essentially a matter of looking. He would grant that there was no look in which the seen was solely the common content that he named being. But he would insist that that common content was included in susryxintellers the object of every intellectual intuition, ands still more would be insist that a look as at nothing, an intuition of nothing, was absurd. In braef, for the Scotist, being is an aspect of the real at which intellect looks; the theory of modes and the distinction between -uidditative and denominative being are efforts to blow this aspect up to the dimensions of the whole. For the Thomist, on the otherk hand, being is the whole of what intelligence anticipates; it is the objective of an unrestricted, dynamic orientation: it is whatever intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation will determine; and so the notion of being is open to the all the incom-lete and partial moments from which cognitional process suffers without ever renouncing its all-inclusive goal.

A Five hundred years separate Hegel from Scotus. As will appear from our discussion of the notion of objectivity, that notable interval of time was largely demoted to working out in a variety of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look. The ultimate conclusion was that it did not and could not. If the reader does not himself accept that conclusion as definitive, certainly Hegel did and so for Hegel could not take advantage of the Scotist escape from the identification of the nation of being with the notion of nothing. But Hegel was boxed on the other side as well. He effectively acknowledged a pure desire with an unrestricted objective. But he could not identify that objective with a universe of being, with a realm of factual existents and occurrences. For being as fact can be reached only in so far as the virtually unconditioned is reached; and as Kant had ignored that constitutive component of judgment, so Hegel neither rediscovered nor re-established it. The only objective Hegel can offer the pare desire is a universe of all-inclusive concreteness that is devoid of the existential, the factual, the virtually unconditioned. There is no rhyme or reason why such an objective should be named Being. It is, as Hegel named it, an Absolute Idea. It is the all-inclusive summit of the pure desire's immanent dialectical process from position through opposition to sublation that yields a new position to recommence the triadic process until the Absolute Idea is reached.

0

Four

C

0

0

22

О

C

Now if the intention that is the pure desire has neither a Scotist reality, on which it can look back, nor a Thomist universe of existents, to which it can look forward, none the less in psychological fact it under-pins and penetrates all conceptual contents. It constitutes then a common factor in all conceptual contents; it can be distinguished from them, for it is identical farmar with none of them; yet, as distinguished from them, it becomes indistinguishable from the notion of nothing; for the only ground of the latter distingtion would be that it looked back or forward to something.

It is interesting to note that, if the foregoing succeeds in fixing fundamental features of Hegel's thought, by that very fact it shows that on Hegelian criteria the Hegelianism is mistaken. Hegel's System is not afraid of facts: it explains any fact alleged against it by showing it to be a manifestation of an incomplete viewpoint included within the System. Hegel's System is not afraid of contradactions: it explains any contradiction alleged against it by thewing revealing what opposed and incomplete viewpoints, accounted for by the System, yield the alleged cont radictory terms. The only thing the System has to feat is that it itself should be no more than some incomplete viewpoint and, in fact, that is what it is. He el aimed at rehabilitating the speculative reason that Kant had dethroned. But the basis of the Kantian attack was that the unconditioned is not a constitutive component of judgment. A complete rehabilitation of human rational consciousness will show that the unconditioned is a constitutive component of judgment. This Hegel did not do. His viewpoint is essentially the viewpoint of a thinker who does not and cannot regard the factual as unconditioned, who cannot acknowledge any factually fixed moints of reference, who cannot advance by distinguishing the zertain definitively certain, the more or less probable, and the unknown. Hegel's range of vision is enormous; indeed, it is unrestricted in extent. But it is alwaxys restricted in content, for it views everything as it would be if there were no facts. It is a restricted viewpoint that can topple outwards into the factualness of Marx or inwards into the factualness of Kierkegaard. It is a viewpoint that is transcended automatically by anyone that, in any instance, grasps the virtually unconditioned and affirms it.

For this reason we placed the discussion of Selfaffirmation prior to the discussion of the Notion of Being. Self-affirmation is the affirmation of the knower conscious empirically intelligently rationally. The pure desire to know know is a constituent element both of the affirming and of the self that is affirmed. But the pure desire to know is the notion of being as it is spontaneously operative in cognitional process and being itself is the to-be-known towards which that process heads.

O

23

の東京は「「「「「「「「「「「「」」」」」