

INSIGHTCHAPTER VIICOMMON SENSE AS OBJECT.(Continued.)The Objective Field of Common Sense

The apparently modest and secure undertaking of common sense is to understand things in their relations to us. Unfortunately, we change: even the acquisition of common sense is a change in us; and so in the preceding section we attempted an investigation of the biological, aesthetic, artistic, intellectual, dramatic subject to which common sense relates things. But if the development of common sense is a change in its subject, still more obviously does it involve a change in its object. Common sense is practical. It seeks knowledge, not for the sake of the alleged pleasure of contemplation, but to use knowledge in making and doing. Moreover, this making and doing involve a transformation of man and his environment, so that the common sense of a primitive culture is not the common sense of an urban civilization, nor the common sense of one civilization the common sense of another. However elaborate the experiments of

the pure scientist, his goal is always to come closer to natural objects and natural relationships. But the practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics, and culture, that not only separate man from nature but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships. No less than the subjective, the objective field of common sense must be explored, for the development of common sense involves a change not only in us, to whom things are related, but also in the things, which are related to us.

1. Practical Common Sense.

In the drama of human living, human intelligence is not only artistic but practical. At first, there appears little to differentiate man from the beasts, for in primitive fruit-gathering cultures, hunger is linked to eating by a simple sequence of bodily movements. But primitive hunters take time out from hunting to make spears, and primitive fishers take time out from fishing to make nets. Neither spears nor nets in themselves are objects of desire. Still, with notable ingenuity and effort, they are fashioned because, for practical intelligence, desires are recurrent, labor is recurrent, and the comparatively brief time spent making spears or nets is amply compensated by the greater ease with which more game or fish is taken on an indefinite series of occasions.

Moreover, such an intervention of intelligence is itself recurrent. As products of human ingenuity,

spears and nets illustrate not only the idea of the old mechanical arts but also the more recondite idea of modern technology. As pieces of material equipment, the same objects are initial instances of the idea of capital formation. Now the history of man's material progress lies essentially in the expansion of these ideas. As inventions accumulate, they set problems calling for more inventions. The new inventions complement the old ~~not only~~ to suggest further improvements, to reveal fresh possibilities and, eventually, to call forth in turn the succession of mechanical and technological higher viewpoints that mark epochs in man's material progress. Moreover, this advance of practical intelligence is registered not merely in memory and, later, in books, but more obviously in concrete products, in tools and buildings, in the ever increasing manifold of appurtenances of laborers, craftsmen, merchants, and carriers. Thus, in correspondence with each stage in the development of practical intelligence, there is a measure and structure of capital formation, that is, of things produced and arranged not because they themselves are desired but because they expedite and accelerate the process of supplying the goods and services that are wanted by consumers. Again, in correspondence with each advance of practical intelligence, there is a technological obsolescence of capital equipment. The old shops still have their shelves and counters; the old machines may suffer no material or mechanical defect. But the new models produce better goods more efficiently; and trade now walks on different streets.

The concrete realization of the succession of new practical ideas does not take place without human cooperation. It demands a division of labor and, at the same time, it defines the lines along which labor is divisible. It invites men to specialize in the skilful use of particular tools and the expeditious performance of particular tasks. It calls forth some economic system, some procedure that sets the balance between the production of consumer goods and new capital formation, some method that settles what quantities of what goods and services are to be supplied, some device for assigning tasks to individuals and for distributing among them the common product.

As technology evokes the economy, so the economy evokes the polity. Most men get ideas, but the ideas reside in different minds, and the different minds do not quite agree. Of itself, communication only reveals the disparity. What is wanted is persuasion, and the most effective persuader becomes a leader, a chief, a politician, a statesman. For the problem of effective agreement is recurrent. Each step in the process of technological and economic development is an occasion on which minds differ, new insights have to be communicated, enthusiasm has to be roused, and a common decision must be reached. Beyond the common sense of the laborer, the technician, the entrepreneur, there is the political specialization of common sense. Its task is to provide the catalyst that brings men of common sense together. It is an incomplete

accumulation of insights to be complemented and modified by the further insights that arise from the situation in hand. It involves some understanding of industry and of commerce but its special field is dealing with men. It has to discern when to push for full performance and when to compromise, when delay is wisdom and when it spells disaster, when widespread consent must be awaited and when action must be taken in spite of opposition. It has to be able to command attention and to win confidence, to set forth concretely the essentials of a case, to make its own decisions and secure the agreement of others, to initiate and carry through some section of that seriation of social responses meeting social challenges that Arnold Toynbee in his Study of History has so lavishly and brilliantly illustrated.

2. The Dynamic Structure

As in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology, so in the field of human events and relationships there are classical and statistical laws that combine concretely in cumulating sets of schemes of recurrence. For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability. Human actions are recurrent; their recurrence is regular; and the regularity is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations that yields conclusions of the type, If an X occurs, then an X will recur. Children are born only to grow, mature, and beget children of their own. Inventions outlive their inventors and the

memory of their origins. Capital is capital because its utility lies not in itself but in the acceleration it imparts to the stream of useful things. The political machinery of agreement ^{and} ~~of~~ decision is the permanent yet self-adapting source of an indefinite series of agreements and decisions. Clearly, schemes of recurrence exist and function. No less clearly, their functioning is not inevitable. A population can decline, dwindle, vanish. A vast technological expansion, robbed of its technicians, would become a monument more intricate but no more useful than the pyramids. An economy can falter, though resources and capital equipment abound, though skill cries for its opportunity and desire for skill's product, though labor asks for work and industry is eager to employ it: then one can prime the pumps and make X occur: but because the schemes are not functioning properly, X fails to recur. As the economy, so too the polity can fall apart. In a revolution violence goes unchecked: laws lose their meaning: governments issue unheeded decrees: until from sheer weariness with disorder men are ready to accept any authority that can assert itself effectively. Yet a revolution is merely a passing stroke of paralysis in the state. There are deeper ills that show themselves in the long-sustained decline of nations and, in the limit, in the disintegration and decay of whole civilizations. Schemes that once flourished lose their efficacy and cease to function: in an ever more rapid succession, as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced: feverish effort is followed by listlessness: the situation becomes regarded as hopeless:

in a twilight of straitened but gracious living men await the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day.

Still, if human affairs fall under the dominion of emergent probability, they do so in their own way. A planetary system results from the conjunction of the abstract laws of mechanics with a suitable concrete set of mass-velocities. In parallel fashion, there are human schemes that emerge and function automatically, once there occurs an appropriate conjunction of abstract laws and concrete circumstances. But, as human intelligence develops, there is a significant change of roles. Less and less importance attaches to the probabilities of appropriate constellations of circumstances. More and more importance attaches to the probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communication, agreement, decision. Man does not have to wait for his environment to make him. His dramatic living needs only the clues and the opportunities to originate and maintain its own setting. The advance of technology, the formation of capital, the development of the economy, the evolution of the state are not only intelligible but also intelligent. Because they are intelligible, they can be understood as are the workings of emergent probability in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology. But because they also are increasingly intelligent, increasingly the fruit of insight and decision, the analogy of merely natural process becomes less and less relevant. What possesses a high probability in one country, or period, or civilization, may possess no probability in another;

community | and the ground of the difference may lie only slightly in outward and palpable material factors and almost entirely in the set of insights that are accessible, persuasive, and potentially operative in the community. Just as in the individual the stream of consciousness normally selects its own course out of the range of neurally determined alternatives, so too in the group, commonly accessible insights, disseminated by communication and persuasion, modify and adjust mentalities to determine the course of history out of the alternatives offered by emergent probability.

Such is the high significance of practical common sense, and it will not be amiss, I believe, to pause and make certain that we are not misconceiving it. For the practical common sense of a group, like all common sense, is an incomplete set of insights that is ever to be completed differently in each concrete situation. Its adaptation is too continuous and rapid for it ever to stand fixed in some set of definitions, postulates, and deductions; even were it outfitted, like David in Saul's armor, with such a logical panoply, it could be validated neither in any abstract realm of relations of things to one another nor in all members of any class of concrete situations. As its adaptation is continuous, so its growth is as secret as the germination, the division, the differentiation of cells in seed and shoot and plant. Only ideal republics spring in full stature from the mind of man; the civil communities that exist and function know only a story of their origins, only an outline of their development, only an estimate of their present complexion.

For the practical common sense, operative in a community, does not exist entire in the mind of any one man. It is parcelled out among many, to provide each with an understanding of his role and task, to make every cobbler an expert at his last, and no one an expert in another's field. So it is that to understand the working of even a static social structure, one must inquire from many men in many walks of life and, as best one can, discover the functional unity that organically binds together the endlessly varied pieces of an enormous jig-saw puzzle.

3. Inter-subjectivity and Social Order.

Though I just spoke of a functional unity to be discovered, really there is a duality to be grasped. As intelligent, man sponsors the order imposed by common sense. But man is not a pure intelligence. Initially and spontaneously, he identifies the good with the object of desire, and this desire is not to be confused either with animal impulse or with egoistic scheming. Man is an artist. His practicality is part of his dramatic pursuit of dignified living. His aim is not for raw and isolated satisfactions. If he never dreams of disregarding the little matter of food and drink, still what he wants is a sustained succession of varied and artistically transformed acquisitions and attainments. If he never forgets his personal interest, still his person is no Leibnizian monad; for he was born of his parents' love; he grew and developed in the gravitational field of their affection; he asserted his own independence only to fall in love and

provide himself with his own hostages to fortune. As the members of the hive or herd belong together and function together, so too men are social animals and the primordial basis of their community is not the discovery of an idea but a spontaneous intersubjectivity.

Thus, primitive community is intersubjective. Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of pre-human attainment, too obvious to be discussed or criticized, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them. The bond of mother and child, man and wife, father and son, reaches into a past of ancestors to give meaning and cohesion to the clan or tribe or nation. A sense of belonging together provides the dynamic premise for common enterprise, for mutual aid and succor, for the sympathy that augments joys and divides sorrows. Even after civilization is attained, intersubjective community survives in the family with its circle of relatives and its accretion of friends, in customs and folk-ways, in basic arts and crafts and skills, in language and song and dance, and most concretely of all in the inner psychology and radiating influence of women. Nor is the abiding significance and efficacy of the intersubjective overlooked, when motley states name themselves nations, when constitutions are attributed to founding fathers, when image and symbol, anthem and assembly, emotion and sentiment are invoked to impart an elemental vigor and pitch to the vast and cold, technological, economic, and political structures of human invention and convention. Finally, as intersubjective community

precedes civilization and underpins it, so also it remains when civilization suffers disintegration and decay. The collapse of Imperial Rome was the resurgence of family and clan, feudal dynasty and nation.

Though civil community has its obscure origins in human intersubjectivity, though it develops imperceptibly, though it decks itself out with more primitive attractions, still it is a new creation. The time comes when men begin to ask about the difference between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, between nature and convention. There arises the need of the apologue to explain to the different classes of society that together they form a functional unity and that no group should complain of its lot any more than a man's feet, which do all the walking, complain of his mouth, which does all the eating. The question may be evaded and the apologue may convince, but the fact is that human society has shifted away from its initial basis of intersubjectivity and has attempted a more grandiose undertaking. The discoveries of practical intelligence, which once were an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living, now penetrate and overwhelm its every aspect. For just as technology and capital formation interpose their schemes of recurrence between man and the rhythms of nature, so economics and politics are vast structures of interdependence invented by practical intelligence for the mastery not of nature but of man.

This transformation forces on man a new notion of the good. In primitive society it is possible to identify the good simply with the object of desire; but in civil community there has to be acknowledged a further component, which we propose to name the good of order. It consists in an intelligible pattern of relationships that condition the fulfilment of each man's desires by his contributions to the fulfilment of the desires of others and, similarly, protect each from the object of his fears in the measure he contributes to warding off the objects feared by others. This good of order is not some entity dwelling apart from human actions and attainments. Nor is it any unrealized ideal that ought to be but is not. But though it is not abstract but concrete, not ideal but real, still it cannot be identified either with desires or with their objects or with their satisfactions. For these are palpable and particular, but the good of order is intelligible and all-embracing. A single order ramifies through the whole community to constitute the link between conditioning actions and conditioned results and to close the circuit of interlocked schemes of recurrence. Again, economic break-down and political decay are not the absence of this or that object of desire or the presence of this or that object of fear; they are the break-down and decay of the good of order, the failure of schemes of recurrence to function. Man's practical intelligence devises arrangements for human living; and in the measure that such arrangements are understood and accepted, there necessarily results the intelligible pattern of relation-

ships that we have named the good of order.

In a simple yet inexorable fashion, this order, originated by human invention and convention, ceases to be an optional adjunct and becomes an indispensable constituent of human living. For the long-run effects of technological advance and new capital formation consist in some combination of increased population, reduced work, and improved living standards. In the course of a century the differences in all three respects may be so great that any return to an earlier state of affairs is regarded as preposterous and is to be brought about only by violence or disaster. But concomitant with the technological and the material development, there also takes place a complementary series of economic and political innovations. Each of these is motivated, to a greater or less extent, by the underlying technical and material changes; each, sooner or later, ^{goes} ~~under~~ ^{through} the adaptations demanded by subsequent changes; and so, in any given present, all together present a united front that can be broken only by the destructive turmoil of a revolution or a conquest. Moreover, ideas have no geographical frontiers, and profits accrue to traders not only from domestic but also from foreign markets. Material and social progress refuses to be confined to a single country; like an incoming tide, first, it reaches the promontories, then, it penetrates the bays, and finally, it pours up the estuaries. In an intricate pattern of lags and variations, new ideas spread over most of the earth to bind together in an astounding interdependence, the fortunes of individuals living dis-

parate lives in widely separated lands.

4. The Tension of Community.

Intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order have their ground in a duality immanent in man himself. As intelligent, man is the originator and sponsor of the social systems within which, as an individual, he desires and labors, enjoys and suffers. As intelligent, man is a legislator but, as an individual, he is subject to his own laws. By his insights he grasps standard solutions to recurrent problems, but by his experience he provides the instances that are to be subsumed under the standard solutions. From the viewpoint of intelligence, the satisfactions allotted to individuals are to be measured by the ingenuity and diligence of each in contributing to the satisfactions of all; from the same high viewpoint the desires of each are to be regarded quite coolly as the motive power that keeps the social system functioning. But besides the detached and disinterested stand of intelligence, there is the more spontaneous viewpoint of the individual subjected to needs and wants, pleasures and pains, labor and leisure, enjoyment and privation. To each man his own desires, precisely because they are his own, possess an insistence that the desires of others can never have for him. To each man his own labors, because they are his own, have a dimension of reality that is lacking in his apprehension of the labors of others. To each man, his own joys and sorrows have an expansive or contracting immediacy that others can know

only through their own experience of joy and sorrow. Yet the ineluctable privacy of each one's experience provides no premise for a monadic theory of man. For the bonds of intersubjectivity make the experience of each resonate to the experience of others; and, besides this elementary communion, there ^{are} ~~is~~ operative in all, a drive to understand and an insistence on behaving intelligently that generate and implement common ways, common manners, common undertakings, common commitments.

For this reason, it would seem a mistake to conceive the sociological as simply a matter of external constraint. It is true enough that society constrains the individual in a thousand ways. It is true enough that the individual has but a slight understanding of the genesis and growth of the civilization into which he was born. It is true enough that many of the things he must do are imposed upon him in a merely external fashion. Yet within the walls of his individuality, there is more than a Trojan horse. He has no choice about wanting to understand; he is committed not by any decision of his own but by nature to intelligent behavior; and as these determinants are responsible for the emergence of social orders in the past, so they account for their development, their maintenance, their reformation. Spontaneously every collapse is followed by a reconstruction, every disaster by a new beginning, every revolution by a new era. Commonly, men want a different social order but, left to themselves, they never consent to a complete anarchy.

There is, then, a radical tension of

community. Intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order possess different properties and different tendencies. Yet to both by his very nature, man is committed. Intelligence cannot but devise general solutions and general rules. The individual is intelligent and so he cannot enjoy peace of mind unless he subsumes his own feelings and actions under the general rules that he regards as intelligent. Yet feeling and spontaneous action have their home in the intersubjective group and it is only with an effort and then only in favored times that the intersubjective groups fit harmoniously within the larger pattern of social order.

Thus it is that in the history of human societies, there are halcyon periods of easy peace and tranquillity that alternate with times of crisis and trouble. In the periods of relaxed tension, the good of order has come to terms with the intersubjective groups. It commands their esteem by its palpable benefits; it has explained its intricate demands in some approximate yet sufficient fashion; it has adapted to its own requirements the play of imagination, the resonance of sentiment, the strength of habit, the ease of familiarity, the impetus of enthusiasm, the power of agreement and consent. Then a man's interest is in happy coincidence with his work; his country is also his homeland; its ways are the obviously right ways; its glory and peril are his own.

As the serenity of the good old days rests on an integration of common sense and human feeling, so the troubled times of crisis demand the discovery and

communication of new insights and a consequent adaptation of spontaneous attitudes. Unfortunately, common sense does not include an inventory of its own contents. It does not reside, whole and entire, in a single mind. It cannot point to any recorded set of experiments for its justification. It cannot assert itself in any of the inflexible generalizations that characterize logic, mathematics, and science. Common sense knows, but it does not know what it knows nor how it knows nor how to correct and complement its own inadequacies. Only the blind and destructive blows, inevitable in even a partial break-down of social order, can impress on practical common sense that there are limits to its competence and that, if it would master the new situation, it must first consent to learn. Still, what is to be learnt? The problem may baffle what experts are available. A theoretical solution need not lead automatically to its popular presentation. Even when that is achieved, the reorientation of spontaneous attitudes will remain to be effected. The time of crisis can be prolonged, and in the midst of the suffering it entails and of the aimless questioning it engenders, the intersubjective groups within a society tend to fall apart in bickering, insinuations, recriminations, while unhappy individuals begin to long for the idyllic simplicity of primitive living in which large accumulations of insights would be superfluous and human fellow-feeling would have a more dominant role.

5. The Dialectic of Community.

The name, dialectic, has been employed in a variety of meanings. In Plato, it denoted the art of philosophic dialogue and was contrasted with eristic. In Aristotle, it referred to an effort to discover clues to the truth by reviewing and scrutinizing the opinions of others. For the Schoolmen, it became the application of logical rules to public disputation. Hegel employed the word to refer to his triadic process from the concept of being to the Absolute Idea. Marx inverted Hegel and so conceived as dialectical a non-mechanical, materialist process. Summarily, then, dialectic denotes a combination of the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory; but this combination may be found in a dialogue, in the history of philosophic opinions, or in historical process generally.

For the sake of greater precision, let us say that a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus, there will be a dialectic, if 1) there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, 2) the events may be traced to either or both of two principles, 3) the principles are opposed yet bound together, and 4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from them. For example, the dramatic bias, described above (^), was dialectical. The contents and affects emerging into consciousness provided the requisite aggregate of events of a determinate kind; these events originate from two prin-

Chapter VI, #27
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ciples, namely, neural demand functions and the exercise of the constructive or repressive censorship: the two principles are linked as patterned and patterning: they are opposed inasmuch as the censorship not only constructs but also represses and, again, inasmuch as a disguised censorship results in neglected neural demands forcing their way into consciousness; finally, change is cumulative, for the orientation of the censorship at any time and the neural demands to be met both depend on the past history of the stream of consciousness.

Now as there is a dialectic of the dramatic subject, so also there is a larger dialectic of community. Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense. The two principles are linked, for the spontaneous, intersubjective individual strives to understand and wants to behave intelligently; and inversely, intelligence would have nothing to put in order were there not desires and fears, labors and satisfactions of individuals. Again, these linked principles are opposed, for it is their opposition that accounts for the tension of community. Finally, these linked and opposed principles are modified by the changes that result from them; the development of common sense consists in the further questions and insights that arise from the situations produced by previous operations of practical common sense; and the alternations of social tranquillity and social crisis mark successive stages in the adaptation of human spontaneity and sensibility to the demands of developing intelligence.

In two manners this dialectic of community differs from the dialectic of the dramatic subject. First, there is a difference in extent, for the dialectic of community regards the history of human relationships, while the inner dialectic of the subject regards the biography of an individual. Secondly, there is a difference in ^{the} level of activity, for the dialectic of community is concerned with the interplay of more or less conscious intelligence and more or less conscious spontaneity in an aggregate of individuals, while the dialectic of the subject is concerned with the entry of neural demands into consciousness. Accordingly, one might say that a single dialectic of community is related to a manifold of individual sets of neural demand functions through a manifold of individual dialectics. In this relationship, the dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship. Still, as is clear, one must not suppose this dominance to be absolute, for both covertly and overtly, neural demands conspire with an obnubilation of intelligence, and what happens in isolated individuals tends to bring them together and so to provide a focal point from which aberrant social attitudes originate.

This raises the basic question of a bias in common sense. Four distinct aspects call for attention. There is the already mentioned bias arising from the psychological depths, and commonly it is marked by its

sexual overtones. There also are the individual bias of egoism, the group bias with its class conflicts, and a general bias that tends to set common sense against science and philosophy. On these three something must now be said.

6. Individual Bias.

There is a rather notable obscurity in the meaning of the terms, egoism and altruism. When a carnivorous animal stalks and kills its prey, it is not properly egoistic; for it is simply following its instincts and, in general, for animals to follow their instincts is for them to secure the biological ends of individual and specific survival. By parity of reasoning, when a female animal fosters its young, it too is following its instincts: though it contributes to a general biological end, still it does so rather by the scheming of nature than by altruism in its proper sense. Finally, if animal spontaneity is neither egoistic nor altruistic, it seems to follow that the same must be said of human spontaneity; men are led by their intersubjectivity both to satisfy their own appetites and to help others in the attainment of their satisfactions; but neither type of activity is necessarily either egoistic or altruistic.

There is a further aspect to the matter. In his Ethics, Aristotle asked whether a good friend loved himself. His answer was that while true friendship excluded self-love in the popular sense, none the less it demanded self-love in a higher sense; for a man loves himself, if he wants for himself the finest things in the

world, namely, virtue and wisdom; and without virtue and wisdom a man can be a true friend neither to himself nor to anyone else. Accordingly, as Aristotle's answer suggests, when one turns from the realm of spontaneity to that of intelligence and reasonableness, one does not find that egoism and altruism provide ultimate categories. For intelligence and reasonableness with their implications automatically assume the ultimate position; and from their detached viewpoint there is set up a social order in which, as in the animal kingdom, both taking care of oneself and contributing to the well-being of others have their legitimate place and necessary function.

None the less, it remains that there is a sense in which egoism is always wrong and altruism its proper corrective. For man does not live exclusively either on the level of intersubjectivity or on the level of detached intelligence. On the contrary, his living is a dialectical resultant springing from those opposed but linked principles; and in the tension of that union of opposites, the root of egoism is readily to be discerned. For intelligence is a principle of universalization and of ultimate synthesis; it understands similars in the same manner; and it gives rise to further questions on each issue until all relevant data are understood. On the other hand, spontaneity is concerned with the present, the immediate, the palpable; intersubjectivity radiates from the self as from a center, and its efficacy diminishes rapidly with distance in place or time. Egoism is neither mere spontaneity nor pure intelligence but an interference

of spontaneity with the development of intelligence. With remarkable acumen one solves one's own problems. With startling modesty one does not venture to raise the relevant further questions, Can one's solution be generalized? Is it compatible with the social order that exists? Is it compatible with any social order that proximately or even remotely is possible?

The precise nature of egoistic interference with intellectual process calls for attention. It is not to be thought that the egoist is devoid of the disinterestedness and detachment of intelligent inquiry. More than many others, he has developed a capacity to face issues squarely and to think them through. The cool schemer, the shrewd calculator, the hard-headed self-seeker are very far from indulging in mere wishful thinking. Without the detachment of intelligence, they cannot invent and implement stratagems that work. Without the disinterestedness of intelligence, they cannot raise and meet every further question that is relevant within their restricted terms of reference. Nor can one say that egoism consists in making intelligence the instrument of more elementary desires and fears. For as long as the egoist is engaged upon his problems, the immanent norms of intelligent inquiry overrule any interference from desire or fear; and while the egoist refuses to put the still further questions that would lead to a profound modification of his solution, still that refusal does not make intelligence an instrument but merely brushes it aside.

Egoism, then, is an incomplete devel-

opment of intelligence. It rises above a merely inherited mentality. It has the boldness to strike out and think for itself. But it fails to pivot from the initial and preliminary motivation, provided by desires and fears, to the self-abnegation involved in allowing complete free play to intelligent inquiry. Its inquiry is reinforced by spontaneous desires and fears: by the same stroke it is restrained from a consideration of any broader field.

Necessarily, such an incompleteness of development is an exclusion of correct understanding. Just as in the sciences, intelligence begins from hypotheses that prove insufficient and advances to further hypotheses that successively prove more and more satisfactory, so too in practical living it is through the cumulative process of further questions and further insights that an adequate understanding is reached. As in the sciences, so also in practical living, individuality pertains to the empirical residue, so that there is not one course of action that is intelligent when I am concerned and quite a different course when anyone else is involved. What is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander. But egoistic emancipation rests on a rejection of merely proverbial wisdom yet fails to attain the development of personal intelligence that would re-establish the old sayings.

Thus, the golden rule is to do to others as you would have them do to you. One may object that common sense is never complete until the concrete situation is reached, and that no two concrete situations are identical. Still, it does not follow that the golden rule is that

there is no golden rule. For the old rule did not advocate identical behavior in significantly different situations; on the contrary, it contended that the mere interchange of individual roles would not constitute by itself a significant difference in concrete situations.

Nor is the egoist totally unaware of his self-deception. Even in the bias and scotosis of the dramatic subject, which operates preconsciously, there is a measure of self-suspicion and disquiet. In the egoist there are additional grounds for an uneasy conscience, for it is not by sheer inadvertence but also by a conscious self-orientation that he devotes his energies to sizing up the social order, ferreting out its weak points and its loop-holes, and discovering devices that give access to its rewards while evading its demands for proportionate contributions. As has been insisted already, egoism is not spontaneous, self-regarding appetite. Though it may result automatically from an incomplete development of intelligence, it does not automatically remain in that position. There have to be overcome both the drive of intelligence to raise the relevant further questions that upset egoistic solutions and, as well, the spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity which, if they lack the breadth of a purely intellectual viewpoint with its golden rule, at least are commonly broader in their regard for others than ^{is} intelligent selfishness. Hence it is that, however much the egoist may appreciate the efforts of philosophers to assure him that intelligence is instrumental, he will be aware that, in his cool calculations, intelligence is boss

and that, in his refusal to consider further questions, intelligence is not made into a servant but merely ruled out of court. Again, however much he may reassure himself by praising the pragmatists, still he suffers from the realization that the pragmatic success of his scheming falls short of a justification; for prior to the criteria of truth invented by philosophers, there is the dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in intelligence itself. The egoist's uneasy conscience is his awareness of his sin against the light. Operative within him, there is the Eros of the mind, the desire and drive to understand; he knows its value, for he gives it free rein where his own interests are concerned; yet he also repudiates its mastery, for he will not grant serious consideration to its further relevant questions.

7 Group Bias.

As individual bias, so also group bias rests on an interference with the development of practical common sense. But while individual bias has to overcome normal intersubjective feeling, group bias finds itself supported by such feeling. Again, while individual bias leads to attitudes that conflict with ordinary common sense, group bias operates in the very genesis of common sense views.

Basically, social groups are defined implicitly by the pattern of relations of a social order, and they are constituted by the realization of those dynamic relations. In its technological aspect the social order generates the distinctions between scientists and

executive | engineers, technicians and workers, skilled and unskilled labor. In its economic aspect, it differentiates the formation of capital from the production of consumer goods and services, distinguishes income groups by offering proportionate rewards to contributions, and organizes contributors in hierarchies of employees, foremen, supervisors, superintendents, managers, and directors. In its political aspect, it distinguishes legislative, judicial, diplomatic, and executive functions with their myriad ramifications, and it works out some system in which the various offices are to be filled and the tasks performed.

However, in the dialectic of community there is the operation not only of practical common sense but also of human intersubjectivity. If human intelligence takes the lead in developments, still its products do not function smoothly until there is effected a suitable adaptation of sensitive spontaneity. In a school, a regiment, a factory, a trade, a profession, a prison, there develops an ethos that at once subtly and flexibly provides concrete premises and norms for practical decisions. For in human affairs the decisive factor is what one can expect of the other fellow. Such expectations rest on recognized codes of behavior; they appeal to past performance, acquired habit, reputation; they attain a maximum of precision and reliability among those frequently brought together, engaged in similar work, guided by similar motives, sharing the same prosperity or adversity.

Among strangers we are at a loss what to say or do. The social order not only gathers men together in functional groups but also consolidates its gains and expedites its operations by turning to its own ends the vast resources of human imagination and emotion, sentiment and confidence, familiarity and loyalty.

However, this formation of social groups, specifically adapted to the smooth attainment of social ends, merely tends to replace one inertial force with another. Human sensitivity is not human intelligence and, if sensitivity can be adapted to implement easily and readily one set of intelligent dictates, it has to undergo a fresh adaptation before it will cease resisting a second set of more intelligent dictates. Now social progress is a succession of changes. Each new idea gradually modifies the social situation to call forth further new ideas and bring about still further modifications. Moreover, the new ideas are practical; they are applicable to concrete situations; they occur to those engaged in the situations to which they are to be applied. ^{However, while} ~~Accordingly,~~ the practical common sense of a community may be a single whole, ~~but~~ its parts reside separately in the minds of members of social groups, and its development occurs as each group intelligently responds to the succession of situations with which it immediately deals. Were all the responses made by pure intelligences, continuous progress might be inevitable. In fact, the responses are made by intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and the interests of groups and, while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity

does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good of society. Just as the individual egoist puts further questions up to a point, but desists before reaching conclusions incompatible with his egoism, so also the group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end.

Thus group bias leads to a bias in the generative principle of a developing social order. At a first approximation, one thinks of the course of social change as a succession of insights, courses of action, changed situations, and fresh insights. At each turn of the wheel, one has to distinguish between fresh insights that are mere bright ideas of no practical moment and, on the other hand, the fresh insights that squarely meet the demands of the concrete situation.

Group bias, however, calls for a further distinction. Truly practical insights have to be divided into operative and inoperative; both satisfy the criteria of practical intelligence; but the operative insights alone go into effect for they alone either meet with no group resistance or else find favor with groups powerful enough to overcome what resistance there is.

The bias of development involves a distortion. The advantage of one group commonly is disadvantageous to another, and so some part of the energies of all groups is diverted to the supererogatory activity of devising and implementing offensive and defensive mechanisms. Groups differ in their possession of native talent,

devising

opportunities, initiative, and resources; those in favored circumstances find success the key to still further success; those unable to make operative the new ideas that are to their advantage fall behind in the process of social development. Society becomes stratified: its flower is far in advance of average attainment; its roots appear to be the survival of the rude achievement of a forgotten age. Classes become distinguished, not merely by social function, but also by social success; and the new differentiation finds expression not only in conceptual labels but also in deep feelings of frustration, resentment, bitterness, and hatred.

Moreover, the course of development has been twisted. The social order that has been realized does not correspond to any coherently developed set of practical ideas. It represents the fraction of practical ideas that were made operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of once excellent schemes that issued from the mill of compromise, the otiose structures that equip groups for their offensive and defensive activities. Again, ideas are general, but the stratification of society has blocked their realization in their proper generality. Ideas possess retinues of complementary ideas that add further adjustments and improvements; but these needed complements were submitted to the sifting of group interests and to the alterations of compromise.

Still, this process of aberration creates the principles for its own reversal. When a concrete situation first yields a new idea and demands its

realization, it is unlikely that the idea will occur to anyone outside the group specialized in dealing with situations of that type. But when some ideas of a coherent set have been realized, or when they are realized in a partial manner, or when their realization does not attain its proper generality, or when it is not complemented with a needed retinue of improvements and adjustments, then there is no need to call upon experts and specialists to discover whether anything has gone wrong nor even to hit upon a roughly accurate account of what can be done. The sins of group bias may be secret and almost unconscious. But what originally was a neglected possibility, in time becomes a grotesquely distorted reality. Few may grasp the initial possibilities; but the ultimate concrete distortions are exposed to the inspection of the multitude. Nor has the bias of social development revealed the ideas that were neglected without also supplying the power that will realize them. For the bias generates unsuccessful as well as successful classes; and the sentiments of the unsuccessful can be crystallized into militant force by the crusading of a reformer or a revolutionary.

The ensuing conflict admits a variety of forms. The dominant groups may be reactionary or progressive or any mixture of the two. In so far as they are reactionary, they are out to block any correction of the effects of group bias and they employ for this purpose whatever power they possess in whatever manner they deem appropriate and effective. On the other hand, in so far as they are progressive, they make it their aim both to

correct existing distortions and to find the means that will prevent their future recurrence. Now to a great extent the attitude of the dominant groups determines the attitude of the depressed groups. Reactionaries are opposed by revolutionaries. Progressives are met by liberals. In the former case the situation heads towards violence. In the latter case there is a general agreement about ends with disagreement about the pace of change and the mode and measure of its execution.

8. General Bias.

To err is human, and common sense is very human. Besides the bias of the dramatic subject, of the individual egoist, of the member of a given class or nation, there is a further bias to which all men are prone. For men are rational animals, but full development of their animality is both more common and more rapid than a full development of their intelligence and reasonableness. A traditional view credits children of seven years of age with the attainment of an elementary reasonableness. The law regards as a minor anyone under twenty-one years of age. Experts in the field of public entertainment address themselves to a mental age of about twelve years. Still more modest is the scientific attitude that places man's attainment of knowledge in an indefinitely removed future. Nor is personal experience apt to be reassuring. If everyone has some acquaintance with the spirit of inquiry and reflection, few think of making it the effective center of their lives; and of that few, still fewer make sufficient

their)

progress to be able to withstand other attractions and persevere in their high purpose.

The lag of intellectual development, its difficulty and its apparently meagre returns bear in an especial manner on common sense. It is concerned with the concrete and the particular. It entertains no aspirations about reaching abstract and universal laws. It easily is led to rationalize its limitations by engendering a conviction that other forms of human knowledge are useless or doubtfully valid. Every specialist runs the risk of turning his speciality into a bias by failing to recognize and appreciate the significance of other fields. Common sense almost invariably makes that mistake; for it is incapable of analyzing itself, incapable of making the discovery that it too is a specialized development of human knowledge, incapable of coming to grasp that its peculiar danger is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results.

8.1 The Longer Cycle.

This general bias of common sense combines with group bias to account for certain features of the distorted dialectic of community. As has been noted, at each turn of the wheel of insight, proposal, action, new situation, and fresh insight, the tendency of group bias is to exclude some fruitful ideas and to mutilate others by compromise. Now fruitful ideas are of several kinds. They may lead to technical and material improvements,

to adjustments of economic arrangements, or to modifications of political structure. As one might expect, technical and material improvements are less subject to the veto of dominant groups than are changes in economic and political institutions. Again, when we shift to the second phase of the distorted dialectic, the resonant demands of the unsuccessful are for material well-being; and when the clamor goes up for economic or political change, such change is apt to be viewed simply as a necessary means for attaining more palpably beneficial ends.

Accordingly, there arises a distinction between the shorter cycle, due to group bias, and the longer cycle, originated by the general bias of common sense. The shorter cycle turns upon ideas that are neglected by dominant groups only to be championed later by depressed groups. The longer cycle is characterized by the neglect of ideas to which all groups are rendered indifferent by the general bias of common sense. Still, this account of the longer cycle is mainly negative; to grasp its nature and its implications, we must turn to fundamental notions.

Generically, the course of human history is in accord with emergent probability; it is the cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities. The specific difference of human history is that among the probable possibilities is a sequence of operative insights by which men grasp possible schemes of recurrence, and take the initiative in bringing about the material

and social conditions that make these schemes concretely possible, probable, and actual. In this fashion man becomes for man the executor of the emergent probability of human affairs. Instead of being developed by his environment, man turns to transforming his environment in his own self-development. He remains under emergent probability, inasmuch as his insights and decisions remain probable realizations of concrete possibilities, and inasmuch as earlier insights and decisions determine later possibilities and probabilities of insight and decision. Still, this subjection to emergent probability differs from the subjection of elections or of evolving species. For, in the first place, insight is an anticipation of possible schemes, and decision brings about the concrete conditions of their functioning instead of merely waiting for such conditions to happen; moreover, the greater man's development, the greater his dominion over circumstances and so the greater his capacity to realize possible schemes by deciding to realize their conditions. But there is also a second and profounder difference. For man can discover emergent probability; he can work out the manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the possibilities and probabilities of later insights and decisions; he can guide his present decisions in the light of their influence on future insights and decisions; finally, this control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not only by the individual in choosing his career and in forming his character, not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by mankind in its conscious-

elections)

ness of its responsibility to the future of mankind. Just as technical, economic, and political development gives man a dominion over nature, so also the advance of knowledge creates and demands a human contribution to the control of human history.

So far from granting common sense a hegemony in practical affairs, the foregoing analysis leads to the strange conclusion that common sense has so aim at being subordinated to a human science that is concerned, to adapt a phrase from Marx, not only with knowing history but also with directing it. For common sense is unequal to the task of thinking on the level of history. It stands above the scotosis of the dramatic subject, above the egoism of the individual, above the bias of dominant and of depressed but militant groups that realize only the ideas they see to be to their immediate advantage. But the general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view or that set up higher integrations or that involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues. The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice. Common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so only partially. It needs to be guided but it is incompetent to choose its guide. It becomes involved in incoherent enterprises. It is subjected to disasters that no one expects, that remain unexplained even after their occurrence, that can be explained only on the level of scientific or philosophic thought, that

even when explained can be prevented from recurring only by subordinating common sense to a higher specialization of human intelligence.

This is not the whole story. The general bias of common sense involves sins of refusal as well as of mere omission. Its complacent practicality easily twists to the view that, as insistent desires and contracting fears necessitate and justify the realization of ideas, so ideas without that warrant are a matter of indifference. The long view, the higher integration, the disputed theoretical issue fall outside the realm of the practical: it may or may not be too bad that they do; but there is no use worrying about the matter; nothing can be done about it; indeed, what could be done about it, probably would not be done. Now I am far from suggesting that such practical realism cannot adduce impressive arguments in its favor. Like the characters in Damon Runyon's stories, politicians and statesmen are confined to doing what they can. None the less, if we are to understand the implications of the longer cycle, we must work out the consequences of such apparently hard-headed practicality and realism.

8.2 Implications of the Longer Cycle.

Already we have explained the nature of the succession of higher viewpoints that characterize the development of mathematics and of empirical science. Now we must attend to the inverse phenomenon in which each successive viewpoint is less comprehensive than its predecessor. In each stage of the historical process, the

facts are the social situation produced by the practical intelligence of the previous situation. Again, in each stage, practical intelligence is engaged in grasping the concrete intelligibility and the immediate potentialities immanent in the facts. Finally, at each stage of the process, the general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent stages both of the further ideas, to which they would give rise, and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented. Such is the basic scheme, and it has three consequences.

In the first place, the social situation deteriorates cumulatively. For just as progress consists in ~~the~~^a realization of some ideas that leads to the realization of others until a whole coherent set is concretely operative, so the repeated exclusion of timely and fruitful ideas involves a cumulative departure from coherence. The objective social situation possesses the intelligibility put into it by those that brought it about. But what is put in, less and less is some part of a coherent whole that will ask for its completion, and more and more it is some arbitrary fragment that can be rounded off only by giving up the attempt to complete the other arbitrary fragments that have preceded or will follow it. In this fashion social functions and enterprises begin to conflict; some atrophy and others grow like tumors; the objective situation becomes penetrated with anomalies; it loses its power to suggest new ideas and, once they are implemented, to

respond with still further and better suggestions. The dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then by stagnation. In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers.

The second consequence is the mounting irrelevance of detached and disinterested intelligence. Culture retreats into an ivory tower. Religion becomes an inward affair of the heart. Philosophy glitters like a gem with endless facets and no practical purpose. For man cannot serve two masters. If one is to be true to intellectual detachment and disinterestedness, to what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, then one seems constrained to acknowledge that the busy world of practical affairs offers little scope to one's vocation. Intelligence easily can link culture, religion, philosophy to the realm of concrete living only if the latter is intelligible. But concrete living has become the function of a complex variable; like the real component of such a function, its intelligibility is only part of the whole. Already we have spoken of an empirical residue from which understanding always abstracts; but the general bias of common sense generates an increasingly significant residue that 1) is immanent in the social facts, 2) is not intelligible, yet 3) cannot be abstracted from if one is to consider the facts as in fact they are. Let us name this residue the social surd.

The third consequence is the surrender of detached and disinterested intelligence. There is the

minor surrender on the level of common sense. It is an incomplete surrender, for common sense always finds a profoundly satisfying escape from the grim realities of daily living by turning to men of culture, to representatives of religion, to spokesmen for philosophy. Still the business of common sense is daily life. Its reality has to be faced. The insights that accumulate have to be exactly in tune with the reality to be confronted and in some measure controlled. The fragmentary and incoherent intelligibility of the objective situation sets the standard to which common sense intelligence must conform. Nor is this conformity merely passive. Intelligence is dynamic. Just as the biased intelligence of the psycho-neurotic sets up an ingenious, plausible, self-adapting resistance to the efforts of the analyst, so men of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they live and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal that would lay the axe to the root of the social surd.

Besides this minor surrender on the level of common sense, there is the major surrender on the speculative level. The function of human intelligence, it is claimed, is not to set up independent norms that make thought irrelevant to fact but to study the data as they are, to grasp the intelligibility that is immanent in them, to acknowledge as principle or norm only what can be reached by generalization from the data. There follow the need and the development of a new culture, a new religion, a new philosophy; and the new differs

radically from the old. The new is not apriorist, wishful thinking. It is empirical, scientific, realistic. It takes its stand on things as they are. In brief, its many excellences cover its single defect. For its rejection of the normative significance of detached and disinterested intelligence makes it radically uncritical. It possesses no standpoint from which it can distinguish between social achievement and the social surd. It fails to grasp that an excellent method for the study of electrons is bound to prove naive and inept in the study of man. For the data on man are largely the product of man's own thinking; and the subordination of human science to the data on man is the subordination of human science to the biased intelligence of those that produce the data. From this critical incapacity, there follow the insecurity and the instability of the new culture, religion, philosophy. Each new arrival has to keep bolstering its convictions by attacking and denouncing its predecessors. Nor is there any lack of new arrivals, for in the cumulative deterioration of the social situation there is a continuous expansion of the surd and so there is an increasing demand for further contractions of the claims of intelligence, for further dropping of old principles and norms, for closer conformity to an ever growing man-made incoherence immanent in man-made facts.

It is ⁱⁿ this major surrender of intellectual detachment that the succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints comes to light. The development of our western civilization, from the schools founded by Charlemagne to

the universities of today, has witnessed an extraordinary flowering of human intelligence in every department of its activity. But this course of human progress has not been along a smooth and mounting curve. It has taken place through the oscillations of the shorter cycle in which social groups become factions, in which nations go to war, in which the hegemony passes from one center to another to leave its former holders with proud memories and impotent dreams. No less does it exhibit the successive lower viewpoints of the longer cycle. The medieval synthesis through the conflict of church and state shattered into the several religions of the reformation. The wars of religion provided the evidence that man has to live not by revelation but by reason. The disagreement of reason's representatives made it clear that, while each must follow the dictates of reason as he sees them, he also must practise the virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others. The helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems called forth the totalitarian who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint. On the totalitarian view, every type of intellectual independence whether personal, cultural, scientific, philosophic, or religious, has no better basis than non-conscious myth. The time has come for the conscious myth that will secure man's total subordination to the requirements of reality. Reality is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of

the all-inclusive state. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war. The succession of less comprehensive viewpoints has been a succession of adaptations of theory to practice. In the limit, practice becomes a theoretically unified whole, and theory is reduced to the status of a myth that lingers on to represent the frustrated aspirations of detached and disinterested intelligence.

8.3 Alternatives of the Longer Cycle.

What is the subsequent course of the longer cycle generated by the general bias of common sense? In so far as the bias remains effective, there would seem to be only one answer. The totalitarian has uncovered a secret of power. To defeat him is not to eliminate a permanent temptation to try once more his methods. Those not subjected to the temptation by their ambitions or their needs, will be subjected to it by their fears of danger and by their insistence on self-protection. So in an uneasy peace, in the unbroken tension of a prolonged emergency, one totalitarianism calls forth another. On an earth made small by a vast human population, by limited natural resources, by rapid and easy communications, by

extraordinary powers of destruction, there will arise sooner or later, the moment when the unstable equilibrium will seem threatened and the gamble of war will appear the lesser risk to some of the parties involved. If the war is indecisive, the basic situation is unchanged. If it is totally destructive, the longer cycle has come to its end. If there results a single world empire, then it inherits both the objective stagnation of the social surd and the warped mentality of totalitarian practicality; but it cannot whip up the feverish energy of fear or of ambition; it has no enemy to fight; it has no intelligible goal to attain.

Common sense, on the other hand, has no use for any theoretical integration, even for the totalitarian integration of common sense practicality. It will desert the new empire for the individual or group interests that it understands. This centrifugal tendency will be augmented by the prepossessions and prejudices, the resentments and hatreds, that have been accumulating over the ages; for every reform, every revolution, every lower viewpoint overstates both the case in its own favor and the case against those it would supersede; from each generation to the next there are transmitted not only sound ideas, but also incomplete ideas, mutilated ideas, enthusiasms, passions, bitter memories, and terrifying bogies. In this fashion, the objective social surd will be matched by a disunity of minds all warped but each in its private way. The most difficult of enterprises will have to be undertaken under the most adverse circumstances and, under the present hypothesis that the general bias of common sense remains effective, one cannot but expect the great crises that

end in complete disintegration and decay.

Still, on the assumption of emergent probability, nothing is inevitable. Indeed, the essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal. For dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles: the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium. Why, then, is it that the longer cycle is so long? Why is the havoc it wreaks so deep, so extensive, so complete? The obvious answer is the difficulty of the lesson that the longer cycle has to teach. Nor are we quite without hints or clues on the nature of that lesson. On the contrary, there is a convergence of evidence for the assertion that the longer cycle is to be met, not by any idea or set of ideas on the level of technology, economics, or politics, but only by the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man's understanding and making of man.

In the first place, the general bias of common sense cannot be corrected by common sense, for the bias is abstruse and general, and common sense deals with the particular. In the second place, man can discover how present insights and decisions influence through emergent probability the occurrence of future insights and decisions; as he can make this discovery, so he can use it, not only in shaping individual biographies and educating children in the image of their parents and of the state authorities, but also in the vastly more ambitious task of directing and in some measure controlling his future history. In the third place, the longer cycle of western civilization has been drawing attention repeatedly to the

notion of a practical theory of history. It was conceived in one manner or another by Vico in his Scienza nuova, by Hegel, and by Marx. It has exercised a conspicuous influence on events through liberal doctrine of automatic progress, through the Marxian doctrine of class war, through the myths of nationalist totalitarianism. In the fourth place, a remedy has to be on the level of the disease; but the disease is a succession of lower viewpoints that leads towards an ultimate nihilism; and so the remedy has to be the attainment of a higher viewpoint.

As there is evidence for the necessity of a higher viewpoint, so also there is some evidence on its nature. Inquiry and insight are facts that underlie mathematics, empirical science, and common sense. The refusal of insight is a fact that accounts for individual and group egoism, for the psychoneuroses, and for the ruin of nations and civilizations. The needed higher viewpoint is the discovery, the logical expansion, and the recognition of the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose. Even in the sphere of practice, the last word does not lie with common sense and its panoply of technology, economy, and polity; for unless common sense can learn to overcome its bias by acknowledging and submitting to a higher principle, unless common sense can be taught to resist its perpetual temptation to adopt the easy, obvious, practical compromise, then one must expect the succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints and in the limit the destruction of all that has been achieved.

8.4 Reversal of the Longer Cycle.

What is the higher principle? Since we have not as yet discussed such notions as truth and error, right and wrong, human science and philosophy, culture and religion, our immediate answer can be no more than a series of notes.

In the first place, there is such a thing as progress and its principle is liberty. There is progress, because practical intelligence grasps ideas in data, guides activity by the ideas, and reaches fuller and more accurate ideas through the situations produced by the activity. The principle of progress is liberty, for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights: on the other hand, one might as well declare openly that all new ideas are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge; they never know whether or not the new idea will work; much less can they divine how it might be corrected or developed; and since the one thing they dread is making a mistake, they devote their energies to paper work and postpone decisions.

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However, while there is progress and while its principle is liberty, there also is decline and its principle is bias. There is the minor principle of group bias which tends to generate its own corrective. There is the major principle of general bias and, though it too generates its own corrective, it does

so only by confronting human intelligence with the alternative of adopting a higher viewpoint or perishing. To ignore the fact of decline was the error of the old liberal views of automatic progress. The far more confusing error of Marx was to lump together both progress and the two principles of decline under the impressive name of dialectical materialism, to grasp that the minor principle of decline would correct itself more rapidly through class war, and then to leap gaily to the sweeping conclusion that class war would accelerate progress. What, in fact, was accelerated was major decline which in Russia and Germany leaped to fairly thorough brands of totalitarianism. The basic service of the higher viewpoint will be a liberation from confusion through clear distinctions. Progress is not to be confused with decline; the corrective mechanism of the minor principle of decline is not to be thought capable of meeting the issues set by the major principle.

Secondly, as there are sciences of nature, so also there is a science of man. As the sciences of nature are empirical, so also the science of man is empirical; for science is the resultant of an accumulation of related insights, and scientific insights grasp ideas that are immanent not in what is imagined but in what is given. If the sciences of nature can be led astray by the blunder that the objective is, not the verified, but the "out there", so also can the human sciences; but while this blunder in physics yields no more than the ineptitude of Galileo's primary qualities and Newton's true motion, it leads zealous practitioners of scientific method in the human field to rule out of court a major portion of the

data and so deny the empirical principle. Durkheimian sociology and behaviorist psychology may have excuses for barring the data of consciousness, for there exist notable difficulties in determining such data; but the business of the scientist is not to allege difficulties as excuses but to overcome them, and neither objectivity in the sense of verification nor the principle of empiricism can be advanced as reasons for ignoring the data of consciousness. Further, as mathematics has to deal not only with direct intelligibilities but also with such inverse instances as primes, surds, imaginaries, continua, and infinities, as the physicist has to employ not only the classical procedures and techniques that deal with the systematic but also the statistical procedures and techniques that take into account the non-systematic, so also human science has to be critical. It can afford to drop the nineteenth-century scientific outlook of mechanist determinism in favor of an emergent probability. It can profit by the distinction between the intelligible emergent probability of prehuman process and the intelligent emergent probability that ^{arises} ~~emerges~~ in the measure that man succeeds in understanding himself and in implementing that understanding. Finally, it can be of inestimable value in aiding man to understand himself and in guiding him in the implementation of that understanding, if, and only if, it can learn to distinguish between progress and decline, between the liberty that generates progress and the bias that generates decline. In other words, human science cannot be merely empirical; it has to be critical; to reach a critical standpoint, it has to be normative. This is a tall order for human science as hitherto it has existed. But people looking

for easy tasks had best renounce any ambition to be scientists; and if mathematicians and physicists can surmount their surds, the human scientist can learn to master his.

8.5 Culture and Reversal.

In the third place, there is culture. The dramatic subject, as practical, originates and develops capital and technology, the economy and the state. By his intelligence he progresses, and by his bias he declines. Still, this whole unfolding of practicality constitutes no more than the setting and the incidents of the drama. Delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humor, stand not within practicality but above it. Man can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart.

Now if men are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so. Were man a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway him. But as the dialectic in the individual and in society reveals, man is a compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity, and it is only through the parallel compound of a culture that his tendencies to aberration can be offset proximately and effectively.

The difficulty is, of course, that human aberration makes an uncritical culture its captive. Mario Praz in The Romantic Agony has found that depth psychology

throws an unpleasantly penetrating light upon romanticism. Nor is the ooze of abnormality anything more than a secondary symptom, for the expanding social surd of the longer cycle is not matched by a succession of less comprehensive viewpoints without the services of a parallel series of cultural transformations. Opinions and attitudes that once were the oddity of a minority gradually spread through society to become the platitudes of politicians and journalists, the assumptions of legislators and educators, the uncontroverted nucleus of the common sense of a people. Eventually, they too become antiquated; they are regarded as the obstinacy of an old guard that will not learn; their influence is restricted to backwaters immune to the renewing force of the main current of human thought and feeling. Change succeeds change. Indiscriminately, each of the new arrivals rests upon the good it brings, upon the opposite defects of the old, and upon a closer harmony with the fact of the social surd. In the limit, culture ceases to be ^{an} independent factor that passes a detached yet effective judgment upon capital formation and technology, upon economy and polity. To justify its existence, it had to become more and more practical, more and more a factor within the technological, economic, political process, more and more a tool that served palpably useful ends. The actors in the drama of living become stage-hands; the setting is magnificent; the lighting superb; the costumes gorgeous; but there is no play.

Clearly, by becoming practical, culture renounces its one essential function and, by that renunciation, condemns practicality to ruin. The general bias of common sense has to be ~~counter-weighted~~ ^{counterbalanced} by a representative of detached in-

telligence that both appreciates and criticizes, that identifies the good neither with the new nor with the old, that, above all else, neither will be forced into an ivory tower of ineffectualness by the social surd nor, on the other hand, will capitulate to its absurdity.

Marx looked forward to a classless society and to the withering of the state. But as long as there will be practical intelligence, there will be technology and capital, economy and polity. There will be a division of labor and a differentiation of functions. There will be the adaptation of human intersubjectivity to that division and differentiation. There will be common decisions to be reached and to be implemented. Practical intelligence necessitates classes and states, and no dialectic can promise their permanent disappearance. What is both unnecessary and disastrous is the exaltation of the practical, the supremacy of the state, the cult of the class. What is necessary is a Cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.

Lower case "c"
here & later

8.6 COSMOPOLIS *Cosmopolis.*

Still, what is Cosmopolis? Like every other object of human intelligence, it is in the first instance an X, what is to be known when one understands. Like every other X, it possesses some known properties and aspects that lead to

its fuller determination. For the present, we must be content to indicate a few of these aspects and to leave until later the task of reaching conclusions.

force
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First, Cosmopolis, is not a police force. Before such a force can be organized, equipped, and applied, there is needed a notable measure of agreement among a preponderant group of men. In other words, ideas have to come first, and, at best, force is instrumental. In the practical order of the economy and polity, it is possible, often enough, to perform the juggling act of using some ideas to ground the use of force in favor of others and, then, using the other ideas to ground the use of ^{force} ~~first~~ in favor of the first. The trouble with this procedure is that there is always another juggler that believes himself expert enough to play the same game the other way by using the malcontents, held down by the first use of force, to upset the second set of ideas and, as well, using malcontents, held down by the second use of force, to upset the first set of ideas. Accordingly, if ideas are not to be merely a facade, if the reality is not to be merely a balance of power, then the use of force can be no more than residual and incidental. But Cosmopolis is not concerned with the residual and incidental. It is concerned with the fundamental issue of the historical process. Its business is to prevent practicality from being short-sightedly practical and so destroying itself. The notion that Cosmopolis employs a police force is just an instance of the short-sighted practicality that Cosmopolis has to correct. However, I am not saying that there should not be a United Nations or a World Government; I am ^{not} saying that such political entities should not have a police force; I am

saying that such political entities are not what is meant by Cosmopolis. Cosmopolis is above all politics. So far from being rendered superfluous by a successful World Government, it would be all the more obviously needed to offset the tendencies of that and any other government to be short-sightedly practical.

Secondly, Cosmopolis is concerned to make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are inoperative. So far from employing power or pressure or force, it has to witness to the possibility of ideas being operative without such backing. Unless it can provide that witness, then it is useless. For at the root of the general bias of common sense and at the permanent source of the longer cycle of decline, there stands the notion that only ideas backed by some sort of force can be operative. The business of Cosmopolis is to make operative the ideas that, in the light of the general bias of common sense, are inoperative. In other words, its business is to break the vicious circle of an illusion: men will not venture on ideas that they grant to be correct because they hold that such ideas will not work unless sustained by desires or fears; and, inversely, men hold that such ideas will not work, because they will not venture on them and so have no empirical evidence that such ideas can work and would work.

Thirdly, Cosmopolis is not a busybody. It is supremely practical by ignoring what is thought to be really practical. It does not waste its time and energy condemning the individual egoism that is in revolt against society and already condemned by society. It is not excited by group egoism

which, in the short run, generates the principles that involve its reversal. But it is very determined to prevent dominant groups from deluding mankind by the rationalization of their sins; if the sins of dominant groups are bad enough, still the erection of their sinning into universal principles is indefinitely worse; it is the universalization of the sin by rationalization that contributes to the longer cycle of decline; it is the rationalization that Cosmopolis has to ridicule, explode, destroy. Again, Cosmopolis is little interested in the shifts of power between classes and nations; it is quite aware that the dialectic sooner or later upsets the short-sighted calculations of dominant groups; and it is quite free from the nonsense that the rising star of another class or nation is going to put a different human nature in the saddle. However, while shifts of power in themselves are incidental, they commonly are accompanied by another phenomenon of quite a different character. There is the creation of myths. The old regime is depicted as monstrous; the new envisages itself as the immaculate embodiment of ideal human aspiration. Catchwords that carried the new group to power assume the status of unquestionable verities. On the band-wagon of the new vision of truth there ride the adventurers in ideas that otherwise could not attain a hearing. Inversely, ideas that merit attention are ignored unless they put on the trappings of the current fashion, unless they pretend to result from alien but commonly acceptable premises, unless they disclaim implications that are true but unwanted. It is the business of Cosmopolis to prevent the formation of the screening memories by which an ascent to power hides its nastiness; it is its

business to prevent the falsification of history with which the new group overstates its case; it is its business to satirize the catchwords and the claptrap and thereby to prevent the notions they express from coalescing with passions and resentments to engender obsessive nonsense for future generations; it is its business to encourage and support those that would speak the simple truth though simple truth has gone out of fashion. Unless Cosmopolis undertakes this essential task, it fails in its mission. One shift of power is followed by another, and if the myths of the first survive, the myths of the second will take their stand on earlier nonsense to bring forth worse nonsense still.

Fourthly, as Cosmopolis has to protect the future against the rationalization of abuses and the creation of myths, so it itself must be purged of the rationalizations and myths that became part of the human heritage before it came on the scene. If the analyst suffers from a scotoma, he will communicate it to the analysand; similarly, if Cosmopolis itself suffers from the general bias of common sense in any of its manifestations, then the blind will be leading the blind and both will head for a ditch. There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history. There is needed an exploration of the movements, the changes, the epochs of a civilization's genesis, development, and vicissitudes. The opinions and attitudes of the present have to be traced to their origins, and the origins have to be criticized in the light of dialectic. The liberal believer in automatic progress could praise all that survives; the Marxist could denounce all that was and praise all that

would be; but anyone that recognizes the existence both of intelligence and of bias, both of progress and of decline, has to be critical and his criticism will rest on the dialectic that simply affirms the presuppositions of possible criticism.

Perhaps enough has been said on the properties and aspects of our X, named Cosmopolis, for a synthetic view to be attempted. It is not a group denouncing other groups: it is not a super-state ruling states: it is not an organization that enrolls members, nor an academy that endorses opinions, nor a court that administers a legal code. It is a withdrawal from practicality to save practicality. It is a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a discovery of historical responsibilities. It is not something altogether new, for the Marxist has been busy activating the class-consciousness of the masses, and, before him, the liberal had succeeded in indoctrinating men with the notion of progress. Still, it possesses its novelty, for it is not simpliste. It does not leap from a fact of development to a belief in automatic progress nor from a fact of abuse to an expectation of an apocalyptic utopia reached through an accelerated decline. It is the higher synthesis of the liberal thesis and the Marxist antithesis. It comes to minds prepared for it by these earlier views, for they have taught man to think historically. It comes at a time when the totalitarian fact and threat have refuted the liberals and discredited the Marxists. It stands on a basic analysis of the compound-in-tension that is man; it confronts problems of which men are aware; it invites the vast potentialities and pent-up energies of our

time to contribute to their solution by developing an art and a literature, a theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and help they need and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense.

Finally, it would be unfair not to stress the chief characteristic of *Cosmopolis*. It is not easy. It is not a dissemination of sweetness and light, where sweetness means sweet to me, and light means light to me. Were that so, *Cosmopolis* would be superfluous. Every scotosis puts forth a plausible, ingenious, adaptive, untiring resistance. The general bias of common sense is no exception. It is by moving with that bias rather than against it, by differing from it slightly rather than opposing it thoroughly, that one has the best prospect of selling books and newspapers, entertainment and education. Moreover, this is only the superficial difficulty. Beneath it lies the almost insoluble problem of settling clearly and exactly, what the general bias is. It is not a culture but only a compromise that results from taking the highest common factor of an aggregate of cultures. It is not a compromise that will check and reverse the longer cycle of decline. Nor is it unbiased intelligence that yields a welter of conflicting opinions. This is the problem. So far from solving it in this chapter, we do not hope to reach a full solution in this volume. But, at least, two allies can be acknowledged. On the one hand, there is common sense, and in its judgments, which as yet have not been treated, common sense tends to be profoundly sane. On the other hand, there is dia-

lectical analysis; the refusal of insight betrays itself; the Babel of our day is the cumulative product of a series of refusals to understand; ^{and} ~~the~~ dialectical analysis can discover and expose both the series of past refusals and the tactics of contemporary resistance to enlightenment.

9. Conclusion.

It is time to end this study of common sense, ^{of Chapter VI}
In the first section there was worked out the parallel between common sense and empirical science; both are developments of intelligence. ^{Next,} ~~In the second and third sections,~~
attention centered on the differences between empirical science which relates things to one another, and common sense which relates things to us. It was seen that the relations, grasped by common sense, stand between two variables: on the one hand, common sense is a development of the subject to which things are related; on the other hand, common sense effects a development in the things to which we are related. Moreover, both developments are subject to aberration; besides the progressive accumulation of related insights, there is the cumulative effect of refusing insights. In the subjective field, such refusal tends to be preconscious; it heads towards psychoneurotic conflict; it is opposite to the subject's rational judgment and deliberate choice, which, accordingly, can provide the analyst with his opportunity. In the objective field, the refusal is rationalized by a distinction between theory and practice; it heads both to social conflict and to social disintegration; it is to be opposed both by the common sense view that practicality is for man and not man for practicality and,

on a more recondite level, by the principle, implicit in dialectic, that practice succeeds in diverging from theory by taking the short view and refusing to raise and face further relevant questions.

Our account of common sense has led us to touch on many issues, but our concern is not these issues, which function illustratively, but the fact and the nature of insight. Within the perspectives of the present work, there is no point to a full and accurate account of the fields of psychology and of sociology. The topic is insight. To exhibit its nature and its implications, one has to venture into every department in which human intelligence plays a significant role. Still that venture is essentially a limited venture. For it is enough for our purpose to show that the notion of insight is indispensable in an adequate view, that it explains both the high esteem, in which commonly common sense is held, and the limitations, to which it is subject, that this explanation can begin from independent and apparently disparate premises and within the larger context that they yield, succeed in hitting off the thought of the average man, ~~as would Kierkegaard~~, the problem of his affects, ~~as would Freud~~, and the dialectic of his history, ~~as would a higher synthesis of liberal and Marxist thought~~.

Further, though our topic is common sense, still it has not been the whole of common sense. Besides intelligence, there is operative in common sense both judgment and choice with their implications of truth and error and of right and wrong. These higher components of common sense will receive some attention later. The foregoing study has been con-