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Fragment, gratia operans

This item is a page of the typescript of a version of Gratia Operans article 1. It was used as a wrapper for the treatise De Eucharistia (A39--in which there were no notations by BL). The material on this page corresponds to that which appears on pp. 292-93 of the published version of the first article (TS 1941), beginning at the very top of 292 and extending to the middle of 293 ('common notions to be found in'), or **CWL 1 pp. 5 (bottom) and 6-7**. But **there are differences**, and so the typescript is reproduced here. Included are typed materials which were crossed out, and an editorial indication at one spot of the changes that were made. The page is numbered at the top, 3. There also appears at the top the running head, Gratia Operans.

... the habit. For the present it will suffice to point out that in the work we are examining St. Augustine does not pay the slightest attention to this future development. Grace is any gratuitous gift of God: it is a vocation to the life of the celibate (6) or the most efficacious vocation of St. Paul (7); it is forgiveness, justification, regeneration (8) but it also is the power to avoid sin in the future (9); it is being a child of God and, as well, it is being moved by the Spirit of God (10); it is creation in Christ Jesus in whom all things are made new (11) and no less is it his aid without which we can do nothing (12); it is faith operating through charity (13) but above all it is charity itself (14).

Thus it is that the idea of liberation from sin and of justification happens to be in the foreground when St. Augustine attempts to reconcile divine operation with human liberty. For there can be no doubt that the will is free, not only when God cooperates with its good desires, but even when he operates good will itself, when he removes the heart of stone and inserts a heart of flesh. The prophet Ezekiel recounts indeed the divine promise to pluck out Israel's heart of stone, but no less does he deliver the divine command that Israel harden not its heart. How, Augustine asks, can God say both *dabo vobis* and *facite vobis*? Why does he give, if man is to be the doer? Or why does he command, if he himself is to be the giver? It is because the will of man is always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then it is evil; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good (15).

This cryptic solution of the problem is a puzzle principally to those who made the mistaken assumption that the *mens Augustini* was a speculative system on the nature of grace and liberty. Nothing could be further from the truth. [The following in italics is written above what is crossed out.] In a sense this disjunction is a major Augustinian problem, but in a more fundamental sense it is not a problem at all. For a problem exists only if there is an intelligibility to be discovered, and to assert a problem of interpretation here, involves the assumption that the *mens Augustini* was a speculative system on the nature of grace and liberty. Now certainly this view has no support in the work with which we are dealing for *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* was concerned not with speculation but with dogma. It was written because the prototypes of exaggerated Augustinianism, certain monks at Hadremetum, had the misfortune to be contemporaries of their adored master and so were rebuked by him for so extolling the grace of God as to deny human liberty (16). The work was addressed not to their understanding but to their faith; and if they failed to understand what they were to believe, they were not to dispute but to pray for light (17). The concepts employed were not the specialized products of abstract reflection but common notions to be found in