Chapter KII

CHE NOTION OF BRING

If the main lines of cognitional process have been set down, it remains that certain fundamental and pervasive notions have still to be clarified. Among them, in the first place, is the notion of being. It is a tricky topic and, perhaps, the most satisfactory procedure will be to begin from a definition. /. A. Septimition

' Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know.

By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection, It is not the verbal utterance of questions. It is not the conceptual formulation of questions. It is not any insight or thought. It is not any reflective grasp or judgment. It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge. The Jesirs to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. By moving him to seek understanding, it prevents him from being content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience. By demanding adequate understanding, it involves man in the self-correcting process of learning in which further questions yield complementary insights. By moving man to reflect, to seek the unconditioned, to grant unqualified assent only to the unconditioned, it prevents him from being content with hearsay and legend, with unverified hypotheses and untosted theories.

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Finally, by raising still further questions for intelligence and reflection, it excludes complacent inertia; for if the questions go unanswered, man cannot be complacent; and if answers are sought, man is not inert.

Because it differs radically from other desire, this desire has been named pure. It is to be known, not by the misleading analogy of other desire, but by giving free rein to intelligent and rational conscionenees. It is, indeed, impalpable but also it is || powerful. It pulls man out of the solid routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, doing and enjoying. It holds him with the fascination of problems. It engages him in the quest of solutions. It makes him aloof to what is not established. It compels assent to the unconditioned. It is the cool shretchees of common sense, the disinterestedness of science, the detachment of philosophy. It is the absorption of investigation, the joy of discovery, the assurance of julgment, the undesty of limited knowledge. It is the releatless serenity, the unburried determination, the imperturbable drive of question following appositely on question in the genesis of truth.

This pure desire has an objective. It is a desire to know. As mere desire, it is for the satisfaction of acts of knowing, for the satisfaction of understanding, of understanding fully, of understanding correctly. But as pure desire, as cool, disinterested, detached, it is not for cognitional acts, and the satisfaction they give their subject, but for cognitional contents, for what is to be known. The satisfaction of mistaken understanding,

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provided one does not know it as mistaken, can equal the satisfaction of correct understanding. Not the pure desire scorns the former and prizes the latter; it prizes it, then, as dissimilar to the former; it prizes it not because it yields satisfaction but because its content is correct.

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The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing rather than the act. Still, the desire is not itself a knowing, and so its range is not the came as the range of a build. Initially in each individual, the pure desire is a dynamic orientation to a totally unknown. As knowledge develops, the objective becomes less and less unknown, more and more known. At any time the objective includes both all that is known and all that remains unther or of the includes actual attainment and heads beyond it with ever further questions.

What is this objective? Is it limited or unlimited? Is it one or many? Is it material or ideal? Is it phenomenal or real? Is it an immanent content or a transcendent object? Is it a reals of experience, be of thought, of essences, or of existents? Answers to these and to any other questions have but a single source. They cannot be had without the functioning of the pure desire. They cannot be had from the pure desire alone. They are to be had inacted as the pure desire alone. They are to be had inacted as the pure desire initiates and susteins cognitional process. Thus, if it is true that A is, that A is one, and that there is only A, then the objective of the pure desire is one. But if it is true that A is, that B is, that A is not B, then the objective is many. Which, you ask, is true? The fact that you ask, results from the pure desire. But to reach the

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answer, desiring is not enough; answers come only from inquiring and reflecting.

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Now our definition was that being is the objective of the pure desire to know. Being, then, is 1) all that is known and 2) all that remains to be known. Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. What, one may ask, is that totality? It is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions. What the answers are, remains to be seen. What the questions are, avoits their emergence. Meaningless or incoherent or illegitimate questions may be possible, but how they are to be defined, is a further question. The affirmation in hand is that there exists a pure desire to know, an inquiring and critical spirit, that follows up questions with further questions, that heads for some objective which has been named being.

Our definition of being, then, is of the second order. Other definitions determine what is meant. But this definition is more remote for it assigns, not what is meant by being, but how that meaning is to be determined. It asserts that if you know, then you know being: it asserts that if you wish to know, then you wish to know being: but it does not settle whether you know or what you know, whether your wish will be fulfilled or what you will know when it is fulfilled.

Still, though our definition is of the second order, it is not simply indeterminate. For neither the desire to know nor knowing itself are in leterminate. Inasmuch as knowing is determinate, we could say that being is what is to be known by true judgments.

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Inasmuch as the desire to know ever goes beyond actual knowledge, we could say that being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. Hence, being has, at least, one characteristic: it is all-inclusive. Apart from being there is nothing. Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal. It is completely concrete; over and above the being of any thing, there is nothing more of that thing. It is completely universal; apart from

the reals of being, there is simply nothing. 2 an Unrestricted Notion

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One may conter just how all-inclusive being is. That wonder may be formulated in a variety of manners. But no matter how it is formulated, no matter whether it can be formulated, it can serve only to show how all-inclusive being is. For the wonder is inquiry. It is the desire to know. Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion of being. Hence, the affort to establish that being is not all-inclusive must be selfdefeating; for at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgment and formulation, underlying all exestioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective.

None the less, it may not be axiss to illustrate this principle concretely. It will be said that there is much we do not know. No do bt, our incorance is great, but we know that fact by raising questions that we do not answer; and being is defined not only by the answers we give but also by the questions we ask. Next, it will be said that there is much it would be futile for us to try to learn. No doubt, the proximately fruitful field of

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inquiry is restricted. But we know that fact by distinguishing between the questions we can hope soon to answer and those that, as yet, we are not prepared to tackle; and being is defined, not only by the questions we can hope to answer, but also by the questions whose answer we have to postpone.

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Thirdly, it will be objected by many that they have nodesire to know everything about everything. But how do they know that they do not already know everything about everything? It is because so many questions can be asked. Thy do they not effectively will to know everything about everything? Because it is so troublesome to reach oven a few answers that they are completely disheartened by the prospect of answering all the questions they could ask.

The attack may be made from the opposite flank. The trouble is that the definition of being is too inclusive. Questions can be meaningless, illusory, incoherent, illegitimate. Trying to answer them does not lead to knowledge of anything. Now, no doubt, there are mistaken questions that lead nowhere. But mistaken questions are formulated questions. Being has been defined, not any the objective of formulated questions, but as the objective of the pure desire to know. Just as that desire is prior to any answer and it itself is not the answer, so too; it is prior to any formulated question and it itself is not a formulation. Moreover, just as the pure desire is the intelligent and rational basis from which we discoun between correct and incorrect answers, so also it is the intelligent and rational basis from which we discern between valid and mistaken questions. In brief, the pure desire to know, whose

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objective is being, is the source not only of answers but also of their criteria, and not only of questions but also of the grounds on which they are screened. For it is intelligent inquiry and reasonable reflection that just as such yield the right questions as the right answers.

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More fundamental misgivings may arise. If one plasses, one may define being as what is to be known through the totality of true julgaments. But is being really that? Might it not be something entirely different? The questions arise. They may be valid or mintaken. If they are mistaken, they are to be ignored. If they are valid, then our misgivings are without foundation. For the being that might be totally different; turns out to be exactly what we are talking about. For we ask whether it might be; and the being we are talking about; is the being we ask about.

Accele, might there not be an unknowable? If the question is valid, it is to be ignored. If the question is valid, the answer may be "Yes" or "No". But the answer, "Yes", would be incoherent, for then one would be knowing that the unknowable is; and the answer, "No", would leave everything knowable and within the range of being.

Other doubts may arise, but instead of chasing after them one by one, it will be better to revert to our initial theorem. Every doubt that the pure desire is unrestricted serves only to prove that it is unrestricted. If you ask whether X might not lie beyond its range, the fact that you ask proves that X lies within its range. Or else, if the question is meaningless, incoherent, illusory, illegitimate, then X turns out to the more

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nothing that results from aberration in cognitional process.

Not only, then, is julgment absolute, not only does it rest upon a grasp of the unconditioned, not only does reflection set the dichotomy, Is it or is it not?; But at the root of cognitional process there is a cool, detached, disinteres to desire to know and its range is unrestricted. Boing is the anything and everything that is the objective of that desire.

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If to have explained what we mean by being, we must now ask what the notion of being is.

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In the first place, a distinction has to be drawn between the spontaneously operative notion and, on the other hand, theoretical accounts of its genesis and content. The spontaneously operative notion is invariant; it is common to all ment it functions in the same manner no matter what theoretical accounts of it a man may come to accept. On the other hand, theoretical accounts of the content and genesis of the notion are numerous; they vary with philosophic contexts, with the completeness of a thinker's observations, with the thoroughness of his analysis. First, we shall give our account of the spontaneously operative notion, and then we shall add a few notes on other theoretical accounts of it.

On the successition of our analysis of cognitional process, it is easy enough to conclude that the spontonoously operative notion of being has to be placed in the pure desire to know. For, first of all, men are not to agree that things are, whether or not we know them and, moreover, that there are namy things that are Known , we wond incompletely or even not at all. The notion of being, then, extends beyond the known. Secondly, being is known

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in judgment. It is in judgment that we affirm or deny and, until we are ready to affirm or deny, we do not yet know whether or not any X happens to be. Still, though being is known only in judging, the notion of being is prior to judging. For prior to any judgment there is reflection, and reflection is formulated in the question, Is 1t? That question supposes some notion of being and, strangely enough, it is prior to each instance of our knowing being. Not only does the notion of being extend beyond the known but also it is prior to the final component of knowing when being is actually known. Thirdly, there are objects of thought. I can think of a horse and, no less, I can think of a centeur. I can think of the best available scientific opinion on any subject and, no less, I can think of all the previous opinions that in their day were the best available on the same subject. In one sense, they are all equivalent, for as long as one is merely thinking, merely considering, merely supposing, one deals merely with the conditioned and 1t makes no difference whether or not its conditions are fulfilled. Thinking, then, prescinds from existing. But if it prescinds from existing, does it prescind from being: and if it prescinds from being, is not all thinking about oothing? The trouble with this argument is that thinking also prescinds from not existing. If I think of a centaur or of phlogiston, I prescind from the fact that they do not exist; hence, if prescinding from existing is prescinding from being, prescinding from non-existence is prescinding from not being; if prescinding from being proves that I am thinking of nothing, then prescinding from not being proves that I am thinking of something, Now this type of consideration has led many thinkers

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to suppose that being is one thing and existing is eacthor, that horses and centaurs, electeons and phlogiston, equally are, but horses and electrons exist while centaurs and phlogiston do not exist. Still that conclusion does not satisfy the facts, for spart from the oddity of accepting that the uon-existent is, there is the oversight of the dynamism of cognitional process. In a sense, thinking prescinds from existing and not existing, for it is not thinking but judging that determines whether or not eaything exists. In a other same, thinking does not prescind from existing and not existing, for thinking is purposive; we think to get our concepts straight; we wich to get our concepts straight that he way be allo to jugger so for from prescieding from existing and not existing, thinking is for the purpose of letermining shather or not what is thought does exist. Alt follows that the notion of being goes beyoud the merely throught, for reack thether or not the merely thought exists, he lass, it follows that the notion of being is prior to thinking, for wore it not, then thinking could not be for the purpose of juiging, for the purpose of determining whether or not the meraly thought exists. The notion of being, then, is prior to conception and goes beyond it: and it is prior to judgment and goes beyond it. That notion must be the immenent, dynamic orientation of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as operative in counitional process. Desiring to know is desiring to show being; but it is merely the desire and not yet knowing. Thinking is thinking being: it is not thinking nothing; but thinking being is not yet browing it. Julging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of

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being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of connect judgments.

Otill, how can an orientation or a desire be namel a notion. A fostal aye is orientated toward seeing; but a fostal eye does not tee and it has no notion of seeing; a notion acies only in so far a understanding discerne future function in present structure. Hunger is orientated towards fool and eating; it is a desire; it lies within expirical consciousness; but a notion arises only in so far a the orientation of hunger is understood. Purposive human action is orientated towards some and or product; cognitional elements provide the rule and guide of such action; but the cognitional elements are prior to the action; they are constituted, not by the action itself, but by the planning that precides it.

It reaches that none of these instances is exactly parallel to the relation between the desire to know and cognitional process. For the desire to know is not unconnetions, as is the foetal eye, nor appirically conscious, as is hunger, nor a consequence of intelloctual knowlocks, as are deliberation and choice. The desire to know is conscious intelligently and rationally; it is inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness. Simply as desire, it is orientation without, as yet, involving any cognitional content or notion. Still intelligence, as obverse, looks for the intelligible, as reverse. Reasonableness, as obverse, looks for the growned, as reverse. Reasonableness, as obverse, looks for the growned, as reverse. Bore fundamentally, the looking for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is an obverse that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted objective named being. Were that heading unconscious, there would be an

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orientation towards being but there would be no desire to know being and no notion of being. Fore that heading empirically conscious, there would be an orientation towards being and a felt desire to know being, but there would be no notion of being. In fact, the heading is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an orientation towards being, not only a sure desire to know being, but also a notion of being.

[1] A. B. Martin, M. M. Martin, and M. Martin, and M. Martin, Phys. Rev. Lett. B10000 (1997) 10100 (1997).

Let us try to catch this notion, this intention of being. in the act. We agend of absoraction, and commonly we mean a direction of attention to some aspects of the given with a concomitant neglect of other aspects. The geometer considers the circle as a plane figure obeying a certain rule; he disregards the size, the color, the inexactitude of the figure he draws or imagines; still more so does he disregard other and more loosely connected aspects of the given. But that is not all. He disregards all other questions in geometry, all other departments of mathematics, all other fields of science, all other human occupations to which he could turn his hand. He considers only the circle. He abstracts from everything else. He does so intelligently, for though the objective of his desira is unrestricted, still he can move towards it only by concentrating on one element at a time. Again, as intelligence abstracts, so reflection prescinds. If I am to judge, whether or not this is a typewriter, I have to prescind from all that is not relevant to that is any. I have to know all that is relevant. If I were a relativist, I mould have to know the universe to know all that is relevant to that single judgment. Even though I am not a relativist, even though I find that many conditioned proposi-

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tions become virtually unconditioned on the fulfilment of a manegeoble number of conditions, still this restriction of the relevant is accorpanied by an acknowledgement of a universe of irvelovencies. Finally, as intelligence concentrates a the significant to abstract from all else, as reflection concentrates on the relevant to proscled from all else, so further questions and further is used arise noither as a superise non as a new beginning. themporary and 'provisional: they wore The abstranting and the procenting wer only moments is a larger process. Nor is that larger process suraly the object of introspontive analysis. I memore within it and operative of it lies as int lligent cal ratio of coarciousness that unrestrictedly intends a correstendingly unrestricted objective maked being, or the all, or everything about everything, or the concrete universe. Just as the notion of the intelligible is involved in the actual functioning of istelligence, just as the estimation of the grounded is involved in the actual functioning of reasonablemess, so the motion of being is involved in the unrestricted drive of inquiving intelligence as reflecting reasonableness. 4. In All-pervasi conco it is that the action of being is all-pervasive. It

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an England all conditional contents. It penetrates then all. It constitutes them a cognitional.

It without the pure all cognitional contents. Without the pure deside to kno, sensitive living would remain in its routine of perception and constint, instinct and habit, motion and action. That breaks that educuit and release intellectual activity is the wonder Actistotic described as the beginning of all adiance and philosophy. But that render is intelligent inquiry. It selects

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data for insight and by selecting it under spins even the empirical component in our knowing. Still more obviously all ideas and all concepts are responses to the desire to understand, and all judgments are responses to the demand for the unconditioned.

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Secondly, the notion of being penetrates all cognitional contents. It is the supreme heuristic notion. Prior to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known through that content. As each content emerges, the "to-be-known through the content" passes without residue into the "known through that content". Some blank in universal anticipation is filled in, not merely to end that element of anticipation, but also to make the filler a part of the anticipated. Hence, prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through all answers. But, once all answers are reached, the notion of being becomes the notion of the totality known through all answers.

Thirdly, the notion of being constitutes all contents as cognitional. Experiodcing is only the first level of knowing: it presents the matter to be known. Understanding is only the second level of knowing: it defines the matter to be known. Knowing reaches a complete increment only with judgment, only when the merely experienced has been thought and the merely thought has been affirmed. But the increment of knowing is always completed in the same fashion. Experience is a kaleidoscopic flow. Objects of thought are as various as the inventiveness of human intelligence. But the contribution of judgment to our knowing is ever a mere "Yesh or "No", a more "is" or "is not". Experience is for inquiring into being. Intelligence is for thinking out being.

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But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is known as being. Hence knowing is knowing being, yet the known is never more being, just as judgment is never a more "Yes" apart from any question that "Yes" answers.

5. The Core of meaning underspins all contents, and penetrates them, and constitutes them as cognitional, so also it is the core of meaning.

Distinguish 1) sources of meaning, 2) acts of meaning, 3) terms of meaning, and 4) the core of meaning.

Any element of knowledge may serve as a source of meaning. Hence, sources of meaning include data and images, ideas and concepts, the grasp of the unconditioned and judgment and, no less, the detached and unrestricted desire to know.

Acts of meaning are of three kinds. They are 1) formal, 2) full, 3) instrumental. The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing, formulating. The full act of meaning is an act of judging. The instrumental act of meaning is the implementation of a formal or of a full act by the use of words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely, imagined utterance.

Terms of meaning are what is meant. They are formal or full. Formal terms of meaning are what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, supposed, formulated. Full terms of meaning are what is affirmed or denied.

Now the all-inclusive term of meaning is being, for apart from being there is nothing. Inversely, the core of all acts of meaning is the intention of being.

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Thus, any given judgment pertains to a context of judgments, and it is from the context that the meaning of the given judgment is determined. But why is the meaning of the given judgment a function of a context of other judgments? Because any judgment is but an increment in a whole named knowledge; because the meaning of the judgment is but an element in the determination of the universal intention of being.

Again, judgments may be true or false. The true judgment affirms what is an't denies what is not. In the true judgment there is harmony between what is intended and what is meant. But in the false judgment there is conflict between intention and meaning. The false judgment as a judgment intends being: it intends to affirm what is and to deny what is not. But the false judgment as false is a failure to carry out its intention as a judgment. It affirms what is not and denies what is. It means not what is but only what would be, one it not false but true; again, in its megative form, it means, not what is not, but what would not be, were it not false but true.

Perhaps it is this internal conflict that has led some to the conclusion that a false judgment is meaningless. But such a dively conclusion seems astocardingly falso. We we the false judgment meaningless, those would be nothing to be false. The false judgment is false precisely because it means a state of effairs that is the opposite of the state one intends to affirm, namely, the state that truly is.

On the level of conception there is a similar but less conspicuous contrast between meaning and its core, which is the

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intention of being. Horses and unicorns, electrons and phlogiston, may be equally valid as formal terms of meaning. One can suppose them, or consider them, or define them, and that is all that is required of the formal term of meaning. Still, horses and electrons seem proferable as formal terms to unicouns and phlogiston. Absolutely, one can think of the latter, but there is something idle, something superfluous, something futile about such thinking. The reason for this is that thinking is a moment in the unfolding of the pure desire to know; though the thought as thought is merely a formal term of meaning, though the unicorn is just as valid a formal term as is the horse, still we do not merely think. Our thinking is purposive. It is a tentative determination of the all--inclusive notion of being. It not merely thinks the object of thought but also anticipates the object of judgment. It not merely means the formal term of meaning but also looks ahead to the full term. Because the infcorn and phlogiston are known to be unsuccessful determinations of being, they are formal terms in which the core of meaning, the intention of boing, has become uninterested.

Finally, in view of the prevalence of empiricist theories of meaning, a few words may be added on instrumental acts. Ordinary instrumental acts, such as spoken or written words or symbols, offer no special interest. But the empiricist emphasizes ostensive acts, such as demonstrative pronouns and adjectives and, of course, gestures. The reason for this emphasis may be readily; grasped if one distinguishes between the function of gestures in any theory of meaning and the function gestures acquire in virtue

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of empiricist affirmations. In any theory of meaning an ostensive act is an instrumental set of meening: it precupposes formal or full acts of scaning, inaccuch as one knows that one means; and it refers to formal or full terms of meaning, inasmuch as all meining refers to a meant. Again, in any theory of meaning the ostensive act is operative inassuch at it succeeds in drawing anothar's attention to a sensible source of meaning, so that by drawing on that source, by understanding, and by reflecting he may reach the appropriate formal or full torm of meaning that is meant. But in empiricist opinion the ostensive act has a third function; for the empiricist identifies the valid field of full terms of meaning (1.o., the universe of being) with the range of sensible presentations; hence, for the expiricist, the ostensive act not merely indicates a source of meaning but also a full term of meaning. Whether or not this empiricist modification of the theory of measing is correct, will depend on the question whether or not the set of propositions that enunClate empiricism are to be

A Russling Notion.

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Before going as to consider other accounts of the action of being, it will be well to deal with a series of puzzles that some at to have a common root. Just as other concepts, the notion of being is represented by instrumental acts that are the name, being, and the verb, to be. By mistagen analogy it is inferred that the notion of being rescribles concepts in their other aspects. But, in fact, the notion of being is unique; for it is the core of all acts of meaning; and it under*gins, penetrates, and goes beyond all other

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cognitional contents. Hence, it is idle to characterize the notion of being by appealing to the ordinary rules or laws of conception. What has to grasped, is its divergence from such rules and laws and, to descend to details, a series of questions will be briefly considered.

First, does the notion of being result from the expression or formulation of an act of understanding?

Other concepts result from some insight either into the use of their names, or into things-for-us, or into things-themselves. The notion of being ponetrates all other contents, and so it is present in the formulation of every concept. <u>But the motion of</u> being has quite a different origin. It cannot result from an insight into being, for such an insight would be an understanding of everything about everything, and such understanding we have not attained. It is, as has been said, the orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness towards an unrestricted objective.

Secondly, has the notion of being an essence, or is it an essence?

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As other concepts result from acts of understanding, as acts of understanding consist in grasping what, from some viewpoint, is essential, other concepts are essences. Moreover, as other concepts are complete prior to the question for reflection that asks whether or not any such essence is, other concepts are merely essences and prescind from existence or actuality. But the notion of being does not result from an understanding of being; it does not rest on the grasp of what from some viewpoint is essential; and so the notion of being is not the notion of some essence.

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Further, the notion of being remains incomplete on the level of intelligence; it moves conception forward to questions for reflection; it moves beyond single jubinents to the totality of correct judgments; and so it does not prescind from existence and actuality.

Thirdly, can the notion of boing be defined?

It cannot be defined in any ordinary manner, for it underpins and penetrates and goes beyond the content of every definition. Here were, it does possess certain definite-ch-racteristics. For it regards the unrestricted objective of our knowing, the concrete unive so, the totality of all that is. Hereover, it is determinate instanch is the structure of our knowing is determinate, and so it can be defined, at a second remove, by saying that it refors to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. On the other hand, such definition does not settle which questions use appropriate to our knowing or which answers are correct. It leaves the materialist free to claim that to be, is to be material. Equally, it allows the expiricist to claim that to be j is to be experienced, the idealist to insist that to be is to be thought, the phenomenalist to explain that to be is to appear, and so forth.

Fourthly, how can one notion have such diverse meenings?

Because it is detorminate only at a second remove. The notion of being is the notion of what is to be determined by corproper cardinal rect judgments. If the (strategic correct judgments are that matter exists and nothing but matter exists, then the materialist is right. If the strategic correct judgments are that there is

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appearance and nothing but appearance, then the phenomenalist is right. Similarly, if the propositions enuntiating other positions are correct, then being is as such positions declare. The notion of being does not determine which position is correct; it merely determines that the intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed is being.

Fifthly, has the notion of being any presuppositions or properties?

Other concepts are determine to essences and so they have presuppositions and implications. If X is not an animal, then X is not a man. If X is a man, then X is mortal. But the notion of being is not the notion of some assence. It becomes determined only as correct judgments are made, and it reaches its full determination only chen the totality of correct judgments are made. However, the making of judgments is a determinate process, and one does not have to acts all judgments to grasp the nature of that process. It is this fact that makes cognitional theory a base of operations for the determination of the general structure of the concrete universe.

Sixthly, is the notion of being univocal or analogous?

Concepts are said to be univocal when they have the same meaning in all applications, and they are said to be analogous when their meaning varies systematically as one moves from one field of application to another. The notion of being may be named univocal inasmuch as it undergpins all other contents; for in that respect it is the one desire to know and it regards one unres-

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tricted objective that is the concrete universe. Again, the notion of being may be named analogous inasmuch as it ponetrates all other contents; in this fachion it is said that <u>aske viventium</u> <u>estivitore</u>; the being of living things is being alive. Finally, the notion of being may be said to be neither univocal nor analogous, for this distinction r gords concepts, chile the notion of being both univergents and goes beyond other contents. It may be noted, however, that what frequently enough; is meant by the analogy of being is precisely what we mean by saying that the notion of being univergents, ponetrates, and goes beyond other contents.)

Seventhly, is the cotion of being abstract?

For a notion to be abstruct it must possess a determinate content and abstruct from other contents. The notion of being abstracts from nothing whatever. It is all-inclusive. Its content is determined by the totality of corflect julgments.

iconover, there is a still larger totality of possible judgments; within it there are strategic cets that serve to define the general character of the concrete universe in accord with the varying viewpoints of different philosophies. Such strategic sets have already been illustrated, e.g., there is matter and nothing but matter, or there is apple rence and nothing but matter, or there is apple rence and nothing but appearance, or there is thought and nothing but thought, or the structure of our knowing is determinate and so the structure of being proportionate to our knowing is determinate.

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Now in virtue of such strategic sets of judy and it is possible to distinguish between the general character of the concrete universe, and, on the other hand, the concrete universe

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in all its details. Clearly enough, a determination of the general character of the concrete universe is an abstract view of being, for it consilers not the whole of being as a whole but the whole of being as fixed by some strategic part or aspect.

In this fashion one reaches a general meaning for the phrase, being as being. But to determine what being as being is in any particular philosophy, one has to examine the strategic judgments of that philosophy; and to determine what is the correct meaning of being as being, one has to examine the strategic judgments of the correct philosophy.

Eighthly, is the notion of being a genus or species or difference?

Inasmuch as the notion of being is prior to all other cognitional contents, it is like a genus avaiting division by the addition of difference. But inesmuch as the notion of being anticipates, penetvates, and includes all other contents, it differs from the genus, which is a determinate content quite distinct from the content of its differences. Thus, being can be divided into red, green, and blue beings; and color can be divided into red, green and blue colors. But the concept of red has a content or element of content absent in the concept of color, and so it differentiates the genus by adding to it from without. On the oth r hand, the concept of red has no content and no element of content absent in the notion of being; it cannot differentiate being by adding to it from without for, without being, apart from being, there is comply nothing. Finally, the notion

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of being not only under-pins and penetrates all other contents but also complements them inasmuch as the "Yes" of julyment constitutes them as actually conditioned and so endows them with an actual objective reference.

Ninthly, when one thinks without as yet judging, either one is thinking of being or of nothing. If one is thinking of being, then one does not need to judge in order to know being. If on - is thinking of nothing, then all thought must be identical, for it always deals with the same nothing.

When one thinks, conceives, considers, supposes, or defines, one does so with respect to being. Hence we accept the first alternative. What one thinks of, is being. Still, to think of being is one thing: to know being is another. To think of being is to operate on the second level of cognitional process: it is to be on the way towards a complete increment of knowing; but it is not to have reached anything more than a partial increment that can be completed only by judging.

Tenthly, the notion of being is the notion of the concrete universe. But universal propositions are abstract and, none the less, they may be affirmed in judgment. Either, then, judgment is not about being, or else being is not concrete.

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The notion of being is the notion of the concrete in the same manner as it is of the universe. It is of the universe because questions end only when there is nothing more to be asked. It is of the concrete, because until the condrete is reached, there remain further questions. Hence, it is not the single judgment but the totality of correct judgments that equates with the con-

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crete universe that is being.

The problem of the adversal proposition may be met by distinguishing between formal and the material aspects of the analytic proposition. Formally an analytic proposition is 1) a conditioned, 2) linked to its conditions by the laws governing the coalescence of the partial instrumental meanings of words into the complete instrumental meaning of the sentence, and 3) having its conditions fulfilled by the meanings or definitions of the words it employs. Materially analytic propositions differ inastuch as the terms and relations employed 1) may be known to occur in concrets julymante of fact, 2) may not be known to occur in concrete judgments of fact, or 3) may be known not to occur in concrete julgments of fact.

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Formally every analytic proposition regards the concrete universe inacauch as syntactical laws are foctual aspects of the coalescence of partial into complete instrumental me nings. Materially some analytic propositions regard the concrete universe either in fact, as in the first case, or tentatively, as in the

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Theories of the Notion of Build. A distinction has been drawn between the spontaneously operative notion of being, common to all men, and theoretical accounts of that notion, that differ from one philosophy to another. Our own theoretical account has been given. It remains that further elarifications be sought by contrasting it with some of the views that have been proposed by others.

For Parmenides, Being was one, without origin or end, homogeneous and indivisible, impovable and unchangeable, full and

spherical. (See F.H. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, London, 1939, pp. 23 ff.

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The genesis of this position would seem to be as follows. Parmanides eliminated the alternative of blank negation, and so was haft with the Alternative of officiency. Affirmation may be reasonably grounded, and then it is the Tay of Fruth, or it may lack reasonable grounds, and then it is the Way of Seeming. Parmenides arrived at his notion of being by following the Way of Truth.

What does the choice of reasonable affirmation imply being to be? If one accepts any affirmation, one has also to eccept the correct statement of the meaning, suppositions, and consequences of this efficiention. Every judgment stands in need of a context, and without efficienting the context the affirmation of the initial judgment loses its meaning. Thus, reasonable affirmation has to be the affirmation of a set of judgments, which form a single whole, and so the affirmed is a corresponding single whole.

What is this single whole that is affirmed to be? The proper answer is to any to work inquiring and reflecting with respect to the whole of expectance. The whole to be known corresponds to the totality of correct judgments. But Parmenides took a shorter route. He did not advert to the fact that being addits no more than a definition of the second order. He treated the notion of being as though it were a concept like "man" or "circle". He supposed that it was a determinate essence with determinate suppositions and determinate consequences. Because being is, it cannot be not-being, nor becoming, nor ceasing to be. Inversely, neither not-being nor becoming nor ceasing to be are being, and so they

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must be nothing. Again, being cannot be differentiated; what differs from being, is not being; and what is not being, is nothing. Again, since there are no differences within being, there can be no motion or change within being. Finally, emptiness, the void, is nothing; being is not nothing, and so it cannot be emptiness; therefore, it is fail. Ste....

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Plato's Forces serve projections into a gostic heaven of what transcends or linery, consitive experience. The Forms, then, are the ideal objectives of 1) aesthetic experience, 2) the insights of the mathematician and physicist, 3) the unconditioned of reflective understanding, 4) moral conscience, and 5) intelligently and reasonably purposive living. They are a confused bag and, as it seems, the <u>Parmenides</u> marks the turning point in which the necessity of drawing distinctions and setting up a more comprehensive theory becomes evident.

In the <u>Sophictos</u> the philosopher is deteribed as heading through rational discourse for the Idea of Being (254 a). It is acknowledged that the isolation of each form from all the others would eliminate the possibility of discourse which lies in the conjunction of distinct Fores or categories (259 e). There is, then, a commingling or participation among the Forms (259 a) and there is a Form of Not-being just as much as of the Great or the Fair (258 c).

The inadequacy of this position lies in its failure to distinguish betwen the level of intelligence and the level of refloction. Without that distinction, the unconditioned of judgment is surreptitiously attributed to mere objects of thought to transform them into eternal Forms and, inversely, the "is" and "is not"

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by which judgment posits the unconditioned can have a meaning only if they too are supposed to be forms. There results an appropriate of Forme, each radicelly and eternally distinct from all the others. Still they are to be reached only through rational discourse, and if discourse is to refer to them, then there must be a conclusion on their part to correspond to the synthetic elements in di cource. What is this courdigling of distinct Forms? It would seen better, b fore trying to answer so difficult a question, to determine whether or not the question really arises. In fact, to vould argue, it does not. Until judgment is reached, the increment of knowing is incomplete. Before juigment is reched, the synthetic element is already present in a oving. All that juigment adds to the question for reflection is the "Yes" or "Ho", the "is" or "is not". What is affirmed or tenied may be a single proposition or the whole set of propositions constitutive of a hypothesis, for either may be regarded as conditioned and either may be grouped as virtually unconditioned. Julgment, they, is not a synthesis of terms but the unconditioned positing of such a synthesis. Corresponding to judgment there is not a synthesis of Forms but the absolute of fout. Platonism is magnificient in its devotion to the pure desire to know. But its failure to grasp the nature of judgment resulted in a deviation from the concrete universe of fact to an Ideal heaven.

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Aristotly clung to the Platonist definition of julgment as a synthesis (<u>Sophistes</u> 263: <u>De Anima</u> III,6,430a 26). Still, he distinguished sharply between questions for intelligence (What is

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it? Why is it so?) and questions for reflection (Is it? Is it so?) <u>Post. Anal., II</u>, 89b 22ff with the result that he had a same and clear-headed respect for fact without reaching its exact implications. He would not have agreed with the empiricist that places fact, not in the virtually unconditioned, but in the sensible fulfilment through which the conditioned becomes grasped as unconditioned. But you would put him a question be had not ade mately contilered, if you asked him whether the virtually unconditioned was a third component in our knowing or, on the other hand, merely a rubber-stamp of approval attached to the conceptual unification of its sensible and intelligible components.

This unresolved ambiguity appears both in his methodology and in his metaphysics. For his the supreme greation wes the question of existence. Still it was a question that was already answered in descriptive knowing; that answer had to be presupposed in the search for explanation; and the function of explanation was simply to determine what things are and why they have the properties they possess. The intrinsically hypothetical character of explanation and its need of a further, verifying judgment of existence were overlooked. Again, Aristotle asks, what being is. That question expresses the demand for understanding, for knowledge of the cause. Quite naturally, Aristotle answers that the cause of being is its immanent form (Net. 2, 17). Primarily, being is what is constituted by a substantial form or, on second thoughts, by the combination of substantial form and watter. Secondarily, being is what is constituted by accidental forms; "white", "heat", "strength" are not nothing though they are not simply what is

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meant by being. Again, being is the collection of existing substances with their properties and incidental modifications; but though being denotes the factually existent, still existing is no more than the reality of substantial forms along with their mainly immanent suppositions and consequences. (See S Mansion, <u>Le Jugement d'existence chez Aristote</u>, Louvain-Paris 1946; J Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Toronto, <u>PIME</u>, 1951)- Parifical Justifut y Mediance Shudua, 1951).

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Qui e plainly this position is coing to give rise to a probles of the unity of the notion of being. Aristotle broke with his Permenidean and Platonist antecedents by identifying being with the concrete universe as, in fact, it is known to be. But Aristotle did not break with their supposition that the notion of being was a conceptual content. He asked what being is. In other words, he supposed that being is some conceptual content and he demanded what act of understanding occurred prior to the formulation of that content. But, as we have seen, being can be defined by us only indirectly, and so Aristotle was unable to assign any specific act of understanding that resulted in the conceptual content of being. However, the conspicuous type of acts of understanding is the insight that grasps intelligible form energent in sensible data: and so Aristotle assigned the ontological principle, form, as the ground of being in things and the cognitional act of grasping form as the insight from which originates the conceptual content. being.

In this fashion, mediaeval Scholasticism inherited a proproblem. Is the notion of being one or is it many? If it is one,

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is its unity the unity of a single content or is it the unity of a function of variable contents?

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llenry of Ohent seems to have held that the unity of being is maraly the unity of a name. God is and I am. In both cases, being is affirmed. But the realities affirmed and simply disparate.

Duns Scotus contonded that, besides the unity of the name, there is also a unity of content. If no part or aspect of you is by identity a part or aspect of me, still neither of us is nothing. There is, then, some minimal conceptual content that positively constitutes that is expressed negatively by the negation of nothing. What it is, cannot be declared by appealing to other positive contents, for it is one of the ultimate atoms of thought; it is simply simply. Still one can approach it by noting that Socrates supposes mun, man supposes animal, animal supposes living, material substance, and substance supposes a something that is even less determinate and less exclusive. The concept of being is the concept with least connotation and greatest demotation. Moreover, it is essentially abstract. That it denotes, is never just being, but either the infinite or some finite mode of being, where the mode is to be viewed not as some further and distinct content but rather as an intrinsic variation of basic, indeterminate content. (Dee A.B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, Fashington: CUA, 1946; A . Marc, L'Idée de l'être chez saint Thomas et dans la scholastique postérieure, Arch. de Phil., X, 1933, 31-49).

Thomas do Vio Caietanus ses no more satisfied with the Scotist view, then Scotus himself had been satisfied with that of Henry of Chent. If a single name without a single meaning will not

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do, neither will a single meaning that as single seems restricted to the order of thought. Accordingly, Cajetan worked out his theory of the unity of a function of variable contents. Just as "double" denotes indifferently the relation of 2 to 1, 4 to 2, 6 to 3, and so Forth, so "being" denotes indifferently the proportion of essence to existence or, as we might say, the proportion between what is formulated by thought and what is added to it by judgment. On this position the notion of being always includes some conceptual content but it may include any; ugain, being in act vill never be known without some affirmative judgment, but the affirmation is never more affirmation for the affirmation of an indeterminate content; it is always the affirmation of some determinate content, and any affirmable, determinate content will do. In brief, Cajetan can grant that atomic conceptual contents are many and disparate; he can deny the Scotist view that there is some common factor, some positive counterpart of "not nothing", of absolutely universal denotation; and yet by his theory of the unity of a function of variable contents, he can possess not only a single name, being, and a single notion of being, but also a single notion that is applicable to anything that in fact, is known to exist. (A. Marc., Op. cit. 50-66).

It is to be noted that, if Scotus stands for the Parmenidean and Platomist suppositions from which Aristotle did not free himself, Cajetan stands for the main orientation of Aristotelian thought but succeeds in doing so only by going beyond it. If conceptual contents are products of acts of understanding that grasp forms emergent in sensible presentations, one may well expect such contents to be a disparate multiplicity. Hence,

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Aristotle answered the question, What is being? not by assigning a conceptual content but Massigning the ground of being in the general object of understanding, form. Since forms are many, it follows that the ground of being is a variable; further, it follows that if the notion of being is to be one, then its unity will have to be the unity of a function of variable contents. What, then, are the vociables within the single function? One of them is form. At first sight, the obvious conditate for the other is matter. Still, if it have selected, it would follow that Aristotle's immaterial substance would not belong to the universe of being. To maintain the Aristotelian position in its integrity, it was necessary to make the second variable the virtually unconditioned grasped by reflective understanding and affirmed in judgment; this in the general case is existence, actuality, fact, that combines with pure form or the compound of form and matter to constitute a being in act.

Brilliant as it is, Cajetan's position has its shorthcomings. It envisages an aggregate of concrete beings each of which is constituted of essence and existence. It offers as the unity of the notion of being the relation or proportion of what is conceived to its being affirmed. But it does not elucidate how that relation emerges in our knowledge as a single notion; and it gives no clue to account for the fact that by "being", we mean, not only this and that being, but everything, totality, the universe. In brief, Cajetan seems to have been more interested in explaining the unity of the notion of being then the notion itself.

To complete Cajetan's position, it is necessary to go back to his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle,

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human intellect is a potential omnipotence, a <u>potens omnia facere</u> ot fiori. But Aquinas could exploit that affirmation in a manner that would have startled Aristotle and, while he did not distinguish explicitly letween the <u>intentio intendens</u> or notion of being and the <u>intentio intenta</u> or concept of being, still he was remarkably aware of the implications of that distinction.

First, he recognized an unrestricted desire to know. As soon as we learn of God's existence, we wish to understand His our nature and so by nature we desire what by nature we cannot achieve (Sum. theol., I, q. 12; I-II, q. 3, a 8; <u>C. Gent.</u>, III, 25 - 63).

Secondly, from the unrestrictedness of intellect there follows the determination of its object. Because intellect is potens omnis fieri, its object is one (Sum. theol., I, q. 79, s, 7).

Thirdly, for the same reason an intellect fully in act must be infinite act and so a finite intellect must be potential (<u>Sum</u>. <u>theol</u>., I, g. 79, a. 2; <u>C. Gent</u>., II, 98).

Fourthly, being is <u>per so</u> and naturally known to us (<u>C. Gent</u>., II, 83, 331; cf. <u>Theological Studies</u>, VIII(1947), 43 f.) and it cannot be unknown to us (<u>C. D. de Ver</u>., q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m). Avicenna had interpreted Aristotle's agent intellect as some separate, immaterial substance. Aquinas found it immanent within us because, he argued, the light of intelligence in each of us performs the functions Aristotle ascribed to agent intellect (<u>C. Gent.</u>, II, 77, 15). Augustine had advanced that our knowledge of truth originated not from without but from within us yet not simply from within us but in some illumination in which we consulted the eternal

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grounds and norms of things. Aquinas explained that we consult the eternal ground and norms, not by taking a look at them, but by having within us a light of intelligence that is a created participation of the eternal and uncreated light. (I, 34, 5, c.)

Fifthly, though being is naturally known, though our intellects are created participations of uncreated light, still, there is no volid ontological argument for the existence of Gody $(I_12_1p_2)$. God's knowledge of being is a priori; He is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything; but we advance towards knowledge by asking the explanatory question, Guid sit? and the factual question, An sit?

In such positions it is easy to discern not only the justification of Cajeton's theory of analogy but also the elements which that theory tends to overlook. Prior to conception and to judement, there is the dynamic orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness with its unrestricted objective. This corientation is man's capacity to raise questions and thereby, generate knowledge. Inserient within man, it is sperk of the divine. Gognate to God, still it is knowing, not in act but in shear potency. As it is the common root of intelligent grasp and reasonable judgment, so also it is the root of the relation or proportion between the consolved escence and the affirmed existence. A s its objective is unrestricted, so it regards not only single compounds of essence and existence but also the universe, totality, infinity.

It has been noted how Cajetan saves the main orientation of Aristotelian thought by going beyond it and, though this involves still more metaphysics, it may be added how Aquinas does so.

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Aristotle acked what being is. But "What?" is just a disguised "Why?", That the question really asks for is the ground of being, and so Aristotle answered by indicating substantial form as the immanent cluse of each being. But since his substantial form was not some unique and separate Platonic Idea, his answer gave rise to the problem of the unity of the notion of being. Now if Aquinas were to ask the same question, his answer would be that God is the ground of being; God's own being is self-explanatory and necessary; by the Aristotelian theorem of the identity of knower and known, God's being is identical with God's anderstanding; by that simile act of unterstanding, God understands himself, and so he understands his own power, and so he understands all that by that power could be produced. God, then, is the act of understanding that grasps everything about averything. The content of the divine act of intellect is the item of being and so, precisely because our intellects are potential, they can define being only at a second remove as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.

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Again, both the position of Gajetan and the position of Sectus stand within the field accessible to the logician. By going behind that field to its dynamic basis, one can find the ground not only of Cajetan's proportion but also of Scotas' minimal content. What is it that is common to every conceptual content? It is that all are undergoinned and penetrated by the pure desire's intention of its unrestricted objective. The Scotist notion of being is reached by distinguishing between the penetrating intention of being and the penetrated conceptual content; from instance to

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instance the conceptual content differs; but in every instance, there is the anticipation, enveloping, penetrating intention, and that is what the Costist alleges to be a compon factor in all contents.

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Still if the intention of being is a common factor in all conceptual contents, it is also a dynamic factor that goes beyond them. To set aside this dynamism is to mullify not only what lies beyond the conceptual contents but also the intention of being itself. Is a "amous little treatise, Aquinas had remarked, "Essentia dicitur secondum quod per ease at in on end habet esse." It is in and through essences that being had orderned, being apart from essence is being oper from the possibility of exist see: it is being that cannot exist: but what cannot exist is motion of nothing.

It will be worth grasping why brotus fall he could escape this conclusion while Hogel falt that he could not avoid it. Scotus fall he could avoid it because he conceived knowing, not as process that remains a complete increment in judgment, but as taking a look. When Geotus separated his notion of being from other concentual contents, he also deparated that notion from the possibility of julgment. Still that spontion did not heply for Scotus a separation from the possibility of knowing, for he viewed knowing, not as ultimately constituted by judging, but as essentially a matter of looking. He could grant that there was no look in which the seen was solely the conson content that he nexed being. But he would insist that that common content was included in the

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object of every intellectual intuition, and still more would insist that a look at pothing, an intuition of nothing, was absurd. In brief, for the sectist, being is an appect of the real at which intellect looks: the theory of modes and the distinction between quidditative and deno inative being are efforts to blow this aspect up to the dimensions of the whole, for the Thesist, on the other hand, being is the whole of what intelligence anticipates; it is the objective of an unrestricted, dynamic orientation; it is whatever intelligent grasp and reaconable affirmation will determine; and so the notion of being is open to all the incomplete and partial moments from which conditional process suffers without ever renouncing its all-inclusive goal.

appear from one discussion of the astrophysics, as will appear from one discussion of the astrophysics, notable interval of time was largely devoted to working out in a weighty of manners the possibilities of the assumption that knowing consists in taking a look. The untilate conclusion can that it did not and coal ont. If the reader loos not himself accept that conclusion as informative, certainly hered did and so Herel could not take alwestings of the Scatist escape from the identification of the notion of being with the notion of acting, but Hered a pure desire with an unrestricted objective, but he could not identify that objective with a universe of being, with a realm of fectual existents and occurrences. For being as fact can be reached only in so far as the virtually enconditioned is reached; and as Kent hed ignored that constitutive component of judgment,

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so Hegel neither rediscovered nor re-astablished it. The only objective Hegel can offer the pure desire is a universe of all-inclusive concreteness that is devoid of the existential, the factual, the virtually unconditioned. There is no phyme-or reason why such an objective should be named being. It is, as Hegel named it, an Absolute Idea. It is the all-inclusive summit of the pure desire's immanent dialectical process from position through oppiosition to sublation that yields a new position to recommence the triadic process until the Absolute Idea is reached.

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Now if the intention that is the pure desire has neither a Scotist reality on which it can look back, nor a Thomist universe of existents, to which it can look forward, more the less, in psychological fact it under prins and penetrates all conceptual contents. It constitutes then, a common factor is all conceptual contents; it can be distinguished from them, for it is identical with none of them; yet, as distinguished from them, it becomes indistinguishable from the notion of nothing; for the only ground of the latter distinction we lid be that it looked back or forward to something.

It is interesting to note that, if the foregoing succeeds in fixing fundamental features of Hegel's thought, by that very fact it shows that on Hegelian criteria, Hegelianism is mistaken. Hegel's System is not afraid of facts; it explains any fact alleged against it by showing it to be a manifestation of an incomplete viewpoint included within the System. Hegel's System is not afraid of contradictions; it explains any contradiction alleged against it by revealing what opposed and incomplete viewpoints, accounted

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for by the System, yield the alleged contradictory terms. The only thing the System has to four is that it itself should be no more than come incomplete viewpoint and, (in fact, that is what it is. Hegel alread at rehabilitating the speculative reason that Kant had dethround. But the busis of the Kantier attack was that the unconditioned is not a constitutive component of judgment. A complete rehabilitation of human rational connectousness will show that the unconditioned is a constitutive component of judgment. This, Hegel did not do. His viewpoint is essentially the viewpoint of a thinger who does not sad cannot regard the factual as unconditioned, who exact ackno ledge may factually fixed points of reference, the cannot advance by distinguishing the definitively certain, the so e or less probable, and the unwearn. Regel's range of vision is enormous; indeed, it is unrestricted in extent. But it is always restricted in content, for it views everything as it would be if there were no facts. It is a restricted viewpoint that can topple outwards into the factualness of Marx or inwards into the factualness of Mierkegaard. It is a viewoolnt that is transconded automatically by a yone that, in any instance, grasps the virtually unconditional and affirms it.

For this maken, to placed the discussion of Self-affirmation prior to the discussion of the Notion of Being. Telf-affirmation is the affirmation of the knower, conscious empirically, intelligently, rationally. The pure desire to know is a constituent element both of the affirming and of the self that is affirmed. But the pure desire to know is the notion of being as it is spontaneously operative in cognitional process and being itself is the to-be-known towards which that process heads.

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