

Bleau - AG

ACTUAL GRACE

Paulin Bleau, S.J.

*Glory be to God the Father,
To Christ, whose members and branches we are through the Virgin,
In union with the Holy Spirit. Amen*

O God, fortitude of those who hope in you, look kindly upon our prayers; and since without you our mortal weakness can do nothing, grant us the help of your grace, so that in carrying out what you command, we may be pleasing to you in our will and our actions.

Through Christ our Lord.

PRELIMINARY NOTES

[RD: there are pages with 'Brief Outline' (p. 2) and 'Abbreviations' (p. 3). These are omitted here at least for now.]

1. IMPORTANCE of the treatise on grace (see Boyer, n. 2).

is derived from three sources.

(a) FROM THE EXCELLENCE OF ITS OBJECT:

It involves the gifts, habits virtues, powers, qualities and movements ordered to arriving at union with God as he is in himself, that is, as a Trinity, namely under the formality of God's intimate life, in relation to the beatific vision; all of which have been obtained for us by the precious blood of Christ: "I have come that they may have life and have it abundantly." Jn 10:10.

(b) FROM THE IMMEDIATE USEFULNESS FOR OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE:

For in this treatise are highlighted: God's goodness, the loftiness of his designs, the dignity of the human soul, the foundations of humility, the need for and power of prayer, the delight of converse with God, and innumerable other ways in which the mind is gently nourished and strengthened.

(c) BECAUSE OF THE CONTROVERSIES:

(1) of Catholics against heretics down through the centuries, going astray in quite opposite directions with very subtle errors;

(2) of Catholics among themselves, regarding the mysteries which by their very obscurity manifest the profundity of the nature of grace. If a person has well understood all these contrary arguments together with their correct solutions, such a one will have greatly advanced in theological knowledge.

2. THE SENDING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT: *Summa Theologiae*, 1, q. 43.

3. KINDS OF GRACE. Pp. 1-11 [In Boyer's text]

Grace has several meanings. It means:

(1) benevolence, favor and love of one person for another. *S.T.* 1-2, qq. 110, 111.

Gen 6:8, 18:3, 39:4; Esther 2, 15-15, 5:2, 8:3; Lk 1:30.

(2) compensation for a benefit received: thanksgiving: Lk 17:16; 1 Tim 1:12.

(3) appearance, beauty, attractiveness: Prov 4:9, 22:11, 33:30; Ps 44:3.

(4) any gift given gratis: Ps 144:16; Dt 33:23; Jn 1:16; Act 11:23; Heb 12:15; Eph 3:8; Rom 11:6, etc., etc. Rom 4:40; Lk 4:22. *S.T.* 1-2, q. 110-111.

This meaning derives from (1) above, so that it sometimes it matters little whether one chooses one or the other meaning, since one who loves gives lovely things; love consists in the mutual sharing of talents, objects, and work. (Cf. Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius, 'Contemplation for Obtaining Love.') – In the treatise on grace, 'grace' is understood in this latter sense. *S.T.* 1, q. 38, a. 2.

Generally speaking, therefore, grace is a Gift given to us gratis. RJ¹ 1791, 1807, 1851.

KINDS OF GRACE

UNCREATED: God himself, as communicated to us: Jn 4:10 (the Son of God, who has been given to us); Lk 2:11; Rom 5:5 (the Holy Spirit, who is given to us); 1 Jn 3:2.

S.T. 1, q. 38, a. 2: "Love has the nature of the first gift, through which all other gifts are freely given."

Created: any gift that is not God himself

In heaven: 1, q. 12, a. 5

In this life:

Broadly speaking: natural gifts: Gen 1:31; RJ 1443.

Strictly speaking: supernatural gifts: Rom 11:6; DB² 1786; RJ 1939

External: 1 Thes. 2:13; DB 1784.

¹ M. J. Rouët de Journal, *Enchiridion Patristicum*.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symbolorum...*

Interior gifts:

Gratuitous grace: S.T. 1-2, q. 111, aa. 4 & 5. [1 Cor 12:1-11]

Sanctifying grace: S.T. 1-2, q. 111, a. 1

Habitual: 2 Pet 1-4; S.T. 1-2, q. 110

Actual: S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 6.

The grace of God and of Christ

Efficacious and sufficient grace

Operative and cooperative grace

Prevenient and subsequent grace

Elevating and healing grace

Supernatural grace (as to substance and as to manner)

4. THE CAUSE OF GRACE

Principal and instrumental cause:

A. ONLY GOD can be the principal efficient cause of grace. S.T., q. 112, a. 1.

De facto: DB 799; Is 43:25; Job 14:4; Lk 5:21; Rom 5:5; 1 Jn 3:1; RJ 1515; DB 134.

De jure: Is this power communicated, at least to the humanity of Christ, as to a principal cause? – This is denied by all theologians.

B. The humanity of Christ and the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace.

HUMANITY OF CHRIST:

(a) as meritorious cause: DB 799, 820

(b) as instrumental cause: Jn 1:16-17; RJ 1838, 1841

(c) and, it would seem, as a physical cause: S.T. 1-2, q. 112, a. 1, ad 1m; 3, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1m; de la Taille, *Mysterium Fidei*, 476-522; Matinasi (*Gregorianum* 1920, 372-393, 513-557); *Greg.* 1926, 393 (de la Taille); Mersch, *Le corps mystique du X*: 1. XXIII ff.

SACRAMENTS: 1 Jn 3:5, 6:27-58; DB 799, 851; S.T. 1-2, q. 112, a. 1, ad 2m.

5. MARY MEDIATRIX

It is not necessary here for us to present at length all that pertains to Mary as ex professo agent of all grace bestowed upon the whole human race; still it will be helpful for the sake of completeness to recall here some of the principal points of this doctrine.

(1) The price of our redemption could have been paid by no one besides Christ; accordingly, in the incurring and payment of this price, Mary was not a mediatrix. She herself was redeemed, with that fuller redemption whereby she was preserved from contracting the stain of original sin. DB 1641.

See the dissertation of Card. Billot at the beginning of *Marie, Mère de Grâce*, by De la Broise and Vainvel.

(2) In applying the price of the redemption achieved by Christ, that is, in the distribution of graces, Mary is a mediatrix, indeed with a universal mediation extending to each and all of the graces granted to us. This stems from her function as the second Eve, from her title of Mother of Christ and mankind. See the Breviary, and the liturgical Jesuit Supplement for May 31st. DB 1940a.

(3) The way in which Mary gives us graces is not physical, as by instrumental causality, but consists in moral influence; and this influence is to be found in her most powerful work of intercession, that is in her prayer to her Son: Mary is the ‘omnipotent suppliant.’

Pius X, *Ad diem illum*, 1904: “It is clear, therefore, that it is not at all the case that we attribute to the Mother of God the power to cause supernatural grace, which belongs to God alone. She, however, being preeminent in holiness and union with Christ and associated with him in the work of salvation, merits for us ‘*de congruo*’ all that Christ has merited for us by right, *de condigno*, and is the primary minister in the conferring of graces.”

Mary’s causality is ‘affective’, not ‘effective.’

For Mary, ‘to intercede’ is to ‘command.’

6. THE AUTHORITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE ON THE QUESTION OF GRACE.

S. Proleg. 6, n. 17.

The MEAT of his teaching is in the following:

Epistle 194 to Sixtus – 33.874-91

“ 186 to Paulinus – No 1 33.815-33

“ 217 to Vitalis – 33.978-90

De grat. et lib. arb. (On Grace and Free Will) – 44.915-59

De natura et gratia – 44.247-91

St Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistle to St Augustine (Epistle 225) – 33.1002-73

St Hilary of Arles, Epistle to St Augustine (Epistle 226) – 33.1007-13

St Augustine: Two books in answer to these epistles.

Book 1 – De Praedestinatione Sanctorum (The Predestination of the Saints) 44.95g-93 [sic];

Book 2 – De dono perseverantiae (The Gift of Perseverance) 45.993-1049.

Second Council of Orange – DB 178ff. 3038f. or 200 a&b

St Augustine: On the Gospel of John, 35.1379-1977.

“ On John, 35.1977-2063.

GEM : “Actual grace is God’s constant smile upon us as an appeal to us to Love.” (Parra, Tibériade 104)

Section A: THE NECESSITY OF GRACE

PRELIMINARY NOTES;

On Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. P.R. pp. 38-53; Fliche et Martin, *Histoire de l’Église*, t. 4.

There are three parts in this section, on the necessity of grace:

- (1) for salvific works,
- (2) for virtuous deeds of the natural order,
- (3) for final perseverance.

A. – 1. – THE NECESSITY OF GRACE FOR SALVIFIC WORKS

Thesis 1

INTERIOR GRACE IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR EVERY SALVIFIC WORK

S.T. 1-2, q. 109; P. 92f.: Suarez, *De Gratia*, 1.2; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1.6, c. 4; W. 291; Hurter, th. 174; Pohle, p. 83ff.; Van der Mersch, pp. 38-48.

A SALVIFIC WORK is a deed that of itself merits salvation in some way. So it either merits eternal life condignly, *de condigno*, or *de congruo* insofar as by way of a moral disposition it positively merits justification: such as to believe, hope, love, repent, etc., in a proper way. DB 798. By acting ‘in a proper way’, the Fathers meant acting ‘as one ought’ [*sicut oportet*], acting rightly, as expedient for salvation, for eternal life.

[Definition of terms:]

EVERY: in a universal supposition without any exception, whatever the work and whoever the subject may be, whether a just person or a sinner.

GRACE: A supernatural gift granted by God to an intellectual creature and ordered to salvation.

INTERIOR GRACE: a grace that directly perfects a person interiorly, as influencing the intellect or will, whether habitually or transiently. It is distinguished from an exterior grace, which in itself is something outside a person and does not perfect that person directly or interiorly, such as Christian doctrine, law, preaching, etc.

WE LEAVE ASIDE the species of this grace, i.e., whether it is sanctifying or actual grace.

NECESSARY: (not as opposed to contingent or free but as opposed to useless or superfluous). It is that without which one is powerless to do or understand something. S.T. 1, q. 82, a. 1. It is that without which a certain thing cannot be obtained.

NECESSITY: the need for that without which one is powerless to do or obtain or understand something; hence necessity varies according to powerlessness.

PHYSICAL POWERLESSNESS: consists in the entitative inadequacy and ineptitude of a faculty for performing an act.

MORAL POWERLESSNESS: is the functional inadequacy of a faculty with respect to the general exercise of freedom in a difficult matter, or, with respect to the difficulty in exercising or putting into practice some physical power. This is called moral or relative powerlessness, to which moral or relative necessity corresponds. Hence

ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY: namely with a necessity that is not only moral, or for being able to act **WITH GREATER EASE**, that is, by overcoming difficulties arising from concupiscence, but also physical, because of the powerlessness whereby nature itself is inadequate for any salvific work because of the superior perfection of the same salvific ability, and so is strictly and properly necessary **FOR THE SIMPLE ABILITY** for a creature to be elevated to the supernatural order. P. 72.

We are especially dealing with deliberate acts of choice.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

In every human being, even the just, interior grace is rigorously necessary for any and every act of one's life connected with justification or beatitude, on account of the entitative lack of proportion of a finite faculty. In other words: the natural power of our natural faculties alone cannot posit any act that would be salvific, that is, done '*sicut oportet*', 'rightly.'

Again: Any person left to one's natural faculties is physically powerless to posit any salvific act; or, in other words, one's natural faculties by themselves are inept, unsuited, inadequate for eliciting any salvific act.

ADVERSARIES:

Pelagians: p. 73-88

Semi-Pelagians: P. 88-92

Socinians (at the end of the sixteenth century)

Liberal Protestants

Rationalists

Modernists – DTC,³ Grâce, 1570

Note: ‘De fide definita’ – ‘Defined as being of faith’. DB 180, 809

PROOF

1. From Scripture:

A. Jn 15:1ff. (P. 93)

A special interior influence from Christ is absolutely necessary for every salvific work;

But this special interior influence is what is meant by interior grace;

Therefore interior grace is absolutely necessary for every salvific work.

N.B. This metaphor shows that there is real physical communication of the life of the Head to his members ... If there could be any doubt here about the physical reality of this communication, the doctrine about the resurrection of Christ in the flesh would suffice to demonstrate it. (Mersch, *Le Corps mystique*, p. 193, note, and Michel in DTC, *Jésus*, col. 1243)

MAJOR: on this text (See DB 197)

- (1) Christ asserts that no one, not even the just, can do anything salvific without his special influence. See verse 5.
- (2) This text refers to the friends of God and permanent grace, but from it we may conclude that such grace is all the more necessary for sinners to perform a salvific work.
- (3) This text deals with Christ’s special influence, for it mentions that influence which Christ has upon the branches inasmuch as he is the Vine, that is, the incarnate Word, the foundation and root of the present supernatural order (Jn 1:11-14).
- (4) It refers to salvific works, for it speaks of
 - (a) the life whereby which his disciples are separated from the world and made friends of Christ (v. 15).
 - (b) Besides, Christ’s special help always looks to salvation, as is clear from the purpose of the Incarnation.
 - (c) It speaks of the fruits which the heavenly farmer and Christ expect, desire, and intend, and by which human beings prove to be genuine branches of so excellent a vine.

³ Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique.

(5) It refers to all salvific works. For although it mentions the works of the just, indirectly and *a fortiori* it refers to sinners; for the comparison used by Christ is universal. See Corlay, *Spicilegium* II, 301ff.; Eph 2:1, 5:8; 1 Cor 2:14. See RJ 1837; DB 197.

MINOR: Christ's influence is interior since it is likened to the influence of the vine upon the branches.

NOTE: This argument is greatly strengthened by the Pauline doctrine about the mystical Body of Christ: Prat, 1, 343ff; 2, 359-70.

B. Every salvific act can be referred back to either thinking or willing or doing as one ought.

But no one can think, will, or do anything without interior grace.

Therefore ... (P. 93).

MINOR:

Thinking: e.g., 2 Cor 3:5; Rom 9:15ff.

Willing and doing: Phil 2:13; 1:6; 1 Cor 12.

Interior grace: 1 Cor 3:4ff.

Other texts: Cf. p. 94; Hurther, th. 174; DTC, Grâce, 1593 [?]; Corlay. *Spicilegium*, 2.284; Prat, 2,266ff.; 1.252-82.

2. From the teaching of the Church.

DB 103ff., 126f., 130-135; 176-182; 191f., 193 (in us without us), 195, 200, 793ff., 797, 811-813, 898, 1521, 2163.

3. From the practice of the Church.

See the Prayer for Friday of Holy Week. DB139, 140, 2200; (RJ 1934); Mass for the Propagation of the Faith; in the Breviary, prayer at Prime, *Domine Deus omnipotens ...*; Prayer for the third and the eighth Sunday after Pentecost; "Actiones nostras ..." (See DB 806, note).

4. From the Fathers of the Church.

After St Augustine they require interior grace not only to heal or strengthen nature (for greater facility) but to elevate it (for the very ability). Pohle, p. 89f; DTC, Grâce, 1574ff.

RJ 220, 348, 558, 1003, 1153, 1219, 1302, 1455f., 1569, 1719, 1733, 1791, 1821, 1832, 1835, 1855, 1890, 1899, 1902f., 1914, 1936ff., 1954, 1966, 2004, 2200, 2202, 2243, 2272, 2276, 2359.

RA 782, 887, 1041ff. (Greek). DB 182-199.

5. Theological Reason.

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 2 ff.. CG 3, 147-48.

A. – Acts leading to a supernatural end must be proportioned to the supernatural end.

But the end of man in the present dispensation surpasses human nature;

Therefore acts leading to man's end surpasses his [natural] powers; hence man's powers have to be augmented by some special assistance not owed to human nature, e.g., (Pohle 93)

B. – Even though St Thomas speaks about salvific acts that are condignly meritorious, this is all the more valid for acts that are meritorious *de congruo*, since the ratio is the same, that is, a lack of proportion.

Difficulties: W. 294; Lahousse, p. 33ff.

C. The force of the solutions: Left to itself, human nature is physically incapable of positing salvific acts.

Who judges you? For the better, God; for the worse, I do. God looks only at being, what is. To speak of sin is to speak of a privation of being. All that is good comes from God, and does so totally, without leaving ? our work, the work of our freedom. Evil comes only from us ... Our initiative in evil does not prevent the good that may come from the divine initiative.

(M. de la Taille: *RSR* 1928, 21ff.

THESIS 2

EVEN FOR THE BEGINNING OF FAITH AND THE DESIRE FOR SALVATION, INTERIOR GRACE IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 6; P97ff.; B. *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1. Cc. 1-4; *De Gratia*, 1,2, cc. 3ff.; Beraza, p. 164ff.; Mazella a 27-5; Hugon, *De Gratia*, 89-92; d'Arcy, *The Nature of Belief*, pp. 323ff.

PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

Among the acts that lead to formal faith we may distinguish four, of which the two first pertain to the intellect and the two last to the will.

1- JUDGEMENT OF CREDIBILITY: Revelation is credible

2- SPECULATIVE JUDGEMENT OF CREDENTITY: I see, I understand that revelation ought to be believed.

3- PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF CREDENTITY: as for me, I ought to believe.

4- DEVOUT READINESS TO BELIEVE: I want to believe.

1- JUDGEMENT OF CREDIBILITY (“It is credible”)

(a) As for the preambles to faith (Theodicy), it does not seem that grace is needed in any way, at least per se; still, external grace, namely revelation, is morally necessary. DB1796.

(b) As for the motives of credibility which with the help of critical history and philosophy ought to be investigated, it does not seem that per se interior grace is required. DB 1790, 1794, 1812, 1813.

2- SPECULATIVE JUDGEMENT OF CREDIBILITY does not seem to require grace per se; that is, supposing a judgement of credibility, it is obvious and natural that reason should pronounce, “I see that this is to be believed” [Lat., *credendum*].

“Reason brings to light the evangelical teaching by way of miracles, undeniable signs of the undeniable truth of the argument that shone forth from the very beginning.’ (Leo XIII, *Aeterni Patris*). From this certain judgement of credibility the speculative judgement of credentia naturally follows – as is confirmed by the experience of certain converts. See *Revue Thomiste*, 1918: Oct. ff. Mainard, *La psychologie de la conversion*.

This does not mean that God cannot grant interior grace to elicit these two judgements. P. 8, 171ff.

3- PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF CREDIBILITY absolutely requires interior grace. RT 1920: practical thinking: for me, ‘this is to be believed’ is owing to interior grace; likewise in

DB 178: the beginning of faith;

DB 194: to know what is to be done

DB 135: holy thoughts, devout decision

DB 180: to think as is required

4- DEVOUT READINESS TO BELIEVE also absolutely requires interior grace.

DB 139, 178, 200 at end; 141, 179; see the Office for Friday of Holy Week.

FAITH (in general): the firm assent to some statement on account of the authority of the speaker.

It can be natural or supernatural. Here we are dealing with supernatural faith.

THE BEGINNING OF FAITH: i.e., inchoate faith, faith in the process of becoming, or on the way; this is distinguished from formal faith, faith as an accomplished fact.

FORMAL FAITH: that by which we believe what has been revealed on the authority of God the revealer.

As an act.

As a virtue: DB 1789

INCHOATE FAITH comprises:

(1) A PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF CREDENTITY, i.e., an act of the practical intellect by which, having carefully considered the motives, we judge that this is to be believed [*credendum*] by us; it is indeed a practical decision, a desire to believe. DB 178.

(2) THE DEVOUT READINESS TO BELIEVE, i.e., an act of the will commanding formal faith.

THE DESIRE FOR SALVATION: i.e., the beginning of justice, consists in the fact that a person desires, seeks, prays for and tries to obtain grace. DB 176 (prayer); 177 (we wish to be purified) 139, 141, 134.

N.B. This thesis deals with a positive disposition; later we shall deal with the question whether a negative disposition exists or not.

DISPOSITION: by which something is more or less made suitable for receiving a certain form. (The fitness of a subject for something)

PHYSICAL: that by which⁴ matter (subject) is more or less made suitable for receiving a form.

MORAL: that which, by its own worthiness, moves someone to confer something.

POSITIVE: that which of itself is ordered to the reception of something.

NEGATIVE: that which is a remover of obstacles.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

Even for inchoate faith, which, according to Catholic doctrine, consists in a practical judgement to believe and an act of the will commanding formal faith, there is a necessity, an absolute necessity, for entitatively supernatural interior grace, which is never preceded by any merit or positive disposition of the subject.

In other words, conversion is not owing to the intellect or to the efforts of the will, or to anyone's affection (father, mother, etc.), or to any unidentified influence of the collective soul or hysterics or neurosymsus (Protestant revivals), or the subconscious, but solely to supernatural interior grace.

Hence in this thesis it is neither affirmed nor denied that fallen humanity, through the motives of credibility, can by their natural virtues alone naturally 'will to believe' and in some way seek salvation.

But we deny that these acts are such that God is obliged to confer grace; one cannot by oneself know what is to be believed in the way that divine faith believes, that is, on the authority of God alone.

ADVERSARIES: Semi-Pelagians

⁴ Reading *quo* for *quod*.

NOTE; DE FIDE DEFINITA. DB 176-178 (812-815)

PROOF:

(1) From Scripture: Sts John and Paul assert that faith and justification are so much the gift of God that no one can have them without the interior help of God, nor can one boast as if they were merited by one's own actions.

Therefore for the beginning of faith

Antecedent: (all texts are found in DB 199)

1 Cor 4:7, 11-14; DB 179, 199; RJ 1734, 1981ff.; 2022, 2071, 2253;

Jn 8:44-45.: DB 181, 3039; (200b); RJ 1105, 1890, 2034;

Jn 6:64-69; RJ 1906, 1946;

Phil 1:29: DB 178, 199, 2029; RH 1979;

Eph 2:8-9: DB 178, 199; RJ 1204, 2159, 2163;

Rom 11:35, 8:15, 26; 1 Cor 7:26, 12:3; 2 Cor 3:5

Phil 2:12

Heb 12:2; Acts 13:48, 16:17.

(2) From the teaching of the Church: DB 104, 135, 176-78;

(a) on the beginning of faith: DB141, 199, 797-798, 1376ff. 1522, 2103, 3038f.

(b) on the desire for salvation: DB 139, 177, 198, 798, 878, 1520.

(3) From the Fathers: RJ 114, 808, 963, 1165, 1177, 1450, 1569, 1571, 1734, 1736, 1936, 1940, 1968, 1978, 1981f., 1984, 2001, 2004-2007, 2034, 2045, 2153, 2227, 2243, 2246 2278.
DB 105, 135, 176ff. P. 98, Pohle 102f., Palmieri, thesis 26, p. 192.

(4) THEOLOGICAL REASON is constant, for the beginning of faith and the desire for salvation are acts leading to supernatural salvation and therefore surpass the powers of nature – see the preceding thesis. S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 6.

EXCURSUS 1: What grace is necessary and how. P. 101ff.

The following are required:

1. Interior grace: DB 104; RJ 1890;

2. Interior grace illuminating the intellect: DB 180;

3. Interior grace inspiring the will: DB 135;

This necessity is absolute and physical: DB 105;

And this also in the order of originated justice: DB 192;

The external grace of preaching is the ordinary condition to which God connects interior grace: Acts 5:20; 1 Cor 4:14.

EXCURSUS 2: On ‘help without which nothing...’ and ‘help by which’, according to St Augustine. P. 103-109.

1. Jansenius:

Help w.w.n.: sufficient grace which is insufficient after the fall: DB 1295-1296.

Help by which: prevailing pleasure

Explanation certainly false, since St Augustine is speaking of the gift of perseverance.

2. Zacharia (P. 103)

Help without which nothing....

Help by which:

3. Pesch (103)

Help without which nothing...: prevenient grace, i.e., elevating grace in first act;

Help by which: assisting grace, i.e., elevating grace in second act.

4. Lubac (RSR. 1931, 524f.)

Help without which nothing... : elevating grace, grace before the fall

Help by which: healing grace, grace after the fall.

5. Portalié (DTC Augustine, 2394) and Boyer, RSR 1930, 499f.

Help without which nothing....: ability to persevere ‘de iure’

Help by which: ability to persevere ‘de facto’

DIFFICULTIES: P. Comp. 249; P. 99; Beraza, n. 205; Max. N. 298ff.

KEY TO THE SOLUTIONS:

1- Left to oneself, one is physically powerless to do any salvific work.

2- The thesis deals with one’s positive disposition.

GEM: [in French]

Theologians quite rightly say that a ‘devout movement’ is necessary for giving consent to the propositions of our faith; the will must soften and let go of its natural hardness – which happens through a gentle breeze or movement of the Holy Spirit, inducing us to believe.

Every day I see persons convinced about this truth, that our believing is good, that it is healthy, that is in conformity with reason, and in addition to all this, seeing no other conclusion from these premises, I cry out: 'What have we done for God that we have been given the gift of Faith, which has with such great difficulty entered into the souls of these poor primitive people.' (P. Lejeune, in the *Jesuit Relations* (1634-36): Vol. 8, p. 272.

THESIS 3: EVEN A PERSON EQUIPPED WITH SUPERNATURAL HABITS NEEDS THE HELP OF ACTUAL GRACE FOR EVERY SALVIFIC ACT

ACTUAL GRACE is a TRANSIENT supernatural help, given gratis by God for doing good and avoiding evil. It is called ACTUAL because it consists only of an act, not like a habit or something permanent, such as sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, etc.

Now this grace is known to have a threefold function; that is, it can be considered as:

1. ELEVATING, inasmuch as it imparts the physical ability to posit a salvific act, in this sinner, for example;
- 2- HEALING, inasmuch as it heals the wounds resulting from original sin, such as the ignorance of the intellect, the wickedness of the will, the weakness of the irascible (by fortitude) and the concupiscence of desire (by self-control). S.T. 1-2, q. 85, a. 3. It performs this function only in the postlapsarian state of humanity;
- 3- MOVING, inasmuch as it is a physical and immediate motion sent by God into a faculty to produce the supernatural *esse* of a salvific act.

Under this aspect, actual grace is the supernatural concurrence of God and corresponds to the natural concurrence of God necessary for performing every natural act by a creature. (P. 3, 69ff.)

PERSON ... EQUIPPED is one who is justified or adorned with sanctifying grace and the other supernatural gifts which as habits are poured by God into the soul of the just together with charity.

FOR EVERY SALVIFIC ACT, that is, in order to posit acts which correspond to these supernatural habits there is required, in addition to God's general concurrence and those supernatural operative principles that are habits, actual and supernatural illumination of the intellect, inspiration of the will, and supernatural motion, so that those acts may be supernatural; it is required, that is, in the case of each salvific act, understood precisely as supernatural.

NEEDS: not in order that one be raised (for the just person is already elevated through sanctifying grace), nor in every case that one be healed (which one cannot imagine either in Christ or in the Blessed Virgin Mary in order to be moved to acting supernaturally. S.T. 1c.

MEANING OF THE THESIS: For every supernatural act of an infused virtue, there is required, in addition to the influence of the virtue, a supernatural actual concurrence of God, that is, the initial supernatural movement of God.

This supernatural concurrence of God possesses the true formality of actual grace, of AROUSING in the case of the initial supernatural divine concurrence, and of HELPING in the case of God's supernatural concurrence continuing or persevering until the act is actually completed.

ADVERSARIES.

Molina, some others, Bellarmine (with qualification) P. 109

Agree with us: St Thomas, Bonaventure, Giles, Capreolus, Suarez, John of St Thomas, Vasquez, Pazz, Pesch, Jansens, Hugon, Beraza, Billot, Pègues, de la Taille, Boyer, etc., etc.

NOTE. More probable, and more in common and more in conformity with the documents of the Church. Metaphysically speaking, it seems to be equally certain as the thesis on the supernatural concurrence of God in the natural order.

PROOF

1- From Scripture.

(a) In the text already cited, especially 2 Cor 3:5 (thinking), Phil 2:15 (willing, performing), 1Cor 12:2 (speaking), 1 Cor ... (working), 2 Thes 2:15-16 (actions, words), Heb 13:21 (every good), grace is said to be absolutely necessary for every salvific action.

But these texts have to do with the just, and the grace to which they refer seem to be actual grace, since they refer to acts.

Therefore everyone who is equipped with supernatural habits needs the help of actual grace for each supernatural act.

(b) From Jn 15:5 , together with DB 809 (Van Noort, no. 39)

That power which constantly influences, which precedes, accompanies, and follows the acts of the just certainly seems to be understood as actual grace, that not only helps but also arouses, when it precedes good works.

Besides, there is taught the physical necessity for this grace when without it the works of the just can by no means be salvific. 'Just as the sun is constantly needed for a plant to grow: the Sun gives the increase.' (1 Cor 3:6).

2- From the Councils: DB 197, 182f., 134, 141, 191, 200, 135 (Zozimus), 809 (Christ has a constant influence upon the just)

The Council of Mainz (de Guibert, 346, 2nd par.)

For it is not in terms of human powers that the works of the just are to be measured but in relation to that grace by which Christ influences them, from which subsequently their good works flow, and in accordance with the the dignity they receive from the Holy Spirit, the **MOVER AND WORKER OF EVERY GOOD WORK**. For thus are human powers to be diminished, so that the grace of God not be accounted cheap at the same time; and so in doing a **GOOD WORK** human power is to be minimized, so that all the while we may think of it as the **MOVEMENT** of the Holy Spirit as **EFFECTIVE** in us, and accepted and precious in the sight of God. See Palmieri, p. 210f.

3- From the Liturgy.

In the Breviary, Office of St Patrick (17 March), lesson 6.

In the Missal: St Martin (11 Nov.); B 606, note 1.

4- From the Fathers.

St Augustine, *Letter to Paulinus*: “It must be acknowledged that the grace and HELP of God is given for each act” (Epist. 186, PG 33, 828). In *Letter to Vitalis*, PG 33, 984: “Grace is given for each act.” This Augustinian principle is unrestricted, and does not apply only to sanctifying grace. See RJ 1556, 1572, 1573, 1792, 1942, 2159, 2201. P. III.

5- From the teaching of theologians: e.g., Billot, *De gratia* III in note:

“The Fathers, led by Augustine, were content throughout the Pelagian controversy, interpreting the teaching of Scripture, to assert that grace, which is given for each act, consists in an actual interior movement of both the intellect and the will.”

6- From theological reason: (*S.T.* 1-2, q. 109, a. 9; and see a. 1)

This is required for determining the supernatural exercise of faculties.

(a) One who is equipped with supernatural habits is constituted in first act for operating supernaturally; but one who is in first act for operating needs to receive not only a supernatural motion from an object but also an interior motion from God in order to actually act, indeed a motion that is proportionate to that act.

Therefore ...

Cf. Terrien, *Grace et gloire*, 2, 56ff.

(b) EXPERIENCE.

Our supernatural life is an ascent to that mountain that is God himself. Now, as Alpinists know, the closer one gets to the top of the mountain, the more and more difficult does the climbing become, and it is only the hope of imminent success that gives them the strength to continue. Not otherwise does it seem to be in the supernatural spiritual life. See de laTaille, RSR 1919, 287, note, and Rev. Apol., t.33, 350. Hence the constant need for prayer and consequently of actual grace.

DIFFICULTIES: DTC 1680; Beraza, n.223.

KEY TO THEIR SOLUTION: Actual grace is required for each supernatural act, at least as moving it.

“May all our actions, O Lord, be initiated by your inspiration and be carried out with your help, so that our every prayer and action may ever begin from you and through you be successfully completed.

A.2. THE NECESSITY OF GRACE FOR VIRTUOUS WORKS OF THE NATURAL ORDER

PRELIMINARY NOTE on the errors of the reformers, the Baianists, and Jansenists. P 113-20

DTC: Articles on Luther, Calvin, Baius, Jansenius

F.X. Jansen: *Baius et le Baianisme*

Ricard: *Les premiers Jansénistes*

RSR: Two deviant Augustinians: 1931: 422ff. (Baius); 513ff. (Jansenius).

De Maistre: *L'Église Gallican*, bk. 1, c. 5, p. 40.

If one considers Port-Royal as a body in the proper sense, its eulogy will be short: Son of Baius, brother of Calvin, accomplice of Hobbes and father of the convulsionists, it has not lived so much as a moment without doing all it could to weary, defy, and wound the Church and the State. If the Pascals, the Arnaulds, the Nicoles were able to see the effects of their teaching shortly afterwards, they would die of shame, and repent, for they were honest and very far, like all the reformers, from foreseeing the consequences of the first step taken against authority.

THE SOURCE OF ALL THOSE ERRORS is the use of an exclusively positive method and a systematic contempt for metaphysics, especially scholastic metaphysics.

F.X. Jansen: *Baius et le Baianisme*, pp. 27-36.

Mersch: *Le corps mystique du Christ*, 2, 239-45; 298-303. Cf. 2, pp. 76f.

DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH

Anno 1567: "Ex omnibus afflictionibus," DB 1001-1080

"Comma Pianum": DB 1080 and note.

a. 1653: "Cum occasione" DB 1092-97

a. 1690: Decree of the Holy Office: DB 1291-1322

a. 1713: "Unigenitus" DB 1351-1452

a. 1794: "Auctorem fidei" DB 1516-27

This matter of the necessity of grace for virtuous acts of the natural order is dealt with by answering the two following questions:

1- What can fallen man do by natural powers alone: P. 120-147

2- What can fallen man not do without the help of grace: P. 147-185.

I- WHAT CAN FALLEN MAN DO BY NATURAL POWERS ALONE

Thesis 4: Without the help of grace, fallen man can do actions that are naturally virtuous.

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 2; 2-2, q. 10, a. 4; P. 120ff.; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1.5, c. 4, 9-13; Suarez, *De gratia*, 1, 1, cc. 2, 6, 7; Mazzella, 453 f.; Beraza, n. 329.

N.B. In the treatise on true religion it seems that the intellect could: DB 1785f., 1806f. Leaving this question aside, we ask in this thesis what the will can do without grace. DB 1794.

CAN: has the strength, both physical and moral.

MAN: historic persons, abstracting from the fact whether they are in a state unbelief, of sin, or of justice; in other words, fallen humanity, redeemed by Christ.

NATURALLY VIRTUOUS ACTS: acts performed in conformity with the natural law, i.e., to the light of reason left to itself indicating what is to be done or not done.

Such acts would have neither the value of supernatural merit, nor would they be sinful.

For such acts, two conditions are required:

1. an act good in itself (*finis operis*)
2. a good intention, so that a good act is not diverted from its natural character through the positive intention of a perverse purpose (*finis operantis*)

(ETERNAL LAW: the divine will commanding that the natural order be maintained and forbidding a positive intention of a perverse end.)

(NATURAL LAW: participation in the eternal law by human beings.)

The question is DE JURE, not DE FACTO; we abstract from the question whether in this order of providence those acts are entitatively supernatural or not.

GRACE: supernatural gift.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

Whether without the help of grace there be in a human person the ability, both physical and moral, to sometimes perform an ethically good act, even to overcome naturally certain temptations.

Our answer: even after the fall, a person can without grace do some particular good act: this at least de jure; whether de facto, we leave aside.

ADVERSARIES

1- Hus, Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, Baius teach that man without justifying grace (charity) can do nothing but sin. This, of course, is contrary to defined faith: DB 642, 817; see 776, 1027-1031, 651, 770.

2- Jansenius, Quesnel, Synod of Pistoia teach that at least the grace of faith is required for an act not to be a sin. DB 1293. This was also condemned, though not explicitly, as heretical. DB 1025. DTC, Baius, 43f. DB 1298.

3- Augustinians. P. 143; DTC: Augustinisme; Baius, col. 35 at end. According to them, man after the fall can do a good deed from an immediate purpose but not from one's ultimate end, because they hold that between good deeds and sin there are acts that are indifferent. (Cf. p. 3.6G4f; S.T. 1-2, q. 18, a. 9.

4- Vasquez and Ripalda deny that fallen man can elicit an act that is good in every respect without special help.

NOTE: It is a matter of faith (De Fide) that not all acts that are done without grace are sins.

As it stands: True and certain (No censure imposed).

PROOF

1- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

(a) INDIRECTLY:

DB 642, 817, 1035, 1298, 1523. Hence the argument as follows: There is no such thing as an indifferent individual act (*S.T.* 1-2, q. 18, a. 9; P 3, 644ff.). But not every act after the fall that is elicited without grace is morally evil; see de la Taille, *Gregorianum* 1926, 30f. Therefore some such acts are morally good.

(b) DIRECTLY: DB 1027, 1037, 1065, 1352, 1389f., 1534.

From Scripture; together with the Fathers.

Rom 2:12-15 (Cornely xxx) and RJ 1733. However: 1905; DB 1022; P. 122.

2 [3] – FROM THE FATHERS

(a) When the Councils and the Fathers speak of the necessity of grace they always restrict that necessity to salvific acts – acts, that is, done ‘as one ought’, ‘as is expedient’, ‘as is fitting’, ‘rightly’, ‘towards salvation, devotion, justice, true holiness.

(b) Acts without grace are called by the Fathers ‘sterile’, ‘wayward’, ‘futile for eternal life’, ‘unprofitable’, even ‘evil’, ‘false virtue’, ‘vague virtue.’

(c) The Fathers who have written against Pelagianism, such as St Augustus, Prosper of Aquitaine, St Fulgentius (P. 122), attribute this power to human nature. For example, RJ 1162, 1220, 1526, 1733, 1795, 1809, 1904 (DB 1524), 2244f., 2272, P. 122; Pohle, p. 58f.

3 [4] – FROM THEOLOGIANS: *S.T.* 1-2, q. 109, a. 2. General agreement, with few exceptions.

4 [5] – ALSO, in both Testaments many deeds done by sinners and unbelievers are praised without any indication that they have been done with the help of grace: Mt 3:46; are rewarded, Ez 29:20, Is 45.

5 [6] – THEOLOGICAL REASON

(a) The impossibility of positing acts to some extent naturally virtuous without grace would be the result of either physical impotence or moral impotence; but neither can be said. Therefore

MAJOR PREMISE: is obvious, ‘because no other sort of impotence can be thought of.’

MINOR PREMISE

(aa) It is not physically impossible; such an act is natural, hence it is proportioned to natural powers. Through original sin, neither free will is destroyed nor is nature totally changed

physically and depraved. Hence: what is taught by the natural law is conformed to reason, since the natural law is the dictate of reason itself.

But a precept that is conformed to reason does not mandate what is impossible to do;

Therefore a precept of the natural law is not physically impossible for a human being.

(bb) Neither is it morally impossible, because there are certain things among these precepts that present no difficulty, such as the precept to love one's parents, etc. DB 1030.

(b) Otherwise fallen nature would have to be said to be intrinsically and totally corrupt, which is not the case. See the treatise on original sin.

(c) A being that could perform no action consonant with its nature is unthinkable.

COROLLARY I. IN PRACTICE it follows that good works, especially public actions that are pleasing to people, are not certain signs of friendship with God.

COROLLARY II. IN FACT there exist works that are naturally virtuous.

EXCURSUS I. On the opinions of Vasquez and Ripalda. P. 126f.; DTC, Grâce 1585ff.; Pohle, 68; Mazzella, 461ff. Boyer, *De Gratia*; these seem contrary to DB 1034, 1524.

EXCURSUS II. No one by one's natural powers alone could love God above all things. P.128ff.; DTC, Grâce 1585ff. *S.T.* 1-2, q. 109, a. 3.

DIFFICULTIES: P. 123; P. Comp. 217; Beraza, n. 346ff. P. N. 307 Inst.

KEY TO THEIR SOLUTION.

Our nature was not essentially corrupted or radically depraved by original sin and so, at least *de jure*, man has the physical and moral power for sometimes acting ethically.

At the origin of protestantism, we believe, and at the origin of other heresies and errors about which we shall have to speak, is a latent presupposition. It is this which we should like to consider first of all.

It is of the METAPHYSICAL ORDER. As well, there is this general rule: IT IS IN THESE BACKWARD AREAS THAT THEOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS ARE FIRST ENTICING, EVEN WHEN, AT FIRST GLANCE, THEY DO NOT PERMIT GOING BACK SO FAR.

Here, the presupposition bears upon the relationships between the world and God.

Now, knowledge of the relation between the world and God, insofar as it is accessible to natural human reason, is a matter of metaphysics.

On the other hand, few epochs were as badly prepared as that in which protestantism took shape. That was when nominalism was rampant in the schools, and nominalism, as we know, is an attitude of defiance towards the APRIORI, confronting what constitutes the PROPER APRIORI OF THE MIND in human knowing, and, at the same time, an attitude of confidence towards sense perception and towards experience. An excellent stance, to be sure, in the domain of the experimental sciences, but a hopeless stance when there is a question of the objects of pure

thought. If one is concerned about constantly dealing with empirical arguments, what shall one be able to say about spiritual realities and particularly about God and the relationships of the world with God?

Mersch, *The Mystical Body of Christ*, 2.239f.

Thesis 5: Not all works that a person does in the state of sin or unbelief are sins.

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a.2; 2-2, q. 10, a. 4. S. 11, c. 4ff.; P 132f.; W 302ff; Beraza 311ff; Pohle 73f., etc.

STATE is the way in which a thing is.

STATE OF UNBELIEF is the state of those who do not yet believe with supernatural faith.

INFIDELITY can be positive, culpable, or negative, inculpable.

Negative infidelity either recognizes the true God – for example, material heretics, Jews, Moslems, perhaps some pagans – or not, such as idol-worshippers and atheists.

ACT OF AN UNBELIEVER: S.T. 2-2, q. 10, a. 4.

A STATE OF SIN is the state of those who habitually are turned away from God, their ultimate supernatural end.

ADVERSARIES

1. Wycliffe, Hus, Luther, Calvin: All the acts of any person whoever are sins.
2. Baius: There are only two possible states and each person acts according to his or her state; the state, that is, of necessitating charity or justice or the state of necessitating greed or injustice.
3. Jansenius: Each one necessarily acts according to one's delight in the things of earth and concupiscence (=sin) or according to delight in the things of heaven (=grace).
4. Augustinians: Practically speaking, an unbeliever sins at least venially in every action. According to them, we must refer our actions to God as loved for his sake. This requires an overwhelming infallible delight which is not necessitating and is not given to unbelievers. Therefore an unbeliever for the most part by reason of the ultimate end commits at least a sin of omission.

See W. 382, Beraza 311f.; P. 132. DB 1394, 1395, 1398, 1935, 1040, 1027, 1294f., 1297, 1298, 1301.

MEANING OF THE THESIS

In the preceding thesis we prescind from the question whether a person acting in the state of grace, or at least has faith, although the reasons were valid even for a sinner and an unbeliever. This thesis is especially aimed at the Baians.

The question is not only *de facto*, but *de jure*; whether, that is, a work, by the very fact that it is the work of a sinner or unbeliever, is a sin. This is obviously a question of sin in the formal sense, taken not only materially or improperly.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE OF THE THESIS:

(1) Regarding SINNERS – inasmuch as it teaches that good works can be done before justification, i.e., in the process of justification: DEFINED AS BEING OF FAITH. DB 798.

(2) Regarding UNBELIEVERS – Against the Jansenists: inasmuch as it teaches that good works that are not sins can be done even by unbelievers, but morally good: the thesis is THEOLOGICALLY CERTAIN.

(3) Against the AUGUSTINIANS: MORALLY CERTAIN.

PROOF

1- From SCRIPTURE

(a) In Scripture

1- Sinners and unbelievers are often praised because of deeds they have done: Ex 1:15ff (Egyptian midwives who feared God); Heb 11:31, Jos 2:1ff (Rahab the harlot); Is 44:28-4:8 (Cyrus).

2- They are invited to give alms, to be converted, to repent: Ecclus (Sir) 21:1 (a sinner); Ez 18:30 (sinners); Mt 5:46 (Publicans); 2 Par 36:22ff. (Cyrus).

3- Examples of Manassis; Samaritans: Lk 10:33; Zaccheus: Lk 19:2ff.; 1 Cor 2:4-6 (the wisdom of men); acts 17:26-28; Wis 13:1ff. (seek God).

(b) Rom 2:2-14ff. P. 139, 142. DB 1022. The Apostle of the Gentiles supposes that some precepts of the natural law are being observed, even though he does not say whether it is done with or without grace, and even though he said in Rom 1:21ff that it was impossible to observe the natural law in its entirety, indeed not even its main precepts.

2- From THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.

DB 642, 817, 1033, 1025, 1027-31, 1033, 1037f., 1040, 1092, 1294, 1297, 1298, 1301, 1304, 1351, 1389, 1395, 1409, 1523f.

3- From THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS. P.136

(a) St Augustine distinguished between divine and human charity, and whether human charity is licit or illicit: RJ 1528, 1733, 1827.

(b) When the Fathers say that actions of unbelievers are sins, they understand these actions as not conducive to salvation: e.g., RJ 1450 (What good merits can sinners have); 1463 (futile works); 1472 (only good works are done from faith), 1528 (human deeds), 1729 (not salvific), 1902f. (not true virtue), 1904f. (whenever they do what belongs to the law they do naturally), 1943 (without charity no good is done), 2014 (False virtue), 2042 (fruitless), 2244f. (not conducive to salvation), 1809 (DB 195), 1761. See 1893, 2037.

(c) They admit good works done by unbelievers, e.g., RJ 425 (understand truth), 982 (customs), 1162 (customs).

4- THEOLOGICAL REASON.

A. DIRECTLY:

(From the false supposition which the contrary error relies upon.

According to the adversaries, the works of sinners and unbelievers would be sins because they proceed from evil desire.

But this supposition is false; therefore...

MINOR premise: It is false to say that a person who has charity is necessarily led by charity, but that one who lacks charity is necessarily led by an evil desire. For

(a) no habit, good or bad, necessarily influences every act, since in fact a just person can sin; therefore likewise the unjust can act virtuously. S.T. 2-2, q. 10, a. 4.

(b) It is false to say that an action which does not proceed from charity is a sin. For an action to be virtuous it is sufficient that it conform to the dictate of [right] reason; it is not required that it proceed from charity. S.T. 2-2, q. 23, a. 7. P. 133; Beraza, 324.

B. INDIRECTLY:

(a) From the fact that one rightly prays to ask for grace

(b) From the fact that can merit conversion through prayer and supplication.

(c) From the previous thesis.

4. FROM HISTORY. See *The Month*, 1930, vol. 155, p. 20:

The Hippocratic Oath (460 B.C.): "I swear by Apollo Physician, by Aesclepius, by Health, by Panacea and by all the gods and goddesses, that I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing. Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course. Similarly I will not give to a woman a pessary to cause abortion. But I will keep pure and holy both my life and my heart. I will not use the knife, not even, verily, on sufferers from the stone, but I will give place to such as are craftsmen."

EXCURSUS 1 – How sin can be said to be whatever is not from faith and charity: P. 34s., 123s., 137, 144 7.

EXCURSUS 2– Charity in the works of the Fathers can mean

(1) any virtuous love

(2) any actual grace

(3) any devout motion arising from grace

(4) a theological virtue

(5) an act of the virtue of charity

(6) an act of any virtue done under the impulse of charity

(7) sanctifying grace.

EXCURSUS 3 – Various explanations for a certain saying of St Augustine, namely, "All works of unbelievers are sins."

DIFFICULTIES: p. 134, 137; W. 306ff.; Beraza, 3176ff; 326ff.

KEY TO THEIR SOLUTION

- (a) A sinner may act as a sinner or as a human being or as a believer; the same can be said for an unbeliever. (Reduplicatively, specifically)
- (b) The influence of both charity and cupidity can be either habitual or actual. (To hate, not love).
- (c) ‘Without charity’ can be understood either negatively or contrarily.
- (d) Charity can be understood to be supernatural or natural, and the last as licit or illicit.
- (e) A good deed is either ethically good (natural, fruitless), salvific in the broad sense (meritorious *de congruo*) or salvific in the strict sense (condignly meritorious).

“You want to be great? Begin small. Are you thinking of building a great and lofty edifice? Consider laying a foundation of humility first.” St Augustine, *Sermo 10 de Verbis Domini*.

DB 195: Concerning those things that are proper for human beings. (Alternative reading: sin is from us, justice from God.). No one by himself have anything but LIES and sin.

RJ 1719: God does not help us to sin.

The idea expressed in DB 195 is St Augustine’s and it is often expressed elsewhere by Augustine; for example:

1- “The only things that are mine and mine alone are sins.” On Psalm 10:20. PL 36, 890B.

2- “From you [God] is whatever good I have; whatever I have that is evil I have from myself.” On Psalm 70:21-36. PL 36, 892A.

3- “Seek what belongs to man and you will find sin; seek what belongs to man and you will find lies. Remove sin, and whatever you find in man is of God.” *Sermo 32*, 19. PL 38, 200C.

4- “Acknowledge all this: From God you have whatever good you have; from yourself, whatever evil.” *Sermo 1766.6* – PL 38, 953B.

5- “... so that it is not by reason of our justice but of God’s that we perform any good work. If we turn away from him, that’s our doing.” *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, 2.5.5. PL44, 153D. See RJ 1719.

II

WHAT MAN AFTER THE FALL CANNOT DO WITHOUT GRACE

N.B. – The following theses treat of actual grace not precisely as necessary for supernaturality (elevating grace) but as necessary by reason of human weakness (healing grace). P. 112, at end.

This matter will be covered in three theses. Without grace:

Thesis 6: see below.

Thesis 7: A human being cannot overcome all serious temptations.

Thesis 8: Not even the just can avoid all venial sins for very long.

THESIS 6

IN THIS PRESENT STATE, A HUMAN BEING WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE
CANNOT FOR LONG OBSERVE THE ENTIRE NATURAL LAW, NOT EVEN
SUBSTANTIALLY

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 4; Suarez, 1.1., c. 26ff.; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1.5. c. 5, c. 5ff.; P. 147; W. 308f. Billot, q. 109, th. 2.

[Definition of terms:]

IN THIS STATE: in the course of human history, i.e., in the present state of human nature as fallen and repaired.

A HUMAN BEING CANNOT: i.e., even though one has the physical power, one does not have the moral strength. In other words, one cannot, not even because of the physical inadequacy of one's faculties by themselves but because of the state of weakness for which, in this present dispensation, no other remedy is applied than the influence of the supernatural grace of Christ. That is to say, the weakness arises from the extreme difficulty to overcome it, which such great constancy and fortitude are needed as human beings never NATURALLY display.

PHYSICAL POWER is taken here as that which belongs to the very nature of the faculties in themselves, that is, their inherent inadequacy for performing or overcoming certain actions, whatever obstacles there may be from other sources.

MORAL POWER adds those conditions by which hindrances are removed, at least insofar as it is necessary that there be present that possibility which is said to be and is truly exercised in keeping with the ordinary norms of human living.

MORAL IMPOTENCE arises from imperfect judgement, from the waywardness of the will, and from the weariness and distaste for resisting. This is a question of mortal sins, since only with the help of grace can one avoid all venial sins. It can be either

STRICTLY SPEAKING: the difficulty which in actual fact no one overcomes even if one has the physical ability.

BROADLY SPEAKING: the difficulty which can be overcome by some, but ordinarily is not.

ANTECEDENT: (it is known a priori that no one is able)

CONSEQUENT: (it is known as a consequence that no one is able)

WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE: left to one's natural ability.

FOR LONG: this cannot be determined mathematically, nor as to the hour; but humanly speaking, one would observe the law for long if one were to keep it for several months or even years.

A person can keep it FOR A SHORT TIME, because this amounts to saying that one does not always sin mortally.

NATURAL LAW: is the eternal law as applied to the force of nature and manifested as law, that is, as obligating; or, is the will of God commanding the natural order to be observed and forbidding its disruption, insofar as this is made clear to us through the dictate of reason.

ABSOLUTE: per se it enjoins only purely natural acts.

HYPOTHETICAL: *per accidens* it enjoins as well supernatural acts that oblige in some determinate economy of Providence, e.g., to believe in God the incarnate Word, and to receive the sacraments, which nevertheless cannot be done without the help of grace, because both moral and physical power are lacking.

The law of Christ in particular contains more precepts than the Mosaic law or the natural law, and yet is easier to fulfil because the Mosaic law was the source of light but not of fortitude; the Christian law, on the other hand, supplies both light and fortitude.

ENTIRE: that is, regarding all its absolute and perfectly known precepts. Billot, 68, note.

PRECEPTS of the natural law can be considered either

(a) DISTRIBUTIVELY = separately [sic. Is this where BL picked up the incorrect spelling of this word (*seorsum*)?] ⁵ = individually = devidedly = particularly; or

(b) COLLECTIVELY = all together

SUBSTANTIALLY: that is, according to what pertain to purely ethical goodness, so that an act may have all that it needs for such purely natural goodness, according to the measure and the purpose that is naturally due. — Not, therefore, a question of salvific acts.

THE NATURAL LAW PRESCRIBING:

1- HYPOTHETICAL PRECEPTS: not even distributively can they be fulfilled without grace, because humans lack both physical and moral power;

2- PRECEPTS that are ABSOLUTE and SUPERNATURAL AS TO MANNER cannot be fulfilled without grace, for the same reason;

3- PRECEPTS that are ABSOLUTE as to SUBSTANCE ONLY:

DISTRIBUTIVELY: can be fulfilled without grace, so long as there it no special difficulty to be overcome;

ALL COLLECTIVELY: can be fulfilled without grace FOR A SHORT TIME, so long as there is no special difficulty to be overcome or no serious temptation arises;

COLLECTIVELY, ALL: cannot be fulfilled FOR LONG without grace.

Here the distinction between the substance of an act and its manner is very important.

⁵ The Lewis and Short Latin dictionary notes that this word, *seorsum*, is often spelled incorrectly. (Tr.)

AN ACT, a deed by which a commandment is observed, is said to be done.

AS TO SUBSTANCE, when the deed that is commanded is done MATERIALLY, e.g., to love one's parents, and also is done according to its MORAL nature, namely in the way and for the purpose that are naturally due.

THE MANNER, however, of an act is its very supernaturality inasmuch as the same material deed, e.g., to love one's parents, is done, no longer for a solely natural good purpose but because of God, the author of the supernatural order and the beatifier.

Those who do not distinguish supernatural acts by their formal objects call the MANNER of the act that which orders an act to a supernatural end, that is, that they proceed from an elevated faculty; hence by the word "manner" also they understand the supernaturality of an act. See DB 1061.

ADVERSARIES: PELAGIANS: distinguish these three:

- 1- Ability (CAN), by which a person is just, which comes from God alone.
- 2- Will (WILL), by which a person wills to be just, which is his alone.
- 3- Action (DO), by which a person is just, which is also his alone.

For according to them, by admitting the necessity for grace, free will would vanish, God would command the impossible and would play favorites.

P 147. RJ1413, 1355, 1411, 1412, 1855, 1888, 1894, 1902, 1976. 2019 at end.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE

Many do not think it to be "defined as belonging to faith", nor simply "of faith", because it is not entirely evident that both Scripture and the Councils, especially those which seem to affirm this proposition, appear to be dealing with the precepts of the natural law, considered as to substance only.

However, because the same texts by solid reasoning are shown to pertain to this, we must say with Suarez, "this doctrine is a THEOLOGICALLY CERTAIN conclusion, so that the contrary is not only temerarious but also 'verging on error'." (l. 16, n. 12)

Boyer (p. 43): "But the others, such as Medina, Billot, Perrone, hold that it is De Fide Definita, 'defined as being of faith.' (DB 104, 105, 130, 132, 182, 195, 804, 806)

PROOF

1- FROM SCRIPTURE (grace is to be considered as 'healing')

A- Rom cc. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8: Paul is not referring to himself personally but about man as constituted under the law and without the grace of the Savior.

According to these texts, both the Jews and the Gentiles are constituted sinners against the natural law (cc. 1, 2); when the Mosaic Law itself, light without fortitude, although holy, is known, it is an occasion of sin; the only means of overcoming concupiscence is the grace of Christ.

But if the Jews, even with the Mosaic Law cannot observe the natural law because of concupiscence, much less can the Gentiles do so without grace.

Therefore human beings, in this present state, cannot without grace observe the natural law for long, even as to its substance.

P. 150ff.' Prat on this topic, e.g., 1, 226; Tobac: "Grâce" in DA,⁶ 334ff., DTC 1584ff.

B- Rom 7:14-23.24.25. (There is no question here of the fulfilment of the law as to its manner, for the Apostle asks for grace to overcome the concupiscence that is contrary to the natural law, that is, as to its substance)

C- Other texts: Tit 3:3, Gal 2:16, 2:21, 2 Cor 3:6, 12:7ff, 1 Cor 15:56f. P. 151.

2- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 103, 104, 105 (regarding the just; applies all the more to sinners); DB 132, 133; DB 806, Innocent I: PL 33, 781 (where grace not only as elevating but also as healing is considered)

3- FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: In their controversies against the Pelagians they teach that grace is necessary not only in order to act salvifically but also not to be overcome by concupiscence; thus they consider grace not as 'elevating' but as 'healing.' P. 152ff.

E.g. RJ 1162, 1719, 1731, 1933, 1941.

4- FROM THEOLOGAINS: *S.T.* 1-2, q. 109, a. 4.

5- FROM REASON:

(a) A POSTERIORI:

From experience it is clear that the whole natural law is not observed by unbelievers without sin – indeed, not even by the faithful taken together as a group are all mortal sins avoided that are contrary to the natural law (especially since 'against nature').

But this shows that there is in man a moral impotence for observing the total natural law for long;

Therefore ... P. 154

(b) A PRIORI:

That one be able to observe all the natural commandments for long without grace it would be necessary that one have love for an invisible God, for a future reward, for abstract virtuousness, and overcome the desire for material things that are available and attractive, and this even in the face of serious temptations, which cannot be absent for long.

But in the present fallen state of humanity this is morally impossible due to the rebellion of the lower appetite, for as St Thomas says in 1-2, q. 109 ? towards the end, i.e., that fallen nature ...?

Therefore ... P. 155

EXCURSUS 1:

⁶ Dictionnaire Apologetique de la Foi Catholique.

From the special need of help to live rightly according to the natural law in the present state of humanity it would be wrong to conclude that the nature of man *demand*s supernatural grace as a complement owed to him. P. 155 Bellamy: *La théologie catholique au 19ième siècle*, p. 254-57. Mazella, n. 396 ff. See the following thesis.

EXCURSUS 2:

From the truth of the first excursus there arises a false theory based upon the principles of imminence devised by certain apologetes, namely from the impotence of a person to attain that moral perfection for which one has a natural desire; for this desire is felt indeterminately regarding any *suitable* divine help, but not determinately regarding supernatural divine assistance... That is, there is need for some help, natural or superntural, and this de jure. De facto, that help for fallen nature is a supernatural assistance that is not owed to nature. DB 103; Schifflini, 93. III; Van der Meersch, n. 80ff; Rivière, *Le Modernisme dans l'Église*; Blondel. P. 155, at th end.

DIFFICULTIES: W, 312ff., 310; Mazella, 396ff.

English translation of the French translation of a Latin poem by St. Prosper of Aquitaine, 'On the Ungrateful,' c. 27:

*Thus does the will in its twistings and turnings
Bear on every side its varied loves;
And like a Dedalus, a wandering vagabond
Goes from one object to another among the false goods of the world.
Futile in its fears, futile in its desires
Futile in its pride, futile in its pleasures,
It falls, and, in falling, its insolent weakness
Rises up again and again, and again and again wounds itself.*

THESIS 7

TO EVERY HUMAN BEING HAVING THE USE OF REASON FOR SOME TIME THERE
COME TEMPTATIONS SO SERIOUS THAT THEY CANNOT RIGHTLY OVERCOME
THEM WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, aa. 4 & 8; P. 156ff.; Suarez 1, 23f; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1.5, cc. 7 & 8; W. 317ff.; Beraza, p. 267.

This is a more accurate determination of the preceding thesis. For besides temptations, there are many other difficulties that can hinder a person.

TO EVERY HUMAN BEING: in an absolute universal supposition, whether sinner or just.

FOR SOME TIME: at least for several months, even for some years.

HAVING THE USE OF REASON: possessing one's faculties developed enough to be able to perfectly distinguish right from wrong; we do not wish to determine at what time one arrives at this state of mind.

TEMPTATION: any difficulty regarding faith or the moral life.

OF TESTING: a difficulty prompting to do what is morally wrong, but not directly; e.g., Gen:22:1.

OF SEDUCTION: a difficulty directly inducing to doing what is morally wrong, that is, soliciting one to sin. It is experienced every time there is moral good to be done and there occurs some motive for not doing that good act, or every time there is some incentive for doing what is morally wrong. It arises either (1) from corrupt nature, (2) from other humans, (3) from external objects, or (4) from the devil.

SERIOUS: not precisely those things which induce or because they induce one to break a serious commandment, but which give rise to a serious difficulty and strongly induce one to sin, and this whether with regard the subject or per se and simply.

SERIOUS WITH QUALIFICATION: either because of the intensity (intensively), or because of the duration (extensively).

SERIOUS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION: an intensity and duration that goes on for so long that the intellect is darkened and the will fatigued, especially because of the duration.

WE ARE DEALING WITH temptation without qualification that is subjectively serious and concerns serious sin, temptation, that is to say, considered in itself (subjectively), not only considering the serious outcome (terminatively), inducing to serious sin. For a temptation can be terminatively (objectively) serious without it necessarily being serious in itself – the temptation to matricide, for example.

WE ARE NOT DEALING WITH a temptation that hinders the free use of reason.

WE DO NOT SAY that a person in the present fallen state of humanity cannot overcome any serious temptation without grace, because this could scarcely be proven from the sources of revelation; but we are saying that there can be such temptations as cannot be overcome without grace.

DE FACTO in this present dispensation there is no serious temptation without the presence of grace at the same time.

WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE: i.e., by one's natural strength alone

SO SERIOUS THAT THEY CANNOT: that is, because of moral, not physical, weakness with the will remaining free.

RIGHTLY OVERCOME: for there can be three kinds of victory: vicious, supernatural, and only naturally moral.

IN THIS THESIS we are dealing with the ethically virtuous victory.

ADVERSARIES: Pelagians: by liberty alone a person can arrive at a state in which he experiences no concupiscent movement.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE: Theologically certain. Suarez, 1, 26, 12.

PROOF:

1- FROM SCRIPTURE:

(a) From the precept to pray:

Christ bids us to pray lest because of the weakness of the flesh we should succumb to temptation;

But prayer would not be always necessary if a person could overcome all temptations or long resist them without God's special help;

Therefore ...

MAJOR premise: Mt 6:13, 26, 41; Lk 18:1, 6f.; where we are bidden to ask, not that we have no temptation but that we may not be conquered by it. P. 159; *S.T.*, 2-2, q. 83, a. 9 at end.

(b) From the strength of our adversaries: 1 Cor 10:12f.; Eph 6:10ff., etc.

St Paul invites the faithful to be constantly cautious, because our struggle is against higher powers; yet even this test, he says, can be resisted with the special help of God;

But this indicates that a person cannot long overcome the temptations that occur to him without such assistance;

Therefore ...

(c) Job 7:1; 14:1; Rom 7:23ff.; 2 Cor 12:9; Gal 5: 17; 2 Thes 3:3; 2 Tim 2:3, 5; 1 Pet 5:8ff. Wis 8:21.

2- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 132f., 135, 103, 182, 190, 187, 1029f., 806. P. 161.

One's own persuasion and the practice of the faithful are evidence that this is the mind [? – first 3 letters of word not clear] of the Church; for they have recourse to God in times of temptation, certain that without grace they will be overcome by it. P. 162.

3- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS:

(a) The teaching of St Augustine and other Fathers against the Pelagians is explicit. They all teach that a special help is necessary even for the just to overcome temptations. P. 161 [?].

E.g. RJ 315, 548, 1191, 1210, 1263, 1404, 14406, 1504, 1509, 1592, 1718, 2201; 485, 1153, 1956, 2227.

(b) Life is a battle: RA 90, 120, 165, 327, 484, 498, 594, 734, 990, 1174.

(c) From the necessary and difficult method for overcoming them: Ra 33, 36, 99, 148, 175, 190f., 193-96, 203, 207f., 232, 478, 547, 567, 594, 772, 837, 931, 957, 968, 1029. Speculative ascetics ...??

4- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE THEOLOGIANS: S.T.1-2, q. 109, a. 8, 2nd paragraph.

4- FROM REASON: see Thesis 6.

EXCURSUS 1:

The reason for this impotence is not to be sought in temptation considered by itself, but results from its long duration and from the fact that it is often connected with a long series of difficulties. The vehemence of the temptation arises from the fact that sensible goods continually and persistently work on the intellect and will and diminish their ability to withstand their force. Hence with the addition of the tempting by the devil, we can no longer resist, unless helped by a higher power. Nevertheless our ability to freely will to resist remains, and no point can be determined at which both our physical and our moral ability to resist ceases, and so we truly sin. But taking all such points together, there will certainly be one at which we cease to will to use the strength available to us to resist. P. 134ff. See S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 8.

EXCURSUS 2: What assistance does one require in order to observe for a long time the entire natural law and conquer all temptations?

It is required from the ordinary power of God, but sanctifying grace is not sufficient. Neither from the nature of the case nor from God's positive disposition does sanctifying grace seem to be enough to overcome all these temptations one by one. Also needed are illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will. DB 139, 141; P. 171ff. These are supernatural at least as to manner, that is, because of Christ's merits, or also natural as to substance (gift); but in the case of the faithful they seem to be intrinsically supernatural.

DIFFICULTIES: W. 319; Beraza 207f.

Billot, *De Gratia*, 207f.:

'Now then, think of a person with this habitual attitude that accompanies the state of pure nature, together with such a dependence on the senses, of course, with such an effective influence of the inner appetite, with such an inclination towards temporal and visible goods, [?] by which with all the intrinsic conditions that are in us [?] the dissolving of the harmony in which the essence of original justice consists; and you will easily determine that the forceful [?] of the affectivity would not have been strong enough of itself to transcend the order of the preceding [?] of life, and that as a result the same person would have been morally powerless to do and avoid whatever had to be done or avoided, so that human life might be well and rightly directed to its ultimate end.'

THESIS 8

NO ONE, NOT EVEN THE JUST, CAN LONG AVOID VENIAL SINS WITHOUT A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, 8; Suarez, 1.9, cc. 7 & 8; P. 173ff.; V. 321ff.; Mazzella, n. 341; Beraza, p. 231; Billot, Thesis 5.

This thesis rules out the perfect sinlessness attributed by the Pelagians to many just persons, and states that even the just commonly commit at least certain venial sins.

VENIAL SIN is a disorder with respect to the divine law and which on account of the lightness of the matter or because of imperfect consent does not involve the loss of God's friendship.

Mortal sin is AGAINST divine friendship

Venial sin is BEYOND [*PRAETER*] divine friendship

WE TREAT in this thesis semi-deliberate venial sins, not deliberate sins that are venial because of the lightness of the matter.

PRIVILEGE is an exemption from a general and distasteful law. It is not only beyond but also against this law.

TO AVOID all venial sins:

- to avoid DELIBERATE venial sins is an extraordinary grace, not against but beyond the law.

- to avoid SEMI-DELIBERATE venial sins is a privilege, not only beyond but against the law.

SPECIAL: i.e., rarely granted to a human being.

THERE IS therefore, in this thesis, a grace that is distinct from sanctifying grace and the actual graces that are ordinarily granted to people in God's supernatural providence.

LONG: that is, at least for several days. If one were to say that all venial sins can be avoided during the course of one day, he would not be saying anything that is improbable.

I estimate, however, that this length of time cannot be completely defined, because it depends upon various circumstances such as the personality and disposition of a person, upon custom, upon one's state of life, and similar things. All we can say is that deliberate sins are avoided for a greater length of time than are those that are committed disingenuously. S.9.29, Maz. 348; Beraza 251.

Hence, the treatment of 'LONG' in this thesis is shorter than in previous theses.

The IMPOSSIBILITY here is not physical but moral, antecedently because of the extreme difficulty, and consequently because of the lack of fortitude and constancy.

THAT IMPOTENCE is

- (a) vague and indeterminate in its outcome; e.g., Mt 18:17.
- (b) regarding venial sins taken collectively, not separately or individually
- (c) antecedent, not only consequent use of freedom, i.e., never overcome
- (d) moral, not physical, antecedent; and indeed
- (e) simply such (strictly speaking), not only with qualification (broadly speaking)
- (f) removable by special privilege – the Blessed Virgin Mary. DB 833.

ADVERSARIES: Pelagians: A person without a privilege can avoid all sin, even venial ones. RJ 1355, 1888, 1894, 1976, 2019.

Beguards and Beguines: DB 471.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

With ordinary or even extraordinary grace there is not given the immediate moral ability to avoid semi-deliberate venial sins taken collectively; even though it cannot be denied that a human being is helped by God to be able to avoid falling into any particular venial sin.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE:

IF 'LONG' = 'lifelong': DEFINED AS OF FAITH: DB 833; 106-08; 804, 810.

IF 'LONG' does not = 'lifelong': THEOLOGICALLY CERTAIN

PROOF:

1- FROM SCRIPTURE: (following the interpretation of the Councils and the Fathers)

A- Jas 3:2 (DB 107); Mt 6:12 (DB 107; RJ 1536, 1781, 1976; Mk 11:25ff.; 1 Jn:8 (DB 106; RJ 1794, 1918).

In these texts,

- (a) all human beings are said to sin frequently;
- (b) all, even the just, beg pardon for their sins from Christ;
- (c) they gladly⁷ beg pardon as often as they begin to pray.

But if everyone, even the just, so frequently admit that they have sinned, we are compelled to say that without a special privilege no one can avoid all sins for long, at least semi-deliberate venial sins.

Therefore P. 176, 178; Van Noort, 48.

MINOR PREMISE: There is moral impossibility, at least consequent impossibility, where virtually no one does what one ought to do.

B- Prov 24:16; Eccl 7:20; 1 Jn 3:6, 8, 9; Par 6:36; Job 37:7; Ps 142:2; Dan 9:15, 20.

2- FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 106-108; 804, 810, 833, 899.

3- FROM THE LITURGY:

In the Mass: "Receive ... which I, your unworthy servant offer to you, my living and true God, for my countless sins, offences, and negligences."

OFFENCES: lack of respect, of politeness, of manners; roughness, outlandish conduct, etc. In God's eyes we are badly formed, vulgar, badly brought up, Danubian peasants, Boeotians.⁸

⁷ Reading *lubenter* for *iubenter* (Tr.)

⁸ Boeotians were the 'country bumpkins' of Ancient Greece.

4- FROM THE FATHERS: P. 179. RJ 527, 981, (1382), 1509, 1536, 1732, 1733, 1737, 1801, 1846, 1888, 1894, 1918, 1921, 2091, 2201. They do not deny that human beings absolutely, by God's grace, can be without sin in this life, but THEY DENY THE FACT: RJ 1720, 1794; R 658, 882.

5- FROM THEOLOGIANS: S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 8; q. 74, a. 3, ad 2m (74.10); 3, q. 79, a. 4, ad 2m: "The saints do not live this life without venial sins."

In 3 Sent, 12.2.2.1 ad 1m: "It is not incorrect to say that in a given hour a person is without any sin; although one cannot continue so for long, on account of the difficulty of avoiding venial sins."

In 4 Sent 21, 1, ad 4m: "It was not the intention of the apostle (1 Jn 1:8) to say that there is no moment at which a person would not be guilty of venial sin; but rather that no one lives this life without sin; and that even once the guilt is forgiven, some residue of the sin remains."

6- FROM REASON AND EXPERIENCE:

This is not proven but is strongly suggested. Van Noort, 50. For even the just experience concupiscence;

But those in whom concupiscence remains cannot long avoid all semi-deliberate venial sin;

Therefore

MAJOR premise:

1- from experience;

2- from reason; for

In order to avoid all sins, even venial sins, all the various movements arising in the soul would have to be perfectly subdued by the power of the will;

But in those persons in whom concupiscence remains not all motions rising in the soul are so perfectly subdued by the power of the will;

Therefore P. 182; S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 8.

EXCURSUS 1 – ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AVOIDING ALL FULLY DELIBERATE VENIAL SINS

Durandus holds that the just can avoid all such sins. But others more commonly teach that with ordinary grace alone not all deliberate venial sins can be *avoided* throughout one's life. The reason is based on the imperfect subjection of the lower appetite. But it is granted that the saints, due to the lessening of the enticements to sin and the abundance of graces, they abstain from such sins for a considerable time and especially at the end of their life. In view of this, it is not to anyone that the suggestion should be made that that person take the vow to avoid all deliberate venial sin. Boyer, 99. P. 174. Saint Claude de la Colombière; *Projet d'un voeu*.

Poulain, *Graces d'oraison*, 10th ed., p. 162 and notes.

THE VOW TO DO THE MORE PERFECT THING MUST BE preceded by a long novitiate. Saint Teresa took this vow at the age of 45. But it was necessary to restrain her, because despite her great illuminations, she developed scruples.

Ibid, p. 160 and notes: on the DEVOTION OF EXPIATION: (1) To accept suffering; (2) to ask for suffering. This second degree must be regarded as quite exceptional.

EXCURSUS 2 – ON THE NATURE OF THE AFORESAID PRIVILEGE

Since the inevitability of sometimes sinning venially, according to what we have said, arises from concupiscence, the special privilege mentioned by Trent consists in the immunity from concupiscent movements, whether that immunity is conferred through the restoration of the habitual gift of integrity or through a continuous series of actual efficacious helps. Hence it is clear why many theologians rightly agree with Suarez in saying that the gift of grace giving one the moral ability to avoid all sin whatsoever is a privilege in the strictest sense, a ‘privilege contrary to the law.’ For it is a universal law that a human being in our state of fallen humanity is subject to concupiscence. And you may infer that the aforesaid privilege is intimately linked with original sin. This being so, the teachings of the Church are completely coherent in holding that this privilege has been granted to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and it is the common opinion of theologians that it has never been granted to anyone else.

EXCURSUS 3

On the custom among saints of accusing themselves of sin, see *Revue d’Ascéétique et Mystique* (1924) 217-33. Humility and truth. (J. De Guibert)

EXCURSUS 4

(1) God confers helps to take away physical powerlessness but not moral powerlessness, which is rooted in the enticement to sin, or concupiscence, the consequence of original sin. God does not take it away because of one’s humility and trust in him. St Augustine; RA 658.

(2) For the remission of venial sins, see the treatise on the sacrament of penance (reconciliation).

(3) Regarding the purpose of not sinning venially.

In 4 Sent, 3, 2, 2, 2a, 2m: ... “For contrition about venial sins a purpose of not sinning venially is not required, which is required for contrition about mortal sins; but what d.... BOTH past sin AND weakness that inclines one to venial sin, although one cannot be totally immune from it.”

(4) From the impossibility of avoiding all semi-deliberate, and indeed fully deliberate venial sins, it would be very wrong to deduce this practical conclusion: “I need not worry about venial sins any more”; and this for several reasons, of which we shall mention two:

(a) Venial sins, especially those that are deliberate, tend to lead us to the opposite of charity, as St Thomas points out, preparing the way to mortal sin, and to thinking “as many venial sins as you want cannot equal the deadly evil of one mortal sin” (Lessius, *De perfectionibus moribusque divinis*, 1, 1, c. 1, n.2 towards the end).

(b) The grace to avoid a single venial sin, even a semi-deliberate one, is always readily available to us, and so sin is imputable to us at least as remote cause.

DIFFICULTIES: W. 322; Mazz. 359ff.; Beraza 263.

KEY TO THEIR SOLUTION:

- 1- Moral impotence does not make an act impossible, but makes it difficult; hence it does not destroy freedom but does diminish it.
- 2- This moral impotence is direct as to the whole series of venial sins collectively, but indirect as to any indeterminate sin, which the will determines when it sins.
- 3- The collective sense cannot be inferred from the distributive sense when some special difficulty is brought up because of the collection; e.g., dardien de but, blay-birds [??]

St Augustine, quoted by Lessius, *De perfectionibus moribusque divinis*, 1.13, c. 15, n.85: “[Venial sin] is not a beast, like a lion, whose jaws crunch with one bite; but small beasts, if numerous enough, kill. If someone is thrown into a place full of [?], surely he does not deserve to be there? How minute are the grains of sand! But if too much sand is loaded onto a ship, it will sink it. How tiny are the drops of rain! But do they not fill the rivers to overflowing and ruin houses? Therefore [word?] do not despise.”

A.- c. THE NECESSITY OF GRACE FOR FINAL PERSEVERANCE

THESIS 9

IN ADDITION TO SANCTIFYING GRACE, THE JUST NEED ANOTHER SPECIAL HELP IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE TO THE END (1st part); ONE’S ACTUAL PERSEVERANCE ITSELF IS A GREAT GIFT OF GOD AND AN EXTRAORDINARY BLESSING (2nd part)

S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 10; 2-2, q. 137; Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 2.9-15; S., 10.4ff.; P. 185ff.; Mazz. 306ff.; Van Noort, 40ff.; Ber[aza], p. 214ff.; etc.

PERSEVERANCE can be understood in two ways: (1-2, q. 109, a. 10):

(1) AS A VIRTUE: (Habit = a quality not easily modified, very stable)

(a) [Virtue is] a habit of the mind through which a person stands firm in virtuous living against whatever difficulties or troubles may beset him.

Understood in this way, it is perseverance in the face of sadness or misfortune, constancy in withstanding concupiscence and pleasures and thus belongs to integral fortitude. (2-2, q. 137, a.1); P. 9.61.

(b) A habit whereby a person has a firm purpose of persevering unto the end in what is good . (More affective). Understood in this way, perseverance is consequent upon any virtue whatever. (2-2, q. 137, a. 1, ad 3m). It is, unless I am mistaken, a firm resolve: DB 897, 898, 915.

These two habits are infused along with sanctifying grace.

(2) AS AN ACT (or series of acts).

(c) The effective continuation in good right up to the end of one's life. (2-2, q. 137, a. 4; q. 137, a. 1, ad 2m; q. 137, a. 2, ad 3m.)

Perseverance as an act is complete only at the end of one's life. See RJ 1992, 1993, 2028. [St Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*]

IMPERFECT PERSEVERANCE (potential, temporal, in some respect); that which continues up to a certain time of life, but not including the end of life. That there is such perseverance is defined as being of faith [*de fide definita*]. DB 827. Cf. RJ 1992, 1993.

PERFECT PERSEVERANCE (actual, FINAL, absolute): a stable continuance in the state (whether initial or repeated) of grace (active perseverance) together with death in the state of grace (passive perseverance); hence it includes two elements, active perseverance and passive perseverance.

Mt 10:22, 25:21; 2 Tim 2:3, 4:7ff.; Apoc 2:10.

ACTIVE PERSEVERANCE (interior and material element); it is the continual exercise of free acts that pertain to the preservation of the state of grace. DB 152[?], 806, 807; RJ 1949 [?], 1999.

PASSIVE PERSEVERANCE (external and formal element): the termination of one's life in the state of grace; the opprortune intervention of death. Wis 4:11, 14; RJ 1949, 2002.

PURELY PASSIVE PERSEVERANCE: that which uniquely depends upon God's providence and not at all on human action, such as the perseverance of those who are perpetually insane or of baptized infants who die before they have the use of reason, or of adults who die immediately after their justification. Mt 2:16ff. (the "holy innocents")

These are perhaps not instances of perseverance GRAMMATICALLY speaking but they are THEOLOGICALLY, and as such manifestly a great gift of God.

SPECIAL: NOT in the sense of a PRIVILEGE or of what is rarely granted, since it is entirely in accordance with the common law of graces and does not go beyond it; for Trent teaches that in fact all the justified are able to refrain from mortal sin and so can persevere, since "God does not desert them once they are justified unless they desert him first" DB 804.

It has the meaning of SPECIAL because it is distinguished

- (1) from sanctifying grace and all habits that are per se infused;
- (2) from God's universal concurrence;
- (3) from actual graces that are connatural, given to the just in the context of individual salvific acts;
- (4) from the power of persevering ("can persevere") which one can possess without actually persevering.

SPECIAL HELP is the particular protection and divine providence, internal and external, needed by a person who has been restored [to grace] but not entirely healed in terms of the subjection of his lower appetite.

It is not a habit, nor is it restricted solely to the area of actual graces, so that it emerges from the sum of them.

But it is solely confined to the area of helps that are required at an opportune time in order to BE ABLE TO MORALLY OVERCOME difficulties that occur along the path of virtue, beyond sanctifying grace; to it is proportioned the common and connatural governance of God. It is BY THIS HELP that it happens that the elect do what is good, avoid sin, overcome all temptations, even the most serious and are taken away at death while still in the state of grace. RJ 1918.

It consists, therefore, of interior and exterior gifts. (2-2, q. 137. a. 4; 1-2. q. 109, a. 10.)

GIFT: “To persevere to the end” or “to arrive at good end” is so gratuitous that no one can merit it condignly. RJ 1999, 2000, 2002, 1993.

[St Augustine] adds that it is clear that the reduction of the ‘potency to persevere’ to act calls for a certain freedom, at least extrinsic, from sin in the moment before death itself.

De dono perseverantiae 6. 11, 12; PL 45.999.

A GREAT GIFT OF GOD because it is connected with eternal life, and it is necessary in order that one simply perseveres, and this is utterly gratuitous as proceeding from God’s good pleasure.

For to die in the state of grace is owed to no one, nor is it to be attributed to one’s merits or powers, even the supernatural ones, but flows solely from an act of divine benevolence as a gift that is distinct from other graces.

A SINGULAR BLESSING, because it implies:

(a) the gift of efficacious graces beyond merely sufficient graces: RJ 1958, 1995 at the end;

(b) external helps by which the just are averted from committing grave sin. RJ 1504.

(c) the presence together of death and the state of grace, as foreseen and intended by God: Mt 24:42, 44, 46.

(d) the obtaining of eternal salvation. RJ 1957.

(e) certain things that are not in any way connected with merit; such as

(1) the beginning = first efficacious grace

(2) progress = the series of efficacious graces

(3) fulfilment; that is

final efficacious grace

dying in the state of grace.

IN ADDITION we must note that such a gift is directly connected with predestination itself. For whatever system it is that one chooses among the approved systems, ultimately it implies a series of efficacious graces to the very end, and on the part of God the free choice of that order of

things in which he foresees that such a person (e.g., St Paul) will at the end consent to such and such determinate helps. P. 189f.; Mazz. 314-17.

FIRST PART: IN ADDITION TO SANCTIFYING GRACE, THE JUST NEED ANOTHER SPECIAL HELP IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE TO THE END.

ADVERSARIES: Pelagians: No gift or supernatural or special help is required; free will is sufficient.

MEANING OF THE THESIS: It is about the MATERIAL ELEMENT in actual perseverance, or about ACTIVE PERSEVERANCE, i.e., about the POTENCY TO PERSEVERE REDUCED TO ACT.

NOTE:

(1) That a special help is required in order that the just persevere is DEFINED AS OF FAITH. DB 832, without determining what this special help is.

(2) That the just can avoid all mortal sins, which is the same as to persevere: DEFINED AS OF FAITH. DB 200, 828, 835, 804.

(3) The Council of Trent teaches that all the just receive this special help: DB 804, 806.

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

(a) IN THE WORDS OF SCRIPTURE:

1- The just preserve their justice despite many difficulties and trials: 1 Cor 9:24-27; Eph 6:11ff.; 1 Pet 5:8f.; Jn 16:4, 9.

2- They must work out their salvation 'with fear and trembling': Phil 2:12

3- They must pray that they do not succumb to temptation: Mt 6:13, 26:41.

4- Their victory is to be attributed to grace: 1 Cor 10:12f.

But all this clearly shows that the just need another special help besides sanctifying grace in order to persevere to the end;

Therefore besides sanctifying grace the just need another special help in order to persevere to the end.

(b) Ps 119 (118), Praise of the divine law; Mt 16:41; Lk 18:1; 1 Tim 6:12; 2 Tim 4:7; Heb 10:32, 12:1.

(2) FROM THE LITURGY: From the prayers at Mass, for example, and the litanies, etc.

In virtually all prayers we ask God that we may persevere unto death.

(3) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 132, 183, 192, 806, 832.

(4) THEOLOGICAL REASON: S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 9.

SECOND PART: FINAL PERSEVERANCE IS A GREAT GIFT OF GOD AND A SINGULAR BLESSING

ADVERSARIES:

Pelagians and Semipelagians deny that final perseverance is a gift.

Sixteenth-Century reformers: The just necessarily sin but necessarily have every sort of certitude about their predestination.

MEANING OF THE THESIS.

This part deals especially with the FORMAL ELEMENT of perseverance, that is, about PASSIVE PERSEVERANCE, PRESUPPOSING ACTIVE PERSEVERANCE, and so it is about ACTUAL PERSEVERANCE.

THEOLOGICAL NOTES:

(1) That final perseverance is a great gift of God and a singular blessing: THEOLOGICALLY CERTAIN from DB 826. See 821, 825 [?], and as for active perseverance, this is explicitly taught by the Council of Trent, DB 826 (806), 183. DB 826: to be able to persevere does not seem to be distinct from actual graces.

(2) It is implied that that gift is distinct from sanctifying grace, it is not given to all the just: this is THEOLOGICALLY CERTAIN: DB 826f.

(3) It is explicitly stated that the just neither can nor ought to have certitude about their perseverance, apart from some revelation: DB 825.

(4) That the fact of dying in the state of grace is a gift that is distinct from the others: CERTAIN.

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE: (Texts from the Councils, the Fathers, and those referred to by Augustine): Rom 14:4; 1 Cor 1:7f.; 1 Thes 5:23; Ps 94 (93):16ff., 119(118):33ff.; 127(126):1ff.; Jn 18:9.

As for the ACTIVE element: Phil 1:6; 1 Pet 5:10; Jn 17:11ff.; Lk 22:31ff.

As for the PASSIVE element: Wis 4:7-15 (RJ 1328); Lk 23:42ff.

HENCE THIS ARGUMENT:

Scripture attributes final perseverance to the gift of God that is obtainable through prayer. Therefore ...

(2) FROM TRADITION:

St Augustine wrote an entire book (PL 45, 993-1049) in which he presents this teaching; and he adduces the statement of Cyprian, who proves this from the Lord's Prayer (PL 45, 996).

P. 186; P. Comp. 256; Van Noort, 44.

This teaching has been received by the Popes and the Councils: DB 132, 139, 183, 806, 825, 826, 833, 836.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH:

From the exhortations they give to the faithful to ask for perseverance, pointing out that this seems to be different from sanctifying grace and the actual graces that are connaturally owed to the justified:

RJ 2002 (passive element), RJ 1984 (active element); RJ 1059, 1958, 1960, 1992f., 1995, 2002, 2005, 2028.

What final perseverance is: RJ 1947, 1949, 1992f., 1999, 2002, 2028

What 'to be able to persevere' is: RJ 1177, 1945, 1955f., RA 326, 432, 958.

From their teaching about the necessity and the frequency of prayer and persistence in praying for perseverance. See RA, alphabetical index s.v. *Oratio*.

(4) THEOLOGICAL REASON P. Comp. 257

For final perseverance for adults, TWO things are required: (1) passive perseverance and (2) active perseverance:

But neither is within the power of a human person.

Therefore final perseverance is a singular blessing of God.

MINOR: PASSIVE perseverance consists in the fact that a person dies in the state of grace;

But death in the state of grace does not depend upon one's free will but upon God's good pleasue;

Therefore passive perseverance is a singular blessing from God.

The LAST MINOR is most clearly seen in children baptized but not yet having the use of reason.

Even in the case of adults there are some utterly singular instances of this.

Regarding ACTIVE perseverance, the minor premise is verified from (a) the inconstancy of human beings, which (b) is not entirely taken away by sanctifying grace and the actual graces connaturally owed to them.

(5) CONFIRMATION: S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 10; 2-2, q. 137, a. 4; De Ver. 24, 9 and 13.

EXCURSUS 1. On 'the ability to persevere'. P. 183f.;

DB 200, 804, 828, 832, 835, 1092; RJ 1177, 1945, 1955f., 484, 1153, 1956, 2227.

EXCURSUS 2. How final perseverance differs from the gift of confirmation in grace. P. 191f.;

S.T. 1, q. 23, aa. 1, 2; 1-2, q. 109, a., 10.

EXCURSUS 3. How final perseverance differs from predestination. P. II, p. 230.

EXCURSUS 4. How the need for a special help to continue in the state of grace is coherent with the need for actual grace for performing each salvific deed. Van Noort, 42.

EXCURSUS 5. The uncertainty of the gift of perseverance. DB 805f., 826, 832 [?]; P. 192; Van Noort, 46. It can, however, be won through supplication, as we shall see later.

DIFFICULTIES: P. Comp. 258ff.; Ber. 237ff., 243; Mazz. 318, 326 ff.

COMPENDIUM OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER ("Our Father")

See *De Dono Perseverantiae*, PL 45, 996.

- (a) HALLOWED BE THY NAME: that God's name may be holy in us, hence that we be holy, so that having been made holy in baptism we may persevere in what we have begun to be (996).
 - (b) THY KINGDOM COME: ... for the kingdom of God will come only to those who PERSEVERE to the end. (997).
 - (c) THY WILL BE DONE ... for when God's will has already been done in the just, why do they pray that it will still be done, unless in order that they may PERSEVERE in doing that in which they began. (997)
 - (d) OUR DAILY BREAD, ... i.e., the Eucharist, lest ??? they be separated from the body of Christ, but that they REMAIN IN THAT HOLINESS. (998).
 - (e) FORGIVE US: not directly, but indirectly about PERSEVERANCE, in teaching the necessity of prayer, because we all, even the just, commit sin. (998)
 - (f) LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION: What else but a prayer to persevere in holiness. (999)
- 'Therefore if there were no other documents, this LORD'S PRAYER alone would suffice for us to produce grace, which we defend: because it has left us nothing of which we may boast as belonging to ourselves. SINCE IN ORDER THAT WE MAY NOT DEPART FROM GOD, IT DOES NOT SHOW THAT ANYTHING IS TO BE GIVEN EXCEPT BY GOD, WHEN IT SHOWS THAT THIS IS TO BE BEGGED FOR FROM GOD' (1001).

One day someone asked Lessius what could assure us of a peaceful death. He replied:

FOUR THINGS:

- (1) Beg from God every day for the gift of final perseverance and the grace of never offending him by sin,
- (2) Daily progress in virtue,
- (3) Maintain in one's heart tender compassion for the sufferings of the Savior and apply oneself to suffer with him,
- (4) Lively affection for the holy Mother of God.

(Van Sull: *Leonard Lessius*, p. 275-76)

B. THE GRATUITOUSNESS OF GRACE

Thesis 10

GRACE IS NOT OWED

- (1) TO ANY NATURAL EXIGENCE
- (2) NOR TO A NATURAL MERIT OF ANY HUMAN BEING
- (3) NOR TO ONE'S NATURAL PRAYERS
- (4) OR NATURAL POSITIVE DISPOSITION.

S.T. 1-2, q. 112, a. 3; De Veritate 6.2; Suarez, Proleg. 4, c. 1; 1.12, c. 34; Bellarmine, De Grat et Lib. Arb., 1.6, cc. 5-8; P. 193ff.; W. 284ff., Mazz. 756f.; V. Noort, 77f., Billot, thesis 13.

GRACE: Supernatural gift; regards the *first* actual grace, not grace that follows a preceding grace.

IS NOT OWED: that is, there would be no injustice on the part of God if he were to deny all grace to humans, either on account of human nature or on account of anyone's works, such as merit or prayers of petition or disposition. P. 193; Mazz. 756.

PART ONE

GRACE IS NOT OWED TO ANY NATURAL EXIGENCE

EXIGENCE: (in general) that which is required by virtue of any necessity or right.

NATURAL EXIGENCE: that which is required in order that any nature not be frustrated.

TWOFOLD: (1-2, q. 113, a. 1, ad 2m)

(a) with respect to human nature itself, which as such could not be abandoned by God without grace; (first part)] NATURE]

(b) with respect to natural human works [OUR WORKS]

OUR WORKS:

- (1) MERIT: condign or congruous
- (2) PRAYERS, or IMPETRATION
- (3) DISPOSITION: positive or negative.

ADVERSARIES:

(1) MANICHEANS: by merit of a good nature, all human souls are owed what is required for supreme perfection and happiness.

(2) BAIANS, JANSENISTS: Created nature of itself is so incapable of attaining its end that God in his goodness and wisdom could not possibly deny it grace. Hence prior to sin, grace was owed; but after sin, it is not owed insofar as it is given to the unworthy, i.e., to sinners.

(3) AUGUSTINIANS: Sanctifying grace is completely unowed to integral nature; actual grace, however, is owed 'out of the fairness of the creator' to nature, lest it fall into abject misery.

NOTE: APPROXIMATES A MATTER OF FAITH.

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE;

(A) As to SANCTIFYING GRACE: follows from the first declaration of and the treatise on sanctifying grace. P. 196; 2 Pet 1:2ff. ; 1 Jn 3:1f.; Eph 1:15f.

(B) As to ACTUAL GRACE: It is described, as the whole order of grace, especially in Paul, as something that is owing solely to God's infinite love and as transcending all created power.

Eph 3:8, 14ff.; Col 1:10ff.; Eph 1:5ff.; Rom 8:14ff.; Jn 17:20ff. See P. 197.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 192, 199, 1011, 1385; *Collectio Lacensis* 7:518a, 567, 1637b, 1638a.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: They teach that

(a) grace surpasses all natural exigencies; e.g. RJ 1456, 1939, 1952, 1982, 2106.

(b) grace is essentially gratuitous: e.g., RJ 1443, 1451f., 1456, 1458, 1473, 1496, 1791, 1807, 1831, 1851, 1857, 1889, 1974, 199[?], 2005, 2034, 2044f.

(c) the essential distinction between grace and natural gifts; e.g., RJ 253, 529, 699, 813, 941, 950, 960, 1027, 1185, 1318, 1755, 2108, 3115, 2256, 2359. See Scheeben, Dogm. 3, 674-699.

(4) FROM REASON: De Veritate 6.2; S.T. 1-2, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2m.

PART TWO

GRACE IS NOT OWED TO ANY NATURAL HUMAN MERIT

MERIT (abstractly) is the right to a reward, whether owed out of justice or out of benevolence or out of fairness or propriety.

MERIT (concretely) is a work done out of deference to another such that it is worthy of a reward.

In first act = the value of a work

In second act = the acceptance of a work by the one who rewards.

TWO KINDS OF MERIT:

CONDIGN: when the value of a work is morally proportionate to the reward; to such merit corresponds the title of justice and due wages.

CONGRUOUS: when the value of a work is not morally proportionate to the reward, but only induces the benevolence of the other person to bestow a reward; to this sort of merit there corresponds the title of *a certain* equity and a reward that is appropriate out of fairness.

ADVERSARIES:

PELAGIANS: humans can merit CONDIGN grace.

SEMI-PELAGIANS: they can merit CONGRUOUS grace.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE:

DEFINED AS OF FAITH: DB 191, 200 (where all merit whatsoever is rejected, whether condign or congruous, since it denies all natural merit), 797, 813. Cf. V. Noort, 78.

PROOF:

(1) FROM THE LETTER OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS:

Paul's teaching in this letter can be summarized as follows:

FIRST ASSERTION: Christ has not been given to us on account of anyone's merits but solely out of the free benevolence and mercy of God. The proof of this follows:

(a) All people, Jew and gentile, were sinners: chapters 1-3.

(b) Abraham himself was justified not by his works but by faith: chap. 4

(c) All, both Jews and gentiles, died in Adam and were brought to life in Christ: cc. 4-6.

(d) The Mosaic Law possessed no power to justify but only grace by which, upon its arrival, the Law was rendered powerless: cc. 7-8.

(e) Although there are many children of Abraham according to the flesh regardless of their works, God has counted some among children of the promise and excluded others: c. 9.

SECOND ASSERTION: Abraham's posterity to whom the promise concerning Christ was made is that which is according to the propagation of the spirit and so are children of Abraham, those who imitate his spirit and imitate faith. Proof follows:

(a) Ismael and Esau are not counted among his sons, even though according to the flesh they were sons; on the contrary, Isaac and Esau were: c. 9.

(b) From the testimony of Hosea and Isaiah, who teach that not only the Jews but also the gentiles were to be called: c. 10.

(c) Justice comes not from the Law but from faith that is proposed to all and so all can be children of Abraham.

(d) From various scriptural texts in which it is proved that God gives grace not to the Jews only but also to the gentiles..

THIRD ASSERTION: The Gospel is to be preached to both Jew and gentile. The law of grace imparts strength, whereas the Mosaic Law obliges but does not enable.

HENCE WE ARGUE:

If humans merited by their purely natural works either condign or congruous grace, then

- (1) this grace would flow from those works,
- (2) people without grace would not be distinguishable from others in performing salvific works and could boast about themselves
- (3) God would bestow his grace to those willing and running, not out of pure mercy but as a something owed to them.

But such persons are condemned by Paul;

Therefore

MAJOR PREMISE: self-evident

MINOR:

- (1) Rom 5:5ff., 11:6.
- (2) Rom 4:4, 9:21, 11:33-37. (1 Cor 4:7; Eph 2:8ff.)
- (3) Rom 9:11ff., 15f., 31f.
- (2) **FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH:** DB 135ff., 176-82, 191, 200, 200a f., 797ff., 801, 1518, 3038f. = 200a f.
- (3) **FROM THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS:** The manifold gratuitousness of grace is the principal teaching stated by them against the Pelagians: e.g. RJ 220, 1165, 1177, 1204, 808, 1791, 1807, 1851, 1857, 2034.
- (4) **FROM REASON:** (S.T. 1-2, q. 114, a. 5).

In order that a person merit a determinate reward, whether out of justice or out of kindness, there must be some proportion between the action and its reward.

But between natural acts and supernatural grace there is no proportion, as is clear from the terms previously stated.

Therefore...

PART THREE

GRACE IS NOT OWED TO OUR NATURAL PRAYERS

PRAYER: the expressing to God of our desire to receive something from him. Cf. S.T. 2-1, q. 38, a. 1: "A petition made to God by suitable persons" [Quotation from St John Damascene]

IMPETRATION: The moral moving of God's freedom or mercy by means of humble petition (Palmieri). It is a

CONFESSION of one's need and an implicit

PROTESTATION of the goodness, the mercy, and the power of God.

PRAYERS are petitions by which human beings express to God their needs and desires, and move God's omnipotence and kindness to grant them their desires. The thesis denies that God grants supernatural gifts because of prayers that are for purely natural abilities. P. Comp. 263.

PRAYERS here are considered as 'impetratory' not as 'meritorious,' if perhaps they might have merit in the natural order. S.T. 2-1, q. 38, aa. 15 & 16.

ADVERSARIES: Semi-Pelagians.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE: AT LEAST CERTAIN

PROOF:

(1) FROM THE COUNCIL OF ORANGE and the FATHERS who wrote against the Pelagians.

DB 179; 176, where there is no definition, because it is not clear whether an invocation is taken as a 'petition' or 'merit.' DB 1518. RJ 1451, 2006, 2034. P. 205.

(2) FROM SCRIPTURE. Suggested, e.g., from Rom 8:15, 26ff.; Jn 15:7; Gal 4:6, where the efficacy of our prayer is attributed to the Holy Spirit and union with Christ.

(3) FROM REASON (DB 1518) suggests the same, because there is no proportion between a natural prayer and a supernatural gift; for without grace we cannot either know or desire supernatural objects as we ought.

But we cannot obtain by praying what we neither know nor desire. For in prayer we move the benefactor to have mercy, by showing him some need or deprivation that we ourselves do not know or desire. P. 206ff. (In the supernatural order, one who cannot merit can petition on behalf of others.)

PART FOUR

HUMANS CANNOT NATURALLY DISPOSE THEMSELVES FOR RECEIVING THE FIRST ACTUAL GRACE

DISPOSITION: that by which something is more or less closely constituted as suitable for receiving a certain form; that by which a subject is rendered proportionate to something.

A disposition acts somewhat like a material cause. (M. de laTaille: *Mystery of Faith and Human Opinion Contrasted and Defined*, p. 404)

TWO KINDS OF DISPOSITION:

PHYSICAL: that by which matter is more or less constituted to receive a form.

MORAL: that which, by its value, more or less moves someone to confer something.

BOTH KINDS: can be positive or negative:

NEGATIVE: that which is like a remover of an obstacle.

POSITIVE: that which of itself is ordered to receiving something.

TO DISPOSE ONESELF POSITIVELY for receiving grace is to perform an act by which the soul would acquire suitability to receive grace, beyond what it has by nature; it would add something to obediential potency. See the Treatise on Sanctifying Grace, first thesis.

TO DISPOSE ONESELF NEGATIVELY is to reject a sinful act which would have placed an obstacle to grace (*removens prohibens*), or to perform natural acts that would facilitate the exercise of salvific acts – weakening bad habits, or acquiring morally good habits. In this way a person would be rendered, not worthy, of course, but less unworthy. It is simply a matter of not placing greater obstacles.

TO ONE WHO DOES [what one can] God does not deny grace. That is, God gives grace NOT BECAUSE one does it but TO THE ONE WHO does it;

while to one WHO DOES NOT do so because of an obstacle one has placed, God often denies grace.

In the Schemata of the [First] Vatican Council, *Collectio Lacensis* 7.553A: “When it defines the necessity for actual grace to will or perform some good act, as required, in order to dispose one for Christian justice, this is to be understood as disposition that is positive and by way of congruous merit, not as disposition improperly so called and only negative, insofar as a person does not place greater obstacles to grace.” See Schema ‘De Gratia’ 1. 4, cc. 12-17; 1. 8, c. 7.”

ADVERSARIES: Semi-Pelagians.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE: AT LEAST CERTAIN. Cf. Van Noort, 79.

PROOF:

(1) FROM THE COUNCIL OF ORANGE. DB 179.

The Council absolutely denies that grace is granted to us on account of any acts done by us by our natural powers, but it teaches that from grace we have that whereby we are able to duly perform any act.

But one who has absolutely no natural act for being granted grace cannot by his natural powers dispose himself positively for the first actual grace.

Therefore

MINOR is clear, for this positive disposition, or suitability for receiving grace, is acquired by some act of the free will by which one gives oneself some fitness for grace. DB 1518, 813.

DB 179 avoids the term ‘disposition’ but sufficiently excludes all the ways in which a disposition of this sort would be had.

DB 176, 177, 178: it is not defined but it is certainly stated that every natural dispositive act does nothing towards obtaining grace. See Phil 1:6, 2:13.

(2) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH, who extol the manifold gratuitousness of grace and ascribe the very first salvific movement to supernatural help. DB 178

(3) FROM THE THEOLOGIANS. For example, S.T 1-2, q. 112, a. 1; 2-2, q. 2, a. 5.

(4) FROM REASON:

Where there is the positive disposition of a subject there is an exigency of some sort for receiving a form.

But there cannot naturally exist any sort of exigency on the part of a creature for supernatural grace, as is clear from the very notion of supernaturality.

Therefore in humans there can be no natural positive disposition for supernatural grace.

ALSO, actual grace does not necessarily presuppose even a negative disposition if this were to exist in fact. E.g. the conversion of St Paul, of Mary Magdalen, of the Samaritan woman.

EXCURSUS: 'GOD DOES NOT DENY HIS GRACE TO ONE WHO DOES WHAT ONE CAN'

(DB 1648, 1677)

P. 210ff. Mazz. 848ff. Van Noort 81s. Capéran, *Le salut des infidèles*. Essai théologique, pp. 39ff.; cf. Index. DTC s.v. Infidèles, 1788ff., 1853ff. DA, *Salut des infidèles*, 1172ss. DTC s.v. Mérite, 696-2a per.; 693-98. Lessius, *De gratia efficaci*, c. 10. S. *De gratia* 1.4. Billot, *De gratia* 99b, 200ff. Boyer, 75f., 247s., 258ff.

Collectio Lacensis 7.553a.

If grace is so greatly necessary for the wicked to be good, for the good to be better, for the better to be perfect, for the perfect to persevere, and for all to do GOOD works and do them WELL, then let this be the one thing we seek and beg for it with innumerable groans as the one thing we need to be ELEVATED and remain at the spiritual level, to be MOVED to perform acts of the supernatural life, and to be HEALED of our wounds that stem from original sin.

C. THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE

N.B. Grace is an entity which cannot through its proper concept be apprehended by us from its properties, as it is a spiritual, i.e., supernatural entity. Hence, it is through analogous concepts that we have to define it and explain it, that is, through its proper concept from common properties.

Thesis 11

TO THE FORMALITY OF GRACE BELONG BOTH INTERIOR ILLUMINATIONS [OF THE INTELLECT] AND INSPIRATIONS OF THE WILL, AND ALSO INDELIBERATE AND DELIBERATE ACTS

S.T. 1-2, q. 110 and 111, aa. 2&3; Suarez, 1. 3, cc. 2-8; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 1.6. c. 15/ P. 11-45; W., *De grat.* 252f.; Palmieri, *De grat.*, th. 1-9; Hurter, th. 172f.; Ber., p. 28ff.; Pohle, *Grâce*, p. 3f.; DTC, *Grâce*, 1568f., 1636; Billot; Poulain, *Les Grâces d'Oraison*, 10e ed. (Bainvel) pp. 661-72; *Imitatio Christi*, 1.3, c.54.

DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH: DB 104, 135, 176-80, 798, 1791.

ACTUAL GRACE: a transient supernatural help, given gratis by God in order to help us do good and avoid evil. It is called "actual" because it consists entirely of a single act, not, however, as a habit like sanctifying grace, which is a permanent quality.

THE SUBJECT of this thesis is internal graces. DB 180

THEY BELONG TO THE FORMALITY OF ACTUAL GRACE: not by determining whether they are formally grace or only its proper and immediate effects. We assert what all Catholics agree about, namely that those acts of our intellect and will, deliberate and indeliberate, inasmuch as they have God as the author of the supernatural order, can and ought to be understood as “actual grace.”

This grace can be something external, such as a homily, a holy picture, a personal example of holiness; but the thesis deals with internal grace.

INTELLECT: the cognitive faculty, which concerns the perception of “BEING” as TRUE.

WILL: the appetitive faculty, which has concerns the choice of “BEING” as GOOD.

LIGHT renders objects visible.

INTELLECTUAL LIGHT enables one to see, to more fully perceive, to plumb more deeply the depths of truth.

INTERIOR ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE INTELLECT is understood to be supernatural, subjective, and *immediate*, produced by the infusion of interior light given by God, “strengthening one by means of an undeserved help to rightly apprehend truth”; not necessarily independently of every object presented to it, but so that the intellect relates to the object in a different way than it would have if it were moved solely by the influence of that object. (Ps 119:6, 9). Thus it is not only a material but a formal enlightenment and it perfects various acts of the intellect, namely apprehensions and judgments, both speculative and practical. RJ 1853; N.B: J 1723, 1856.

IMMEDIATE ENLIGHTENMENT which we are referring to is immediately produced by God by an operation that is secret, interior, marvelous, ineffable and hidden.

NATURAL ENLIGHTENMENT that is objective and mediate is that which, in accordance with a psychological law, when confronted by an object, spontaneously occurs in the intellect.

INSPIRATION OF THE WILL is understood not only mediate but also and especially immediate.

MEDIATE is that motion that occurs in the will from the light shone upon it by the intellect, either mediate (through preaching) or immediate (through the light shone upon it).

IMMEDIATE is a movement by which God directly and physically influences in a special way the intrinsic principle of willing, independently of the intellect, as it were.

THESE INSPIRATIONS in the will are found in all the passions of the will: love, hate; desire, rejection; hope, despair; fear, bravery; joy, sadness; anger. (1-2, q. 23, aa. 2&4). DB 798, 898.

INDELIBERATE ACTS are acts that are physically and vitally elicited by a person without reflection and without the consent of the will; acts such as those which precede all free choice, even at times contrary to the free effort on the part of the will. Rom 7:14ff. They proceed from the faculty, as nature (*thelēsis*), not as free (*boulēsis*); “in us without us,” as Augustus said.

DELIBERATE ACTS are those which are elicited by a person upon reflection, which in turn can be the principle of new deliberate act.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

It belongs to God alone to penetrate the depths of the human intellect and will, to infuse light into the mind and love into the will, and so these are rightly to be numbered among the graces that have been mentioned in the statement of the thesis. See St Ignatius Loyola, “Rules for the Discernment of Spirits,” II, 2 – thus not in the mere external presentation of an object. “It belongs to God our Lord alone to give the soul consolation without a preceding cause, because it is proper to the Creator to enter into and to leave the soul and produce a movement in it.” See Poulain, *Grâces d’Oraison*, pp. 661-72; *Imitation of Christ*, Bk. 1, c. 54.

ADVERSARIES:

Against illumination and inspiration: Quesnel: It is divine omnipotence. DB 1369-1375. In 1360 and 1360 it is not the omnipotence of grace as much as its irresistible influence that he wanted to teach.

Antoine Arnauld and some Jansenists, who teach that grace is defined as “the deliberate act of a creature.” They deny, for instance, that the formality of grace belongs even to indeliberate acts. DB 1029-98, 1296f.; Mazz. 133ff.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE;

That *some* actual grace consists in the enlightenment of the intellect and inspiration of the will:

IS [a matter] OF FAITH.

That at least the enlightenment of the intellect is immediate, and consequently the inspiration of the will is mediate:

IS OF FAITH.

That there is also an *immediate inspiration* of the will:

COMMON AND CERTAIN OPINION

That both indeliberate and deliberate acts are to be numbered among the graces:

COMMON AND CERTAIN.

PART ONE

ILLUMINATIONS OF THE INTELLECT

PROOF

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

2 Cor 3:5ff. (thoughts), 2 Cor 4:6 (light, illumination, splendor, knowledge); 1 Cor 3:6ff. (increase of faith); Eph 1:17ff. (wisdom, revelation, illumination; Jn 6:45 (teachable, to learn); 1 Cor 12:3 (to speak, to say); Lk 24:45 (opening of the mind); Acts 26:16ff. (Paul’s conversion); Acts 16:14 (opening); 1 Jn 2:20 (anointing); 1 Jn 2:27 (anointing, teaching).

Where an interior grace is described as thought, light, illumination, increase, knowledge, wisdom, revelation, acknowledgement, teachability, learning, speech, opening of the senses,

understanding, opening of the heart to attend to what is being said, unction in teaching, teaching, eye-opening, heavenly vision of all that clearly belong to the intellect and its enlightenment.

HENCE WE ARGUE:

In these texts are set forth the interior illuminations necessary for salvific acts in addition to the exterior grace of preaching, illuminations that are not from us but from God, and which are superior to our [natural] faculties;

But such gifts are actual graces;

Therefore they pertain to the formality of actual grace.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 104, 193, 135ff, 178-80, 797, 1335, 1521, 1791.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH:

(a) It is an interior movement; hence in the intellect or will. E.g., RJ 833, 1343, 1556, 1736, 1764, 1853, 2043.

(b) It is an illumination of the intellect: E.g., RJ 430, 704, 1483, 1485, 1720, 1722, 1734, 1852f., 2034, 2043, 2276; RA 232, 591, 626, 1040, 1204.

(4) FROM THEOLOGIANS: S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 1.

(4) FROM REASON:

The acts of the intellect are (1) apprehension and (2) judgement, either speculative or practical;

But actual grace belongs to these acts;

Therefore illuminations of the intellect belong to the formality of grace.

MINOR PREMISE:

(1) apprehension; e.g., the suffering of Christ in his passion

(2) speculative judgement; e.g., revelation is believable

(3) practical judgement; e.g., I see that this revelation should be believed

St Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Omnium Gentium*, II, 26 (PL 51, 711): "In every process of justification the grace of God is mainly preeminent in urging by exhortation, in moving by examples, in frightening about [by warning of] dangers, in astounding by miracles, in imparting understanding, in inspiring decision, and in enlightening the heart and warmly disposing it towards faith.

PART TWO

IMMEDIATE INSPIRATIONS OF THE WILL

N.B. Having demonstrated the supernatural illumination of the intellect, it follows that there is a mediated movement of the will, for all illumination of the intellect in manifesting the truth by that very fact draws the will and so mediately moves it; this at least can be deduced from the texts quoted above. From this follows the proof for the immediate inspiration of the will.

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

Phil 2:13 (to will); Jn 6:44 (to draw); 2 Cor 6:1, Prov 21:1 (heart, to will); 1 Kg 8:57ff. (incline the heart); Rom 9:16; Lam 5:21 (convert); Song 1:4 (draw).

INSPIRATIONS of the will are described in Scripture as “willing”, “being drawn”, “inclining the heart”, “converting”, hence as immediately affecting the will.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 104, 135, 178, 179f., 798, 898.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH:

N.B. The Fathers do not restrict the word ‘inspiration’ to the movement of the will, since they also apply it to the movement of the intellect, but the distinction is often evident. RJ 1485.

(a) RJ 53, 430, 548, 1159, 1456, 1568, 1576, 1720, 1722, 1724, 1736, 1821f., 1852f., 1955, 2035, 2091.

Le Bachelet, *Auctuarium Bellarminianum*, pp. 153-56; and

Le Bachelet, *Grâce et prédétermination*, I, pp. 113-24; 284-94, where there is a collection of texts from St Augustine.

(b) RZ 229, at end, 233, 579, 586, 590, 591, 751, 796, 1024, 1227, 1967.

BOTH PARTS ARE PROVEN:

(1) FROM THE LITURGY (see Mazz., p. 94, n. 127).

In its prayers imploring God’s help the Church asks for light to enlighten the intellect, and for gentleness and love to enflame our hearts.

This help is called:

on the part of the intellect: enlightenment, knowledge, illumination, thought, openness to truth, persuasion, revelation, knowledge, call, drawing, inspiration, knocking [Mt 7:7ff., Rev 3:20].

on the part of the will: inspiring love, delight in heaven, goodwill, encouragement, joy, charity, desire for the good, holy desire.

Further similar examples; e.g.,

“God, who ... the hearts of the faithful ...

Fourth Sunday after Pentecost, the Secret prayer [Pre-Vatican II Sacramentary]

The sacramentary attributed to St Leo the Great

“Open my mouth, O Lord, ...

(2) FROM THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST IGNATIUS: I ask for two graces:

- for the intellect: THAT I MAY SEE

- for the will: THAT I MAY WILL

(3) THEOLOGICAL REASON regarding both parts:

(a) By considering grace as ELEVATING, or as a ‘connatural concurrence.’ (Motion)
THUS:

One can merit and in fact does merit to attain a supernatural end;

but one cannot merit a supernatural end unless their intellect and will are helped by supernatural assistance;

therefore supernatural assistance, the formality of actual grace, is verified in such illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will

MAJOR: Mt 16:27, 25, 34ff., and at greater length later in the treatise on merit.

MINOR: Merit belongs to the higher human faculties, for a moral act is an act of the will with knowledge of an intellectual end.

Besides, a movement towards an end begins in the intellect and is completed in the will. But as we said before, no created faculty can arrive at this without supernatural help. Heb 11:8.

(b) But considering grace as 'HEALING'

According to St Thomas, 1-2, q. 85, a. 3, human nature has four wounds:

1. ignorance in the intellect
2. malice in the will
3. weakness in the irascible passions (for difficult things)
4. concupiscence in the concupiscent passions (for lovable things)

Grace in the state of fallen nature is medicinal;

But both the intellect and the will are wounded;

Therefore the ignorance of intellect and malice, weakness, and concupiscence should be healed.

S.T. 1-2, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, aa. 3&4. 1L. 52.230D.

PART THREE INDELIBERATE ACTS

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

These graces are indeliberate 'acts of man' [*actus hominis*] in which the eyes, senses, and heart of a person are said to be opened by God, or by which one is being called to faith and charity;

But in Scripture the eyes, senses, and heart are said to be opened by God, and the person is said to be called to faith and charity;

Therefore ...

MINOR PREMISE: Rev. 3:20 (knocking); Jn 15:1, 6 (choosing); Acts 9:44f. (voice); Act 16:14 (opening the heart); Lk 14:31, 24:45 (opening); Mk 2:17 (calling); Rom 8:30 calling); Eph 5:14 (awakening, rising from the dead, shining); Jn 6:44 (drawing); Ps 13:4 (lighting the eyes), Ps 141:3-4 (vigilance).

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH:

DB 193 (in us without us), 797 (accept or reject), 200 (inspires first), 317 (grace precedes), 798 (aroused), 807 (aroused) 815 (inspiration precedes), 814 (movement, aroused), 898 (impulse).

(3) FROM THE FATHERS:

These graces are indeliberate acts which come to be in us without us; they do as we wish, they call us, they go ahead of us, they change our disposition, they can be either accepted or rejected, they arouse us;

But all this is verified concerning actual grace, according to St Augustus and St Prosper of Aquitaine. See, for example, RJ 1458, 1556, 1572, 1576, 1793, 1914, 1958, 2035, 2235, 2278, 2316, 1893, 1943, 1736.

(4) FROM THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF THEOLOGIANs:

B[ellarmino?], *De gratia*, 1.6,c. 15; S[uarez?]. 3.5. n. 2; Molina, *Concordantia*, 14.45.

PART FOUR

DELIBERATE ACTS (HELPING GRACE)

(1) FROM THE COUNCILS: DB 190.

(2) FROM THE FATHERS: RJ 465, 485, 599, 704, 1005, 1219f., 1510, 1571, 1722, 1737, 1793, 1822, 1848, 1893, 1914, 1936, 1941f., 1999, xxxx, 2272, 2273, 2316, 2326, 2385.

(3) FROM THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF THEOLOGIANs

(4) FROM REASON:

To the formality of grace belongs the supernatural gift of God, which is the principle of salvific works;

But every free act of any virtue whatever is a supernatural gift which is the principle of salvific works;

Therefore...

MINOR PREMISE: Supernatural gift: because by the help of grace one is made ?? and can move to performing other salvific works. P. 32

COROLLARIES: Hence actual graces are vital acts. P. 23ff., Pohle, p. 25ff., Palmieri, thesis 9.

EXCURSUS 1:

To the formality of actual grace also belong external graces – e.g., the preaching of the gospel, the example of Christ, other supernatural facts, even good things that are natural in themselves which God uses to move us supernaturally, such as sickness, and so on.

Rom 8:28; Wis 4:10f.; Rom 1:20. RJ 430, 1443, 1556, 1736, 1764, 2035, 2053, 1483, 1504, 1592.

EXCURSUS 2:

Besides illuminations of the intellect and inspirations of the will there are graces, both external and interior, which belong to the sensory faculties. P. 25f.; Soube, *Grâce*, p. 12f., Pohle, p. 26.

In the [old] Missal: Eleventh Sunday after Pentecost, Postcommunion: ‘support for mind and body.’

Prayer to the Blessed Virgin Mary: health of mind and body.

Preparation for Mass:

- (1) ... our reins ... chaste body
- (2) to our hands... without pollution...of body
- (3) Quench in our loins the wellsprings of lust
- (4) Restore the garment of immortality

- (1) Shoes for my feet
- (2) Gird up my loins
- (3) Offered through our hands
- (4) ... of my heart and body, adorn my fingers with virtue

See the Ritual: Sacraments, Blessings.

SCHOLION 3: In what sense every salvific movement of the will can be said to be charity.
P. 34f.

SCHOLION 4: On arousing grace, operative, prevenient, antecedent grace; helping, cooperative, subsequent, concomitant grace. P. 36-41.

ACTUAL GRACE as moving, elevating, healing

Division according to essence prevenient

AROUSING (calling)	SUFFICIENT: precisely (=truly)	
(indeliberate act)	negative (=mere) remote	or
(in us without us)	positive	

EFFICACIOUS IN 1st ACT (positively sufficient) concomitant

HELPING	Division according to effect	
(deliberate act)	OPERATIVE (willing) (elicited) (interior)	
(with us)	(efficacious in 2 nd act)	or
	COOPERATIVE (completed) (commanded)	

THESIS 12

GRACE CONFERS STRENGTH, BOTH MORAL AND PHYSICAL, FOR ACTING SALVIFICALLY

B[ellarmine], *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 1.1, c. 13. S[uares] 1.3, c. 4, n. 12; 3.15; P. 45ff., Palmieri, th.15, 19; Mazz. N. 88ff; Tanquerey, 25ss.; Pohle, p. 15; Ber[aza], p. 80ff.

STRENGTH: vigor, stamina, power, ability to act (Forcellini).

MORAL STRENGTH consists in this, that a person either proposing to do what is good is enabled to do so, or faced with doing wrong is deterred from doing so. This strength acts by way of exhortation and urging, by intentionally linking ability with the object; hence it bears upon a faculty, not precisely AS faculty BUT AS intellectual or volitional. Moral strength supposes physical strength and only increases one's inclination to do what is good and weakens one's inclination towards evil. ; hence it influences them inasmuch as they are intentional; it acts intentionally.

IT DOES NOT INCREASE physical strength 'per se' but 'per accidens,' inasmuch as it posits the conditions that will enable physical strength to be more readily exerted. B., l.c. (5, 532-1 col.). It removes difficulties, adds greater facility in being able to act. S.T. 1-2, q. 83, a. 5.

MORAL INFLUENCE calls, arouses, coaxes, draws, similar to the way a teacher coaxes a pupil to improve his handwriting. This is grace as 'HEALING', or 'medicinal.' It has only an indirect influence upon performance.

PHYSICAL STRENGTH is the efficient principle of action, such that without it the action is not just difficult but absolutely impossible. It results from the very entitative perfection of the principal agent, indeed, that perfection itself as ordered to action.

It acts through action properly so called; it influences through its efficiency.

It bears upon a faculty as faculty, such that without it, apart from whatever difficulty or facility may be present, it is absolutely impossible for that faculty to do what it does.

It not only removes any difficulty but also any impossibility; it not only gives that with which one 'can more easily' but even 'simply can.'

Its physical influence directly affects actions; e.g., a teacher guiding the hand of his pupil and writing along with him.

HENCE WE STATE:

(1) The absolutely necessary ability to elicit supernatural acts IS NOT TOTALLY from nature;

(2) This ability comes also from grace

(3) Through grace formally existing in a nature, the physical ability of a faculty is strengthened, so that with it that faculty can perform an act more perfect in its being than it could have done without it.

This is grace as 'elevating' and at the same time as 'moving' in a sinner; 'moving' and in a true sense 'elevating', even in the just. (2 Cor 3:5; Phil 2.13).

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

Through actual grace, not only is one induced to exert the abilities which one already has but is further strengthened interiorly, so that with grace one has more physical strength than one had without it.

ADVERSARIES:

Some restrict arousing grace to moral strength only. Among these adversaries Molina and Lessius are falsely numbered (Mazz., 191), albeit with a distinction – namely, they do not seem to admit of physical strength for indeliberate acts. Pohle; Pesch, 49.

NOTE:

Grace confers MORAL STRENGTH: CERTAIN AND COMMON

Grace confers PHYSICAL STRENGTH: MUCH MORE COMMON AND PROBABLE.

MORAL STRENGTH (HEALING)

N.B. Grace ‘as healing’ belongs only to the order of fallen nature.

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

That help confers moral strength which invites, arouses, enlightens, urges, inclines, knocks, coaxes, delights, gives sweetness, draws to what is good;

But, in Scripture we find that grace does the above;

Therefore actual grace confers moral strength.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 180, 130, 317: Just as sanctifying grace ‘heals’, so also does actual grace.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS: The same argument. See P. Comp. 211; and the references to the Church Fathers in the foregoing theses. RJ 1812, 1822f.; regarding ‘victorious delight’, RJ 1568,⁹ 1594, 1722, 1724, 1737.

(4) FROM THE LITURGY:

E.g., ‘Wash what is dirty, water what is dry, heal what is wounded, bend what is rigid, straighten what is crooked.’ ‘Lord,... force our rebellious wills towards you.’

(5) Strengthened BY REASON:

A natural agent does not need that an inanimate thing or brute animal be forced to do its work; rather, it is moved to action by knowledge and pleasure.

⁹ “We are bound to follow after what gives us the greater delight. For example, the image of a beautiful woman meets our gaze and moves us to the delight of fornication. But if the interior and true beauty of chastity delights us more, then through the grace that is in our faith in Christ, we live and operate according to the latter delight.” St Augustine, *Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians*. (Tr.)

Therefore. In accordance with a manner totally adapted to human nature, which is an intellectual nature.

PHYSICAL STRENGTH (ELEVATING)

N.B. Grace as ‘elevating’ and ‘moving’ belongs to any order of elevating.

In this part we are dealing with the DE FACTO. [i.e., the actually existing order – Tr.]

Not all theologians agree about the manner or the way in which grace confers physical strength in ascribing the cause that produces this strength. P. 49; Com. 214; S.T. 1-2, q. 110, a. 2; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7.

(1) Molina, Ripalda, and Lessius hold that the very acts of illumination and inspiration, as being supernatural, are a physical cause, which, supposing divine concurrence, produce the element of supernaturality in deliberate acts. It is act from one part, grace from another. (Extrinsic elevation)

(2) Suarez, Tanner, and others hold that a cause that strengthens physically is not something created but is the Holy Spirit who immediately assists the will to elicit free supernatural acts. Suarez, De Gratia, 1.3, disp. 17ff.

(3) Thomists and many others hold that physical causality is not habitual but consists in fluid qualities, such as in any intention having an incomplete being, that is, in a fluid power, as will be seen in the next thesis. (Fluid quality)

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

That entity gives physical strength to an agent which gives it a sufficiency of ability to act salvifically and renders its work salvific, not only more easily but implicitly possible.

But according to Scripture, grace gives us a sufficiency [of ability] to act salvifically and renders our action salvific, not only more easily so, but simply possible.

Therefore ...

MINOR PREMISE: Jn 15:5; 2 Cor 3:5, 8:6; Phil 2:13; 1 Cor 15:10. And in the many texts which we adduced above to prove the necessity of grace for performing a salvific act.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 103f., 105, 131, 135, 197f., 797 (move itself), 809 (vine), 811-813; that is

- (a) Without grace we can do nothing ‘towards salvation.’
- (b) Grace gives not only to be able ‘more easily’ but ‘simply’ to be able at all
- (c) Without grace we can do no salvific work ‘as one ought’, ‘rightly.’
- (d) Nor could Adam when still innocent do any salvific good deed without grace.

In the Council of Trent one often finds the expressions ‘moved by God’, ‘aroused by God.’

(3) FROM THE FATHERS. See RJ [references illegible]

(4) Confirmed BY REASON:

(a) From the fact that often supernatural acts do not present any great difficulty to be overcome, and therefore it does not seem that they necessarily require additional moral strength to be produced; however, because they necessarily require an additional help, it seems that one must conclude that the function of this help is to confer physical strength. [references illegible]

(b) Besides, an agent that has only natural physical strength cannot produce an act that is entitatively supernatural without [word?]¹⁰ added physical strength.

(c) Clearly, the supernatural order exceeds the natural order in its ontological perfection; and so the power of doing what belong to the supernatural order must be ontologically superior to the power of the natural order. Since, therefore, this power is conferred through grace, grace must give to our [natural] faculties a more excellent ontological perfection, which is nothing else than to give them physical strength. Palmieri, p. 50.

(d) S.T. 1-2, q. 109, a. 9. Solution:

a – to be moved to act by God (physical strength)

b – to be healed with respect to the flesh (moral strength)

COROLLARY: Here is Fr Perrone's classical definition:

ACTUAL GRACE is that gratuitous help (formal cause) which God (efficient cause) through the merits of Christ (meritorious cause) and his physical influence lavishes upon fallen mankind, both in order to take care of *its weakness* (moral causality) and to lift it up to the supernatural level and so render it *apt* for eliciting supernatural acts (*physical causality*), in order that it may obtain justification (incomplete final cause) and persevere in what it has obtained, until it arrives at eternal life (complete final cause). Cf. Pohle, p. 18.

DIFFICULTIES

COMMENT: Obedience [??] to God's grace may not take away anything human nor detract from that good without which no good things can exist; and if one experiences anything impossible or arduous in fulfilling the commandments, let him not look to himself but turn to the Author of the commandments, who issues these precepts in order to stir up one's desire and give him help, as we read in the prophet, "Cast your care upon the Lord and he will sustain you" (Ps 55 (54):22). St Leo the Great, RJ 2201.

THESIS 13

ACTUAL GRACE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS A DIVINE MOTION RECEIVED IN A FACULTY, INITIATING A SUPERNATURAL ACT OF THE FACULTY, AND IT IS AN INTENTION OR POWER POSSESSING INCOMPLETE EXISTENCE. [BEING IN PROCESS].

¹⁰ Possibly *habeat*, 'having.' (Tr.)

St. Thomas, *S.T.* 1-2, 109, 110, 111 passim; Suarez, *De grat.*, 1.3; Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*, 1.6, c. 15: sixth; 1.4., cc. 14 ff.; P. 50-66; Molina, q. 14, a. 3, disp. 25-31, 39-42; John of St. Thomas. 1-2. q. 111, disp. 23, a. 1, n. VII ff.; Hugon II, p. 153; Billot, th. 8; Mazz. N. 141 ff.; Lahousse, n. 100ff; Pohle. P 29 ff; Van Noort, 14 f.; DTC, art. Grâce, 1642; Terrien, *Grâce et Gloire*, 2.365 ff.; Platel, 547; Sylv. Maurus, 1.6.68.8-19, 24; Salmat., *De Gratia*, disp. 5, dub. 3; *S. Opusc. de Grat. Eff.*, 1.3, c. 12m31 and c. 4, n. 2. (Vivès, t. 11); Schiffini, *Theol. nat.*, 580. II; Le Bachelet, *Auctarium Bellarm.*, pp. 13, 20, 22f., 39, 95, 100, 102ff., 125 ff.; *La Prédestination et la Grâce*.

MEANING OF THE THESIS:

In the previous thesis we saw that indeliberate acts of both the intellect and the will fulfil the formal definition of the actual grace that is called ‘arousing grace.’ All Catholics admit this. This thesis deals with a controversial issue among Catholics. The point of this controversy is: ‘Are indeliberate supernatural acts by themselves arousing grace or only its proximate immediate and necessary effect; that is, are they such that the *formality* of grace is, or is not, to be located in the interiorly received divine motion whereby a faculty is determined to eliciting the said acts,’ (Billot [1], p. 149 f.).

Molina, Lessius, Suarez, Ripalda and many others hold that actual grace consists formally in indeliberate supernatural acts of the intellect and will, so that the act *as vital* is from the faculty and *as supernatural* is from God. According to this opinion, God *does not act intrinsically* within the faculty itself; yet they acknowledge a certain power assisting *extrinsically*, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit gives extrinsic help to a supernatural act, somewhat as a teacher does in guiding the hand of a pupil learning to write ... and so God acts directly upon the *indeliberate act* of a faculty. Through the mediation of *this indeliberate act*, however, a person is intrinsically raised and made ready to posit *deliberate* supernatural acts along with divine concurrence corresponding to first act. P. 61-64.

Accordingly, actual grace is not something in the cause but in the effect – that is, not something in a faculty, i.e., proximately and immediately in a will or intellect, but in a supernatural act of will or intellect; for it is the dependence that an act has upon God as first cause, even in the supernatural order.

‘Therefore there is no interior help present within potencies except for vital acts and their actions, nor do I acknowledge any other qualities infused per se apart from for either supernatural habits or acts.’ Suarez, 1.3, c. 1, n. 12; Billot, p. 149.

See Suarez again, 1. 3, c. 4, n. 2: ‘I hold that no entity is infused that exists prior in time or in nature to the very act of arousing grace or its proximate principle, but that the Holy Spirit alone directly and by himself infuses these acts by elevating the power to perform them’

‘Thus universal divine concurrence is not God’s influence upon a secondary cause, as if that cause works when moved by a prior influence from God and so produces its effect, but that immediately with the cause there is a (divine) influence upon its action and effect.’

Molina, *Concordia*, q. 14, art. 13, disp. 26.

Molina also says that arousing grace is a motion upon the cause itself, but he says this about the indeliberate act itself with regard to the consequent deliberate act; for the indeliberate act assists the will in the performance of a free act. Similarly Pesch, Comp. 214; Terrien, *Grâce et Gloire*, l.c.

A SECOND OPINION holds that actual grace, considered formally in itself, is not formally the *indeliberate vital act* itself but its proximate cause; thus it is a *prior motion* by which a faculty is first moved by God to act, and it posits its act. That prior motion is a transient force impressed upon a faculty, applied to and brought to bear upon an instinctive act, and (if an infused habit is lacking) intrinsically elevating the faculty.

This is the explanation given by the Salamanca theologians, l. 3, c. 1, n. 12: God can be understood as giving assistance by producing something in a faculty which is not a second act or vital act but only some entity as a quasi first act, yet not does not reside permanently in a non-operating faculty but remains only as long as the faculty is operating, so that in this respect it is different from every quality that is infused in us in the manner of a habit. And this kind of assistance some modern theologians affirm to be and call that actual, because it is something transient, and so is distinguished from habitual help.

Boyer, d'Alès, de la Taille., et al.

D'Alès: Actual grace is essentially a premotion.

DE LA TAILLE: 'But this ACTUALITY which I possess and make use of as I will in every field of the desirable and the choiceworthy is a [?] ACTUALITY; it is the causality of the divine MOVER bearing upon me, for as long a time as this causality is exercised. I do not possess this eminent form by way of a form that is constitutive of my essence or of my faculties. No creature is capable of possessing it in such a way that it is a form whose efficacy has a formal term that is superior to all created efficacy: only to the first Love does love for the sovereign good look back. The virtue inherent in this act is in me as a VIRTUE PROPERLY INSTRUMENTAL. It was therefore necessary, as for every instrumental virtue, to be in me the EFFECT OF A [DIVINE] MOTION received first of all passively before being deployed in this act. Movement towards the sovereign good is truly my work, a vital operation on the part of my soul. It presupposes GOD'S OPERATION upon me, to put me into action. I believe that if you look well enough you will find in Aristotle this beautiful, profound and true saying, 'NO ONE FORCES HEAVEN UNLESS TOUCHED BY HEAVEN.' Divine motion always has the Good in view in God's intentions.... The matter is even more evident in the supernatural order where the PREMOTIONS are the attractions of grace, the impulse towards indeliberate acts of charity, etc. Such PREMOTIONS are certainly not indifferent; they are not turned equally towards good or evil: they are all turned at all times towards the good. But we, we divert them, not having made use of this divine power placed in us by the Holy Spirit. But within the scope of the universal and fundamental MOTION towards beatitude we sin so as to avail ourselves of our natural ability to incline and drift towards the pleasurable or useful goods that are opposed to what are morally and spiritually good. (Letter to Fr Dugas). Again:

Greg[orianum] 1926, 35: MOTION in a friendly order is connatural and just. And, to put it more precisely, God moves in two ways only: either in ACTUATING to their due measure the perfect virtues that he possesses, or in ENHANCING their action by the timely putting into play of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. There are no other motions of grace to which the just can consent.

ACTUAL GRACE: the transient supernatural help intrinsically perfecting the faculties, which God gives us in order to operate in a salvific manner.

CONSIDERED IN ITSELF: according, that is, to its proper formality, or essence, or as existing in a determinate species of being.

DIVINE MOTION RECEIVED IN A FACULTY: Any physical entity produced by God alone without the concurrence of the creature in the faculty being moved, just as in an instrument the movement of a principal cause posits some real power by which the instrument is applied to and raised to [producing] its effect. Terrien, *Grâce et Gloire*, 2, 368.

THE INITIATING SUPERNATURAL ACT OF A FACULTY: the first interior principle of a salvific act ('principle': the first item from which anything is understood, or comes to be, or is.) That by which a faculty is determined to an indeliberate supernatural act.

Bellarmino, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 121[?], c. 2 Vivès, 5. 501: 'Third division ...'

If the soul is equipped with sanctifying grace, its motion is a motion applying an habitually elevated faculty and instinctively determining it to its act and object. But if not, it is a motion that not only applies but at the same time also elevates the faculty transiently and makes up for the deficiency of its habits. Billot (1), p. 153b f.

AN INTENTION OR POWER HAVING AN INCOMPLETE ACT OF EXISTENCE: that is, being such as that *by which* a faculty is applied, or even elevated to an act exceeding the proportion of its proper form. A faculty moved by God, insofar as it is moved by God, is given a real power, one that is really distinct from the action of the faculty.

De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m.: 'What is done by God in a natural being by means of which it actually acts, is as an intention only, having an incomplete existence, like colors in the air (sound in the air) and art in the artist's instrument.'

'Since moderns have seen that "to act" is more perfect than "to be," they have seen that what is not "from itself" and cannot be "from itself" remains in "being," much less can it act "from itself." (St Albert the Great, 2 Sent. 35, 7, quoted by Mattiussi: le 24 thesi, p. 256. *Auctarium Bellarminum*, p. 75, ad 5m: *Dico*. [I say].

PROOF, PART 1: DIVINE MOTION RECEIVED IN A FACULTY

(a) From St Thomas, passim; *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 7.

Motion, according to St Thomas, is a matter of going from potency to act and belongs to the genus of efficient cause. Now, in the present questions which ex professo deal with grace, he constantly describes actual grace as a supernatural help from God that moves the soul [*anima*]. He uses these words at least 112 times: movement, moved; motion; [it] moves, moving; [it] is moved, to be moved.

See the Catechism (Trent), P. 1, c. 2, no.22, and the Council of Munich in de Guibert, *Documenta Perfectionis*, n. 346. See DB 814, 898, 798, 1789, 1790, 1791, 1794, 797, 193, 135, 177, 809.

(b) 'If there are many agents in an order, a second agent always acts in virtue of the first agent.' ["For the first agent moves the second agent to act"] *Sum.Theol.* 1, q. 105, a. 5, c
But in producing indeliberate acts, God and the created faculties are ordered agents, and a created agent is a second agent.

Therefore faculties producing those acts are within the power of God; accordingly, they are moved by God just as an instrument or tool is moved by a principal cause.

MAJOR premise: Where there is one effect, and it is wholly from many agents, an ordering is absolutely required and thus a subordination of agents.

MINOR: Such an ordering is had when a single act is produced totally from a faculty and totally also from God.

(c) According to adversaries, a pious thought or devout feeling, if considered as indeliberate acts, are formally grace, at least those that are supernatural. They reason as follows:

What goes from potency to act must be moved to the exercise of its act either by itself or by another; but a faculty is not moved by itself to the exercise of a supernatural indeliberate act; therefore, if it is not moved by another and nevertheless action is supposed, by that very fact there is affirmed an act that lacks a sufficient reason.

Therefore the external mover is God alone. Billot (1), p. 151; P., p 160 n.; 268, at the beginning, 269, 270; Bellarmine, *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, art. 1, 1, c. 2. (Vivès, 5, 501, 1a col. Tertio).

PROOF, PART 2: THAT MOTION IS AN INTENTION OR POWER HAVING AN INCOMPLETE ACT OF EXISTENCE. A BEING IN PROCESS.

Created faculties being moved by divine motion are like instrumental causes operating under the movement of a principal cause.

But the motion of a principal cause brings a real power to an instrumental cause by which the instrumental cause actually acts as an instrument, and which, by constantly flowing through the instrument, attains its purpose, namely its effect, so that it transmits to the instrument the efficacy of the principal cause.

Therefore actual grace consists in an intention or power having an incomplete act of existence, a being in process.

MAJOR PREMISE: See Part 1.

MINOR: If nothing is brought or added to the instrument, how would it produce its effect? ‘That which is done by God in a natural object by which it actually acts is as an intention only, having an incomplete act of existence, like colors in the air and the art in the instrument of the artist. *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. (Sound in the air). *Bell. Auctarium*, 97, 1st col., 106; on the 3rd question, 35, 2nd col., ‘to the fifth I say ...’

Every proposition we enuntiate and could enuntiate provides an example of this ‘intention’ or incomplete ‘being’; for example:

THIS (nothing) IS (nothing) MY (nothing) BODY (transubstantiation takes place);

THIS FELLOW (nothing) IS (nothing) A BUNCH (nothing) OF NONSENSE (that’s it!)

EXCURSUS 1:

This prior motion is in no way a predetermination to one particular action, in only applying and moving the choice of the free will; but by that motion itself the will is both moved

and moves itself, determining itself, applying itself; and the motion is non-necessitating, non-determining.

Da: Providence, 472, note; 461.

Bellarmino Auctarium; pp. 107f.; *De Grat et Lib*, 1, 1, c.2 (Vivès 501-2a, §1. 4), c. 16 (V. 6.34, 2a, §4).

EXCURSUS 2:

No motion of any further grace is required for a deliberate act. (Think, for example, of creation and conservation); the influence of God received in the application and motion in first act, in simultaneously influencing further produces second act if the will does not resist.

P. 41-45; Pascal, *Lettres Provinciales*, 2nd letter.

[EXCURSUS 3?]

EXCURSUS 4:

Actual grace is always of the same entity whether it has or does not have the ultimate effect accorded to the free consent of the will; somewhat in the same way as that in which the sacraments are always the same in their entity, power and causality, whether or not they obtain the ultimate result for they are made to cause, namely, the grace of justification which is called the *res sacramenti*. Billot (1) 156.

EXCURSUS 5: SIMULTANEOUS CONCURRENCE

It is the synchronicity of two causal agents with perfect concordance; still, from this there results not an action essentially (per se) one but rather one that is only accidentally one, which has to be divided into two quite distinct effects, one or other of which is produced by two coordinated but not subordinated causes – action that is one per accidens, not per se. (Think, for example, of Leibnitz's preestablished harmony between body and soul.)

Viode de Regnon: *Bañez et Molina*, pp 13, 178ff., 199ff., 247ff., 365ff.; Mattiussi, 24 Theses, pp. 254-262.

DIFFICULTIES: P. 51, 54, 56, 58; Billot (1), pp. 154ff.

D. – GRACE WITH RESPECT TO FREE WILL or, THE EFFICACY OF GRACE

So far we have been explaining the CHARACTER or nature of actual grace. In the following theses we ask HOW grace works.

How, that is, through arousing grace present in an indeliberate act, the will is able to posit a deliberate act.

And first we will state two theses with which all Catholic theologians agree, namely about the existence of sufficient grace (thesis 14) and about the existence of efficacious grace (thesis 15).

Afterwards in the three following theses we go on to ask whether sufficient grace is intrinsically or extrinsically distinct from efficacious grace (theses 16, 17, 18).

Thesis 14

THERE EXISTS GRACE THAT IS TRULY AND MERELY SUFFICIENT

S.Th. 1-2, q. 111; Suarez 1.4, cc. 1-7; Bellarmine, *De Grat et Lib. Arb.* 1.1, cc. 11-14; P. 217ff.; W. 325ff.; Mass., 406ff.; Billot, th. 11; Ber. Pp. 418ff.; V. Noort, 53-63.

SUFFICIENT GRACE: (in general, as opposed to efficacious grace, because the latter can also be called 'sufficient.'

It is a grace that provides full and ready ability to carry out a free supernatural act, but which, when one's will goes against it, the intended act does not follow. *B. Auctarium*, 86-1a.

Grace does give complete ability to act, i.e., the efficacy of a power *in first act*. It has by reason of its intrinsic entity the ability to cause salvific consent; for it provides whatever actuality, power, strength, ability, effectiveness, etc., is required for performing a deliberate salvific action. If, for example, the act of praying is to be performed, the ability needed for deliberately performing the second act is given. It can produce a deliberate salvific act but does not produce it when the will is lacking; it is a supernatural help with which one truly can act if one wills and which is given by God with that intention to act.

Efficacy in second act = efficacy of the act itself

Sufficient grace can be considered IN THREE WAYS:

TRULY (prescinding from whether it remains efficacious in second act or not (NON-INSUFFICIENT: sufficient efficacy):

A transient supernatural help that really and truly provides whatever is sufficient (the power, ability, strength, force, effectiveness, etc.) for performing a salvific act here and now, such that the failure to act comes not from its insufficiency but from the free resistance of the will.

IT IS OPPOSED TO INSUFFICIENT GRACE, which according to Catholic teaching is a contradiction in terms (DB 1296), but abstraction is made from second act.

MERELY (negatively, purely) (UNUTILIZED GRACE)

A transient supernatural help that in fact is not connected with a salvific act because it is resisted by the will remains without deliberate consent of the will. A grace in a vacuum, it is received in vain and remains unused. P. 217, 222.

POSITIVELY (UTILIZED): A transient supernatural help that in fact is connected with a salvific act, the will deliberately consenting.

'Truly', 'merely', 'positively' SUFFICIENT are three aspects of the same transient supernatural entity:

(a) TRULY, abstractively, NOT-INSUFFICIENT is:

DE JURE efficacious; but DE FACTO abstraction is made.

(b) MERELY, negatively, purely, UNUTILIZED is:

DE JURE efficacious; but DE FACTO, ineffective

(c) POSITIVELY, UTILIZED is:

DE JURE, efficacious, and DE FACTO efficacious; it is grace that produces a deliberate salvific act.

EFFICACIOUS GRACE (in general) is grace that is positively sufficient, i.e., that produces a deliberate salvific act, one having connection with the consent of the will.

Hence the words ‘sufficient’ and ‘efficacious’ do not fully describe the inner nature of grace in terms of its integral act of existence [*esse*] but in terms of its external effect; for if looked at from a moral point of view, there is something more in efficacious grace than in sufficient grace.

PROXIMATELY SUFFICIENT (grace of operation): grace for overcoming this particular temptation, or for performing this determinate act.

REMOTELY SUFFICIENT (grace of prayer): grace that is not directed towards overcoming this particular temptation, nor towards performing this determinate act, but towards other acts which, if carried out, render this remotely sufficient grace here and now proximately sufficient for performing some salvific act – martyrdom, for example.

Remotely sufficient grace is always proximately sufficient for prayer. B[ellarmino], *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, l. 1, c. 2, V, 502: Quinta partitio est ... (The fifth division is ...)

And so God always gives us sufficient help for performing our spiritual exercises.

DEFICIENCY IN THE WILL is twofold:

Moral: it acts deficiently because it wills deficiently;

Physical: it acts deficiently because it is deficient in its mode of existing.

ADVERSARIES:

(a) Sixteenth-century heretics, who, denying freedom of indifference, hold that there is only freedom from constraint and that the human will is necessarily impelled either by concupiscence or by grace. For them, freedom is solely immunity from constraint, not immunity from necessity. For example, in the Synod of Dordrecht: ‘We find the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace to be without proof.’ ‘... for to whomever the Holy Spirit draws he gives not only the ability to run but also the ability to run in actual fact.’ DB 776.

Luther wrote a book against Erasmus, the title of which was *De Servo Arbitrio*, i.e., ‘pessimistic determinism.’ RSR 1933, 505ff.

CALVIN: ‘God moves the will not in the way in which it has been said and believed for many centuries, that it is up to us to either obey or reject the movement to choose, but simply to act on it.

(b) Jansenius and his followers, who reject merely sufficient grace. Grace is always efficacious; however, not every supernatural pleasure is connected with a slavific act, but only that which is greater, opposed to the earthly pleasure. DB 1296.

By way of explaining that only efficacious graces are given, they say that sin exists when there is given a ‘small grace’ which gives power absolutely, if there were no obstacles; because of obstacles, it does not give it relatively. Hence antecedently, this grace is simply insufficient. DB 1296.

Arnauld admitted a 'small grace' that gives the power to act in general without giving this power really 'here and now.' Just enough fare for the passage; if an accident happens, our breakdown remains and we remain in distress.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE: DEFINED AS OF FAITH AS TO THE FACT, on account of the II Council of Orange. DB 200, 321, 804, 814, and especially from the condemnation of the Jansenists: 1092f., 1296, 1367, 1359-1375. Van Noort, 55; P. Comp., 276.

PROOF:

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE. God often

(a) complains about human beings, or upbraids them because, although they have had truly sufficient help, they have not produced the fruit of good works

(b) and warns and exhorts them not to miss out on grace.

But all this would be pointless if they did not have truly sufficient graces, graces which nevertheless do not always have a salvific result, so are truly and merely sufficient.

Therefore there is such a thing as truly and merely sufficient grace.

MAJOR PREMISE:

(a) Is 5:1-17: (PARABLE OF THE CHOSEN VINEYARD)

This passage recounts the interior graces given by God to the Israelites to bear fruits of their labors pleasing to God.

Now, the graces conferred upon the Israelites were

(1) Merely sufficient, since the Israelites did not produce the fruits that God expected.

(2) Truly sufficient:

(a) on God's part, nothing was lacking; he chose the place, dug the vines, fortified it, cleared the stones.

(b) He waited for the fruit; he gave not only absolute power but also relative power, that is, in accordance with these relative circumstances.

(c) He asks, 'What more ought I to have done?'

(d) He would have been blaming them unjustly had he not given them all the means necessary to produce the desired fruit.

(b) Is 65:2; Prov 1, 24; Mt 11:21f., 32, 37; 1 Cor 10:13; Rom 2:4f., 11:22f.; Jn 15:22, 24; Act 7:51

(c) 1 Thes. 5:19; 2 Cor 6:1f.; Rev 3:20.

(2) FROM LITURGY

Almost all the Epistles at Masses during Lent, as exhortations by the prophets that the chosen people should return to the worship of Yahweh.

(3) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH:

Db 160A, 196, 200, 321 at end, 319, 348, 793ff., 797, 804f., 819, 1092-1096, 1224, 1296, 1359-1364, 1367-1372, 1521, 1791, 1054, 1066, 1375, 1381, 1419.

Note that the *grace of possibility* of the Pelagians is not sufficient grace in the Catholic sense, but the grace of possibility according to them is free will. RJ 1413; P. 225.

(4) FROM THE FATHERS: RJ 244, 247, 622, 2258f., 2118, 1220, 1219.

St Augustine teaches:

(a) There is grace that gives the power to act: e.g., RJ 1436, 1735f., 1955f., 1736.

(b) Sins occur because we do not want that life with grace which is available to us: RJ 1718, 1720, 1722, 1925, 1945.

(c) We always have grace to pray, and grace sometimes is lacking because we do not want to pray; e.g., RJ 1722.

(d) God abandons no one unless first abandoned: e.g., RJ 1795, 1889, 1954, 1960; 1702+DB 804, near the middle.

(5) FROM THEOLOGIAN: all hold or suppose this teaching; S.T. 1-2, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2m; S[uarez], L. 4, c. 1ff.

(6) FROM REASON:

(a) God wants all to be saved (1 Tim 2:1-4). Therefore he gives to all sufficient grace for salvation. Now there are some who will not be saved... Therefore there exists grace that is truly and merely sufficient.

(b) Christ did not die only for the predestined (DB 1096). Therefore there are others who receive the grace of Christ without this grace being efficacious.

(c) All people, even those who do actually sin, must keep the commandments and overcome temptations (DB 804). Therefore they can, but without truly sufficient grace they cannot.

(d) Grace is given to one in order to freely work towards salvation, so that one can accept it or resist it (DB 797). But one who has grace can work salvifically with it, but one who resists has grace that is truly and merely sufficient. Therefore ...

COROLLARY: SUFFICIENT GRACE IS TRULY A BLESSING, and is to be asked for from God. P. 226; W. 343f.

FOR IT IS BESTOWED:

(a) to do a simply good act; indeed

(b) to do a supernatural act;

(c) in two ways it is not owed to us;

(d) of itself it can be linked with an effect in second act and is bestowed by God with that intention. B[ellarmine], *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, 1, 1, c. 2. (V[ivès] 5, 501-2a, col.). And it alone is what is compatible with freedom. For it depends upon one's will that there be an effect, or

else remain without effect. Therefore it is a blessing, both from that which is given and from the benevolence out of which it is given. For the contrary opinion, see DB 1296. [Jansenist error]

N.B. – Often this grace is proximately sufficient only for praying.

DIFFICULTIES: W., 330; P., 227; Comp. 280ff.

If ‘on coming into this world he is the light of everyone,’ how is it that so many people remain unenlightened? For not all accept the Christian religion. How, then, does he enlighten all people? As much as possible. If some of their own accord close the eyes of their mind and refuse to perceive the rays of this light, it is not because of the nature of the light that they remain in the darkness, but out of the wickedness of those who by their own choice deprive themselves of this gift. (St John Chrysostom, RJ 1158)

Thesis 15

THERE EXISTS EFFICACIOUS GRACE HAVING AN INFALLIBLE AND ANTECEDENT CONNECTION WITH THE ACTUAL CONSENT OF THE WILL (Part 1), SUCH THAT ONE’S FREEDOM FROM NECESSITY IS NOT TAKEN AWAY (Part 2).

S.T. 1-2, q. 111; S[uares], 1. 5, cc. 1-6; Bellarmine, *De Grat. et Lib. Art.*, 1. 1, cc. 11-14; P. 242; Comp. 284ff.; W. 361ff.; Billot, Thesis 11; Lahousse, n. 201ff; Palmieri, Thesis 39ff.; Hurter, Thesis 191-94; Mazz. 553ff.; Schiffini, 235ff.; Pohle, 223ff.; Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Perfection chrétienne et la contemplation*, 1. 88-131.

EFFICACIOUS GRACE (in general): that which produces a deliberate salvific act.

EFFICACIOUS GRACE can be understood in three ways:

(1) EFFICACIOUS GRACE AS TO ITS POWER: grace that in its own order has the power of causing salvific consent; this efficacy is intrinsic to the entity of divine help (arousing grace)

This EFFICACY OF POWER is common to all grace that God bestows on us for every work of salvation. In this sense, grace that is received in a vacuum also could and ought to be called efficacious, since there is no power lacking to it that would prevent it from obtaining its effect as much as possible; for actual grace causes an indeliberate act and gives it the ability to arrive at a deliberate act.

It is arousing (sufficient); truly and merely sometimes only.

(2) EFFICACIOUS GRACE AS TO ITS OUTCOME is grace whose efficacy is taken only according to its outcome, that is, as de facto contingent, called grace from the mere fact (efficacy of power). In this sense efficacious grace is that which is linked with the consent of the will. This grace it at least *consequently* efficacious = efficacious in second act. (Positively sufficient grace) (Helping or assisting grace).

That it is given is a matter of faith [De Fide] and is supposed throughout the treatise on grace and in the entire economy of salvation; by the very fact that someone does a supernatural act, it is certain that he or she had efficacious grace in second act, or efficacious as to its outcome.

There is nothing to be looked for beyond the free determination of the will in order to explain the consent of the will given under such a grace.

It is helping grace. Helping grace (efficacious as to its outcome) is entitatively and numerically the same as arousing grace and is not termed ‘helping’ or ‘assisting’ unless the cooperation of the free will is supposed, which can be present as well as lacking. This grace is also called consequently efficacious. (*operans* or *cooperans*).

(3) EFFICACIOUS IN THE STRICT AND PROPER SENSE is grace whose efficacy depends upon an antecedent and infallible connection of the help of grace with the consent of the free will, so that if that consent is given, it is absolutely certain that the salvific act will ensue. = efficacious in first act = ANTECEDENTLY EFFICACIOUS.

EFFICACIOUS GRACE, in this sense, is that which is infallibly connected with the consent of the will and therefore produces the free act for which it was given; e.g., it is that grace about which God infallibly foreknows: ‘if I give this grace to this person, he or she will de facto elicit a free salvific act.’ Hence, in order to explain the positing of a free act we must consider that there is not only the free choice of the will (as in the case of efficacious grace as to its outcome) but also a property, intrinsic or extrinsic to that grace, and ultimately to God’s choice. This is dealt with in the thesis.

All theologians teach that there is such a thing as efficacious grace. The thesis is about the *fact*, not the *manner*, of explaining this efficacy.

FREEDOM FROM NECESSITY, i.e., immunity from being determined to one position, so that a deliberate act is always left in the power of the will, even in the case of sudden conversion – of Paul, for example, or Matthew.

ADVERSARIES:

Against Part 2: Lutherans, Calvinists, Baianists, Jansenists.

NOTE: Part 1: At least *theologically certain*; Part 2, *De Fide definita*, DB 814; see 1093-1095.

PROOF OF PART 1: EFFICACIOUS GRACE EXISTS.

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

Scripture often speaks as if God could as he wished convert some humans to himself and save them;

But that is impossible unless there is given a grace that would have an infallible antecedent connection with an actual consent of the will.

Therefore ...

MAJOR PREMISE: Ex 36:26-27, 11:19-20; Prov 21:1; Jer 32:40; Ps 36:23, 50:12, 118: 1 Kg 8:58; Bar 2:31; Lk 22:31f.; Jn 10:29; Esther 15:11; Act 9; Rom 9:16; Jn 6:45; Act 13:48.

MINOR: Without such grace humans could always resist, and Scripture could not so firmly state the future fact.

(2) FROM THE LITURGY: [Preconciliar liturgy]

‘Secret’ prayer, 4th Sunday after Pentecost: in your mercy, ‘compel our wills to yourself.’

Wednesday after the second Sunday of Lent: ‘that in the spirit they may be found steadfast and effective in their work.’

Prayer in the Vigil of Pentecost after the first Prophecy: ‘Grant to us also to break the wickedness of our will.’

In the prayer ‘Humility’ at the end of Mass throughout Lent: ‘Through your gifts, O Lord, may your faithful be strengthened.’

(3) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH: DB 182: ‘[God] works that we might work.’

DB 1020, 1097 and notes: If the Church’s decrees regulate the way in which disputations explain efficacious grace, it is a sign that the Church admits the existence of such grace, the fact that it exists.

DB 719-723.

(4) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: e.g. RJ 348, 558, 1568, 1572f., 1707, 1890, 1926, 1940, 1955f., 1958, 1963, 1979, 1991.

From St Augustine: B[ellarmino] l. 2, cc. 11, 12, 13. (V[ivès] 5, 524-533).

(5) FROM THE THEOLOGAINS: [S.T.] 1, q. 23; 2-2, q. 24, a. 11 [‘caritas nullo modo potest peccare’]; De Caritate 12 (at the beginning).

(6) FROM REASON: [S.T.] 1, q. 23.

It is certain that there is the predestination of the saints, or the preparation of God’s benefits, by which those are most certainly liberated whoever are liberated;

But the benefit most certainly connected with salvation is efficacious grace;

Therefore ...

PROOF OF PART 2: EFFICACIOUS GRACE DOES NOT TAKE AWAY FREEDOM OF INDIFFERENCE.

Freedom:

Moral freedom is immunity from obligation.

Physical freedom is immunity from necessity or compulsion.

Immunity of spontaneity is freedom from external necessity = from compulsion

Immunity of indifference is freedom from interior necessity.

Freedom of contradiction (or exercise) = one can act or not act

Freedom of specification = one can do this or do that

Freedom of contrariety = one can do good or do evil

The essence of freedom is found in the freedom of exercise.

Freedom of contrariety is a defect of freedom

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

(a) It declares that humans are totally free in acting salvifically, and not at all compelled to this by necessity.

But in acting salvifically humans possess efficacious grace;

Therefore efficacious grace does not take away freedom from necessity.

MAJOR PREMISE: Sir [Ecclesiasticus] 15:14f., 31:8f.; Rev [Apoc] 3:18, 20; Mt 19:17, 23:37; Act 7:51; 1 Cor 7:37, 2 Cor 6:1; Phil 2:12, 13; Zech 1:3; Jn 24:15. 22; Gen 4:6ff.

Whenever we act 'rightly, 'as one ought', we are acting out of efficacious grace as to its outcome, in accordance our knowledge, but it is out of antecedent efficacious grace, according to God's infinite knowledge, and known to us by revelation.

(b) From the treatise on merit:

If efficacious grace were necessitating, there could be no meritorious work;

But meritorious works do exist;

Therefore efficacious grace does not necessitate.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH:

A. DB 134, 141, 196, 200, 317, 319, 348, 793, 797f., 814f., 1065ff., 1093f., 1296, 1359-1364, 1371, 1521, 1719, 1814, 181, 186, 325, 776, 1039, 1291, 1041, 1650.

B. (a) one ought to cooperate with grace, 'which one can reject' : DB 814.

(b) freedom from necessity can be proven from Scripture: DB 1041

(c) freedom can also be proven from reason: DB 1650

(d) Paul V: 'God by the efficacy of his grace makes one act,' makes the unwilling willing and bends and changes human wills. Cav. P. 508, note.

(3) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH:

(a) Human beings are free: RJ 125, 142, 156, 184, 244, 335, 446, 542,667, 1151, 1380, 2113, 2225, 2265, 2357.

(b) Grace does not destroy free will: e.g., 244, 446, 704, 1034, 1151, 1159, 1165, 1188, 1204, 1319, 1436, 1455, 1510, 1556, 1571-74, 1710, 1722ff., 1735ff., 1821, 1823, 1848, 1854, 1890, 1936, 1954f., 1961.

(c) Possessing equal grace, one person can consent, another dissent: RJ 246m 1753m 1822.

(d) According to Augustine, the 'prevailing pleasure' does not take away freedom: RJ 1568, 1594, 1722, 1724, 1737, 1822. [See at the end of this thesis]

(4) FROM REASON:

It is certain that human acts elicited with grace are salvific, and if a person is just, the acts are meritorious.

But for a salvific and meritorius act freedom from necessity is required;

Therefore freedom from necessity is not destroyed by grace.

MAJOR PREMISE: DB 842, and see treatise on merit.

MINOR PREMISE: Humans acquire neither merit nor demerit in actions that are not in control of their will; but what is not free from necessity is not in control of the will.

DIFFICULTIES: P. Comp. 287ff. W. 362

We are bound to follow after what gives us greater delight. For example, the image of a beautiful woman meets our gaze and moves us to the delight of fornication. But if the interior and true beauty of chastity delights us more, then through the grace that is in our faith in Christ, we live and operate according to the latter delight. Thus, if sin does not hold sway in us to obey its desires, but rather justice rules in us through love, we do with great pleasure whatever we know to be pleasing to God. St Augustine, RJ 1568)

Thesis 16

THE EFFICACY OF GRACE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE EXPLAINED BY PHYSICAL PREDETERMINATION

Suarez 1.5, cc. 6ff., First Appendix after 1.12 on grace. Bellarmine, *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* 1.1, c. 12, Bell. *Auctarium*, p. 164ff.; P. 229-271; Stuffer, *De Deo Operante*; d'Alès, *Prov. et Lib. Arb.*; W. 363ff.; Palmieri, thesis 49; Billot, thesis 11; Pohle, p. 231ff.; Van Noort, n. 64ss.; Joanna Iesu Maria, ODC (1564-1615), *Tractatus de probabilitate utriusque partis in controversia de efficacia gratiae*; See *The Month* 105 (1930) 178; *Auctarium Bell.* Pp. 95, 100, 102ff., 125-27; A. Bonet, *La filosofía de la libertad en las controversias teológicas del siglo 16 y 17*; See RSR (1933) 507-12; *Gregorianum* (1933) 313-401; Van Hove, RHE (1933) 700; de Aldama, AH 51 (1934) 150-52; *ibid.* 650; Dumont, Paul, 'Liberté humaine et concours d'après Suarez.'

BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

N.B. DB 1090, 1??? et notas; C av. 920-924 et notas. DB 71??

THEREFORE there is no right to impose any theological censure on adversaries.

In what is certain, unity,

In what is doubtful, liberty,

In all things, charity.

Still, there is some freedom; one can use such expressions as: sounds wrong, false, dangerous, irrational, stupid, foolish, unusual, incoherent, absurd, erroneous, insane, outlandish, inept, bold, rash, contradictory, illogical, puerile, ambiguous word-play, and other similar expressions of silliness. *Études* 102, 704.

Hence there is considerable latitude for disputants' outbursts of holy wrath; e.g. Billot 7: *De Deo*, 219, note.

As de la Taille wrote to Fr Dugas: "You are quite right to rule out a determining premonition regarding the means to beatitude; no subtlety, however sophisticated, will excuse it from destroying freedom."

Papagni, OP:

Marin-Sola: [Bañezian theory]

EFFICACY OF GRACE: is that by which there is an infallible nexus between grace in first act and the consent of the will in second act; for a grace by which the human will consents is said to be efficacious. Billot, thesis 11.

In the following theses we ask whether efficacious grace is efficacious of itself, *intrinsically*, or on the contrary is efficacious from the consent of the will, *extrinsically*, supposing, of course, God's foreknowledge and choice. In other words, whether efficacious grace in its physical entity differs intrinsically and specifically from sufficient grace. P. 229-33.

One must carefully distinguish between efficacy of *power* and efficacy of *connection*.

EFFICACY OF POWER is the intrinsic power of the entity of a divine help in which, so far as possible, nothing is lacking to obtain a salvific act of the will.

EFFICACY OF CONNECTION is the infallible nexus between the efficacy of power and the effecting of the consent of the free will and consequently of a salvific act.

Efficacy of *connection* may be *consequent* or *antecedent*: P. 242; Mazz. 581.

CONSEQUENT: (de facto) inasmuch as it really obtains the effect.

= efficacious as to the outcome. See previous thesis

ANTECEDENT: (de jure) inasmuch as it will without fail obtain the effect

= efficacious in the strict sense of the word

These theses deal with *antecedent efficacy of connection*. It is once again threefold:

OBJECTIVE, inasmuch as it is objectively true that through such grace such an effect will be produced.

COGNITIVE, inasmuch as God infallibly knows what grace will have this effect (God's infallible knowledge)

AFFECTIVE, inasmuch as God wills to give the grace that will obtain the effect. (Predestination).

THIS THESIS deals with **OBJECTIVE ANTECEDENT EFFICACY OF CONNECTION**.

SUFFICIENT GRACE in general: grace that does not produce a deliberate salvific act but can produce it. In this respect it is opposed to efficacious grace in general.

EFFICACIOUS GRACE in general: grace that produces a deliberate salvific act.

SUFFICIENT GRACE in general:

1. **TRULY** [sufficient] (precise, in the abstract) = is opposed to insufficient grace, which for Catholics is a contradiction in terms. (DB 1296)

2. **MERELY** (negatively, purely, concretely) = unused, received in vain.

3. **POSITIVELY** (in the concrete) = utilized

= utilized truly sufficient grace

EFFICACIOUS GRACE in general:

1. as to POWER
2. as to OUTCOME
3. STRICTLY and in the proper sense

EFFICACY of grace;

1. of power
2. of connection
 1. consequent
 2. antecedent
 1. objective
 2. cognitive
 3. affective

DOES NOT SEEM TO BE EXPLAINED. See N.B. at the beginning of the thesis.

Here something should be said about sufficient grace, in the Bañezian sense. ACCORDING TO THEM, there are two graces that are intrinsically and specifically distinct from each other: sufficient grace, which is less perfect and less strong, and efficacious grace, which is more perfect and stronger.

Sufficient grace gives 'to be able to act' not 'to act'; it is sufficient in first act, not in second act; it does not give all that is required to actually act; it gives the power to act but not the act.

Efficacious grace is a new grace superadded to sufficient grace, which determines and confers the act; it is sufficient in second act.

Sufficient grace is never connected with second act.

Efficacious grace is never unconnected with second act.

Papagni, OP: 'In that opinion, ...'

According to our opinion, sufficient and efficacious grace do not differ in terms of their intrinsic power. From free will, sufficient grace will PROXIMATELY be efficacious, although freedom contributes no power to sufficient grace, which suffices both for first act and for second act. But freedom makes use of the power of sufficient grace to be able to give the efficacy of connection in second act. REMOTELY this is had from God's knowledge and predestination.

Physical predestination is a physical influence of the divine will upon a human will whereby it is determined to a numerically one action, so that it is intrinsically impossible for the will both not to perform the act to which it was predetermined and to perform an act without being physically predetermined to it. P. 243 ff.; Palmieri, 440; Schiffini, 397 note.

A. In other words, it is a motion that cannot be rejected or resisted that without fail determines second act as to exercise and to specification and to manner, the manner being freedom.

It is a *determination*, because the will, equipped with such a grace, cannot not produce that act.

It is a *predetermination*, because it is given before (not in time but in nature and causality) the consent of the will and for the effecting of that consent.

It is *physical* (not only *morally*, in so far as God through indeliberate thoughts and affections draws the will), but it is above all and foremost *physical*, because it produces the second effect by the power of its own entity, from within itself, independently of whatever the circumstance or consent of the creature. P. 243f., and the authors referred to above. Palmieri, p. 449f.; Schiffini, p. 397; Van Noort, n. 64.

B. Hence the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace and its infallible connection with the free cooperation of the free will is totally based upon and derived from the omnipotence of God as its deepest root and from the absolute effective decree of His will. The effectiveness of this decree is extrinsic to the act itself, but corresponds to the intrinsic efficacy received in the will through the prior predetermination. God moves the free will by predetermining it to one act, in both its exercise and specification.

C. Yet this physical predetermination does not destroy freedom of necessity.

Because even when efficacious grace has been given, the will can resist – *in sensu diviso* (that is, it retains the ability to resist separate from the dissent itself), but it is impossible for this ability to actually act; not, however *in sensu composito* (that is, it does not retain the ability to resist along with the actual dissent itself). P. 245ff.; Van Noort, 65.

In other words, physical predetermination is a divine motion whereby God, antecedently to any prevision of the choice made by any creature whatsoever, applies the will to the positing of this one determined act, while it remains that the will is not necessitated by the object of the act. Such a motion, if it predetermines to the positing of a salvific act, is efficacious grace.

This *efficacious grace* differs intrinsically from *sufficient grace*. The latter gives that by which the ability of a faculty to act is complete in the order of potentiality, but is by its nature incapable of leading a faculty to act, and so in this system it is impossible for anyone, equipped only with sufficient grace, to posit a salvific act. P. 229-242.

D. This is the original system such as was taught by the Bañezians, Lemos, Graveson, Goudin, Alvarez, et al.

E. A modified predetermination is taught by Joannis Gonzalez de Alb. (v) eda, Bancil, Masoulié, and among modern authors by Guillermin. (*Revue Thomiste*, 1901-1902). See Jansens, p. 601. This is what they teach:

1. Both sufficient and efficacious grace are *divine motions to second act*.
2. It is not impossible for the human will to resist a divine motion.
3. Grace is efficacious when a divine motion goes hand in hand with the will taken in the concrete (congruity in the concrete), so that it obtains the consent of the will and overcomes all resistance.
4. Grace is merely sufficient when it is not made to overcome concretely existing obstacles.

F. P. Marin-Sola has further modified this system. *Archive de Philosophie* 6. Cf. *Revue Thomiste*, Nov. 1925, March, 1926. This is his doctrine:

1. The divine motion is so dependent upon the free will that it can be *either accepted or not accepted*, without the intervention of some other grace. If accepted, it is *truly* sufficient, and if resisted, it is *merely* sufficient.

2. God does not predetermine the matter of a sin unless after *foreseeing the will's resistance* to sufficient grace. If, however, a person does not resist sufficient grace, then *intrinsically efficacious* grace is given him.

3. God certainly knows the weakness of a creature, which does not follow from any infallible decree, by seeing it as present to His eternity.

NOTE: Much more probable.

PROOF:

1. FROM SCRIPTURE.

Is. 5:1 ff.; Mt 11:20ff.

In these passages those who have not followed the lead of grace were unreasonably rebuked if they had needed a physical predetermination which they did not have.

Therefore this predetermination was not necessary.

Therefore ... Palmieri, 453ff.; Ber. n. 535ff.

Nor let it be said that it depends upon the person for this predetermination to be given, by the way in which one uses sufficient grace, for, according to our adversaries it is absolutely impossible that with sufficient grace alone and without predetermination anyone would posit a salvific act.

See 2 Cor 6:1; Rev 3:20; Mt 23:37; Sir 15:14.

2. FROM THE COUNCILS.

(a) Trent and Vatican I: DB 979, 798, 804, 813, 814, 179.

In these texts, the councils seem to teach that that grace which in fact is efficacious, could have been rendered inefficacious through the resistance of the human will.

But if this is so, the efficacy of grace cannot be explained by predetermination

Therefore.

Replies to adversaries; P. 252ff.; Ber. 540ff.

(b) DB 804.

3. FROM REASON.

According to our adversaries, when predetermination has been given, a non-act on the part of the will is metaphysically impossible; but without predetermination, the act of the will is metaphysically impossible.

But such a predetermination destroys the concept of human freedom and of sufficient grace.

Therefore it is not to be admitted.

P. 257ff., DTC, Grâce, 1667ff.; Pohle, 237ff., P. 238.

EXCURSUS: On the doctrine of St Thomas, see P. 263ff.; Beraza, 547ff.; d'Alès, *Providentia et liberum arbitrium*, 187ff.; DTC, Providence, c. 461; Jansens, 9. 560-76; De San: De Deo Uno, 1, 545-746.

DIFFICULTIES: 3.364; Lahousse, 443.

Thesis 17

THE EFFICACY OF GRACE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE EXPLAINED BY MORAL PREDETERMINATION.

P. 271ff.; W. 365ff.; Mazz. 629ff.; Ber. 365ff.; Pohle, p. 248ff.; DTC, Augustinianisme.

MORAL PREDETERMINATION is not a physical motion but an attraction that cannot be refused, or, as the Augustinians say, an overwhelming delight which the will cannot resist and by which one is determined to making one choice.

It is moral, not in the sense that it is not absolutely certain but in the sense that it influences more by attracting, in the manner of a final cause, or by leading, in the manner of a formal cause, than by impelling, in the manner of an efficient cause.

The Augustinians state, with the Jansenists, that we are not always moved by what is delightful, whether heavenly or earthly, by which the will is inevitably conquered; but they do not admit, as do the Jansenists, that the delight is so overwhelming as to destroy free will.

According to JANSENISTS and BAIANISTS:

- (1) There are two kinds of delight, carnal and heavenly, which preserve freedom from extrinsic necessity, or force, but do not preserve it from intrinsic necessity, DB 817, 1042, 1092-95.
- (2) All grace is an overwhelming delight, or charity. DB 1934ff.
- (3) The celestial delight that causes a good act of the will is sometimes sufficient, sometimes not: DB 1296, 1523.

MAIN POINTS of the theory of the Augustinians:

- (1) Efficacious grace is an overwhelming delight, an inspiration of charity that overcomes the opposite covetousness (the more rigid, sch as Noris, Berti, Bellelli).

The more moderate (Ysambert, Tornely, et al.) do not deny that other affects, e.g., fear, etc., inasmuch as they proceed from a holy love, can belong to efficacious grace.

- (2) This grace is efficacious inwardly, that is, in and of itself, and before the free choice of the will is considered, it determines consent infallibly and irresistibly.
- (3) This predetermination is necessary in the state of fallen humanity, but would not have been in the state of pure nature or integral nature or elevated and sinless nature.

(4) There are degrees of efficacious grace such that the same delight in one person could be efficacious while in another would be merely sufficient; it is, therefore, only comparatively efficacious, relatively, not absolutely. DTC, Augustinianism, 2487ff., 2492; Maxx. 633ff.

MODERATES deny that the efficacy of grace consists only in only the greater intensity of the delight, but also in the variety and choice of graces. ‘The infallible efficacy of this moral pre-motion is to be found, not in its physical entity taken as such, but more in its perfect adaptation to and contemporaneity with this will, *its internal congruity*. Internal, I say, namely that which by its own power most certainly produces the consent of this will, so that God, without presupposing any middle knowledge [*scientia media*], infallibly sees in the very decree of giving this grace to this person sees its efficacy in second act.’ Van Noort, n. 73.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE:

Against the Jansenists: De Fide. See DB 1093-1095

Against the more rigid Catholics [?], seems Certain

Against the moderates, More Probable

PROOF. P. 272.

(1) Moral predetermination can either be combined with the dissent of the will or it cannot;

But if it can, there is no infallible connection, which needs to be explained;

If it cannot, freedom seems to vanish, as in the system of physical predetermination;

Therefore ... P. 272.

(2) Besides, this does not explain grace that is truly sufficient. P. 275. For if a person lacks the greater indeliberate delight, he lacks truly sufficient grace.

(3) Against the rigid proponents: It is false that a person

(a) is moved by a formal delight in every action, or

(b) always follows the greater indeliberate delight. P. 273-75.

SCHOLION 1: Concerning the system of St Alphonsus of Liguori, or the Sorbonne, or syncretism.

Hermann, *De Gratia*, p. 337ff.; Jansens, p. 656ff.;

Van Noort, 73ff.; DTC, Augustinianism, 2948ff.

SCHOLION 2. On the system of the Scotists. P. 2, 284ff.; Ber., 571.

SCHOLION 3. On St Augustine’s doctrine. P. 276-80.

DTC, Augustine, 2389, 2492, 2376. Bellarmine, *Auctarium*, p. 41, note; Pelland: Whether or not St Prosper of Aquitaine faithfully followed his master St Augustine in questions about predestination and God’s salvific will; d’Alès, Boyer, et.al. Le Bachelet, *Prédestination et Grâce*, passim.

DIFFICULTIES: W. 364, 366, 370ff.

“One thing seems evident: the expression, ‘predetermination’ is not a category in St Thomas’s vocabulary. He would like neither the prefix *pre* – for the mode of divine knowledge, like that of divine causality, is eternity, the present of eternity – nor the word *determinatio*, at least in what concerns free acts – for the word is a stranger in the order of freedom and owes more to the cycle of the realities of nature.” Yves Congar, OP, *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 1934, p. 370.

Thesis 18

THE EFFICACY OF GRACE IS EXPLAINED BY GOD’S GRANTING TO A PERSON SUCH GRACE AS HE KNOWS TO BE CONGRUENT, SO THAT THE PERSON FREELY CONSENTS

Suarez, *De Gratia*, 1.5, *Tractatus de vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis*; Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 1. 1, c. 12; *Auctarium*, P. 280ff.; Billot, Thesis 11; Pohle, p. 255f.; Le Bachelet, *Prédestination et Grâce*.

EFFICACY OF GRACE, that is, the infallibility of the nexus between grace considered in first act and the consent of a free will.

It is not a question of the efficacy of power, which belongs to the very entity of grace, nor of the efficacy of the connection, which is had de facto from the consent of the will (efficacy as to the outcome), but of the efficacy of infallibility, namely that grace which was foreseen from all eternity to be going to have efficacy in second act.

EFFICACY OF GRACE:

of power (intrinsic) = from grace in its physical entity

of connection (extrinsic) = from freedom

consequent (de facto, in second act)

antecedent (de iure, in first act)

cognitive: from God’s knowledge

affective: from God’s predestination

objective: of the connection, or infallibility, from congruity, knowledge and freedom.

IT IS EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT GOD GIVES TO A PERSON SUCH GRACE AS HE KNOWS WILL BE CONGRUOUS.

‘For God, before deciding to grant this grace, has known from eternity what a person would do if he received this grace. Next, out of sheer mercy or love he has decided to give this person that grace, and foresaw absolutely that the person with grace would consent. God’s knowledge and predestination is infallible. Hence before a person performs a salvific act, it is infallibly certain that his free consent would ensue.’ P. Comp. 295.

CONGRUOUS GRACE, prior to (*in signo priori*) one’s future consent, is that which not only attributes to a person the ability to act in a salvific way but also is suited to one’s reason and

interest, so that the consent would be given because the person is called in the manner, time and place in which it is congruous for him to freely consent.

Consequently upon (*in signo priori*) the future consent, congruous grace is that which infallibly has consent attached to it. Congruity, therefore, is not within a grace as such but includes some relation to the disposition and the one who acts; not is it had solely from the fact that one is going to consent but from the fact that God grants such a grace as that to which He foresees that the person will consent.

N.B. – A. WE DO NOT SAY that the efficacy of grace is consists

(1) in the consent of the will, in the sense that it comes from the human will or is attached to grace by the efficacy of power;

(2) or because de facto the will consents, which is the efficacy of the connection as to the outcome.

B. BUT WE DO SAY:

(1) that it is not from our consent that power is added to grace, but that by grace the will receives the ability to consent, although the will retains the ability to refuse consent; the actuality, reality, and energy of power is totally from grace, not from freedom;

(2) that the efficacy of grace depends upon the will of God, inasmuch as God chooses to give to the will, not any help whatever, even one that would be quite sufficient, but that help that He knows will not be rejected (congruous help);

(3) that efficacious grace, *considered concretely*, is always greater in terms of benefit than sufficient grace, inasmuch as it excels other gifts, descending as it does from that predestination, that proposal, that choice by which God prepares for certain ones the outpouring of all the riches of his mercy;

(4) *considered abstractly*, that is, in its bare entity, efficacious grace could be simply less than sufficient grace; *concretely*, however, it could be greater, considering, that is, God's intention and its suitability for moving this will, here and now. P. 282.

This efficacious grace is said to be efficacious extrinsically, not intrinsically. See theses 16 and 17.

Grace that is efficacious intrinsically, by reason of its nature, determines the CONSENT OF THE WILL to one.

In our opinion, efficacious grace is not such by its nature, because the will could withhold consent (not being determined to one, even though in fact it will not dissent). And so it cannot be said to be efficacious without a consideration of some thing distinct from it, *extrinsic to it*, although infallibly connected with it, namely a free will, and as such it is said, in our opinion, to be efficacious *extrinsically*.

For according to us, efficacious grace does not differ from sufficient grace in its physical entity as an intrinsic help, but differs solely by extrinsic denomination, as given by God from his foreknowledge and absolute proposal to obtain consent. P. 260.

“We have spoken of graces that are equal *in themselves*, and not graces on the part of God. That is something quite different, for it is clear that if one considers the equality of the graces, not in their own entity, which is the same, but in terms of the choice that God makes for two different persons, with the foreknowledge that one will let grace go and the other will bear fruit, the latter has received from God a much greater gift, the favor of a choice.” Se Scorraille. Suarez, 1. P. 376. See de la Taille, RSR 1923, p. 20, note.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE: More probable.

PROOF: THE EFFICACY OF GRACE is better explained in that system which alone

- (1) regarding FREEDOM, preserves the essence of human freedom;
- (2) regarding the TRUE SUFFICIENCY OF GRACE, preserves the essence of sufficiency in *merely* sufficient grace, such as we know it from the sources of revelation;
- (3) regarding the INFALLIBILITY OF THE CONNECTION, gives sufficient reason for the infallibility of the connection between grace considered in first act and the consent of a free will (RJ 1427, 1573, 1574);
- (4) regarding the NOTION OF BENEFIT, preserves the special notion of benefit in efficacious grace over that of sufficient grace (RJ 1740, 1830, 1948, 1985, 2033);
- (5) regarding to the DOMINION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, NAMELY GOD, preserves His full dominion over free acts;
- (6) as to the MYSTERY, it leaves the mystery where it belongs, namely in God;
- (7) as to CONTRADICTION, it teaches nothing contradictory, and is superior to all of them, distributively and collectively.

But a system in which God gives to a human being a grace that he knows to be congruous for that person to freely consent is the only one that is superior to all others both distributively and collectively.

Therefore ...

MAJOR PREMISE: is valid from the fact that all these systems have to find a reasonable explanation, which nevertheless do not satisfy the intellect. ‘Do not try to understand things that are beyond you ...’ (Sir 3:22)

MINOR:

- (1) as to FREEDOM:

Admitted by all.

- (2) as to the TRUE SUFFICIENCY OF GRACE:

From the fact that the intrinsic efficacy of power is the same in efficacious grace as in sufficient grace; and so, although sufficient grace is not efficacious, still in itself, by its nature, it is intrinsically truly sufficient, in the proper sense of the word, in that it provides sufficiency to operate, so that the failure to operate does not come from the insufficiency of its power but from the free resistance of the will, truly sufficient not only verbally. *Summa contra Gentiles* 3, 159, ‘Ad huius ...’

(3) as to THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CONNECTION: It does not seem that the intrinsic infallibility of *causality* is required, but it seems that *extrinsic* infallibility is sufficient. For since God in His knowledge will have seen that such a help, being perfectly in accordance with this [human] will, is not rejected by this free will, and will have chosen this order of providence, it already becomes quite certain before the consent of the will, from the fact that such a grace is given, that the will will consent to this grace. *S.T.* 3, q. 3. a.1, ad.4m = ‘Predestination presupposes knowledge of the future.’

(4) as to the NOTION OF BENEFIT: Inasmuch as it flows from the choice by which God has prepared the outpouring of all the riches of his mercy.

(5) as to the DOMINION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, NAMELY GOD: Since it acknowledges the absolute subordination of a second cause to the first cause, although the will moves itself, determines itself, without having been determined to one by the first cause. Billot (1), p. 29: ‘Concludendum ...,’ p. 32: ‘In agente autem ...’. DTC, *Grâce*, 1665.

(6) as to MYSTERY: We readily admit that we cannot understand the mystery, but at least we do not fabricate new mysteries that have not been revealed.

(7) as to CONTRADICTIONS: the system here expounded contains none, as is evident.

EXCURSUS

On the essence of Molinism and its various explanations in secondary writings. P. 229ff; DTC, ‘Congru?? et Molinisme’; Bellarmine, *Grâce*; Lessius; Concours, Liberté – De Scorraille; Suarez I, p. 355f., 467f., II, p. 246ff.; Coudarc; Bellarmine; Van Sull; Leonard Lessius DA: Providence. Thomisme.

DIFFICULTIES: P., 285-88; P. Comp. 296; W. 381ff.

Rule 15 in *The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola*, ‘Rules for Thinking with the Church,’

E. THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRACE

GOD DENIES TO NO ONE SUFFICIENT GRACE FOR ATTAINING SALVATION, NEITHER TO THE FAITHFUL, WHETHER JUST (Part 1) OR SINNERS, EVEN HARDENED SINNERS (Part 2), NOR TO NEGATIVE UNBELIEVERS

S.T. 1-2, q. 112, aa. 3,4; Suarez, *De Gratia*, 1.4, cc. 7-19; Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, 1.2, cc. 1-9; P. 291-305; W. 345ff.; Mazz., 782f.; Pohle, 167ff.; DTC, *Grâce*, 1595f.; Ber., DA: Salut des infidèles; DTC, Infidèles (Salut des); Billot, *De personali et originali peccato*, p. 90ff.; A. du C., 1925, 360 ff., 1929, 831ff., 1933.

ADULTS: those who can distinguish between moral good and evil. (Abstracting from a definite time in which a human being attains that status)

THIS THESIS: concerns adults only, indeed those taken reduplicatively; hence it does not deal

- with those who have not yet attained the use of reason;
- or with those who have lost their reason after having committed sin;
- or with those who die while sinning.

Terminology:

SUFFICIENT GRACE:

COMMON SINNER is one who has not shaken off all fear of God.

BLINDNESS consists in the withdrawal of divine light and in a positive perversion of one's judgment.

The blinded have no understanding of or fail to grasp the things of salvation and perversely judge what pertain to them.

Already included in blindness is any hardness, or else hardness that follows from blindness; for what blindness is in one's understanding and judgment, hardness is in the will and affectivity.

HARDNESS consists in a firm and obstinate clinging of the affectivity to some evil because of a certain appearance of good. Hence it happens that neither external warnings nor interior inspirations, nor flogging, nor promises can move the person, but like a stone one is hardened to everything and is impenetrable, unless moved by some stronger divine impulse. (See Lessius, *De Perf. Div.*, 1, 13, c. 14, nn. 76-83). (But very often such voices are used without discernment).

HARDENED SINNER (blinded, hardened, obstinate) is one who is obstinate in sin. (*De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 11).

STUBBORNNESS implies some steadfastness in sin whereby one cannot withdraw from sinning. S.T. 1-2, q. 79, a. 3.

PERFECT: in the damned

IMPERFECT: when a person has such an obstinate will in sin that no, or very weak, movements arise in him, which renders his conversion very difficult. The causes of this stubbornness are

(a) positive interior causes: the sinner who has regularly developed bad habits, namely stubbornness of the will and blindness of the intellect, because of the perversion of judgment that stems from the force of the passions. See, e.g., Wis 11: 16-27.

(b) positive external causes: the devil and his minions (occasional moral cause)

(c) negative and permissive external cause: God, through the withdrawal of a more abundant actual grace. S.T. 1-2, q. 79, a. 3; see Rom 1:28; RJ 1830.

But the main cause is the sinner himself, *both efficiently and meritoriously*.

We say that any sinner, whether common or hardened, if he lives for some time after sinning and is of sound mind, will receive from God sufficient grace, either proximately or remotely, at a certain time, i.e., opportunely, so that he can rise from sin and avoid new sins. As long as one lives after sinning, that person is a sign of God's mercy.

PROXIMATELY SUFFICIENT GRACE: sufficient for performing this determinate salvific act.

REMOTELY SUFFICIENT GRACE: not sufficient for performing this determinate salvific act, but for other acts to which a person is disposed towards, or successfully prays for, proximately sufficient grace.

Although a sinner may not always have grace by which he can *here and now* attain justification, still he does have grace by which he can *pray* and so dispose himself for justification. DTC, Grâce, 1600.

UNBELIEVER: Three classes can be distinguished:

POSITIVE unbelievers are those who refuse to adhere to faith that has been sufficiently explained to them,

either (1) because they have abandoned the faith by apostasy,

or (2) because they have refused to embrace it.

THE THESIS does not deal with the positive unbelievers; for whatever can be said about sinners can be applied to them.

NEGATIVE unbelievers (3) are those to whom the faith has been insufficiently explained to them or not at all.

OUR POSITION is that God gives to such believers sufficient graces as to enable them to arrive at supernatural faith (DB 1173), and through faith arrive at justification.

Our thesis deals with the fact of grace and not the way it is conferred.

ADVERSARIES:

Luther and Calvin hold that all, even the just, lack the grace necessary to fulfil God's commandments.

Jansenis

ts: DB 1092, 1096, 1295.

A few Catholics have been of the opinion that God sometimes denies truly sufficient grace to hardened sinners: Bañez, Ledesma, Gonet.

THEOLOGICAL NOTE:

Against Protestants and Jansenists: De Fide Definita. DB 828, 1092

Regarding hardened sinners: Certain and Common

Regarding negative unbelievers: Certain and Common

Regarding common sinners: Theologically Certain

PROOF OF PART 1: REGARDING THE JUST

N.B. – The argument holds also for the just outside the Catholic Church, even though there is a more abundant fountain of grace in the Church.

1. FROM SCRIPTURE:

God does not deny the just grace sufficient for attaining salvation if the just can avoid all mortal sins;

But the just can avoid all mortal sins;

Therefore

MAJOR PREMISE: Obvious

MINOR is proven from 1 Cor 10:13; 1 Jn 5:3-6; Mt 11:25-30; Ps 17:1; Rom 5:8-10, 8:8-24.

2. FROM CHURCH TEACHING:

- (a) God does not desert the justified unless first deserted by them. DB 804, 808, 1794, 979, 980.
- (b) God does not command the impossible. DB 200, 804, 828, 1092, 1519.
- (c) Everyone can persevere if they are willing. See thesis 9.

3. FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH

- (a) God does not command the impossible. RJ 1220, 1795
- (b) All the just can persevere if they are willing.
- (c) God never abandons a person unless first abandoned by him: RJ 1792, 1889, 1954, 1960, 2026, 2227, 2232, 2255. See RJ, *Index Theologicus*, 310, 318, 344.

4. FROM REASON:

From the just person has been removed that deordination whereby he had become incapable of avoiding all mortal sins. S.T. 1-2, q. 109, aa. 4 & 8.

5. FROM EXPERIENCE we know that many saints have never sinned mortally.

6. WE HAVE PROVEN that truly sufficient grace exists; but if it is not given at least to the just, to whom would it be given?

PROOF OF PART 2: REGARDING EVEN HARDENED SINNERS.

A. REGARDING ORDINARY SINNERS:

1. FROM SCRIPTURE:

God wills: (a) the salvation of all human beings, and

(b) the conversion of all sinners;

But for the salvation of all and the conversion of sinners God's grace is absolutely necessary;

Therefore God does not deny grace, even to the stubborn sinner.

MAJOR PREMISE:

(a) 1 Tim 2:4ff.; Mt 11:28.

(b) Ez 33:7-16, 18; 23, 30; Wis 11:24ff., and the following chapter; Lk 5:32, ch. 15 (Prodigal Son); Is 1:18, 65:2; Prov 1:23ff.; Acts 7:51; Rom 2:4ff.; 2 Pet 3:9.

2. FROM CHURCH TEACHING:

- (a) The Church obliges the faithful who are sinners to receive the sacraments of Penance (Reconciliation) and the Eucharist at least once each year. DB 43, 167, 437, 1033.
- (b) 200, 319, 430, 507, 827ff., 839, 897-899 (perfect contrition), 911.

3. FROM THE LITURGY:

- (a) Votive Masses: for the healing of schism, for the remission sins, for begging the grace of a happy death.
- (b) In the Creed: ‘... who for us and for our salvation’ came down ...
- (c) In litanies:
 - (1) ‘O God, whose it is to ever show mercy and to spare ...’
 - (2) ‘Graciously show us, O Lord, your ineffable compassion ...’
- (d) There are numerous prayers in the Church pleading for divine mercy.
- (e) In virtually all the offices in the breviary and the Missal during Lent and Advent, etc.

4. FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: RJ 1155, 1220, 1405, 1795, 1830, 2097, 2227, 2232.

5. FROM THEOLOGIANS:

- (a) Freedom assisted by grace can be attributed to God’s mercy.
- (b) There is no sin that cannot be forgiven. P. 297ff.; Comp. 270; S.T. 3, q. 86, a. 1, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 11.

6. FROM REASON:

All the faithful are obliged to observe the commandments of God and to live in accordance with the faith; conversion is incumbent upon all sinners; the Church imposes upon the faithful to precept of receiving the sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist each year.

But all this is impossible for a person denied the grace of God;

Therefore...

B. REGARDING HARDENED SINNERS IN PARTICULAR

God gives them sufficient graces, for:

- (a) There is no sin nor any number of sins for which a person cannot be pardoned. (S.T. q. 86, a. 1)
- (b) In Scripture and the Fathers God’s mercy is described as extending to extreme misery. RJ 1220, 1405, 1830, 2097, 2932. ‘God, whose nature it is to have mercy and spare..’
- (c) God wills the conversion of all sinners without distinction.
- (d) God invites all sinners to repent.
- (e) God invites even the obstinate to repent.

- (f) Hardness is not allowed by God except as a penalty for previous sin, and this penalty is always medicinal.
- (g) God provides so many occasions for conversion, so many external helps, that it is beyond doubt that at the same time He also gives sufficient incitements to conversion. RJ 1830, 1907.
- (h) N.B.: AVOID SAYING that there is for every individual a determined number of sins, beyond which God will grant no more graces.

PROOF OF PART 3: REGARDING NEGATIVE UNBELIEVERS.

(1) FROM SCRIPTURE:

- (a) God hates nothing that he has made (Wis 11:24f.) and wills all to be saved, 1 Tim 2:4; see 1 Tim 4:10.

Wisdom calls everyone (Prov 1:20; 8.1); Christ is the atonement for the sin of all the world, 1 Jn 2:2, the light of the world, Jn 1:9, 8:12; Rom 11:32; 2 Cor 5:15; Ps 18:7.

But all this would hardly make sense unless it applied also to negative unbelievers who make up such a large part of the world.

Therefore even to negative unbelievers God does not deny his grace.

- (b) From the whole of Luke's gospel, whose aim it is to show that salvation is offered to all the Gentiles and not only the Jews.
- (c) From the letters of Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles: salvation is not for the Jews alone but for the Gentiles as well.

(2) FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH:

DB 1068, 1096, 1294f., 1376-79, 1521f., 1648, 1677, 1793, 3026 (160a a and b)

Encyclicals:

Annum sacrum (1899) AAS 31, 646ff. (649)

Mortalium animos, AAS, 1928, 5 ff.

Miserentissimus Redemptor, AAS, 1928, 165ff.

Devotio et Consecratio ad SS. Cor Iesu.

(3) FROM THE LITURGY:

For example, prayers for Friday of Holy Week; Mass for the Propagation of the Faith.

(4) FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH – for example:

RJ 12, 389, 622, 1053, 1158, 1202, 1279, 1313, 1343, 13656, 1461, 1539, 1791, 1968, 1986, 2020, 2030, 2046f., 2227, 2286, 2358.

If at times they seem to say the opposite, it is because they are dealing with abundant efficacious grace as, for example, in the *Auctor de Vocatione Gentilium* 1, 2, v. 25, where he distinguishes between [God's] general kindness and his special mercy. (PL 51, 710ff.)

(5) FROM THEOLOGIANS: S.T. 1-2. q. 89, a. 6; *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1m, q. 18, a. 3; S., 1.4, c. 18; P. 302ff.

(6) FROM REASON:

It seems to be in keeping with divine wisdom that all human beings should be raised to the supernatural order;

But God owes it to Himself not to deny grace sufficient for faith and salvation to those whom he raises to the supernatural order and who are capable of faith.

Therefore God does not deny grace sufficient for salvation even to negative unbelievers. P. 304f.

EXCURSUS 1: IN GOOD FAITH:

There can be no reason to doubt the good faith of those whose positions seem to us the most illogical; this is generally well understood. As I am on this subject, I feel obliged to add my testimony to that of Cardinal Manning and many others: I believe that the great majority of Anglicans are in absolutely good faith, or, if you wish, are in the most unbelievable ignorance. (Cf. Dom Bede ??, *De l'Anglicanisme au Monochisme*). How would this not also be so for Lutherans, Calvinists, and the Greek Orthodox, for similar reasons. (Pinard de la Boulaye, *Études*, 209, 642).

A poor Turkish woman, as she kissed the hands of the Franciscan who had cured her son, tearfully said to him, "Father, I will pray to Allah with all my heart that you will be converted and become a Muslim and will go to paradise." (*Revue Thomiste*, 1905, p. 663).

EXCURSUS 2: THE INEQUALITY OF GRACES

N.B. – God does not play favorites, in the sense that God denies no one grace sufficient for salvation; nevertheless, it cannot be denied that God grants to some graces that are more than absolutely sufficient.

(a) From Scripture: Mt 11:21, 10:14; Rom 12:3ff., 9:25ff.; 1 Cor 12:11; Sir 11:23ff.

(b) From the Church Fathers: e.g., RJ 1456, 1495, 1821, 1925, 1995, 2028, 2277.

(c) From the lives of the saints.

(d) From experience.

[SOURCE] ? OF THIS INEQUALITY:

First grace: from God's benevolence

Subsequent graces:

(1) from human cooperation. 'No one knows how great a perfection one would acquire if he were to always cooperate with grace.' (St. Ignatius)

(2) from fervor in the Church

(3) especially from God's benevolence

But the mystery remains, for which no a priori rules can be given: 'O altitudo!'

EXCURSUS 3. How sinners are called to conversion. See Mazz., 794-79 [?]

EXCURSUS 4. Theories on the way in which unbelievers can come to faith. P. 304; DTC, *Salut des infidèles*, 1600ff.

- (a) Theory of preaching.
- (b) Theory of observance of the natural law by way of which they may arrive at faith.
- (c) Theory of supernatural grace as to manner.
- (d) Theory of implicit faith and interior illumination.

EXCURSUS 5. On the nature of grace by which unbelievers are called to salvation. Various theories.

DIFFICULTIES: W. 348ff., 352ff.; Mazzella, 828ff.; Ber. 421ff., 446ff.

Prat, *S. Paul I*, p. 299:

At first glance, the difference between two men called [by God] in the same way, one of whom answers the call while the other resists, would seem to reside solely in each one's free act. Augustine carries the question even higher and farther, before the moment when a man makes use of his freedom.

He states that the act of faith itself is a gift of Gd. The one who actually responds to the divine call cannot have received greater help; he has certainly received more benefit and so more grace: and even in a way more help, since he received it at an opportune moment. A call rendered efficacious by reason of the his effective response is a greater favor than the same call that was not carried into effect because of the resistance of his free will.

The last reason for this divine predilection, calling such a person at the moment when God through his foreknowledge knows that it had to be efficacious for one and not for the other – this is the mystery that impelled Paul to exclaim, O altitudo! O the depth ...! [Rom 11:33]

MICHAEL SHIELDS

LONERGAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TORONTO

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