Part II Insight as Knowledge - see general index for sub headings

Self-affirmation of the Knower.

It is time to turn from theory to practice. Judgment has been analysed. Its grounds in reflective understanding have been explored. Clearly the next question is whether judgments occur, and the answer to it is the act of making one.

correct

Since our study has been of cognitional process, the judgment we are best prepared to make is the self-affirmation ~~of such a process as cognitional~~ of an instance of such a process as cognitional. By the "self" is meant a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole. By "self-affirmation" is meant that the self both affirms and is affirmed. By "self-affirmation of the knower" is meant that the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming.

The affirmation to be made is a judgment of fact. It is not that I exist necessarily, but merely that in fact I do. It is not that I am of necessity a knower, but merely that in fact I am. It is not that an individual performing the listed acts really does know, but merely that I perform them and that by "knowing" I mean no more than such performance.

As all judgment, self-affirmation rests upon a grasp of the unconditioned. The unconditioned is the combination of 1) a conditioned, 2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and 3) the fulfilment of the conditions. The relevant conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The link between the conditioned and its conditions may be cast in the proposition, I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. The fulfilment of the conditions is given in consciousness.

The conditioned offers no difficulty. It is merely the expression of what is to be affirmed. Similarly, the link offers no difficulty: the link itself is a statement of meaning; and the conditions which it lists have been become familiar in the course of this investigation. The problematic element, then, lies in the fulfilment of the conditions and we proceed to indicate what is meant and not meant by consciousness and by the fulfilment of conditions.

First, consciousness is not to be thought of as some sort of inward look. People are apt to think of knowing by imagining a man taking a look at something and, further, they are apt to think of consciousness by imagining themselves looking into themselves. Not merely do they indulge in such imaginative opinions but also they are likely to justify them by argument. Knowing, they will say, is knowing something; it is being confronted by an object; it is the strange, mysterious, irreducible presence of one thing to another. Hence, though knowing is not exclusively a matter of ocular vision, still it is, ~~exclusively~~ radically that sort of thing. It is gazing, intuiting, contemplating. Whatever words you care to employ, consciousness is a knowing and so it is some sort of inward looking.

Now while consciousness is a factor in knowing, and while knowing is an activity to which a problem of objectivity is annexed, still it is one thing to give an account of the activity and it is something else to tackle the problem of objectivity. For the present we are concerned simply with an account of the activity, and so we have defined the knower, not by saying that he knows something, but solely by saying that he performs certain kinds of acts. In like manner, we have not asked whether the knower knows himself; we ask solely whether he can perform the act of self-affirmation. Hence, while some of our readers may possess the rather remarkable power of looking into themselves and intuiting things quite clearly and distinctly, we shall not base our case upon their success. For, after all, there may well exist other readers that resemble the writer and find that looking into themselves yields results that, if not just blank, are clearly very dim.

Secondly, by consciousness we shall mean that there is an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. Already a distinction has been drawn between act and content, for instance, between seeing and color, hearing and sound, imagining and image, insight and idea. To affirm cognitional consciousness is to affirm that cognitional process is not merely a procession of contents but also a succession of acts. It is to affirm that the acts differ radically from such unconscious acts as the metabolism of one's cells, the maintenance of one's organs, the multitudinous biological processes that one learns about through the study of contemporary medical science. Both kinds of acts occur, but the biological occur outside consciousness, and the cognitional occur within consciousness. Seeing is not merely a response to the stimulus of color and shape; it is a response that consists in becoming aware of color and shape. Hearing is not merely a response to the stimulus of sound; it is a response that consists in becoming aware of sound. As color differs from sound, so seeing differs from hearing. Still seeing and hearing have a common feature, for in both occurrences there is not merely content but also conscious act.

By the conscious act is not meant a deliberate act; we are conscious of acts without debating whether we will perform them. By the conscious act is not meant an act to which one attends: consciousness can be heightened by shifting attention from the content to the act; but consciousness is not constituted by that shift of attention, for it is a quality immanent in acts of certain kinds, and without it the acts would be as unconscious as the growth of one's beard. By the conscious act is not meant that the act is somehow isolated for inspection, nor that one grasps its function in cognitional process, nor that one can assign it a name, nor that one can distinguish it from other acts, nor that one is certain of its occurrence.

Does, then, "conscious act" mean no more than "cognitional act"? A distinction has to be drawn. First, I do not think that only cognitional acts are conscious. Secondly, there are those that would define "seeing" as "awareness of color," and then proceed to argue that in seeing one was aware of color but of nothing else whatever, that "awareness of color"

occurs but that a concomitant "awareness of awareness" is a fiction. This, I think, does not accurately reflect the facts. If seeing is solely an awareness of nothing but color and hearing is an awareness of nothing but sound, why are both named "awareness?" Is it because there is some similarity between color and sound? Or is it because that color and sound are disparate, yet with respect to both there are acts that are similar? In the latter case, what is the similarity? Is it that both acts are occurrences, as metabolism is an occurrence? Or is it that both acts are conscious? One may quarrel with the phrase, awareness of awareness, particularly if one imagines awareness to be a looking and finds it preposterous to talk about looking at a look. But one cannot deny that, within the cognitional act as it occurs, there is a factor or element or component over and above its content, and that this factor is what differentiates cognitional acts from unconscious occurrences.

Thirdly, by consciousness is meant an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts. There is an empirical consciousness characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely presented or represented, so the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere givenness of the acts. But there is an intelligent consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight, and formulation. On this level cognitional process not merely strives for and reaches the intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its intelligence; it operates intelligently. The awareness is present but it is the awareness of intelligence, of what strives to understand, of what is satisfied by understanding, of what formulates the understood, not as a school-boy repeating by rote a definition, but as one that defines because he grasps why that definition hits things off. Finally, on the third level of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment, there is rational consciousness. It is the emergence and the effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and a refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned yields assent.

Empirical consciousness needs, perhaps, no further comment, for by it we illustrated the difference between conscious and unconscious acts. Intelligent and rational consciousness, on the other hand, may be clarified by a contrast. In their different manners both common sense and positive science view the material world as subject to intelligible patterns and as governed by some law of causality. To confine our attention to what man knows best, namely, his own artefacts, there is discernible in them an intelligible design and their existence has its ground in the labor of production. But before the design is realized in things, it was invented by intelligence; before the sequence of productive operations was undertaken, it was affirmed as worth while for some sufficient or apparently sufficient reason. In the thing there is the intelligible design, but in the inventor there was not only the intelligibility on the side of the object but also intelligent consciousness on the side of the subject. In the thing there is the groundedness that consists in its existence being accounted for by a sequence of operations; but

in the entrepreneur there was not only the groundedness of his judgment in the reasons that led to it but also the rational consciousness that required reasons to reach a judgment. Intelligence and intelligibility are the obverse and reverse of the second level of knowing: intelligence looks for intelligible patterns in presentations and representations; it grasps such patterns in its moments of insight; it exploits such grasp in its formulations and in further operations equally guided by the insights. In like manner, reasonableness and groundedness are the obverse and reverse of the third level of knowing. Reasonableness is reflection inasmuch as it seeks groundedness for objects of thought; reasonableness discovers groundedness in its reflective grasp of the unconditioned; reasonableness exploits groundedness when it affirms objects because they are grounded. In man's artefacts there are the reverse elements of intelligibility and groundedness, but there are not the obverse elements of intelligence and reasonableness. ~~The obverse elements characterize the second and third levels of cognitional process, not in terms of what pertains to the known on those levels, but in terms of~~ The observe elements pertain to cognitional process on its second and third levels; they do not pertain to the contents emergent on those levels, to the idea or concept, to the unconditioned or affirmed; on the contrary, they characterize the acts with which those contents are coupled and so they are specific differentiations of the awareness of consciousness. Clear and distinct conception not only reveals the intelligibility of the object but also manifests the intelligence of the subject. Exact and balanced judgment not only affirms things as they are but also testifies to the dominance of reasonableness in the subject.

Still, it may be asked, am I really conscious of intelligence and reasonableness? The question, I think, is misleading. It suggests that there is a type of knowing in which intelligence and reasonableness come up for inspection. But what is asserted is not that you can uncover intelligence by introspection, as you can point to Calcutta on a map. The assertion is that you have conscious states and conscious acts that are intelligent and reasonable. Intelligent and rational consciousness denote characters of cognitional process, and the characters they denote pertain not to the contents but to the proceeding. It is repugnant to me to place astrology and astronomy, alchemy and chemistry, legend and history, hypothesis and fact, on exactly the same footing. I am not content with theories, however brilliantly coherent, but insist on raising the further question, Are they true? What is that repugnance, that discontent, that insistence? They are just so many variations on the more basic expression that I am rationally conscious, that I demand sufficient reason, that I find it in the unconditioned, that I assent unreservedly to nothing less, that such demanding, finding, self-committing occur, not like the growth of my hair, but consciously within a field of consciousness or awareness. Again, if at moments I can slip into a lotus land in which mere presentations and representations are juxtaposed or successive, still that is not my normal state. The Humean world of mere impressions comes to me as a puzzle to be pieced together. I want to understand, to grasp intelligible unities and relations, to

know what's up and ~~xhxx~~ where I stand. Praise of the scientific spirit that inquires, that masters, that controls, is not without an echo, a deep resonance within me, for, in my more modest way, I too inquire and catch on, see the thing to do and see that it is properly done. But what are these but variations on the more basic expression that I am intelligently conscious, that the awareness characteristic of cognitional acts on the second level is an active contributing to the intelligibility of its products? When I listen to the story of Archimedes and when I read the recital of a mystical experience, there is a marked difference. What the mystic experiences, I do not know. But, though I never enjoyed so remarkable an insight as Archimedes, still I do know what it is to miss the point and to get the point, not to ~~xhx~~ have a clue and then to ~~notice~~ catch on, to see things in a new light, to grasp how they hang together, to come to know why, the reason, the explanation, the cause. After Archimedes shouted "I've got it," he might well be puzzled by the question whether he was conscious of an insight. Still there can be no doubt that he was conscious of an increment of knowledge, an increment that he had wanted very much. Did he want the king's favor? Did he want to enhance his reputation? Perhaps, but at a deeper and more spontaneous level, he wanted ~~xx~~ to know how to do something; he wanted to solve a problem; he wanted to understand; his consciousness was on the second level where it seeks the intelligible and follows up partial insights with further questions until there comes the final crowning insight that ends questioning and satisfies intelligent consciousness.

In the fourth place, there are unities of consciousness Besides cognitional contents there are cognitional acts; different kinds of acts have different kinds of awareness, empirical, intelligent, rational. But the contents cumulate into unities: what is perceived is what is inquired about; what is inquired about is what is understood; what is understood is what is formulated; what is formulated is what is reflected on; what is reflected on is what is grasped as unconditioned; what is grasped as unconditioned is what is affirmed. Now, just as there are unities on the side of the object, so there are unities on the side of the subject. Conscious acts are not so many isolated, random atoms of knowing, but many acts coalesce into a single knowing. Not only is there a similarity between my seeing and your hearing, inasmuch as both acts are conscious; there also is an identity involved when my seeing and my hearing or your seeing and your hearing are compared. Moreover, this identity extends all along the line. Not only is the percept inquired about, understood, formulated, reflected on, grasped as unconditioned, and affirmed, but also there is an identity involved in perceiving, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming. Indeed, consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we ~~xay~~ talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between ~~xxtx~~ conscious acts occurring within the field and unconscious acts occurring outside it.

One might go further and argue that, were the unity of consciousness not given, then it would have to be postulated. For many contents on diverse levels cumulate into a single known. But how can that occur? How can images be derived

from sensations? How can inquiry be about percepts? How can insight be into images? How can definition draw upon both images and the ideas grasped in insight? How can reflecting be about formulations? How can the grasp of the unconditioned be obtained by combining the conditioned that is thought and the fulfilment that is sensed? How can each judgment emerge in a context of other judgments that determine its meaning, complement it, qualify it, defend it, ~~with~~ so that it is but a single increment within a far vaster knowing? I cannot inquire into your experience or reflect on your thoughts. But if there were no "I," how could there be a "my experience" with respect to which a "my inquiry" occurred, or ~~any~~ "my reflection" "my thoughts" with respect to which "my reflection" occurred? If there were not one consciousness, at once empirical, intelligent, and ~~reflective~~ rational, how could rational judgment proceed from an unconditioned grasped in the combination of thought and sensible experience?

Still, if the unity of consciousness would have to be postulated on the hypothesis that it were not given, it remains that it is given. By this, of course, I do not mean that it is the object of some inward look. What ~~is~~ is meant is that a single agent is involved in many acts, that it is an abstraction to speak of the acts as conscious, that concretely consciousness pertains to the acting agent. Seeing and hearing differ inasmuch as one is an awareness of color and the other an awareness of sound. Seeing and hearing are similar inasmuch as ~~both~~ each is an awareness. But the similarity between my seeing and your hearing is an abstract indication of consciousness which, as it is given, is primarily an identity uniting my seeing and my hearing or your seeing and your hearing.

We have been engaged in determining what precisely is meant by consciousness. We have contended that it is not some inward look but a quality of cognitional acts, a quality that differs on the different levels of cognitional process, a quality that concretely is the identity immanent in the diversity and the multiplicity of the process. However, one cannot insist too strongly that such an account of consciousness is not itself consciousness. The account supposes consciousness as its data for inquiry, for insight, for formulation, for reflection, for grasp of the unconditioned, for judgment. But the account itself is the formulating and the judging, while the account itself is what is formulated and affirmed. Consciousness as given is neither formulated nor affirmed. Consciousness is given independently of its being formulated or affirmed. To formulate it does not make one more conscious, for the effect of formulation is to add to one's concepts. To affirm it does not make one more conscious, for the effect of affirmation is to add to one's judgments. Finally, as consciousness is not increased by affirming it, so it is not diminished by denying it, for the effect of denying ~~is also to add to judgments and not to the grounds of judgment~~ is to add to the list of one's judgments and not to subtract from the grounds on which judgments may be based.

This remark brings us to our second topic. We proposed to say what was meant and not meant by consciousness. We also proposed to say what was meant and not meant by the fulfilment of conditions for the affirmation of the conditioned.

By such experiential fulfilment, then, one does not mean the conditioned, nor the link between the conditioned and its conditions, nor the conditions as formulated let alone as affirmed. One does mean that the conditions, which are formulated, also are to be found in a more rudimentary state within cognitional process. Just as inquiry brings about the advance from the perceived and not understood to the perceived and understood, so there is a reverse shift by which one moves from the perceived and understood to the merely perceived. It is this reverse shift that commonly is meant by verification. If from a more general theory I obtain the formula, PV = 64, then I can infer that when P is 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, V will have theoretically the values 32, 16, 8, 4, 2. By setting up suitable apparatus and securing appropriate conditions defined by the theory, I can advance from an/ theoretical inference to/experimental check. The results of the experiment may be expressed in a series of propositions, such as the statement that, when P was approximately 2, V was approximately 32, but such a series of statements, however accurate, is not what was given by the experiment. The statements represent judgments of fact; the judgments rest on grasping the unconditioned; the grasp rests on formulations and visual experiences. The experiment gives not statements nor judgments nor reflective understanding nor formulations but only visual experiences. The experiment gives not visual experiences as described but visual experiences on the level of merely seeing. That P is 2 when the needle on a dial stands at a certain place, is a judgment. ~~theory~~. That V is 32 when certain dimensions of an object coincide with certain dimensions of a measuring rod, is another judgment. ~~more theory~~. All that is seen, is the needle in a position on the dial and dimensions of an object standing in coincidence with numbered units on a rod. Nor is it this description that is seen, but only what is so described. In brief, verification is an appropriate pattern of acts of checking; acts of checking are reversals from formulations of what would be perceived to the corresponding but more rudimentary cognitional contents of acts of perceiving or sensing. In the formulation there always are elements derived from inquiry, insight, conceiving. But in virtue of the checking one can say that the formulation is not mere pure theory, that it is not merely supposed or merely postulated or merely inferred, that its sensible component is given.

Now just as there is reversal to what is given sensibly, so there is reversal to what is given consciously. Just as the former reversal is away from the understood as understood, the formulated as formulated, the affirmed as affirmed, and to the merely sensed, so also the latter reversal is from the understood, formulated, affirmed as such to the merely given. Hence, in the self-affirmation of the knower, the conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The link between the conditioned and its conditions is cast in the proposition, I am a knower if I am a unity performing certain kinds of acts. The conditions as formulated are the unity-identity-whole to be grasped in data as individual and the kinds of acts to be grasped in data as similar. But the fulfilment of the conditions in consciousness is to be had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary state of the formulated where there is no formulation but merely experience.

From preliminary clarifications, we turn to the issue. Am I a knower? Each has to ask the question of himself. But anyone who asks it, is ~~intelligently-conscious~~ rationally conscious. For the question is a question for reflection, a question to be met with a Yes or No; and asking the question does not mean repeating the words but entering the dynamic state in which dissatisfaction with mere theory manifests itself in a demand for fact, for what is so. Further, the question is not any question. If I ask it, I know what it means. What do I mean by I? The answer is difficult to formulate but, strangely, in some obscure fashion I know very well what it means without formulation, and by that obscure yet familiar awareness I find fault with various formulations of what is meant by "I." In other words, "I" has a rudimentary meaning from consciousness and it envisages, not the multiplicity nor the diversity of contents and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them. But if "I" has some such rudimentary meaning from consciousness, then consciousness supplies the fulfilment of one element in the conditions for affirming that I am a knower. Does consciousness supply the fulfilment for the other conditions? Do I see, or am I blind? Do I hear, or am I deaf? Do I try to understand or is the distinction between intelligence and stupidity ~~quite-inapplicable~~ no more applicable to me than to a stone? Have I any experience of insight, or is the story of Archimedes as strange to me as the account of Plotinus' vision of God the One? Do I conceive, think, consider, suppose, define, formulate, or is my talking like the talking of a parrot? I reflect for I ask whether I am a knower. Do I grasp the unconditioned, if not in other instances, then in this one? If I grasped the unconditioned, would I not be under the rational compulsion of affirming that I am and so, either affirm it, or else find some loophole, some weakness, some incoherence in this account of the genesis of self-affirmation? As each has to ask these questions of himself, so too he has to answer them for himself. But the fact of the asking and the possibility of the answering are themselves the sufficient reason for the ~~necessary~~ affirmative answer.

The foregoing account of self-affirmation stresses its positive aspect. It is a judgment of fact and so it rests heavily upon the experiential component in knowing. Still it is a singular type of judgment for it possesses a variety of overtones. I might not be, yet if I am, I am. I might be other than I am yet, in fact, I am what I am. The ~~condition~~ contingent, if you suppose it as a fact, becomes conditionally necessary, and this piece of elementary logic places the merely factual self-affirmation in a context of necessity.

Am I a knower? The answer, Yes, is coherent, for if I am a knower, I can know that fact. But the answer, No, is incoherent, for if I am not a knower, how could the question be raised and answered by me? No less, the hedging answer, I do not know, is incoherent. For if I know that I do not know, then I am an knower; and if I do not know that I do not know, then I should not answer.

Am I a knower? If I am not, then I know nothing. My only course is silence. My only course is not the excused and explained silence of the skeptic but the complete silence of the animal that offers neither excuse nor explanation for his complacent absorption in merely sensitive routines. For if I know nothing, I do not know excuses for not knowing. If I know nothing, then I cannot know the explanation of my ignorance.

~~Self-Affirmation~~

Self-Affirmation

The conditional necessity of contingent fact is what involves the talking skeptic in contradiction. If enthusiasm for the achievements of Freud leads me to affirm that all thought and affirmation is a by-product of the libido, then this thought and affirmation must be such a by-product; and if it is such a by-product, then it is silly for me to complain that others pay no heed to ~~utterances from such sources~~ this pronouncement of mine.

It is this conditional necessity of contingent fact that involves the talking skeptic in contradiction. If ~~X~~ enthusiasm for the achievement of Freud were to lead me to affirm that all thought and~~s~~ affirmation is just a by-product of the libido, then, since I have admitted no exceptions, this very assertion of mine ~~is~~ would be mere assertion from a suspect source. If second thoughts lead me to acknowledge an exception, they lead me to acknowledge the necessary presuppositions of the exception. By the time that list has been drawn up and accepted, I am no longer a skeptic.

Still the Aristotelian prescription of getting the skeptic to talk derives its efficacy not only from the conditional necessity of contingent fact but also from the nature, the natural spontaneities and natural inevitabilities, that go with that fact. Why is it that the talking skeptic does not talk gibberish? Why is it that one can count on his being nonplussed by self-contradiction? It is because he is conscious, empirically, intelligently, and rationally. It is because he has no choice in the matter. It is because extreme ingenuity is needed for him not to betray his real nature. It is because, were his ingenuity successful, the only result would be that he had revealed himself an idiot and lost all claim to be heard.

This aspect of the matter deserves further attention. Cognitional process does not lie outside the realm of natural law. Not merely do I possess the power to elicit certain types of acts when certain conditions are fulfilled, but also with statistical regularity the conditions are fulfilled and the acts occur. I cannot escape sensa, percepts, images. All three keep occurring during my waking hours, and the images often continue during my sleep. No doubt, I can exercise a selective control over what I sense, perceive, imagine. But the choice I cannot make effective is to sense nothing, perceive nothing, imagine nothing. Not only are the contents of these acts ~~are~~ imposed upon me, but also ~~the consciousness of the acts~~ consciousness in some degree is inseparable from the acts. Nor is that consciousness merely an aggregate of isolated atoms; it is a unity.

If I cannot escape presentations and representations, neither can I be content with them. Spontaneously I fall a victim to that wonder that Aristotle named the beginning of all science and philosophy. I try to understand. I enter, without questionning, the dynamic state that is revealed in questions for intelligence. Theoretically there is a disjunction between "being intelligent" and "not being intelligent." But the theoretical disjunction is not a practical choice for me. I can deprecate intelligence; I can ridicule its aspirations; I can reduce its use to a minimum;

but it does not follow that I can eliminate it. I can question everything else, but to question questionning is self-destructive. I might call upon intelligence for the conception of a plan to escape intelligence, but the effort to escape would only reveal my present involvement and, strangely enough, I would want to go about the business intelligently and I would want to claim that escaping was the intelligent thing to do.

As I cannot be content with the cinematographic flow of presentations and representations, so I cannot be content with inquiry, understanding, and formulation. I may say I want not the quarry but the chase, but I am careful to restrict my chasing to fields where the quarry lies. If, above all, I want to understand, still I want to understand the facts. Inevitably, the achievement of understanding, however ~~brilliantly coherent~~ stupendous, only gives rise to the further question, Is it so? Inevitably, the progress of understanding is interrupted by the check of judgment. Intelligence may be a thoroughbred exulting in the race; but there is a rider on its back; and, without the rider, the best of horses is a poor bet. The insistence that modern science envisages ~~xxfuture~~ an indefinite future of repeated revisions does not imply an indifference to fact. On the contrary, it is fact that will force the revisions, that will toss into the waste-basket the brilliant theories of previous understanding, that will make each new theory better because it is closer to the facts. But what is fact? What is that clear, precise, definitive, irrevocable, dominant something ~~that we name fact? As yet, at least, we are not concerned with metaphysical answers, and so what is wanted now, or what for the present will have to do, is an account, not of fact itself, but of knowing fact~~ that we name fact? More exactly, in what does our knowing fact consist? Clearly, fact is concrete, as is sense and consciousness. No less clearly, fact is virtually unconditioned; it might ~~ha~~ not have been; it might have been other than it was; but, as things are, it possesses conditional necessity, and nothing can possibly alter it. Fact, then, has the concreteness of experience, the clarity and precision of intelligent formulation, ~~the~~ and the absoluteness of judgment

that we name fact? More exactly, in what does our knowing fact consist? Clearly, fact is concrete, as is sense and consciousness. Again, fact is intelligible; if it is independent of all doubtful theory, it is not independent of the insight and formulation necessary to give it precision and accuracy. Finally, fact is virtually unconditioned; it might not have been; it might have been other than it was; but as things stand, it possesses conditional necessity and nothing can possibly alter it now. Fact, then, combines the concreteness of experience, the clarity of accurate intelligence, the absoluteness of rational judgment. It is the natural objective of human cognitional process. It is the anticipated unity to which perception, inquiry, imagination, insight, formulation, reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment make their several contributions. ~~X~~ When Newton knew that the water in his bucket was rotating, he knew a fact though he thought he knew an absolute space. When relativity and quantum mechanics posit the unimaginable in a four-dimensional manifold, they bring to light the difference between the realm of imagination ~~and the realm to which fact pertains.~~

Am I conscious empirically, intelligently, rationally? If I am, I can originate statements that are factual, intelligible, grounded. If I am not, then I am no more the origin of such statements than is the ventriloquist's dummy. If I am not empirically conscious, my intelligence has no materials for inquiry, no data for insights, nothing unified or ~~ex~~ related to formulate; and no less my reasonableness has no experience ~~exxx~~ in which it can find the fulfilment of conditions for judgments of fact. If I am not intelligently conscious, then I do not inquire or seek insights or enjoy them. Not only is my world the Humean world of juxtaposed and succeeding impressions

that we name fact? The question is too large to be settled here. Each philosophy has its own view on what fact is and its consequent theory on the precise nature of our knowledge of fact. All that can be attempted now is to state what we happen to mean by knowing fact. Clearly, then, fact is concrete as is sense or consciousness. Again, fact is intelligible: if it is independent of all doubtful theory, it is not independent of the modest insight and formulation necessary to give it its precision and its accuracy. Finally, fact is virtually unconditioned: it might not have been; it might have been other than it was; but as things stand, it possesses conditional necessity, and nothing can possibly alter it now. Fact, then, combines the concreteness of experience, the determinateness of accurate intelligence, and the absoluteness of ~~judgment~~ rational judgment. It is the natural objective of human cognitional process. It is the anticipated unity to which sensation, perception, imagination, inquiry, insight, formulation, reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment make their several, complementary contributions. When Newton knew that the water in his bucket was rotating, he knew a fact, though he thought he knew absolute space. When quantum mechanics and relativity posit the unimaginable in a four-dimensional manifold, they bring to light the not too surprising fact that scientific intelligence and ~~judgment~~ verifying judgment go beyond the realm of imagination to the realm of fact. Just what that realm is, as has been said, is a difficult and complicated problem. Our present concern is that we are committed to it. We are committed, not by knowing what it is and that it is worth while, but by an inability to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure when a rationality identical with us demands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than the unconditioned and, when that is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in which we bow to an immanent Anagke. Confronted with the standard of the unconditioned, the skeptic despairs. Set before it, the products of human understanding are ashamed. Great are the achievements of modern science; by far are they to be preferred to earlier guess-work; yet rational consciousness finds that they approximate indeed to the unconditioned but do not attain it; and so it assigns them the modest status of probability. Still, if rational consciousness can criticize the achievement of science, it cannot criticize itself. The critical spirit can weigh all else in the balance, only on condition that it does not criticize itself. It is a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all else but offers no justification for its demanding. It arises, fact-like, to generate knowledge of fact, to push the cognitional process from the conditioned structures of intelligence to unreserved affirmation of the unconditioned. It occurs. It will recur whenever the conditions for reflection are fulfilled. With statistical regularity those conditions keep being fulfilled. Nor is that all, for I am involved, engaged, committed. The disjunction between rationality and non-rationality is an abstract alternative but not a concrete choice. Rationality is my very dignity, and so closely to it do I cling, that I would want the best of reasons for abandoning it. Indeed, I am so much one with my reasonableness that, when I lapse from its high standards, I am compelled either to repent my folly or to rationalize it.

Self-affirmation has been considered as a concrete judgment of fact. The contradiction of self-negation has been indicated. Behind that contradiction there have been discerned natural inevitabilities and spontaneities that constitute the possibility of knowing, not by demonstrating that one can know, but pragmatically by engaging one in the process. Nor in the last resort can one reach a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. Even to seek it involves a vicious circle; for if one seeks such a foundation, one employs one's cognitional process; and the foundation to be reached will be no more secure or solid than the inquiry utilized to reach it. As I might not be, as I might be other than I am, so my knowing might not be and it might be other than it is. The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it. The skeptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a knower. Contradiction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to deny it.

There is a further aspect to the matter. Is the self-affirmation that has been outlined descriptive of the thing-for-us or explanatory of the thing-itself? We have spoken of natural inevitabilities and spontaneities. But did we speak of these as they are themselves or as they are for us?

Unfortunately, there is a prior question. The distinction that was drawn, earlier, between description and explanation was couched in terms that sufficed to cover the difference in the fields of positive empirical science. But human science contains an element not to be found in other departments. Both the study of man and the study of nature begin from inquiry and insight into sensible data. Both the study of man and the study of nature can advance from the descriptive relations of the object to the inquirer to the explanatory relations that obtain immediately between objects. Just as the physicist measures, correlates measurements, and implicitly defines correlatives by the correlations, so too the student of human nature can forsake the literary approach to determine economic, sociological, cultural, political, historical correlations. But the study of man also enjoys through consciousness an immediate access to man, and this access can be used in two manners. The initial use is descriptive. In this fashion we began from an account of an event named insight. We pointed out that it was satisfying, that it came unexpectedly, that its emergence was conditioned more by a dynamic inner state of inquiry than by external circumstance, that while the first emergence was difficult, repeated occurrence was easy and spontaneous, that single acts of insight accumulate into clusters bearing on a single topic, that such clusters may remain without formulation or may be worked out into a systematic doctrine. Naturally enough, this description of insight was presupposed and utilized when we came to examine it more closely; and this closer examination was in turn presupposed in our account of explanatory abstraction and explanatory system and in our study of empirical method.

In brief, because man is a knower, because he is conscious empirically, intelligently, and rationally, it follows that statements, proceeding from his knowledge, claim to be factual, intelligible, and grounded. The contradiction, in ~~which the talking skeptic is involved, lies in the use of speech, designed to express knowledge~~ which the talking skeptic is involved, lies inwardly in the use of cognitional process to deny that process and outwardly in the use of speech, which represents knowledge, to deny that his speech represents anything.

Moreover, since data, percepts, and images are prior to inquiry, insight, and formulation, and since all definition is subsequent to inquiry and insight, it was necessary to define data, percepts, and images as the materials presupposed and complemented by inquiry and insight and, further, it was necessary to distinguish between them by contrasting the formulations of empirical science with those of mathematics and the formulations of both of these with the formulations of common sense. Finally, the analysis of judgment and the account of reflective understanding consisted in relating these acts to each other, and to the formulations of understanding, and to the fulfilment provided by experience. As the reader will discern, the initial procedure of description gradually yielded to definition by relation; and the defining relations obtained immediately between different kinds of cognitional state or act. But definition by this type of relation is explanatory, and so descriptive procedure was superseded by explanatory.

There are, then, two types of description and two types of explanation. If one begins from the data of sense, one begins by describing but goes on to explain. Again, if one begins from the data of consciousness, one begins by describing and goes on to explain. Still, there is an important difference between the two types of explaining. For explanation on the basis of sense can reduce the element of hypothesis to a minimum but it cannot eliminate it entirely. But explanation on the basis of consciousness can escape entirely the merely supposed, the merely postulated, the merely inferred.

First, explanation on the basis of sense can reduce hypothesis to a minimum. This, of course, is the point of the principle of relevance. Galileo's law of falling bodies does not suppose or postulate distance or time or the measurements of either. It does not suppose or postulate the correlation between distance and time; for there is some relation between the two inasmuch as falling bodies fall farther in a longer time; and the actual measurements ground a numerical determination of that relation. Moreover, what holds for the law of falling bodies, holds for the other laws of mechanics. If one pleases, one may contend that the use of inquiry, insight, formulation, and consequent generalization is mere supposition or mere postulation; but at least it is not the type of mere supposition that the empirical scientist systematically avoids or that he seriously fears will be eliminated in some more intelligent method of inquiry to be devised and accepted in the future. To reach the element of mere supposition that makes any system of mechanics subject to future revision, one must shift attention from single laws to the set of primitive terms and relations which the system employs in formulating all its laws. In other words, one has to distinguish between, say, mass as defined by correlations between masses and, on the other hand, mass as enjoying the position of an ultimate mechanical concept. Any future system of mechanics will have to satisfy the data that now are covered by the notion of mass. But it is not necessary that any future system of mechanics will have to satisfy the same data by employing our concept of mass. Further developments might lead to the introduction of a different set of ultimate concepts, to a consequent reformulation of all laws, and so to a dethronement of the notion of mass from its present position as an ultimate of mechanical

system. Hence while empirical method can reduce the hypothetical to a minimum, it cannot eliminate it entirely. Its concepts as concepts are not hypothetical, for they are defined implicitly by empirically established correlations. None the less, its concepts as systematically significant, as ultimate or derived, as preferred to other concepts that might be empirically reached, do involve an element of mere supposition. For the selection of certain concepts as ultimate occurs in the work of systematization, and that work is provisional. At any time a system is accepted because it provides the simplest account of all the known facts. But at the same time it is acknowledged that there may be unknown yet relevant facts, that they might give rise to further questions that would lead to further insights, and that the further insights might involve a radical revision of the accepted system.

Secondly, explanation on the basis of consciousness can escape this limitation. I do not mean, of course, that such explanation is not to be reached through the series of revisions involved in the self-correcting process of learning. Nor do I mean that, once explanation is reached, there remains no possibility of the minor revisions that leave basic lines intact but attain a greater exactitude and a greater fulness of detail. ~~What is excluded is the radical revision that involves a shift~~ in the fundamental terms and relations of the explanation.

The source of this peculiarity of cognitional theory would seem to be a coincidence of the thing-for-us that it begins by describing with the thing-itself that it ends by explaining. When physics or chemistry turns from things-for-us to things-themselves, there occurs a step into the merely hypothetical. But when cognitional theory turns from its thing-for-us to its thing-itself, there occurs no more than a change in perspective. One describes sensation, perception, imagination, inquiry, insight, formulation, reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment, inasmuch as one states that each of these kinds of act are like acts performed and experienced under described conditions. Similarly, one describes the relations between these acts by pointing to dynamic states, such as inquiry leading from presentations to insight and formulation, or reflection leading from formulations to grasp of the unconditioned and judgment; again, one describes relations by pointing to the coalescence of the contents of different acts; thus, insight is into data; formulation is of the idea, grasped in insight, with what is essential to the idea in the presentation; the unconditioned is a combination of a conditiond formulation with the fulfilment of its conditions; judgment adds a Yes or No to a question derived from other partial contents. Now the transition from such description to explanation involves no new terms or relations. It retains the same terms and the same relations and effects merely a change of perspective. Insight ceases to be what is similar to a certain event in consciousness and becomes what stands in certain relations to inquiry, presentations, formulations, other insights, reflection, and judgment. In like manner each of these other terms becomes fixed by its relations to the rest. Explanatory exposition takes as fundamental the ~~the experientially valid states validated stat~~ the experientially validated dynamic states of inquiry and reflection. These states are relational. They both distinguish and connect the three levels of knowing. Again, they are dynamic; they head for further acts in which 1) the second level adds to the first and the third level adds to the second and 2) the addition of the second level to the first is combined with the first, and the addition of the third level to the second is combined with the

images or/

Again, I do not mean that human nature and so human knowledge are immutable, that there could not arise a new nature and a new knowledge to which present theory would not be applicable. But what is excluded is the radical revision that involves a shift in the fundamental terms and relations of the explanatory account of human knowledge the human knowledge underlying existing common sense, mathematics, and empirical science.

The impossibility of such revision appears from the very notion of revision. A revision appeals to data. It contends that previous theory does not satisfactorily account for all the data. It claims to have reached complementary insights that lead to more accurate statements. It shows that these new statements either are unconditioned or more closely approximate to the unconditioned than previous statements. Now if in fact revision is as described, then it presupposes that cognitional process falls on the three levels of presentation, intelligence, and reflection; it presupposes that insights are cumulative and complementary; it presupposes that they head towards a limit named described by the adjective, satisfactory; it presupposes a reflective grasp of the unconditioned or of what approximates to the unconditioned. Clearly, revision cannot revise its own presuppositions. A reviser cannot appeal to data to deny data, to his new insights to deny insights, to his new formulation to deny formulation, to his reflective grasp to deny reflective grasp.

The same point may be put in another manner. Popular relativism is prone to argue that empirical science is the most reliable form of human knowledge; but empirical science is subject to indefinite revisions; therefore all human knowledge is equally subject to indefinite revision. Now such argument is necessarily fallacious. One must definitively/ has to know invariant features of human knowledge before one can assert that empirical science is subject to indefinite revision; and if one knows invariant features of human knowledge, then one knows what is not subject to revision. Moreover, as is obvious, such knowledge ~~of the invariant~~ surpasses empirical science at least in the respect that it is not subject to revision.

definitively

The same conclusion may be reached by setting forth the a priori conditions of any possible judgment of fact. For any such judgment can be represented by a Yes or No in answer to a question, Is it so? The answer will be rational, that is, it will be rest on known sufficient reason. Moreover, the answer will be absolute; Yes utterly excludes No; and No utterly excludes Yes. Hence, since the only/sufficient reason for an absolute answer must itself be absolute and known, the Yes or No must rest on some apprehension or grasp of the unconditioned. Now the judgment of fact is not to the effect that something must be so or could not be otherwise; it merely states that something is so; hence the unconditioned that grounds it will be not formally but only virtually unconditioned. The first condition, then, of any possible judgment of fact is the grasp of 1) a conditioned, 2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and 3) the fulfilment of the conditions. It is such a grasp that effects the transition from the question, Is it so? to a rational, absolute answer.

known/

But this first requirement presupposes other requirements. The "it" of the judgment of fact is not a bare "it." On the contrary, it is the conditioned known as conditioned that

through the fulfilment of its conditions is grasped as virtually unconditioned. Prior to the question for reflection, there must be a level/activity that yields the conditioned as conditioned, the conditioned as linked to its conditions. But this is a level of intelligence, of positing systematic unities and systematic relations. Moreover, it will be a freely developing level. ~~If it did not develop, it would be always at some fixed level;~~ it would possess or yield some permanent stock of systematic unities and relations; it would offer a limited range of instances of the conditioned as conditioned, and so there would be no possibility of new questions of fact. Moreover, it must be a freely developing level; it must envisage the conditioned simply as conditioned and apart from the fulfilment of the conditions; for if it envisaged only such instances of the conditioned as had their conditions fulfilled, then questions of fact would not really arise

Without free development there would be no positing of the conditioned simply as conditioned ~~and apart from the fulfilment of the conditions; if there were~~

For without free development questions of fact would not arise. The only instances of the conditioned that would be envisaged would be instances with the conditions fulfilled. In that case the answer would always be an automatic Yes; and if the answer were always an automatic Yes, there would be no need to raise any questions of fact. Still, though there is free development of systematic unities and relations, such development cannot occur in some pure isolation from the fulfilling conditions. Were there such isolation, it would be impossible to tell whether or not conditions were fulfilled; and if that were impossible, then judgments of fact could not occur. This yields the second condition of judgments of fact. It is a level of intellectual activity that posits systematic unities and relations 1) with some independence of a field of fulfilling conditions and 2) with reference to such a field.

~~But this second requirement presupposes a third. There must be the~~ field of fulfilling conditions. Continuous with this field, though with some independence, there must be the freely developing process of positing systematic unities and relations that yield the conditioned as conditioned. Finally, continuous with both, there must be the third level that combines the conditioned as conditioned with the fulfilling conditions. Nor is "continuous" the exact epithet. Rather, there must be a single concrete unity and identity in which the fulfilling conditions emerge, the process of freely developing systematization occurs, and the combination of conditions and conditioned is grasped.

The third requirement of a concrete unity calls for a modification of the initial starting-point. The initial ~~demand was for the conditions of possible judgments of fact~~

But this second requirement presupposes a third. There must be a field of fulfilling conditions. More exactly, since conditions are simultaneous with what they condition, there must be a prior field containing what can become fulfilling conditions. Of themselves, they will be neither conditioning nor conditioned; they will be merely given.

Finally, possibility is concrete. Logicians may say that a "mountain of gold" is possible if there is no intrinsic contradiction involved in supposing such a mountain. But in fact a mountain of gold is possible only if ~~there is enough gold to make a mountain, and if the means are available for acquiring all it, for transporting it to a single area~~ the means are available for acquiring enough gold to make a mountain, for transporting it to a single place, for heaping it up in the fashion of a mountain, and for keeping it there long enough for the golden mountain to exist for some minimum interval of time. Similarly, any possible judgment of fact would be some concrete judgment. The conditions of its possibility include the conditions of bringing together its diverse components. There must be, then, a concrete unity-identity-whole that experiences the given, that inquires about the given to generate the free development of systematic unities and relations, that reflects upon such developments and demands the virtually unconditioned as its ground for answering Yes or No. It is this concrete unity that asks, Is it so? It is this concrete unity that initiates the free development by asking about the given, What is this? Why is it? How often does it exist or happen? It is this concrete unity that grasps and formulates the conditioned as conditioned and that appeals to the given to grasp the virtually unconditioned and to affirm it rationally and absolutely.

There remains a corollary. Judgments of fact may be not only possible. They may actually occur. But if any judgment of fact occurs, there must be as well the occurrence of its conditions. Hence, if there is any judgment of fact, no matter what its content, there also is a concrete unity-identity-whole that experiences some given, that inquires, understands, and formulates, that reflects, grasps the unconditioned, and so affirms or denies. Finally, such a concrete unity-identity-whole is a thing-itself, for it is defined by an internally related set of operations, and the relations may be experientially validated in the conscious and dynamic states 1) of inquiry leading from the given to insight, 2) of insight leading to formulation, 3) of reflection leading from formulation to grasp of the unconditioned, and 4) of that grasp leading to affirmation or denial.

From the corollary there results our contention. There cannot occur a revision without the occurrence of some judgment of fact. But if there occurs any judgment of fact, there occur the dynamic states in which may be validated experientially the relations that define the conjugate terms by which the thing-itself that knows is differentiated.

What is the source of this peculiarity of cognitional theory? It is that other theory reaches its thing-itself by turning away from the thing as related to us by sense or by consciousness, but cognitional theory reaches its thing-itself by understanding itself as and affirming itself as concrete unity in a process that is conscious empirically, intelligently, and rationally. Moreover, since every other known becomes known through this process, it could not impugn the process without simultaneously impugning its own status as a known.

We have performed something similar to what a Kantian would name a transcendental deduction. Accordingly, we ~~will~~ shall be asked to explain the fact that our deduction yields different results from Kant's.

A first difference is that ~~asked~~ Kant asked the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in the sense of knowing an object. We have distinguished two issues: there is the problem of objectivity, and from this we have carefully prescinded not only in the present section but also in all earlier sections; there also is the prior problem of determining just what activities are involved in knowing, and to this prior problem we have so far confined our efforts. Hence we asked, not for the conditions of knowing an object, but for the conditions of the possible occurrence of a judgment of fact. We have asked for the conditions of an absolute and rational Yes or No viewed simply as an act. We have not asked on what conditions there would be some fact that corresponded to the Yes. We have not even asked what meaning such a ~~xx~~ correspondence might have.

A second difference lies in the distinction between thing-for-us and thing-itself. Kant distinguished these as phenomenon and noumenon. Just what he meant is a matter of dispute but, at least, it is clear that the distinction pertained to his formulation of a theory of objectivity. Moreover, it seems to me to be probable enough that the historical origin of the Kantian distinction is to be sought in the Renaissance distinction of primary and secondary qualities where the former pertained to the real and objective things themselves while the latter pertained to the subject's apprehension of them. In any case our distinction is neither the Renaissance nor the Kantian distinction. It is simply a distinction between description and explanation, between the kind of cognitional activities that fix contents by indicating what they resemble and, on the other hand, the kind that fix contents by assigning their experientially validated relations. A thing is a concrete unity-identity-whole grasped in data as individual. Describe it, and it is a thing-for-us. Explain it, and it is a thing-itself. Is it real? Is it objective? Is it anything more than the immanent determination of the cognitional act? These are all quite reasonable questions. But as yet we answer neither Yes nor No. For the moment our answer is simply that objectivity is a highly complex issue and that we shall handle it satisfactorily only if we begin by determining what precisely cognitional process is. No doubt, there are objections that may be urged against this procedure; but the objections too will be handled satisfactorily only after the prior questions are ~~an~~ answered.

A third difference regards universal and necessary judgments. They stand in the forefront of the Kantian critique which was largely engaged in the problem of transcending Hume's experiential atomism. But in our analysis they ~~occur~~ play a minor role. A universal and necessary judgment may be ~~merely~~ merely the affirmation of an analytic proposition, and such analytic propositions may be mere abstract possibilities without relevance to the central context of judgments that we name knowledge. Our emphasis falls on the judgment of fact that itself is an increment of knowledge and, as well, contributes to the transition from the analytic proposition to the analytic principle, that is, to the universal and necessary judgment whose terms and relations are existential in the sense that they occur in judgments of fact.

A fourth difference regards the immediate ground of judgment. Kant formulated this ground by setting forth his schematism of the categories. There is a proper use of the category, Real, if there occurs a filling of the empty form of Time. There is a proper use of the category, Substance, if there is a permanence of the Real in Time. However, Kant's schematism is not regarded as one of his happiest inventions. What he was trying to get hold of was the reflective process of checking, of verifying, of bringing the merely conceived and the merely given into unity. In fact, that process is far more complicated and far more versatile than Kantian analysis would lead one to suspect. Verifying supposes a vast array of hypothetical propositions that state what would be experienced under precisely defined conditions. Verifying consists in having those experiences, all of them, and none but them, under the defined conditions. Moreover, what is verified, is what is conceived, formulated, supposed. It need have no imaginable counterpart, and so one can speak of verifying the theory of relativity or the affirmations of quantum mechanics. Indeed, as we have shown at length, there is a single formula that covers the immediate ground of all our judgments; it is the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. So far was Kant from positing the unconditioned as the immediate ground of every judgment, that he described it an Ideal of Pure Reason, an ideal that becomes operative in our knowing, not prior to judgment and as a condition of judgment, but subsequently inasmuch as each judgment rests on an infinite regresss of prosyllogisms. As the reader, familiar with Kant, will note, our assertion of a demand for the unconditioned as a prior ground for judgment not merely implies that the Kantian analytic is grossly seriously incomplete but also involves in utter ruin the Kantian dialectic. For the dialectic has but a single premise, namely, that since the demand for the unconditioned is not a necessary ground for judgment, therefore it is a transcendental illusion; in other words, since the unconditioned is not constitutive of knowing an object in the sense of making a judgment, therefore it has a purely regulative function in our knowing. On our showing, the unconditioned is prior and constitutive; to affirm a fact is to affirm the unconditioned.

A fifth difference has to do with consciousness. Kant acknowledged an inner sense. Roughly one may say that as he acknowledged what we have termed empirical consciousness, that is, the awareness that accompanies seeing, hearing, imagining, desiring, fearing, and the like. On the other hand, for Kant there was no awareness of the generative principles of the categories. The categories could be inferred from their occurrence in judgments. But as Kant spoke neither of inquiry nor of insight nor of reflection nor of grasp of the unconditioned, so he did not speak of intelligent or of rational consciousness. There he left a vacuum into which Hegel boldly marched. But if Hegel marched into that vacuum, he did not grasp the fulness of its resources and versatility. He had some of the Kantian illusion of fixed categories and not enough awareness of the possibilities of intelligent inquiry either/ or of the significance of simple facts.

We differ from Kant in our conclusions, then, because we differ in our assumptions. The issue between us is a question of fact, for our self-affirmation, despite its overtones of necessity, is fundamentally an affirmation of fact. If the Kantian objects to our stand on fact as a mere psychologism, our answer has already been given. There is an empirical inquiry that escapes the merely hypothetical, that can claim immunity from future radical revision. It is cognitional theory.

A fifth difference has to do with consciousness. Kant acknowledged an inner sense that corresponds roughly to what we have named empirical consciousness, namely, the awareness that is immanent in acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, desiring, fearing, and the like. Besides this acknowledgement of inner sense Kant deduced or postulated an original synthetic unity of apperception as the a priori condition of the "I think" accompanying all cognitional acts. On the other hand, Kantian theory has no room for a consciousness of the generative principles of the categories; the categories may be inferred from the judgments in which they occur; but it is impossible to reach behind the categories to their source. It is precisely this aspect of Kantian thought that gives the categories their inflexibility and their irreducible mysteriousness. It is the same aspect that provided Fichte and Hegel with their opportunity to march into the unoccupied terrority of intelligent and rational consciousness. The dynamic states named inquiry and reflection do occur. Inquiry is generative of all understanding, and understanding is generative of all concepts and systems. Reflection is generative of all reflective grasp of the unconditioned, and that grasp is generative of all judgment. If the Kantian proscribes consideration of inquiry and reflection, he lays himself open to the charge of obscurantism. If he admits such consideration, if he praises intelligent curiosity and the critical spirit, then he is on his way to acknowledging the generative principles both of the categories Kant knew and of the categories Kant did not know.

The foregoing list of differences account for the divergence between Kant's conclusion and our own. They are differences in the problem under consideration, in the viewpoint from which it is considered, in the method by which it is solved. More fundamentally there are differences about questions of fact, for our self-affirmation is, as we have insisted and may be pardoned for repeating, primarily and ultimately a judgment of fact. The orthodox Kantian would refer to our stand as mere psychologism, as an appeal to the empirical that can yield no more than a provisional probability. But our retort is simple enough. Without judgments of fact one cannot get beyond mere analytic propositions. Further, though self-affirmation is no more than a judgment of mere fact, still it is a privileged judgment. Self-negation is incoherent. One has only to inquire and reflect, to find oneself caught in the spontaneities and inevitabilities that supply the evidence for self-affirmation. One has only to make a single judgment of fact, no matter what its content, to involve oneself in a necessary self-affirmation. Finally, cognitional theory differs from other theory: for other theory reaches explanation only by venturing into the merely supposed; but cognitional theory reaches explanation without any such venture; and since it contains no merely hypothetical element, it is not subject to radical revision.

If our position differs from Kant's, it also differs from Descartes'. Descartes represents the entry into philosophy of naive Renaissance views on objectivity. It was Kant's merit that he challenged such views. It was his misfortune that he did not succeed in disengaging himself completely from them. Descartes took them for granted to affirm a res cogitans and a res extensa, to invite Hobbes to his reduction of the thinker to the status of a res extensa

From Kantian we turn to relativist thought. The initial question in the present section was whether correct judgments occur. Our account of self-affirmation directly contradicts the relativist contention that correct judgments do not occur. Though the arguments for our position have been given, it will not be amiss to indicate where the relativist would disagree and why.

First, relativist thought is largely devoted to a refutation of empiricism. Correctly it insists that human knowing cannot be accounted for by the level of presentations alone. There is, as well, the level of intelligence, of grasping and formulating intelligible unities and systematic relations. Without this second level of activities there is, indeed, a given but there is no possibility of saying what is given.

Secondly, just as the relativist insists on the level of intelligence against the empiricist, so we insist on the level of reflection against the relativist. Human knowing is not merely theory about the given; there are also facts; and the relativist has not and cannot establish that there are no facts, for ~~if he did, then~~ the absence of any facts would itself be a fact.

other/

Thirdly, just as the empiricist could have nothing to say if, in fact, he did not utilize operations on the level of intelligence, so also the relativist does not confine himself strictly to the levels of presentation and of intelligence. He is quite familiar with the notion of the unconditioned. He regards the unconditioned as the ideal towards which human knowing tends. But he supposes that this ideal is to be reached through understanding. If the universe in its every part and aspect were thoroughly understood, there could be no further questions; everything would be conceived exactly as it ought to be; on every possible topic a man could say just what he meant and mean just what he said. On the other hand, short of this comprehensive coherence, there can be no sure footing. There is understanding, but it is partial; it is joined with incomprehension; it is open to revision when present incomprehension yields to future understanding; and so intimately are all things related that knowledge of anything can be definitive only when everything is known.

Fourthly, the relativist is able to follow up this general view by facing concrete issues. Is this a typewriter? Probably, Yes. For practical purposes, Yes. Absolutely? The relativist would prefer to be clear about the precise meaning of the name, typewriter; he would like to be told just what is meant by the demonstrative, this; he would be grateful for an explanation of the meaning of the copula, is. Your simple question is met by three further questions; and if you answer these three, your answers will give rise to many more. If you are quick and see that you are starting on an infinite series, you may confront the relativist with a rounded system. But the relativist is also a smart fellow. He will point out that ordinary people, quite certain that this is a typewriter, know nothing of the system on which you base their knowledge. Nor is this all. For human knowledge is limited; systems have their weak points; and the relativist will pounce upon the very issues on which a defender of the system would prefer to profess ignorance.

Fifthly, not only will the relativist make it plain that there are further questions until everything is known, but also he will explain why this is so. A relation is named internal

to an object when, without the relation, the object would be differ radically. Thus, we have spoken of inquiry and insight. But by inquiry we have not meant some pure wonder; we have meant a wonder about something. Similarly by insight we have not meant a pure understanding but an understanding of something. Inquiry and insight, then, are related internally to materials about which one inquires and into which one gains insight. Now, if one supposes that the whole universe is a pattern of internal relations, clearly it follows that no part and no aspect of the universe can be known in isolation from any other part or aspect; for every item is related internally to every other; and to prescind from such relations is to prescind from things as they are and to substitute in their place other imaginary objects that simply are not. If, then, one asks the relativist to explain why questions run off to infinity, he has a ready answer. The universe to be known by answering questions is a tissue of internal relations.

Sixthly, if the foregoing fairly represents the relativist position, it also reveals its oversights. Questions are of two kinds. There are questions for intelligence asking what this is, what that means, why this is so, how frequently it occurs or exists. There also are questions for reflection that ask whether answers to the former type of question are correct. Next, the unconditioned that is required for judgment is not the comprehensive coherence that is the ideal of understanding, that grounds answers to all questions of the first type. On the contrary, it is a virtually unconditioned that results from the combination of a conditioned with the fulfilment of its conditions. Further, a judgment is a limited commitment; so far from resting on knowledge of the universe, it is to the effect that, no matter whatthe rest of the universe may prove to be, at least this is so. I may not be able to settle border-line instances in which one might dispute whether the name, typewriter, would be appropriate. But at least I can settle definitively that this is a typewriter. I may not be able to clarify the meaning of <u>is</u>, but it is sufficient for present purposes to know the difference between <u>is</u> and <u>is not</u>, and that I know. I am not very articulate when it comes to explaining the meaning of <u>this</u>; but if you prefer to use <u>that</u>, it will make no difference provided we both see what we are talking about. You warn me that I have made mistakes in the past. But your warning is meaningless, if I am making a further mistake in recognizing a past mistake as a mistake. And in any case the sole present issue is whether or not I am mistaken in affirming this to be a typewriter. You explain to me that my notion of a typewriter would be very different, if I understood the chemistry of the materials, the mechanics of the construction, the psychology of the typist's skill, the effect on ~~writing due to composing~~ sentence structure resulting from the use of a machine in composing, the economic and sociological repercussions of the invention, its relation to commercial and political bureaucracy, and so forth. But may I not explain to you that all these further items, however interesting and significant, are to be known through further judgments, that such further judgments, so far from shifting me from my present conviction that this is a typewriter, will only confirm me in it, that to make those further judgments would be rather difficult if, at the start, I could not be certain whether or not this is a typewriter?

Sixthly, however, the questions that are answered by a pattern of internal relations are only questions that ask for explanatory system. But besides things-themselves and prior to them in our knowing, there are things-for-us, things as described. Moreover, the existents and occurrences, in which explanatory systems are verified, diverge non-systematically from the ideal frequencies that ideally would be deduced from the explanatory systems. Again, the activity of verifying involves the use of description as an intermediary between the system defined by internal relations and, on the other hand, the presentations of sense that are the fulfilling conditions. Finally, it would be a mistake to suppose that explanation is the one true knowledge: not only does its verification rest on description but also the relations of things to us are just as much objects of knowledge as are the relations of things among themselves.

Seventhly, the relativist invents for himself a universe that consists merely of explanatory system because he conceives the unconditioned as the ideal of understanding, as the comprehensive coherence towards which understanding tends by asking what and why. But as we have seen, the criterion of judgment is the virtually unconditioned. Each judgment is a limited commitment. So far from pronouncing on the universe, it is content to affirm some single conditioned that has a finite number of conditions which, in fact, are fulfilled. No doubt, were the universe simply a vast explanatory system, knowledge of the conditions of any conditioned would be identical with knowledge of the universe. But, in fact, the universe is not simply explanatory system; its existents and its occurrences diverge non-systematically from pure intelligibility; it exhibits an empirical residue of the individual, the incidental, the continuous, the merely juxtaposed, and the merely successive; it is a universe of facts and explanatory system has validity in the measure that it conforms to descriptive facts.

Eighthly, the relativist argument from unending further questions is more impressive than conclusive. Human knowing does not begin from previous knowing but from natural spontaneities and inevitabilities. Its basic terms are not defined for it in some knowing prior to knowing; they are fixed by the dynamic structure of cognitional process itself. The relativist asks what is meant by the copula, <u>is</u>, and the demonstrative, <u>this</u>. But neither he nor anyone else is given to confusing <u>is</u> with <u>is not</u> or <u>this</u> with <u>not this</u>; and that basic clarity is all that is relevant to the meaning of the affirmation, This is a typewriter. A cognitional theorist would be called upon to explain such elementary terms; he would do so by saying that <u>is</u> represents the <u>Yes</u> that occurs in judgment and that is anticipated by such questions as, Is it? What is it? Similarly, a theorist would explain <u>this</u> as the return from the field of conception to the empirical residue in the field of presentations. But questions relevant to cognitional theory are not relevant to every instance of knowing. They are not universally relevant because, in fact, there is no operational obscurity about the meanings that cognitional theory elucidates. Again, they are not universally relevant, because such elementary meanings are fixed, in a manner that surpasses determination by definition, with the native immutability of the dynamic structures of cognitional process.

Ninthly, as human knowing begins from natural spontaneity, so its initial developments are inarticulate. As it asks what and why without being given the reason for its inquiry, so also it sets off on the self-correcting process of learning without the explicit formulations that rightly would be required in an explanatory system. Single insights are partial. Spontaneously they give rise to the further questions that elicit complementary insights. Were the universe purely an explanatory system, the minor clusters of insights reached by what is called common sense would not head for a limiting position of familiarity and mastery in which evidently it is silly to doubt whether or not this is a typewriter. But, in fact, the universe to be known by answering questions is not pure explanatory system. In fact, insights do head for limiting positions of familiarity and mastery. In fact, as everyone knows very well, it is silly to doubt whether or not this is a typewriter. The relativist would beg me to advert to the enormous difference in my notion of the typewriter, were I to understand fully the chemistry of its materials, the mechanics of its construction, the psychology of the typist's skill, the twist given literary style by composing on a typewriter, the effect of its invention on the development of commercial and political bureaucracy, and so forth. But granted such an enrichment of my knowledge to be possible and desirable, none the less it is further knowledge to be obtained by further judgments; and since the enrichment is explanatory, since explanatory knowledge rests on descriptive knowledge, not only must I begin by knowing that this is a typewriter, not only must I advance by learning how similar other machines must be if they are to be named typewriters, but also I can attain valid explanation only in so far as my descriptions are exact.

Tenthly, it is quite true that I can be mistaken. But that truth presupposes that I am not making a further mistake in acknowledging a past mistake as a mistake. More generally, judgments of fact are correct or incorrect, not of necessity, but merely in fact. If this is something, still it might be nothing at all. If it is a typewriter, still it might be something else. Similarly, if I am correct in affirming it to be a typewriter, it is not a pure necessity but merely a fact that I am correct. Correct judgment of fact is a matter of being correct in fact. To ask for the evidence that excludes the possibility of my being mistaken in affirming this to be a typewriter, is to ask too much. Such evidence is not available, for if I am correct, that is merely fact. But if that evidence is not available, still less is there the evidence that will exclude the possibility of error in all judgments of fact. Errors are just as much facts as are correct judgments. But the relativist is in conflict with both categories of fact. For him nothing is simply true, for that is possible only when comprehensive coherence is reached; for him, nothing is simply wrong, for every statement involves some understanding and so some part of what he names truth. In the last analysis, just as the empiricist tries to banish intelligence, so the relativist tries to banish fact and, with it, what everyone else names truth.