

INSIGHTCHAPTER XXSPECIAL TRANSCENDENT KNOWLEDGE

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General transcendent knowledge is the knowledge of God that answers the basic questions raised by proportionate being, namely, what is being and whether being is the real.

Still, there is a fact of evil and man is inclined to argue from that fact to a denial of the intelligence or the power or the goodness of God. Even though it is agreed that the evil of objects of aversion is, from an intellectual viewpoint, a potential good, even though it is agreed that the evil of disorder is an absence of intelligibility that is to be understood only by the inverse insight that grasps its lack of intelligibility, there remains the concrete fact of evil and the practical problem of determining what one is to do about it.

Indeed, since God is the first agent of every event and emergence and development, the question really is what God is or has been doing about the fact of evil. The answer to that question we shall name special transcendent knowledge, and our discussion will fall under four main heads, namely, the fact of evil, the existence of a solution, the

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heuristic structure of the properties of the possible solutions, and the identification of the solution that exists.

1.

The Problem

The cult of progress has suffered an eclipse, not because man does not develop, nor because development does not imply a revision of what has been, but because development does imply that perfection belongs not to the present but to the future. Had that implication of present shortcomings not been overlooked with such abandon, had the apostles of progress not mistaken their basic views for premature attainments of future perfection, then the disillusionment of the twentieth century could hardly have been at once so unexpected, so bitter, and so complete.

Yet as things are, in the aftermath of economic and political upheavals, amidst the fears of worse evils to come, the thesis of progress needs to be affirmed again. For the very structure of man's being is dynamic. His knowing and willing rest on inquiry, and inquiry is unrestricted. His knowing consists in understanding, and every act of understanding not only raises further questions but also opens the way to further answers. His good will is consistent with his knowledge, and as his knowledge develops, he can be persuaded effectively to an ever fuller willingness. His sensitivity and his intersubjectivity are, like his knowledge and willingness, systems on the move; if their adaptation to spiritual advance is slow, at least it tends to endure; and so the accepted manners and customs of an earlier time can become abominations, at once incredible and repulsive, to a later age.

But if the thesis of progress must be affirmed, it must be taken to imply, not only a contrast with the past, but also a contrast with its goal. An unrestricted desire to understand correctly heads towards an unrestricted act of understanding, towards God. A will that is good by its consistency with knowledge is headed towards an antecedent willingness that matches the desire to know both in its essential detachment from the sensitive subject and in its unrestricted commitment to complete intelligibility, to God. A sensitivity and an intersubjectivity that have their higher integration in knowing and willing are headed towards objects and activities that can be no more than symbols and signs of what they cannot comprehend or appreciate. The whole world of sense is to be, then, a token, a mystery of God, for the desire of intelligence is for God and the goodness of will is the love of God.

There is a further implication. As the thesis of progress never places man on the pinnacle of perfection, it ever asserts that his knowledge is incomplete, that his willingness is imperfect, that his sensitivity and intersubjectivity still need to be adapted. Knowledge comes by the apparently random process of discovery, and it is disseminated by the laborious process of teaching and learning, writing and reading. Willingness to live consistently with knowledge has to be acquired by persuading oneself or by being persuaded by others. Sensitivity and intersubjectivity need time to become at ease with new ways. So it is that the present is ever a pattern of lags. No one can postpone

his living, until he has learnt, until he has become willing, until his sensitivity has been adapted. To learn, to be persuaded, to become adapted, occur within living and through living. The living is ever now, but the knowledge to guide living, the willingness to follow knowledge, the sensitive adaptation that vigorously and joyously executes the will's decisions, these belong to the future and, when the future is present, there will be beyond it a further future with steeper demands.

Now inasmuch as the courses of action that men choose reflect either their ignorance or their bad will or their ineffectual self-control, there results the social surd. Then to understand his concrete situation, man has to invoke not only the direct insights that grasp intelligibility but also the inverse insights that acknowledge the absence of intelligibility. Still this subtle procedure has to be discovered, taught, learnt. Until the discovery is made and disseminated and accepted, man tends to regard his situation as a homogeneous array of intelligible facts. The social surd, which should be discounted as mere proof of aberration, is regarded as evidence in favor of error. Man becomes a realist. The dictates of intelligence and reasonableness are found irrelevant to concrete living. The facts have to be faced, and facing them means the adjustment of theory to practice. But every adjustment makes the incidental sins of the past into the commonly accepted rule of the present; the social surd expands; and its expansion demands a further adjustment.

If this succession of ever less comprehensive syntheses can be deduced from man's failure to understand himself and his situation dialectically, if historical evidence for the failure and its consequences is forthcoming both in the distant and in the recent past, still it is far too general a theorem to unravel at a stroke the tangled skein of intelligibility and absurdity in concrete situations. Its generality has to be mediated by a vast accumulation of direct and inverse insights and by a long series of judgments of truth and of value, before any concrete judgments can be made. And on what Calahad shall we call to do the understanding and to make the judgments? For the social surd resides least of all in outer things and most of all in the minds and wills of men. Without an unbiased judge, the truth would not be reached; and if an unbiased judge were found, would the biased remainder of mankind acknowledge the rectitude of his decisions and effectively abide by them?

It was to this point that we were brought by our study of common sense and by its revelation of the scotosis of the dramatic subject and of the threefold bias of the practical subject. Then we appealed to a higher viewpoint, to an X ~~which we~~ ^{we} named, Cosmopolis, and indicated some of its features. But if the need of some Cosmopolis makes manifest the inadequacy of common sense to deal with the issue, on a deeper level it makes manifest the inadequacy of man. For the possibility of a Cosmopolis is conditioned by the possibility of a critical human science, and a critical human science is conditioned by the possibility of a correct and accepted

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philosophy. However, as the intervening chapters have attempted to explain, and as the history of philosophy rather abundantly confirms, the polymorphism of human consciousness loses none of its ambivalence because men have turned to philosophy. On the contrary, the many philosophers are but the adequate expression of the inner polymorphic fact. For every human discovery can be formulated either as a position or as a counter-position. The positions invite development, and in the measure that they are developed, they are expressed in many ways. Initially, each may appear singly. Then it is joined with further antithetical questions. Then positions begin to coalesce, first in more numerous but lesser syntheses, later in fewer but more comprehensive unities. Besides the many expressions of the positions, there are the counter-positions, and they invite reversal. But the reversal that could come from a single, penetrating stroke, more commonly is delayed. The counter-position expands by the unfolding of its logical implications; it recognizes its fellows and unites with them in a common cause; together they foresee the impending danger of reversal, not in its root, but in some particular manifestation; and then they shift their ground and avoid the menaced attack. So the counter-positions multiply; they occupy a vast territory from high-minded incoherence to simple-minded opportunism and violence; and if the worst of the counter-positions has no truck with any position, if the most perfect expression of the positions happens to be free from any taint of the counter-positions, still philosophers are men and the vast majority of them cling to some blend of both.

This conclusion may sound like scepticism. But certainly I would be the last to deny the possibility of working out a philosophy on the basis of the polymorphism of human consciousness and of the dialectical opposition between positions and counter-positions. After all, one does not deem impossible what one labors to achieve. Yet, if I fancy that I have made some contribution towards a philosophy of philosophies, I cannot dream so complex a transposition to end multiplicity; I cannot but suppose that those that will accept my conclusions also will endeavor to improve upon them, while those that disagree, ^{if ever} ~~base~~, they cease to believe silence the more efficacious weapon, will labor manfully to reverse my views. Moreover, in the measure that this work and subsequent improvements upon it possess concrete and practical implications, in that measure not only human intelligence and reasonableness but also human will and the established routines of human sensitivity and intersubjectivity are involved. So the Babel of men's minds passes into the conflict of their wills, and the conflict of wills reaches for its panoply of image and emotion, sound and passion.

Now if philosophy speaks with so many voices that a correct philosophy must be too complicated to pierce the din, should one not appeal directly to men of good will? Indeed, one should, provided one can find them. But there must be no illusions. One is not to define good will by its resemblance to one's own will, or even by its resemblance to the will one would like to possess but does not. Will is good by its conformity to intelligence. It is good in the

measure that antecedently and without persuasion it matches the pure desire both in its detachment from the sensitive subject and in its incessant dedication to complete intelligibility. A will, less good than that, is less than genuine; it is ready for the obnubilation that takes flight from self-knowledge; it is inclined to the rationalization that makes out wrong to be right; it is infected with the renunciation that approves the good yet knows itself to be evil. In brief, as man's intelligence has to be developed, so also must his will. But progress in willingness is effected by persuasion, persuasion rests upon intelligent grasp and reasonable judgment, and so the failure of intellect to develop entails the failure of the will.

There is a deeper level to the problem. In an earlier paragraph it was concluded that the pure desire of the mind is a desire of God, that the goodness of man's will consists in a consuming love of God, that the world of sense is, more than all else, a mystery that signifies God as we know him and symbolizes the further depths that lie beyond our comprehension. There is a theological dimension that must be added to our detached analysis of the compounding of man's progress with man's decline. Bad will is not merely the inconsistency of rational self-consciousness; it is also sin against God. The hopeless tangle of the social surd, of the impotence of common sense, of the endlessly multiplied philosophies, is not merely a cul-de-sac for human progress; it also is a reign of sin, a despotism of darkness; and men are its slaves.

No doubt, men are free. Were they not free, there would be no question of their sinning. But their essential freedom is one thing, and their effective freedom is another. Their essential freedom lies in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness; it is a higher integration of lower manifolds that can be integrated in many different manners; each element in that higher integration appears, first, as a possible course of action revealed by insight, secondly, as a value to be weighed by reflection and, thirdly, as an actuality only if it is chosen. No single course of action is necessary. If insight grasps only one at a time, still the insight raises the further question that leads to reflection, and the reflection leads to the further insights that reveal the alternative possibilities of the concrete situation. Again, reflection can pronounce one course of action preferable to all others, but that pronouncement has its suppositions, and the suppositions are not all that necessarily is so but, at least in part, merely what one chooses or has chosen to prefer. Finally, reflection never settles the issue: it can determine that a given course is valuable or pleasurable or useful; but only the decision makes the course actual; nor does the decision follow because the reflection ends, but the reflection ends because the decision is made. Because man determines himself, he is responsible; because the course of action determined upon and the process of determining are both contingent, man is free.

Effective freedom supposes essential freedom, as statistical law supposes classical law. Essential freedom is an intrinsic property of acts of a determinate class;

but effective freedom regards the relative frequencies of different kinds of acts within the class. Essential freedom is concerned with the manner in which acts occur: but effective freedom asks what acts are to be expected to occur.

The reign of sin, then, is the expectation of sin. On a primary level, it is the priority of living to learning how to live, to acquiring the willingness to live rightly, to developing the adaptation that makes right living habitual. On a second level, it is man's awareness of his plight and his self-surrender to it: on each occasion, he could reflect and through reflection avoid sinning; but he cannot bear the burden of perpetual reflection; and long before that burden has mounted to the limit of physical impossibility, he chooses the easy way out. On both the primary and the second levels, there is the transposition of the inner issue into the outer social milieu; concrete situations become infected with the social surd; they are intractable without dialectical analysis; and the intractability is taken as evidence that only in an increasingly limited fashion can intelligence and reasonableness and good will have any real bearing upon the conduct of human affairs. Finally, dialectical analysis can transpose the issue, but it cannot do so effectively. It goes beyond common sense to a critical human science that supposes a correct and accepted philosophy; but a correct philosophy will be but one of many philosophies and, precisely because it is correct, it will be too complicated to be commonly accessible and too alien to sinful man to be widely accepted.

2.

The Existence of a Solution

There is a fact of evil. It is not an incidental waywardness that provides the exceptions to prove a rule of goodness. Rather it is a rule. If it is not a necessary but only a statistical rule, it is no less a fact and, indeed, it is a worse fact. Were the rule necessary, it would exclude freedom; were freedom excluded, there would be no sin. But the rule is statistical: freedom remains essentially intact; and so effectively man's rational self-consciousness is frustrated with the burden of responsibility for sins it could avoid but does not.

But is there also a problem of evil? There can be a problem only if there is an intelligibility to be grasped. But what intelligibility and, as well, what lack of intelligibility there are in man's condition and situation, have been grasped already. There are intelligible possibilities of intelligent and reasonable and good courses of action. There is the intelligibility of the frequencies with which they are and are not executed. There is the intelligibility of actual choices that are good. There is the surd of sin, and it is understood inasmuch as one grasps its lack of intelligibility. Nor are there further questions, as long as one directs one's attention to man; for while intelligence can grasp what man might do, it also grasps that man won't do it.

None the less, there is a problem of evil, for besides man there also is God. The order of this universe

in all its aspects and details has been shown to be the product of unrestricted understanding, of unlimited power, of complete goodness. Because God is omniscient, he knows man's plight. Because he is omnipotent, he can remedy it. Because he is good, he wills to do so. The fact of evil is not the whole story. It is also a problem. Because God exists, there is a further intelligibility to be grasped.

Certain remarks are in order. First of all, I have employed the name, problem, in a technical sense, so that it is meaningless to speak of a problem for which no solution exists. But the argument does not depend upon the definition of terms. No matter how one cares to phrase it, the point seems to remain that evil is, not a mere fact, but a problem, only if one attempts to reconcile it with the goodness of God, and, if God is good, then there is not only a problem of evil, but also a solution.

In the second place, since a solution exists, our account of man's moral impotence and of the limitations of his effective freedom cannot be the whole story. There is a further component in the actual universe that, as yet, has not been mentioned. Because it has not been mentioned, our statements on man's plight are true as far as they go, but they are not the whole truth. They are true hypothetically inasmuch as they tell what would be, did the further component not exist; but they are not true absolutely, for they prescind from a further component that both exists and is relevant to the issue.

In the third place, because this book has been written from a moving viewpoint, we have mentioned first

a problem and only later its solution. But it would be an anthropomorphic blunder to transfer this succession to God. There are no divine afterthoughts. The unrestricted act of understanding grasps the total range of possible world orders; each is a consequence and manifestation of divine intelligence and wisdom, of divine reality and truth, of divine goodness and love; since all are worthy of God, any can be chosen and that choice will be intelligent and wise, good and loving. Moreover, as has been seen already, the good is potential or formal or actual; but the problem under consideration is potentially good, for it is the potency to the solution; the solution as a further order is formally good and as a possible object of choice is a value or actual good in prospect or in process or in its term. It follows that the problem and its solution are related both from the viewpoint of intelligence and from the viewpoint of the good; and so once more there appears the absurdity of thinking of the problem without its solution.

In the fourth place, it is important not to confuse the intelligible unity of the actual world order including both its problem and its solution and, on the other hand, the possibility that the things of this world order might exist in any of a range of other orders. The root of this confusion is conceptualism, which places conception before understanding and things before their orders; in consequence, it divides the order of things into two parts, of which the first is necessitated by the things that are ordered and the second is an arbitrary complement added by a voluntaristically conceived divine will. It follows that the

conceptualist cannot argue from the intelligible unity of this world order, for he acknowledges no such unity but merely a compound of the necessary and the arbitrary. Again, it follows that, if the conceptualist argues at all, then he argues from the natures of the things that are ordered and he can conclude only to what is necessary.

On the other hand, the intellectualist, as he rejects the conceptualist's suppositions, so he is not hampered by their limitations. For him, understanding is first. The unrestricted act grasps in itself the total range of possible world orders, and it is within the orders that the things are known. Since every instance of possibility is included within the total range of possible orders, since every instance of the non-contradictory is possible, since the same things admit many possible but mutually incompatible predicates, it follows that the same things recur in many different orders. But this recurrence of the same things within different orders by no means is opposed to the intelligible unity of each order. For necessarily every order is worthy of God, intelligent and wise, good and loving, just and merciful. Moreover, this necessity is not a restriction on possibility defined as internal coherence; for as one and the same reality is at once divine intelligence and wisdom, divine reality and power, divine goodness and love, so all that divine power can do, divine wisdom can do wisely and divine goodness can do well. (See Sum. theol., I, q. 25, aa. 3 & 5)

3. The Heuristic Structure of the Solution

We have affirmed the existence both of a problem and of its solution within the intelligible unity of the actual order of the universe. But this implies the existence of a heuristic structure. For there is a heuristic structure whenever the object of an inquiry admits antecedent determinations; and the solution that we are seeking is an object of inquiry that satisfies the intelligible unity of the actual world order and that solves the problem defined above.

Now it would seem that this heuristic structure is worth investigating. For even when such a structure fails to determine a single answer, at least it offers a set of alternative answers; and then through an appeal to the facts it becomes possible to settle which of the alternatives is correct.

First, then, the solution will be one. For there is one God, one world order, and one problem that is both individual and social.

Secondly, the solution will be universally accessible and permanent. For the problem is not restricted to men of a particular class or of a particular time; and the solution has to meet the problem.

Thirdly, the solution will be a harmonious continuation of the actual order of this universe. For there are no divine afterthoughts.

Fourthly, the solution will not consist in the addition of central forms of a new genus or species. For the solution is to a human problem; the problem has to be solved

for men, and it would merely be dodged by introducing a new genus or species.

Fifthly, the solution can consist in the introduction of new conjugate forms in man's intellect, will, and sensitivity. For such forms are habits. But man's intellect is an unrestricted potency, and so it can receive habits of any kind; man's will is good in so far as it follows intellect, and so it can receive habits that correspond to the habits received in intellect; finally, man's sensitivity is a lower manifold under the higher integration of intellectual and volitional acts, and so it can be adapted habitually to the acts that occur.

Sixthly, the solution will include the introduction of such conjugate forms. For the problem arises from the nature of development; because man's living is prior to learning and being persuaded, it is without the guidance of knowledge and without the direction of effective good will; as long as that priority remains, the problem remains. The solution, then, must reverse the priority, and it does so inasmuch as it provides intellect, will, and sensitivity with forms or habits that are operative throughout living.

Seventhly, the relevant conjugate forms will be in some sense transcendent or supernatural. For what arises from nature is the problem. The forms that solve the problem, then, do not arise from nature; they are not the result of accumulated insights, for such accumulation takes time, and the problem arises because man has to live during the interval in which insights are being accumulated. Moreover, the understanding man acquires in this fashion, the judgments that he

forms, and the willingness that he obtains, all suffer from the fourfold bias of the dramatic and practical subject and from the tendency of speculative thought to the counter-positions.

Eighthly, since the solution is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, and since that order involves the successive emergence of higher integrations that systematize the non-systematic residues on lower levels, it follows that the relatively transcendent conjugate forms will constitute a new and higher integration of human activity and that that higher integration will solve the problem by controlling elements that otherwise are non-systematic or irrational.

Ninthly, these higher conjugate forms will pertain not to static system but to system on the move. For they have their place in a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, and in that order the lower static systems of physics and chemistry are succeeded by the higher dynamic systems of biology, sensitive psychology, and human intellectual activity. Moreover, the higher conjugate forms have to meet a problem that varies as man develops and declines, and so they too must be capable of some development and adaptation.

Tenthly, since higher integrations leave intact the natures and laws of the underlying manifold and since man is intelligent and rational, free and responsible, it follows that the solution will come to men through their apprehension and with their consent.

Eleventhly, since the solution is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe and since that order is an emergent probability, it follows that the emergence of the solution and its propagation will be in accord with the probabilities. It is to be borne in mind, however, that emergent probability has the same meaning here as in the earlier chapters of this work; it does not denote any sort of efficient cause; it refers to the immanent intelligibility of the design or order in which things exist and events occur.

Twelfthly, the relevant probabilities are those that regard the occurrence of man's intelligent and rational apprehension of the solution and his free and responsible consent to it. But there are stages in human development, when there is no probability that men will apprehend and consent to a universally accessible and permanent solution that meets the basic problem of human nature. Moreover, all human development has been seen to be compounded with decline and so it fails to prepare men directly and positively to apprehend and consent to the solution. Accordingly, it seems necessary to distinguish between the realization of the full solution and, on the other hand, the emergent trend in which the full solution becomes effectively probable.

From the cosmic and metaphysical aspects of the solution, we now turn to a closer determination of the appropriate higher conjugate forms.

In the thirteenth place, then, the appropriate willingness will be some type or species of charity.

For good will follows intellect, and so it

matches the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire of intellect for complete understanding: but complete understanding is the unrestricted act that is God; and so the good that is willed by good will is God. Moreover, to will the good of a person is to love the person; but God is a person, for he is intelligent and free; and so good will is the love of God. Further, good will matches the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to know, and so good will is a love of God that is prompted not by a hope of one's own advantage but simply by God's goodness.

Again, a man or woman knows that he or she is in love by making the discovery that all ~~their~~ spontaneous and deliberate tendencies and actions regard the beloved. Now as the arm rises spontaneously to protect the head, so all the parts of each thing conspire to the good of the whole, and all things in all their operations proceed to the realization of the order of the universe. But the order of this universe is actual and the orders of all other universes are possible because of the completeness of the intelligibility, the power of the reality, and the perfection of the goodness and love of God. It follows that, apart from the surd of sin, the universe is in love with God: and good will is the opposite of the irrationality of sin: accordingly, the man of good will is in love with God.

Again, the actual order of the universe is a good and value chosen by God for the manifestation of the perfection of God. Moreover, it grounds the emergence and includes the excellence of every other good within the universe, so that to will any other good is to will the order

of the universe. But good will follows intellect and so, as intellect apprehends, so it wills every other good because of the order of the universe and the order of the universe because of God.

Again, the order of the universe includes all the good that all persons in the universe are or enjoy or possess. But to will the good of a person is to love the person; and so to will the order of the universe because of one's love of God is to love all persons in the universe because of one's love of God.

Again, the order of the universe is its intelligibility to be grasped by following the appropriate classical or statistical or genetic or dialectical method. Hence, to will the order of the universe is not to will the clock-work perfection of mechanist thought but the emergent probability of the universe that exists. It is not to demand that all things be perfect in their inception but to expect and will that they grow and develop. It is not to exclude from man's world the possibility of the social surd, nor to ignore it for it is a fact, nor to mistake it for an intelligibility and so systematize and perpetuate it, but to acknowledge it as a problem and to embrace its solution.

Now the will can contribute to the solution of the problem of the social surd, inasmuch as it adopts a dialectical attitude that parallels the dialectical method of intellect. The dialectical method of intellect consists in grasping that the social surd neither is intelligible nor is to be treated as intelligible. The corresponding dialectical attitude of will is to return good for evil. For it

is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing love.

Again, self-sacrificing love of God and of one's neighbor is repent^aant. For man's rational self-consciousness exists over time. If it develops and becomes good, it has been less good and perhaps evil. If it approves its past, it thereby reverts to its past. If it would remain as it is, it must disapprove its own past; and if it would become still better, it must disapprove its present. So rational self-consciousness deplores and regrets the scotosis of its dramatic bias and its involvement in the individual, group, and general bias of common sense; it repents its flight from self-knowledge, its rationalization of wrong, its surrender to evil; it detests its commitment to the counter-positions, its contribution to man's decline through the successive adjustments of theory to ever worse practice, its share in the genesis and the propagation of the myths that confer on appearance the strength and power and passion that are the due of reality.

Such repent^aance is not a merely sensitive feeling of guilt. It is an act of good will following the insights of intelligence and the pronouncements of reasonableness. It is apart from the vagaries of mere feelings, and when they go astray, it disapproves them, curbs them, and may seek aid in controlling them.

Further, such repentance^a does not stop short at the limited viewpoint of our chapter on the possibility of ethics. For as intellect rises to knowledge of God, the will is called to love of God, and then evil is revealed to be not merely a human wrong but also sin, revolt against God, an abuse of his goodness and love, a pragmatic calumny that hides from oneself and from others the absolute goodness and perfect love that through the universe and through men expresses itself to men. So repentance^a becomes sorrow. A relation between stages in one's living is transformed into a personal relation to the one loved above all and in all.

Finally, good will is joyful. For it is love of God above all and in all, and love is joy. Its repentance^a and sorrow regard the past. Its present sacrifices look to the future. It is at one with the universe in being in love with God, and it shares its dynamic resilience and expectancy. As emergent probability, it ever rises above past achievement. As genetic process, it develops generic potentiality to its specific perfection. As dialectic, it overcomes evil both by meeting it with good and by using it to reinforce the good. But good will wills the order of the universe, and so it wills with that order's dynamic joy and zeal.

In the fourteenth place, besides the charity by which the will itself is made good, there will be the hope by which the will makes the intellect good.

For intellect functions properly inasmuch as the detached and disinterested desire to know is dominant in cognitional operations. Still this desire is merely spontaneous. It is the root of intelligent and rational self-con-

sciousness, and it operates prior to our insights, our judgments, and our decisions. Now if this desire is to be maintained in its purity, if it is not to suffer from the competition of the attached and interested desires of man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity, if it is not to be overruled by the will's connivance with rationalizations, then it must be aided, supported, reinforced by a deliberate decision and a habitual determination of the will itself.

Now such a decision and determination of the will can have as its object only the proper good of intellect. But the proper good of intellect is the attainment of the objective of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know: and the attainment of that objective is knowledge of God who is at once the transcendent idea of being and the transcendent reality of being. It follows that, as intellect spontaneously desires knowledge of God, so the will deliberately desires attainment of that knowledge. Moreover, since the act of will is an act of rational self-consciousness, it will not be a mere repetition of the intellect's desire but also will take issue with conflicting tendencies and considerations. On the one hand, then, it will be a decision against man's despair, for the secret of the counter-positions is not the superficial confusion generated by the polymorphism of human consciousness but the deeper hopelessness that allows man's spirit to surrender the legitimate aspirations of the unrestricted desire and to seek comfort in the all too human ambitions of the Kantian and the positivist. On the other hand, it will be a decision against presumption no less than against despair. The objective of an unrestricted desire to understand

correctly lies beyond the reach of empirical science, of common sense, of their unification in metaphysics, of the transcendent knowledge by which we know that God exists and that he is the unrestricted act of understanding. That objective is some attainment by knowledge of God who is the unrestricted act. The fulfilment of the conditions for that attainment lie not with man but with God whose wisdom designed the order of the universe and whose goodness brings a solution to man's problem of evil. Now a desire that excludes both despair and presumption is a confident hope, and so the conjugate form of willingness that aids and supports and reinforces the pure desire is a confident hope that God will bring man's intellect to a knowledge, participation, possession of the unrestricted act of understanding.

However, the range of divine wisdom is as large as the range of divine omnipotence. As there are many possible solutions to man's problem of evil, so there are many manners in which God could communicate to man a knowledge that manifested the answer to all questions and so provided the will's love of God with an irresistible source and ground in man's own knowledge. Now in the present section we are concerned to work out the heuristic structure of all solutions possible within the framework of the actual order of the universe. Accordingly, we must remain content to affirm hope only in a generic fashion. What specifically is man's hope in the actual order of things, is to be settled later by an appeal to facts.

In the fifteenth place, there is to be considered the appropriate, relatively transcendent conjugate form that

a realization of the solution to the problem of evil would involve in man's intellect. For if hope aids and supports the pure desire by striving for its goal, still hope is not knowledge but only an expectation of knowledge. It is not the knowledge that we hope for but the knowledge we possess that will supply the will's hope with its object and assurance and the will's charity with its motives. There is needed in the present a universally accessible and permanently effective manner of pulling men's minds out of the counter-positions, of fixing them in the positions, of securing for them certitude that God exists and that he has provided a solution which they are to acknowledge and to accept.

However, at first sight, this seems an impossibility within the limits of the problem. For the problem arises inasmuch as human knowledge bogs down in the counter-positions; and the solution has to be received by man not merely as intelligent and rational, free and responsible, but also as operating within a harmonious continuation of the present order of the universe. Not only is there demanded a leap from the counter-positions, but also it is expected that its occurrence will be probable not in a few cases but in a general and permanent fashion.

This argument, however, can be met with a distinction. For there are two ways in which men reach truth and certitude. If one asks a mathematician what is the logarithm of the square root of minus one, he will set down the relevant definitions and postulates and then proceed to deduce the answer. But if you ask a non-mathematician, he will turn and ask the mathematicians and, in the measure he is confident

of their ability and sincerity, he will have no doubt that that the answer they give is correct. In both cases truth and certitude are attained, but in the first case it is generated immanently, while in the second case it is obtained through communication with those whom one knows to know. Now the argument outlined above goes to prove that there is no probability of men generally moving from the counter-positions to the positions by immanently generated knowledge. On the other hand, as far as the argument goes, it reveals no obstacles to the attainment of truth through the communication of reliable knowledge.

Still one has only to notice the similarity between such communicated knowledge and belief to be aware that this proposal bristles with difficulties. For on the subject of belief the counter-positions have been both abundant and eloquent and, until it can be shown that there is a possibility of conceiving belief as an intelligent and reasonable procedure, there is no use attempting to continue the present account of the heuristic structure of the solution to the human problem of evil.

4.

The Notion of Belief.

The account to be offered of the notion of belief falls into four main parts. First, there will be outlined the general context of the procedure named believing. Secondly, the procedure itself will be analyzed. Thirdly, the method of eliminating mistaken beliefs will be explained. Fourthly, certain technical questions, raised by the analysis, will be discussed.

It is to be noted that the whole of the present section is simply an explanatory note that interrupts the exposition of the heuristic structure of the solution. To that exposition we return in the next section.

4.1

The General Context of Belief

The general context of belief is the collaboration of mankind in the advancement and the dissemination of knowledge. For if there is such a collaboration, then men not only contribute to a common fund of knowledge but also receive from it. But while they contribute in virtue of their own experience, understanding, and judgment, they receive not an immanently generated but a reliably communicated knowledge. That reception is belief, and our immediate concern is its general context.

Already the reader is familiar with the distinctions between empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness, and the further enlargement that we have named rational self-consciousness. One is empirically conscious inasmuch as one is aware of data into which one can inquire. One is intelligently conscious inasmuch as one inquires, understands, formulates, and raises further questions for intelligence. One is rationally conscious inasmuch as one puts questions for reflection, grasps the unconditioned, and passes judgment. But one becomes rationally self-conscious inasmuch as one adverts to the self-affirming unity, grasps the different courses of action it can pursue, reflects upon their value, utility, or agreeableness, and proceeds to a free and responsible decision.

Now just as the pure desire to know, which is spontaneous, can be aided, supported, reinforced by a free decision of the will in which one determines to be quite

genuine in all one's investigations and judgments, so also the spontaneous procedures of the mind can be submitted to introspective analysis, formulated as methods, and reinforced by free decisions in which one wills to be faithful to methodological precepts.

Now a fundamental methodological issue is whether each man should confine his assents to what he knows in virtue of his personal experience, his personal insights, and his personal grasp of the virtually unconditioned or, on the other hand, there can and should be a collaboration in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge.

In fact, the collaboration exists. Our senses are limited to an extremely narrow strip of space-time and, unless we are ready to rely on the senses of others, we must leave blank all other places and times or, as is more likely, fill them with our conjectures and then explain our conjectures with myths. Again, the personal contribution of any individual to the advance of human understanding is never large. We may be astounded by men of genius; but the way for their discoveries was prepared by many others in a long succession; and if they took enormous strides, commonly it was because the logic of their circumstances left them no opportunity to take shorter ones. But without collaboration each successive generation, instead of beginning where its predecessor left off, would have to begin at the very beginning and so could never advance beyond the most rudimentary of primitive levels.

Some collaboration, then, is inevitable. But once it begins, it spreads. Mathematicians expedite their calculations by having the recurrent parts of their work

done once for all and then published in tables of various kinds. Again, the departments of mathematics multiply and, as it becomes obvious that no one can master all, it follows that each begins to rely on others for results obtained in branches in which he himself is not competent. What holds for mathematics, also holds in a broader manner for the empirical sciences. Not only must each physicist and chemist rely on the reports of his predecessors and colleagues, not only are the further questions set by an objective and general process of advance rather than by the individual's desire to learn, but even the verification of each hypothesis really lies not in the confirmation that any one man's work can bring but rather in the cumulative evidence that is provided by the whole scientific tradition.

It is true of course that if the engineer suspects his tables, if the mathematician doubts the theorems propounded in a different branch, if the empirical scientist has reason to challenge accepted views, then it is not only possible but also highly laudable for them to labor to bring about a revision. But if this possibility and encouragement offer a necessary safeguard, they must not blind us to the actual facts. Engineers tend to feel their duty has been done when they learn how to use a slide-rule, and no one would dream of imposing upon their intellectual conscience the obligation of working out independently the trigonometric functions and the logarithmic tables. When it is claimed that any engineer could have immanently generated knowledge of the correctness of his slide-rule, it is not to be forgotten that all engineers merely believe slide-rules to be

correct and that none of them has any intention of seeking to establish the matter by carrying out for himself the endless computations that the slide-rule so compactly summarizes. When it is claimed that each scientist could repeat and check the results of any experiment, it is not to be forgotten that no scientist has any intention of repeating and checking all the experiments which his thinking presupposes. Nor is this all, for empirical science is a collective enterprise to so radical an extent that no scientist can have immanently generated knowledge of the evidence that really counts: for the evidence that really counts for any theory or hypothesis is the common testimony of all scientists that the implications of the theory or hypothesis have been verified in their separate and diverse investigations. In plainer language, the evidence that really counts is the evidence for a belief.

specialties | Because collaboration is a fact, because it is inevitable, because it spreads into a highly differentiated network of interdependent specialties, the mentality of any individual becomes a composite product in which it is impossible to separate immanently generated knowledge and belief. As was seen in the chapter on the Notion of Judgment, there stands in the habitual background of our minds a host of previous judgments and assents that serve to clarify and define, to explain and defend, to qualify and limit, the prospective judgment that one is about to make. But if this host is submitted to scrutiny, one finds that one's beliefs are no less operative than one's immanently generated knowledge; and if one pursues the examination, one is forced to the con-

clution that, as no belief is independent of some items of immanently generated knowledge, so there are extraordinarily few items of immanently generated knowledge that are totally independent of beliefs. One does not simply know that England is an island. Neither does one merely believe it. Perhaps no one has immanently generated knowledge that general relativity is more accurate than Newtonian theory on the perihelion of Mercury. But it does not follow that for everyone it is purely a matter of belief. The development of the human mind is by the self-correcting process of learning, and in that process personal knowledge and belief practise an unrelenting symbiosis. The broadening of individual experience includes hearing the opinions and the convictions of others. The deepening of individual understanding includes the exploration of many viewpoints. The formation of individual judgment is a process of differentiation, clarification, and revision, in which the shock of contradictory judgments is as relevant as one's own observation and memory, one's own intelligent inquiry and critical reflection. So each of us advances from the nescience of infancy to the fixed mentality of old age and, however large and indeterminate the contributions of belief to the shaping of our minds, still every belief and all its implications have been submitted to the endlessly repeated, if unnoticed, test of fresh experiences, of further questions and new insights, of clarifying and qualifying revisions of judgment.

The general context of belief, then, is a sustained collaboration of many instances of rational self-consciousness in the attainment and the dissemination of know-

ledge. The alternative to the collaboration is a primitive ignorance. But the consequence of the collaboration is a symbiosis of knowledge and belief. What, then, is the process of believing?

4.2

The Analysis of Belief

The analysis of belief presupposes a theorem and outlines a typical process.

The theorem regards the logical possibility of belief, and it may be divided into two parts, one remote and general, the other proximate and concrete.

The remote and general part of the theorem argues from the criterion of truth. As has been seen, when a proposition is grasped as virtually unconditioned, there arises a rational necessity that leads us to affirm or deny the proposition as certainly or probably true. Hence, while truth is a property immanent in rationally conscious acts of assent or dissent, still it rests on the unconditioned. But the unconditioned is independent not only of particular places and times but also of the particular mind that happens to be its subject. Accordingly, there is to any truth an essential detachability from the mind, in which it happened to be generated, and an essential communicability, for the unconditioned cannot but be independent of processes of transmission from one place and time to another and from one mind to another.

The proximate and concrete part of the theorem is involved in a question of fact. There can and to some extent there does exist a collaboration of men in the advancement and the dissemination of knowledge. On that collaboration there rest the invention and development of languages, the erection of schools and universities, the use of scientific methods and the publication of scientific journals, our domestic, economic, and political institutions, and the

whole network of communications of the civilized world with their implicit, and often explicit, reprobation of perjury, deceit, and propaganda. Now in so far as this collaboration is conducted properly, there is an implementation of the essential detachability and communicability of truth. To a common fund each may contribute inasmuch as he grasps the virtually unconditioned; to that common fund each does contribute inasmuch as he expresses exactly the unconditioned that he grasps; and from the common fund each may make his own appropriations inasmuch as intelligently and critically he believes the truths which others have grasped.

Just how one is to discriminate between the properly and the improperly conducted parts of the collaboration, raises a complex question that had best be reserved to the next subsection (4.3). Our immediate concern is with the outline of the typical process of true belief, say, an acceptance of a table of logarithms as true. Five stages are to be distinguished, namely, 1) preliminary judgments on the value of belief in general, on the reliability of the source for this belief, and on the accuracy of the communication from the source; 2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition, 3) the consequent judgment of value, 4) the consequent decision of the will, and 5) the assent that is the act of believing.

In this sequence, the key act is the second. For it is the goal towards which the preliminary judgments head and in which they are resumed; and at the same time it

anticipates the subsequent three acts and constitutes the guarantee of their validity and of their rationality. Accordingly, it will be well to begin with a brief consideration of the other acts so that we may know both what the central act has to support and what it may presuppose.

The third act, then, is a judgment on the value of deciding to believe with certitude or with probability that some proposition certainly or probably is true or false. As any judgment, it proceeds with rational necessity from one's own grasp of the virtually unconditioned and it posits precisely what is grasped as unconditioned. As any judgment, it may be true or false, for the investigation leading up to the judgment may or may not have been free from the undue influence of desires other than the pure desire to know and, again, one may or may not be insufficiently or excessively exigent in determining the presence of the virtually unconditioned. However, it differs from judgments of fact and from theoretical judgments, for it settles a question of value; and it differs from other judgments of value, for it is concerned not with the good of the senses nor with the good of the will nor with the good of the whole man nor with the good of society but simply and solely with the good of intellect. Moreover, it is concerned not with the good of intellect in general but with a particular belief. Accordingly, it presupposes that it is good for intellect to reach the unconditioned through its own inquiry and reflection, that it is good for intellect to communicate to others the unconditioned that it has reached, and that it is good for intellect to accept from others the unconditioned that they

have reached. But the judgment of value now under discussion goes beyond these generalities to pronounce upon the value of accepting from others in a determinate instance what they communicate as unconditioned.

The fourth act follows upon the third. It is a free and responsible decision of the will to believe a given proposition as probably or certainly true or false. It is a reasonable act of the will, if it is proceeded by a sincere and favorable judgment on the value of deciding to believe the proposition in question. It is a good act of the will, if the sincere and favorable judgment of value also is correct. Moreover, in its antecedents, the decision to believe may be said to resemble any other decision; for it presupposes the occurrence of an insight in which one grasps believing as a possible course of action and, further, it presupposes the occurrence of rational reflection in which the course of action is evaluated favorably. But, in its consequents, the decision to believe differs from other decisions of the will; for other decisions initiate or continue integrated sequences of bodily movements, or they modify the flow of images and consequent affects, or they regard the will itself by deciding to decide; but the decision to believe is a decision to produce in intellect the act of assenting to a proposition or dissenting from it.

The fifth act is the act of believing. It is an act of rational self-consciousness that occurs within the general program of a collaboration of minds in the advancement and in the dissemination of knowledge of truth. It resembles the act of judgment in object and in mode, but it

differs from it in motive and in origin. It resembles judgment in its object, for it affirms or denies a proposition to be true. It resembles judgment in its mode, for it is a rational utterance of a "Yes" or "No" that may be pronounced with certitude or with probability. But while judgment is motivated by one's own grasp of the unconditioned, the assent or dissent of belief is motivated by a decision to profit by a human collaboration in the pursuit of truth. And while judgment results with rational necessity from reflective grasp of the unconditioned, the assent or dissent of belief results with natural necessity from a free and responsible decision to believe.

The third, fourth, and fifth acts form a sequence. The judgment is on the value of deciding to believe. The act of will is a decision to believe because of the value. The assent or dissent of belief is the value that one affirms and decides to accept. Now as the act of believing depends upon the decision, and the decision depends upon the judgment of value, so all three acts are anticipated by the reflective act of understanding: for in that reflective act the conditioned that is grasped as virtually unconditioned is the value of deciding to believe a given proposition. Accordingly, if the reflective act occurs, there will follow with rational necessity the judgment of value, with free responsibility the decision to believe, and with natural necessity the act of believing. However, if the reflective act is to occur, there must be 1) a conditioned, 2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and 3) the fulfilment of the conditions.

The conditioned in question is the value of deciding to believe a determinate proposition.

The link between the conditions and the conditioned is that, if the proposition has been grasped as unconditioned in a manner that satisfies the criterion of truth, then there exists a value in deciding to believe the proposition.

Finally, the conditions are fulfilled in the measure that one knows 1) that the proposition has been communicated accurately from its source, and 2) that the source uttered the proposition, uttered it as true, uttered it truthfully, and was not mistaken.

Since knowledge of the fulfilment of the conditions commonly consists in judgments or assents, the unconditioned can be expressed as a syllogism in which the link supplies the major premise^e and the fulfilment of the conditions supplies the minor premise^u. However, as has been seen already, the function of syllogistic expression is not to eliminate but to facilitate the occurrence of the reflective act of understanding. A parrot or an electronic computer can send forth signs in a syllogistic pattern; but neither can grasp the virtually unconditioned; and neither can be subjected to the rational necessity that results in a judgment. Inversely, when a man pronounces a judgment on the value of deciding to believe, it is not because of a syllogism nor even because he accepts the premises of a syllogism but only because the syllogism has helped him grasp the virtually unconditioned in his acceptance of the premises.

It remains that something be said on the preliminary judgments. For if we have considered already their theoretical elements, such as the essential communicability of the unconditioned and the value of implementing this communicability in a human collaboration, there also are involved such concrete elements as the reliability of a given source and the accuracy of a given communication.

Here the fundamental observation is, of course, the ultimate insufficiency of any set of general rules. For the concrete goes beyond all generalities, and the relevant concrete judgment of fact will vary not only with beliefs but also with sources, with communications, and with the circumstances and knowledge of prospective believers. Intelligent inquiry and critical reflection have to deploy all their resources both to exclude the numerous possibilities of error and inaccuracy and to discover and assemble the equally varied indications and confirmations of truth. Finally, as has been seen, while an analysis can indicate the general lines along which man's intellect proceeds to the concrete judgment of fact, it can never do justice to the full range of its resources and to the delicacy of its discernment.

distinguish
But if one cannot hope to present concrete judgments in general terms, at least one can distinguish certain broad differences. For one can reach the unconditioned grasped by another mind either in a personal interview or through a series of intermediaries. One can rely on personal knowledge of an individual's abilities and character or on the

testimony of others whose ability and character are known. One can exclude error by appealing to ability and deceit by scrutinizing motives or one can argue in the opposite fashion as in Prof. Collingwood's detective story in which all the witnesses were lying and all the clues were planted. One can move beyond the whole range of personal considerations to base one's case on the constitutive laws of a human collaboration that not only in its intent but also in its functioning is so constructed to reduce error and inaccuracy to a minimum and, sooner rather than later, to extrude even the minimum that incidentally arises. But whatever the procedure, the only general rule is to be alertly intelligent and critically reflective; and however intelligent and critical one may be, the result is to be named not knowledge but belief, for one ends with an assent to a proposition that one could not oneself grasp to be unconditioned.

There is a final observation and it is that the scrutiny of the reasons for almost any belief will reveal that it rests on other beliefs. This is only to be expected since, in fact, men collaborate in the pursuit of knowledge and since each judgment they make rests on their prior judgments and assents. But it will not be amiss to illustrate the point and we shall take a scientific example both because science is so clearly a collective enterprise and because there exists a widespread blunder that contrasts science with belief.

Let us ask, then, whether the General Theory of Relativity reduces the error of 43 seconds of arc per century that arises in the Newtonian calculation of the

perihelion of Mercury. An affirmative answer would presuppose

- 1) a number of different and quite accurate observations,
- 2) the principles and inferences introduced in constructing, mounting, and using the astronomical instruments, 3) the principles and lengthy calculations needed to determine the Newtonian expectations, and 4) the validity of the tensor calculus and the correctness with which it is employed to reach the Einsteinian approximation. But to secure the relevant observations, there is needed a succession of trained observers and the knowledge or belief that they were trained successfully, that they were conscientious, and that they obtained the results that are attributed to them. A long range of scientific issues are involved in the design and construction, the erection and use, of the astronomical instruments; the principles on which each of these issues was solved, if established scientifically, was established by a human collaboration that operates through belief; and whether or not the principles were applied correctly in the case of each instrument, is a matter of further belief for all for whom the applications were not a matter of immanently generated knowledge. What is meant by Newtonian theory and by the General Theory of Relativity, may be read in a variety of books that ultimately acknowledge Newton and Einstein as their sources; but not only the readers of the books but also most of the authors did not know but believed that Newton and Einstein were the sources. Finally, while one may know both Newtonian mechanics and the tensor calculus, one may be a bit hesitant about trusting one's own unsupported judgment on the correctness of the Einsteinian approximation, or one may

shrink from the labor of working out for oneself the relevant Newtonian calculations, or at least one will draw the line at undertaking a fresh and independent computation of the mathematical tables that facilitate the calculations; and so one would be led to add still further beliefs to ground one's belief in the superiority of the theory of relativity.

None the less,
~~Still~~, however numerous the beliefs involved, one will console oneself with the thought that one is believing scientists. They possess a high reputation for intellectual integrity. Moreover, it is rather difficult for them to avoid meriting their reputation, for not only are they subjected to strong motives for avoiding error and inaccuracy but also each of them possesses both the incentives and the facilities for making public any error or inaccuracy that escaped the notice of ^{his} ~~their~~ colleagues. Like the Constitution of the United States of America, scientific collaboration is a system of checks and balances in which everyone is out to avoid mistakes and alert to spot the mistakes of others. But while everyone can grasp this general principle, it is another matter to have some experience of the way it works out in practice. Scientists themselves have such experience and it both yields knowledge of their individual case and supports belief in the operativeness of the same pressures upon other scientists. Yet the question is whether these pressures were in fact operative on the individual scientists positively or negatively responsible for the expression of the precise proposition to be believed here and now. If they were, the longer

the time in which the proposition remains unchallenged, the greater becomes the approximation to certitude. If they were not, if other equally efficacious pressures or motives were not operative, then modern science could hardly have succeeded in effecting its profound transformation of modern living. And so the dependence of belief on other beliefs moves from the field of science to the field of history, for the profound transformation of modern living by modern science is a truth that we accept without immanently generating knowledge of the whole of it by our personal experience, personal inquiry, and personal grasp of the unconditioned.

4.3

The Critique of Beliefs

In principle, belief is possible because the criterion of truth is the unconditioned. In practice, belief is as intelligent and reasonable as is the collaboration of men in the advancement and in the dissemination of knowledge. In fact, if the collaboration in the field of natural science enjoys enormous prestige, it does not merit the same high praise in other fields. Mistaken beliefs exist, and the function of an analysis of belief is overlooked if it fails to explain how mistaken beliefs arise and how they are to be eliminated.

Fortunately, the present question raises no new issues. Already there has been carried through a general critique of error and, as error in general, so mistaken beliefs have their roots in the scotosis of the dramatic subject, in the individual, group, and general bias of the practical subject, in the counter-positions of philosophy, and in their ethical implications and consequences. In belief as in personal thought and judgment, men go wrong when they have to understand and to judge either themselves or other things in relation to themselves. The serenity and sure-footedness of the mathematician, the physicist, the chemist, are not independent of the remoteness of these fields from human living. If, in the past, physicists and chemists have been prominent in propagating an erroneous mechanist determination, still it was a single sweeping mistake, it had its origin in the polymorphism of human consciousness, and it has been corrected by the abstractness

Haeckel

of relativity and the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. If Haeckel offers an instance of scientific fraudulence, it also is true that his deception was in the interest not of biology but of a materialist philosophy. On the other hand, when it comes to the study of life, of the psychological depths, of human institutions, of the history of nations, cultures, and religions, then diversity multiplies, differences become irreconcilable, and the name of science can be invoked with plausibility only by introducing methodological conventions that exclude from scientific consideration the heart of the matter. The life of man on earth lies under the shadow of a problem of evil; ^{the} evil invades his mind; and as it distorts his immanently generated knowledge, so also it distorts his beliefs.

If the determination of the origin of mistaken beliefs raises no new issues, neither does the problem of eliminating from one's own mind the rubbish that may have settled there in a life-long symbiosis of personal inquiry and of believing. For learning one's errors is but a particular case of learning. It takes as its starting-point and clue the discovery of some precise issue on which undoubtedly one was mistaken. It advances by inquiring into the sources that may have contributed to that error and, perhaps, contributed to other errors as well. It asks about the motives and the supporting judgments that, as they once confirmed one in that error, may still be holding one in others. It investigates the consequences of the view one now rejects and it seeks to determine whether or not they too are to be rejected. The process is cumulative. The discovery of

one error is exploited to lead to the discovery of others; and the discovery of the others provides a still larger base to proceed to the discovery of still more. Moreover, this cumulative process not only takes advantage of the mind's native process of learning, in which one insight leads on to other insights that open the way to still further insights, but it also exploits the insistence of rational consciousness on consistency; for just as our love of consistency, once we have made one mistake, leads us to make others, so the same love of consistency leads us to reject other mistakes, when one is rejected, and at the same time, it provides us with abundant clues for finding the others that are to be rejected.

If our general principles enable us to be brief both on the origin of mistaken beliefs and on the method of eliminating them, there is not to be overlooked the clarification that comes from contrast.

In the first place, the critique rests on a systematically formulated notion of belief. There exists a human collaboration in the pursuit and the dissemination of truth. It implies that in the mentality of any individual there exists in principle a distinction between his judgments, which rest on immanently generated knowledge, and his other assents, which owe their existence to his participation in the collaboration. Without some immanently generated knowledge, there would be no contributions to the collaboration. Without some beliefs, there would be no one that profited by the collaboration. It follows, further, that immanently generated knowledge and belief differ, not in their object

or their modes, but in their motives and their origin. Thus, the same proposition, say " $E=mc^2$ ", may be known by some and believed by others; it may be known or believed as more or less probable; but if it is known, the proposition itself is grasped as unconditioned; and if it is believed rationally, then the unconditioned that is grasped is the value of being willing to profit by the intellectual labors of others. Hence, because the object of belief is the same as the object of immanently generated knowledge, we have to disagree with all the views that attribute belief to the psychological depths or to desire or fear or to sentiment or to mere will. On the other hand, because even an intellectual collaboration is conditioned by decisions of the will, we also disagree with all the views that admit any belief to be simply a matter of cognitional activity.

In the second place, though there exists in principle a distinction between immanently generated knowledge and belief, it does not follow that there exist two compartments in anyone's mind and that he can retain what he knows and throw out what he believes. On the contrary, the external collaboration is matched by an internal symbiosis, and the counsel that one should drop all belief has the same ludicrous consequences as the Cartesian philosophic criterion of indubitability. For the counsel can be followed only if one has a quite inaccurate notion of the nature and the extent of belief; it leads to the rejection of all beliefs that, on erroneous suppositions, are known to be beliefs; and so not only are true beliefs rejected, which is not an act of devotion to truth, but also there

arises the absurd conviction that one's mistaken but covert beliefs must be named either science or sound common sense or philosophy.

No doubt there are mistaken beliefs. No doubt mistaken beliefs are to be eliminated. But the first step is to know what a belief is. It is to make the discovery, perhaps startling to many today, that a report over the radio of the latest scientific discovery adds, not to one's scientific knowledge, but to one's beliefs. The second step, no less necessary than the first, is to grasp the method to be followed in eliminating mistaken beliefs. For if one fails to hit upon the right method, one gets nowhere. The elimination of mistaken beliefs is not a matter of taking up a book and of believing the author when he proceeds to enumerate your mistaken beliefs; for that procedure adds to your beliefs; the addition varies with the author that you happen to read; it is extremely unlikely that he will hit off with any accuracy your personal list of mistaken beliefs; and it is not improbable that your mistaken beliefs will determine which author you prefer and so covertly govern your critique of belief by belief. Again, the elimination of mistaken beliefs is not a matter of attempting to assign explicitly the grounds for each of your beliefs and of rejecting those for which adequate explicit grounds are not available. For inquiry into the grounds of any belief soon brings to light that it depends on, say, ten other beliefs; each of the ten, in turn, will be found to depend on ten others; one's neglect of method now has one attempting to test at once one hundred and eleven beliefs, and they will be found not only

to be linked together in an organic interdependence of mutual conditioning but also to raise still further considerations that partly are matters of immanently generated knowledge and partly matters of further belief. The simple fact is that a man cannot reconstruct his mind by the process of explicit analysis; for explicit analysis takes more time than the spontaneous procedures of the mind; it has taken each of us our lifetime to reach by spontaneous procedures the mentalities we now possess; and so if it were necessary for us to submit our mentalities to a total explicit analysis, it would also be necessary for us to have twofold lives, a life to live, and another, longer life in which to analyze the life that is lived.

In contrast, the method, offered by our critique, asks no one to believe that he subscribes to mistaken beliefs. Without undue optimism it expects people of even moderate intelligence to be able to discover for themselves at least one mistaken belief. Again, the proposed method does not offer anyone a putative list of his mistaken beliefs; it does not even offer a list of alternative lists, as the clothing industry offers a range of ready-made suits of different sizes. Rather it aims at the perfect fit, and so it is content to point out the far-reaching significance of the discovery of even one mistaken belief. For that discovery enables one to set in reverse the same spontaneous and cumulative process that gave rise to one's mistaken beliefs. So one secures at a stroke the procedure that is both economical and efficacious: it is economical, for it wastes no time examining beliefs that are true; and it is efficacious, for

it begins from the conviction that one has made one bad mistake, and it proceeds along the structural lines of one's own mentality and through the spontaneous and cumulative operations of the mind that alone can deal successfully with concrete issues.

In the third place, though we claim the method to be efficacious against mistaken beliefs, we do not claim that it goes to the root of the problem. For the basic problem lies not in mistaken beliefs but in the mistaken believer. Far more than they, he is at fault. Until his fault is corrected, until his bias is attacked and extirpated, he will have little heart in applying an efficacious method, little zeal in prosecuting the lesser culprits, little rigor in pronouncing sentence upon them, little patience with the prospect of ferreting out and examining and condemning still further offenders. A critique of mistaken beliefs is a human contrivance, and a human contrivance cannot exorcize the problem of human evil. If man's will matched the detachment and the unrestricted devotion of the pure desire to know, the problem of evil would not arise. Inversely, as long as will fails to match the desire of intellect, intellect may devise its efficacious methods but the will fails to give them the cooperation they demand. Still, this pessimism is only hypothetical. It acknowledges a problem of evil, yet it prescind from the existence of a solution. The solution does exist and so no one can assure himself that its realization has not begun in him. And if in him that realization has begun, then his discovery and rejection of one mistaken belief can lead

him on to the discovery and the rejection of as many more
as the God of Truth demands of him.

4.4

A Logical Note

The possibility and fact of belief enlarges the notion of truth to include not only the content of judgments resulting from reflective grasp of the unconditioned but also the content of assents that proceed proximately from decisions of the will and remotely from someone else's grasp of the unconditioned.

However, if this enlargement is overlooked, there arise a number of logical problems that have repercussions on the analysis of belief. It will be the purpose of the present subsection to indicate that such problems are merely logical and that they vanish when the notion of truth and, in particular, its enlargement are taken into account.

First, then, it will be objected that belief involves no enlargement. For whether one knows or believes, truth consists simply in affirming what is and in denying what is not while falsity consists simply in affirming what is not and in denying what is. The answer to the objection is to be had in noting that affirmation and denial are intrinsically rational acts, that they not merely regard an object but also occur because of an apprehended motive. Hence, while belief does not enlarge the range of objects of true affirmation, it does enlarge the range of true affirmations for it enables many to affirm truly what only a few may grasp as unconditioned.

Secondly, it may be objected that, in the analysis of belief, four of the alleged typical acts are superfluous. For once one knows that an expression has been communicated

accurately from a really reliable source, one knows that it is true. Therefore, there is no need for the reflective act of understanding, for the judgment of value, for the decision of the will, and for the assent that is said to be an act of believing. The answer is to point out that the objection takes the counter-positions for granted. It supposes that truth and falsity are properties of expressions but, as has been seen, they are properties of intrinsically rational acts while expressions are merely adequate or inadequate. Hence, to know that an expression has been communicated accurately from a reliable source 1) is not to know that the expression is true, for truth is not a property of expressions, and 2) does not lead to knowledge of truth but solely to belief.

Thirdly, one may object that it leads not merely to belief but also to knowledge of truth. For it leads to the judgment on the value of deciding to believe; that judgment is not a belief, for it proceeds immediately from a grasp of the value as unconditioned; moreover, that value is neither sensible nor volitional but purely intellectual, and the purely intellectual value is truth.¹ Therefore, the judgment of value is not belief but knowledge of value, and the value known is truth. Further, there follows the corollary that the decision to believe and the act named believing are superfluous.

The fallacy here turns on the use of the name, knowledge. In a broad sense, one can say that a cognitional act is knowledge if its object is true; in that sense all true belief is an instance of knowledge. But in a strict sense one will say that a cognitional act is knowledge 1) if its object is true, and 2) if the cognitional act results immediately

from a reflective grasp of the object as unconditioned; and, clearly, in this strict sense not even true belief is knowledge.

Now, in the third objection, it is argued that the judgment of value is not belief but knowledge, and then the name, knowledge, is employed in the strict sense. Later, however, it is argued that the value in question is a truth and, since the value is known, therefore the truth is known. Now it is in this argument that the ambiguity becomes operative. For knowledge of the value is knowledge in the strict sense. Knowledge that the value in question is the value of truth again is knowledge in the strict sense. But knowledge of the content or object, subsumed under the value of truth, is no more than knowledge in the broad sense. For it is knowledge that an act of believing, if it occurs, will be true; but even when the act of believing does occur, it will be no more than knowledge in the broad sense; and anticipatory knowledge of knowledge in a broad sense is knowledge of the anticipated content or object only in a broad sense.

Fourthly, it will be objected that at least the decision to believe and the act of believing are superfluous. For in the judgment of value there is implicit knowledge that the content of this anticipated assent of belief will be true. But, by adverting to the implication, one already knows all that one will know by believing. Therefore, at least for anyone aware of the implications of his acts, the decision to believe and the act of believing are superfluous.

The basic distinction overlooked by this objection is between the primary flow of consciousness, in which occurs

the process of believing, and the secondary, introspective flow, in which occurs the analysis of the process of believing.

Now in the primary flow a judgment on the value of deciding to believe either is or is not superfluous. If it is superfluous, then the premise^x of the fourth objection vanishes along with the decision to believe and the act of believing. But if it is not superfluous, then the affirmation of the value of deciding motivates the will to decide and may even oblige it to decide; and if the will decides, then the act of believing follows with natural necessity. Moreover, if one grants the judgment of value to be superfluous, then one is committing oneself to the counter-positions; for one will be driven to conceive truth, not as a property of intrinsically rational acts (veritas logica formaliter est in solo iudicio), but as a property of expressions or, perhaps, as some self-subsistent entity to be known by taking a look.

It is in the secondary, introspective flow of consciousness that there occurs the advertence to the implication that, if the judgment of value is true, then the assent of belief will be true. But though the implication exists and the advertence may occur, they do not render superfluous either the decision to believe or the act of believing. For the introspective flow of consciousness either is confined to knowing or else it goes beyond knowing to become a principle of action. If it is confined to knowing, then its sole function is to report accurately what occurs in the primary flow; and the accurate report is that the

decision to believe and the act of believing are not superfluous but normal elements in the collaboration of men in the pursuit of truth. On the other hand, if the introspective flow of consciousness is supposed to be a principle of action, so that man knows himself in order that he may reconstruct his procedures, then at least the reconstruction has to be coherent and reasonable. But it would be incoherent to posit a judgment on the value of deciding to believe and, at the same time, exclude the decision and the believing. And a will that consistently failed to respond to affirmative judgments of value would not be good and reasonable but bad and unreasonable. Finally, while the reader may feel that he could work out a coherent and reasonable reconstruction that modified the actual process of belief, he also will acknowledge that his reconstruction would remain a mere theory, quite irrelevant to the analysis of belief, until believers commonly proceeded along the new lines laid down for them.

5. Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution

The foregoing account of belief interrupted a larger discussion. For the present chapter began with the affirmation of a problem of evil and of the existence of a solution. Moreover, though it was clear that many solutions lie within the reach of divine omnipotence, it was seen to be possible to determine the general characteristics common to all solutions. Thus, any solution would be one; it would be universally accessible and permanent; it would be some harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe; it would consist in some reversal of the priority of living over the knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to follow knowledge; this reversal would be effected through conjugate forms that in some sense would transcend human nature, that would constitute a new higher integration of human activity, that would pertain not to static system but to system on the move, that would be realized with man's apprehension and consent and in accord with the probabilities of world order. Finally, it was seen that these conjugate forms would be some type of charity, of hope, and of belief.

Now that the nature of belief has been clarified, it is possible to resume our investigation of the heuristic structure; and to emphasize the continuity of the present fifth section with the earlier third section, it may not be amiss to carry over the numbering of the successive assertions.

In the sixteenth place, then, the solution in its cognitional aspect will consist in a new and higher collaboration of men in the pursuit of truth. For it has been seen that the solution meets a problem of error and sin through a higher integration that, though in some sense transcendent, none the less is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe. Now in the actual order of the universe man's intellectual development occurs within a collaboration, which men maintain by their truthfulness and accuracy, in which they participate by their beliefs, and to which they contribute by the addition of their immanently generated knowledge. Accordingly, because the solution is a harmonious continuation of the actual order, it too will be a collaboration that involves belief, truthfulness, accuracy, and immanently generated knowledge. Again, because the solution is a higher integration, it will be a new and higher collaboration. Finally, because the solution meets a problem of error and sin, the new and higher collaboration in the pursuit of truth will provide an antidote to the errors to which man is inclined.

In the seventeenth place, the new and higher collaboration will be, not simply a collaboration of men with one another, but basically man's cooperation with God in solving man's problem of evil. For if men could collaborate successfully in the pursuit of the truth that regards human living, there would be no problem and so there would be no need of a solution. But the problem exists, and the existence of a solution is affirmed because ^{of} divine wisdom, divine goodness, and divine omnipotence. It follows that the new and

higher collaboration is, not the work of man alone, but principally the work of God.

In the eighteenth place, man's entry into the new and higher collaboration and his participation of its fruits will be some species of faith.

By faith is meant the requisite conjugate form that the solution brings to man's intellect. By some species of faith is meant any of the conjugate forms that perfect intellect in any of the series of possible solutions within the reach of divine omnipotence.

Moreover, it can be shown that this faith will be a transcendent belief. For the solution is to be universally accessible, yet it is not to violate the probabilities of the actual order of the universe. But belief and only belief is universally accessible within a harmonious continuation of the existing order. Moreover, the relevant belief will be transcendent; for it makes a man a participant in the new and higher collaboration in which God is the initiator and the principal agent.

In the nineteenth place, with regard to faith three stages have to be distinguished. For it has been seen that the solution introduces into man's will a hope of knowledge of God that reinforces the pure desire to know. There is, then, a final stage when the attainment of knowledge supplants faith and realizes the object of hope. Moreover, it has been seen that the solution itself divides into two parts with, first, an emergent trend and, only secondly, its full realization. Accordingly, there will be an introductory faith and collaboration in the emergent trend towards the

solution, and there will be a full faith and collaboration in the full realization of the solution.

In the twentieth place, because faith is a transcendent belief operative within a new and higher collaboration of man with God, the act of faith will be an assent of intellect to truths transmitted through the collaboration and it will be motivated by man's reliance on the truthfulness of God. For, as a belief, the act of faith will be an assent of intellect to an object and because of a motive. As a belief within a new and higher collaboration, the object of faith will be the truths transmitted by the collaboration. Because it is a belief within a collaboration of man with God as initiator and principal agent, the motive of faith will ^{be} the omniscience, goodness, and omnipotence of God originating and preserving the collaboration.

In the twenty-first place, the act of faith, as specified by its object, will include an affirmation of man's spiritual nature, of his freedom, responsibility, and sinfulness, of God's existence and nature, and of the transcendent solution God provides for man's problem of evil. It will include the basic truths about man and about God, not because the ordinary collaboration of men cannot arrive at them, but because it invariably fails to reach unanimity upon them. It will include an announcement and an account of the solution because, as has been seen, though man cannot originate the solution nor preserve it, still he must be intelligent and reasonable in his acknowledgement of it and his acceptance of it.

In the twenty-second place, man will be intelli-

gent and reasonable in his acknowledgement of the solution inasmuch as 1) he grasps the existence of the problem of evil and, in particular, of man's inability to cope with it, 2) he infers that divine wisdom must know many possible solutions, that divine omnipotence can effect any of them, and that divine goodness must have effected some one of them, 3) he recognizes that, in fact, there has been in human history, first, an emergent trend and, later, the full realization of a solution that possesses all the characteristics determined or to be determined in such a heuristic structure as the present.

In the twenty-third place, man will be intelligent and reasonable in his acceptance of the solution inasmuch as the foregoing judgments enable him to grasp as unconditioned the value of deciding to assent to the truths of the new and higher collaboration because of the initiating and preserving truthfulness of God. For from that grasp of the unconditioned there will follow with rational necessity a judgment on the value of deciding to assent, with free responsibility a decision to assent, and with conditioned natural necessity the act of assent itself.

In the twenty-fourth place, since the solution is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, men will not only acknowledge and accept the solution but also will collaborate with it. Accordingly, because the solution is for all men and universally accessible, there will be the collaboration that consists in making known to others the good news of the solution and its nature. Again, because the solution is permanent, there will be the collaboration

that consists in transmitting it from each generation to the next. Again, because human expression is relative to its audience, there will be the collaboration that consists in recasting the expression of the solution into the equivalent expressions of different places, times, classes, and cultures. Again, because man can arrive at a universal viewpoint, there will be the collaboration that consists in conceiving and expressing the solution in terms of the universal viewpoint. Finally, because the solution regards man's problem of evil, there will be the collaboration that consists in grasping and formulating the manner in which the solution is relevant and effective in each of the successive situations of individuals, classes, national groups, and of men generally.

In the twenty-fifth place, as the problem of evil exists because God respects man's freedom, so the existence of the solution leaves human freedom intact. Accordingly, one is to expect not only that man's collaboration in the solution will be marked by deficiencies and failures but also that these indications of aberration will be marked by their human origin. The scotosis of the dramatic subject will betray itself both by excessively spiritual pretensions and by excessive interest in the sensible. Individual bias will forget that man's basic role in the collaboration is faith and that the contributions he can make are limited to grasping and clarifying and expressing the significance, the implications, and the applications of the truths of faith. Group bias will replace a single, universally accessible solution by a multiplicity of solutions for different classes and different nations. General bias will introduce the

counter-positions. For in virtue of its failure to grasp that the real is being and that being is known by a rationally uttered "Yes", it will account the truths of faith to be mere words or mere symbols and it will insist that man contacts reality only on the level of the experience that is prior to all questions and all answers. In turn, once the counter-positions become operative, whether fully as in modernism or in some mitigated form, the new and higher collaboration of men under God is stripped of its meaning; its implementing procedures and institutions are denied validity and competence; and the hope and charity that would reinforce man's pure desire and transform his willingness are left without the motivation and guidance of an intelligently formulated and reasonably accepted faith.

In the twenty-sixth place, if faith does not exclude the possibility and the fact of heresy because the solution is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, still heresy cannot eliminate the solution and restore an unchallenged reign of sin. For the solution is principally the work of God who is omniscient and omnipotent and goodness itself. It follows, then, that the new and higher collaboration will survive the inroads of heresy. Moreover, this survival and preservation, though principally the work of God, will be effected through human channels and in accord with the probabilities, for the new collaboration is part and parcel of the actual order of the universe. But the one human means of keeping a collaboration true to its purpose and united in its efforts is to set up an organization that possesses institutions capable of making necessary judgments

and decisions that are binding on all. Accordingly, it follows that God will secure the preservation of faith against heresy through some appropriate institutional organization of the new and higher collaboration.

In the twenty-seventh place, though the solution as a higher integration will be implemented principally in man's intellect and will through conjugate forms of faith and hope and charity, it must also penetrate to the sensitive level and envelop it. For, in the main, human consciousness flows in some blend of the dramatic and practical patterns of experience and, as the solution harmoniously continues the actual order of the universe, it can be successful only if it captures man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity. Moreover, as has been seen, all exercise of human intelligence presupposes a suitable flow of sensitive and imaginative presentations and, again, inasmuch as intelligence and reasonableness and will issue into human words matched with deeds, they need at their disposal images so charged with affects that they succeed both in guiding and in propelling action. Again, besides the image that is a sign of intelligible and rational contents and the image that is a psychic force, there is the image that symbolizes man's orientation into the known unknown; and since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity.

It follows that the solution will be not only a renovation of will that matches intellectual detachment and aspiration, not only a new and higher collaboration of intellects through faith in God, but also a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended.

Further, since mystery is a permanent need of man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity, while myth is an aberration not only of mystery but also of intellect and will, the mystery that is the solution as sensible must be not fiction but fact, not a story but history. It follows, then, that the emergent trend and the full realization of the solution must include the sensible data that are demanded by man's sensitive nature and that will command his attention, nourish his imagination, stimulate his intelligence and will, release his affectivity, control his aggressivity and, as central features of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God.

In the twenty-eighth place, the solution will be effective in the sense that it meets the problem of evil not by suppressing the consequences of man's waywardness but by introducing a new higher integration that enables man, if he will, to rise above the consequences, to halt and reverse the sequence of ever less comprehensive syntheses in which theory keeps surrendering to practice, to provide a new and

more solid base on which man's intellectual and social development can rise to heights undreamed, and perpetually to overcome the objective surd of social situations by meeting abundant evil with a more generous good.

In the twenty-ninth place, the solution will have a nature and content and significance and power of its own. For if we have approached the solution through the problem of evil and, consequently, have emphasized the aspects in which it is related to the problem, none the less the solution will be a new, higher integration, a new level on which human living develops and rejoices. However, many different solutions are possible to divine omnipotence, and a heuristic structure necessarily is confined to determining the generalities that are common to all solutions. Accordingly, for a specific account of the new higher integration, of the content of its faith, of the object of its hope, of the intimacy of its charity, of the mystery of its transformed humanism, it is necessary to proceed from the heuristic structure of the solution to its identification in the facts of human living and human history.

In the thirtieth place, while every solution is transcendent in the sense that it involves a new, higher integration, while every solution is religious inasmuch as it is constituted by a faith and hope and love that look primarily to God, still in the measure that the higher integration goes beyond the minimal essentials of every solution, in that measure there will be revealed to faith truths that man never could discover for himself nor, even when he assented to them, could he understand them in an adequate

fashion. For the greater the proper perfection and significance of the higher integration, the more it will lie beyond man's familiar range and the more it will be grounded in the absolutely transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act of understanding.

Accordingly, if we specialize the general heuristic structure by adding further alternative hypotheses, we are led to distinguish between natural solutions, relatively supernatural solutions, and absolutely supernatural solutions. All three types would have the common feature that they provide solutions to man's problem of evil. But the natural solutions would not offer to faith any truths that man could not discover for himself through the development of his own understanding; they would not offer to hope more than the natural immortality, that can be deduced from the spirituality of the human soul, and the knowledge of God that is consequent upon the separation of the immortal soul from the mortal body; they would not offer to charity more than the perfection of a total, self-sacrificing love in a creature for his or her creator. In the relatively supernatural solutions, man's natural capacities cease to set a limiting rule; the object of faith includes truths that man could not reach through the development of his understanding; the object of hope is a knowledge of God beyond the appropriate attainment of an immortal soul; and charity is the more abundant response to a more indulgent beneficence. Still, all such solutions are only relatively supernatural, for though they go beyond the measure set by human nature, still there are other possible creatures, more excellent than man, for whom they

Foot-note to Chapter XI, p. 1223.

I should explain that I use the word, super-
natural, not in its current meaning, but as the English
equivalent to the medieval theologians' supernaturale. It
was a technical term that referred to the entitative dis-
proportion between nature and grace, faith and reason and
faith, good will and charity, human esteem and merit before
God.

would be natural solutions. Finally, there are the absolutely supernatural solutions. Conceived negatively, they are absolutely supernatural, because there is no possible creature for which they would be the natural solutions. Conceived positively, they are absolutely supernatural, because their sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself. Then faith includes objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding. Then hope is for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence. Then charity is the transport, the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy, that results from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God.

In the thirty-first place, if the solution, which in fact is provided for man, happens to be supernatural and, in particular, if it happens to be absolutely supernatural, there will result a heightening of the tension that, as we have seen, arises whenever the limitations of lower levels are transcended. Moreover, when the higher integration is emergent in consciousness, not only is the tension itself conscious as an inner opposition and struggle but also it is objectified socially and culturally in the dialectical unfolding of human living and human history.

For the supernatural solution not only meets a human need but also goes beyond it to transform it into the point of insertion into human life of truths beyond human comprehension, of values beyond human estimation, of an alliance and a love that, so to speak, brings God too close to man. No doubt, once man would be established within the

supernatural solution, all would be well. For such a solution would be a higher integration; of its very nature it would respect and, indeed, foster the proper unfolding of all human capacities; and just as the organism attains the height of its complexity and versatility under the higher integration of animal consciousness, just as the psyche reaches the wealth and fulness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence, so also would human excellence enjoy a vast expansion of its effective potentialities under the higher integration of the supernatural solution. Still, generalities can be very misleading. It is not to be forgotten that the solution is a harmonious continuation of the present order of the universe, that it is constituted through conjugate forms that develop, and that its realization and development occur through acts of human acknowledgement and consent that accord with probability schedules. The assent of faith is the starting-point for an ever fuller understanding of its meaning, its implications, and its applications. The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference either with intellect's unrestricted finality or with its essential detachment and disinterestedness. The antecedent willingness of charity has to mount from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God's concept and choice. Accordingly, even in those in whom the solution

is realized, there are endless gradations in the measure in which it is realized and, by a necessary consequence, there are endless degrees in which those that profess to know and embrace the solution can fail to bring forth the fruits it promises in their individual lives and in the human situations of which those lives are part.

But the point I would make is that in solutions of the supernatural type these difficulties are augmented. Even of natural solutions it would be probable that universal accessibility would not ensure universal acceptance, that intellectual collaboration would develop down the ages, that the faith and hope and charity of successive generations of members more commonly would hover about intermediate values than reach maxima of intensity and efficacy. Still, natural solutions would not exceed the bounds of humanism. Their faith would be not only a believing to understand (crede ut intelligas) but also a believing what man in this life eventually could understand. Their hope would reinforce the pure desire without introducing a displacement away from human concerns. Their charity would be ^a self-sacrificing love of God ~~above all~~ that bore no appearance of a contempt for human values. In contrast, the supernatural solution involves a transcendence of humanism, and the imperfect realization of the supernatural solution is apt to oscillate between an emphasis on the supernatural and an emphasis on the solution. Imperfect faith can insist on believing to the neglect of the understanding that makes faith an effective factor in human living and human history; and an even less perfect faith can endanger the general collaboration in its

hurry to show forth its social and cultural fruits. Imperfect hope can so expect the New Jerusalem as to oppose any foretaste of intellectual bliss and union in this life; and an even less perfect hope can forget that a supernatural solution involves a real displacement of the center of human concerns. Imperfect charity lacks the resources needed to combine both true loving and the true transformation of loving. It can be absorbed in the union of the family, in the intersubjectivity of comrades in work and in adventure, in the common cause of fellows in nationality and in citizenship, in the common aspiration of associates in scientific, cultural, and humanitarian pursuits. On the other hand, it can withdraw from home and country, from human cares and human ambitions, from the clamor of the senses and the entanglement of the social surd, to fix its gaze upon the unseen ultimate, to respond to an impalpable presence, to grow inwardly to the stature of eternity. But imperfect charity, inasmuch as it is imperfect, will not realize at once the opposed facets of its perfection; if it is in the world, it ever risks being of the world; and if it withdraws from the world, the human basis of its ascent to God risks a contraction and an atrophy.

Moreover, the heightened tension, which would result from a supernatural solution, would not lack its objectification in the dialectical succession of human situations. Hitherto, the dialectic has been conceived to rest on a bipolar conjunction and opposition. Within each man there are both the attachment and interestedness of sensitivity and intersubjectivity and, on the other hand,

the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to know. From this conjunction of opposites there follow 1) the interference of the lower level with the unfolding of inquiry and reflection, of deliberation and decision, 2) the consequent unintelligibility of situations, and 3) the increasing irrelevance of intelligence and reasonableness to the real problem of human living. But when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself. At the same time, because the supernatural solution is realized in accord with probability schedules, because it is accepted by some and rejected by others, because acceptance is no more than the base and beginning for further development, because the undeveloped is imperfect and the imperfection of the supernatural solution misses the higher synthesis of human living, there will be a humanism in revolt against the proffered supernatural solution. It will ignore the problem of evil; it will contest the fact of a solution; it will condemn mystery as myth; it will

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demand reason and exclude faith; it will renege hope and labor passionately to build the city of man with the hands of man; it will be ready to love God in song and dance, in human feasting and human sorrow, with human intelligence and human good will, but only so. For a time, it may base its case upon the shortcomings of those that profess the solution but live it imperfectly or intermittently or not at all. But this incidental argument sooner or later will give place to its real basis. For it rests on man's proud content to be just a man, and its tragedy is that, on the present supposition of a supernatural solution, to be just a man is what man cannot be. If he would be truly a man, he would submit to the unrestricted desire and discover the problem of evil and affirm the existence of a solution and accept the solution that exists. But if he would be only a man, he has to be less. He has to forsake the openness of the pure desire; he has to take refuge in the counter-positions; he has to develop what counter-philosophies he can to save his dwindling humanism from further losses; and there will not be lacking men clear-sighted enough to grasp that the issue is between God and man, logical enough to grant that intelligence and reason are orientated towards God, ruthless enough to summon to their aid the dark forces of passion and of violence.

6. The Identification of the Solution

There remains the problem of identifying the solution that exists. For if possible solutions are many, the existent solution is one, universally accessible and permanent, continuous with the actual order of the universe, and realized through human acts of acknowledgement and consent that occur in accordance with the probabilities; it is a divinely sponsored collaboration in the transmission and application of the truths of the solution; it is a mystery in the threefold sense of psychic force, of sign, and of symbol; it moves from an initial emergent trend through a basic realization and consequent development to the attainment of an ulterior goal; it is operative through conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity, that enable man to achieve sustained development on the human level inasmuch as they reverse the priority of living over the knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to follow knowledge: it is a new and higher integration of human activity that, in any case, involves some transcendence of human ways and, possibly, complicates the dialectic by adding to the inner conflict between attachment and detachment in man the necessity of man's going quite beyond his humanity to save himself from disfiguring and distorting it.

The task of identifying the solution is not the same for all. Already many have acknowledged and accepted it, and their problem lies in bringing forth fruits worthy of their faith, hope, and charity. But the existence of a

problem of error and sin implies that others will have notable difficulty in recognizing the solution. For further insights depend upon one's past accumulation of insights, and further judgments depend upon the context of habitual judgments that favor some new affirmations and are hostile to others. None the less, there is available the critique of erroneous beliefs that has been outlined. Anyone that has found himself in error on one point can initiate a scrutiny that cumulatively will bring to light any other errors in which he happens to be involved. Nor will he labor alone in the purification of his own mind, for the realization of the solution and its development in each of us is principally the work of God who illuminates our intellects to understand what we had not understood and to grasp as unconditioned what we had reputed error, who breaks the bonds of our habitual unwillingness to be utterly genuine in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection by inspiring the hope that reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know and by infusing the charity, the dispassionate, unrelenting at-oneness with all the true, the real, the good, that outlasts the fire-ball of the atom bomb and immeasurably exceeds its power to change the living of man.