

the habit. For the present it will suffice to point out that in the work we are examining St. Augustine does not pay the slightest attention to this future development. Grace is any gratuitous gift of God: it is a vocation to the life of the celibate (6) or the most efficacious vocation of St. Paul (7); it is forgiveness, justification, regeneration (8) but it also is the power to avoid sin in the future (9); it is being a child of God and, as well, it is being moved by the Spirit of God (10); it is creation in Christ Jesus in whom all things are made new (11) and no less is it his aid without which we can do nothing (12); it is faith operating through charity (13) but above all it is charity itself (14).

Thus it is that the idea of liberation from sin and of justification happens to be in the foreground when St. Augustine attempts to reconcile divine operation with human liberty. For there can be no doubt that the will is free, not only when God coöperates with its good desires, but even when he operates good will itself, when he removes the heart of stone and inserts a heart of flesh. The prophet Ezechiel recounts indeed the divine promise to pluck out Israel's heart of stone, but no less does he deliver the divine command that Israel harden not its heart. How, Augustine asks, can God say both dabo vobis and facite vobis? Why does he give, if man is to be the doer? Or why does he command, if he himself is to be the giver? It is because the will of man is always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then it is evil; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good (15).

*In a sense this designation is a major Augustinian problem, but this cryptic solution of the problem is a puzzle principally to those who make the mistaken assumption that the mens Augustini of this is an intellectual life to be discovered, and to exist a problem of interpretation was a speculative system on the nature of grace and liberty. Nothing here involves the assumption that the mens Augustini was a speculative system on the nature of grace, liberty. Most certainly his view has no support in the work in which we are dealing, for was concerned not with speculation but with dogma. It was written*

because the prototypes of exaggerated Augustinianism, certain monks at Hadrumetum, had the misfortune to be contemporaries of their adored master and to some rebuked by him for so extolling the grace of God as to deny human liberty (16). The work was addressed not to their understanding but to their faith; and if they failed to understand what they were to believe, they were not to dispute but to pray for light (17). The concepts employed were not the specialized products of abstract reflection but common notions to be found in