

Bleau-DES

THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER

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[BL's handwritten notations are in *cursive script*]

The First Vatican Council (Schema) in *Collectio Lacensis*, 7.555 d.s.:

The supernatural state of being is defined, following St Thomas, as a participation in divine goodness, that is, the goodness that naturally belongs to God. This goodness is twofold: (1) 'God's love for all his creatures in common by which he bestows natural existence upon them (Wis 11:24), and (2) a special love by which he leads rational creatures from their natural state to a participation in divine goodness' (*Sum. Theol.*, 1-2, q. 110, a. 1).

Ibid. 547 d.s.

'God has willed to grant to his rational creatures a knowledge of him and love of him and a communication of himself and union with him in a far more sublime order which their natural powers, however perfected they may be within their own order, do not attain – an order, therefore, that is above the power of any created nature and beyond any requirement of their natural perfection, and thus is a supernatural order.'

Ibid. 563a.: The supernatural does not diminish human dignity, nor does it hinder freedom and happiness; it does not repress them but exalts them in a marvelous way.

Ibid.563d 3: Declaration: 1^o : 'the human order is not repressed by the supernatural, but is ennobled and perfected ...' God in his infinite goodness has ordered humanity to a supernatural end, to a participation in the good things of God, which utterly surpass the understanding of the human mind (DB 1786).`

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DECLARATION 1

Considered philosophically, an absolutely supernatural being is one that exceeds the proportion of any limited substance whatsoever.

N.B.: Important to distinguish carefully:

1- The existence of God, pure existence;

2- The supernatural order; that is, the mystery of God's life in itself

3- The preternatural order; that is the order of the integrity of our human faculties fully subordinate to reason, which must be the sovereign mistress of the animal element of our life. Such complete dominion of reason over the lower faculties was a gratuitous favor. This gift was not owing to man as simply a rational animal; but it was not on that account supernatural, since its perfection is within itself and not at all divine.

(Balthasar: *Revue Neo-Scholastique*, 71 bis)

Supernatural: etymologically, 'that which is above nature, where nature is understood as finite, limited, something at least singular.

Nature: etymologically, that which is one with its origin. *Sum. Theol.* 3, q. 2, a. 12 c.

Dynamically: the radical principle of acting and receiving that belongs per se to any thing.

Ontologically: (a) metaphysically, the essence of a thing

(b) physically, all the elements whereby a being proceeds, becomes known to us, and is distinguished from other beings.

Collectively: the essential order of things that per se and primarily work together for the perfecting of the whole. See *Sum. Theol.* 1, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4m.

We are dealing here with an intellectual nature.

Natural: for any thing, it is that which belongs to that thing in accordance with its being. S.T. 1-2, q. 10, a. 1.

It is a relational term with a broader meaning than 'nature'.

That is said to be 'natural' (*an equivocal term*) which (1) accompanies the birth or origin of a thing, (2) is suitable for a nature inasmuch as it is opposed to what is contrary to a nature, violent (these two meanings are to be disregarded, as having no contribution to make to constructing the notion of the supernatural), (3) constitutes the essence of a thing, (4) is a necessary consequence to or is conceived as being consequent upon the

essence of a thing, (5) pertains operationally to the essence of a thing (its passivities, activities), (6) what is demanded by a nature, so that its powers not be frustrated in their action, (7) whatever is conducive or complementary to a nature, i.e., what is useful or helpful to the being or the action of a thing, or (8) what pertains to the purpose of a nature, that is, to its end and its attainment to which a nature is rightly ordered.

Supernatural: can be described as that which

- (1) neither constitutively (essentially) nor consecutively (as a consequence) nor operationally nor exigently nor dispositively and complementarily nor purposefully belongs to a nature,
- (2) is found beyond the range and ambiance of a nature,
- (3) is added a nature already constituted, which it thereby perfects and by perfecting it elevates it and so transfers it to a higher order, and
- (4) excludes anything that is due (merited), not only to the person (morally) but also to the nature (S.T. 1-2, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2m), and this both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject.

In general, then, supernatural is that which exceeds the proportion, that is, the essence, the exigence, and the potency (powers) of a nature and can gratuitously perfect it beyond its own order.

Hence it is not unsuited to nature, nor is it indifferent; but it is fitting for it, not through its own connatural potency but through obediencial potency. S.T. 1-2, q. 2, a.1; 3, q. 11, a. 1. [RD: *potentia oboedientiae*] (*a higher agent can use a lower in whatever way he wants*)

Three natures can be considered:

- a) a singular created nature
- b) the universal created nature
- c) a possible or createable universal nature

Considering nature as (a) or (b), what is natural with respect to one nature can be supernatural with respect to the other lower nature. Hence 'supernatural' can be relatively supernatural, that is, supernatural in some respect, or absolutely supernatural, supernatural without qualification.

The relatively supernatural, that which exceeds the proportion of only some created nature, but not of all created or createable (possible) nature.

The absolute supernatural is that which exceeds the proportion of any substance (nature) whatsoever, that is, of anything created or createable or of any limited substance whatsoever.

Considered from a philosophical viewpoint, that is, attending primarily to nature, the point at which the departure begins, or rather, the point above which the advance and elevation occurs.
(Negative definition; nominal definition; abstract idea; relatively considered; secondary concept.)

Accordingly, absolute supernatural must be divided upon the basis of this excess and this basis can only be intrinsic or extrinsic.

Hence supernatural is essentially diverse according to whether it exceeds nature as to its intrinsic causes or only as to its extrinsic causes.

Therefore a thing is absolutely supernatural either

(1) as to substance (essence). This is intrinsically or entatively supernatural (S.T. 1-2, q. 110, [a. 2], ad 2m), or

(2) as to the manner. This is essentially or entatively natural but advanced or ordered to a supernatural end (modally supernatural).

Supernatural as to substance (i.e., as to formal cause) = uncreated or created

Supernatural as to manner, as to the final cause (e.g., going for a walk in the state of sanctifying grace) or as to the efficient cause (e.g., miracles, DB 1790):

- as to substance (above nature); *e.g.*, change in a glorified body

- as to subject in which (contrary to nature) *e.g.*, raising of Lazarus

- as to manner (beyond nature), *e.g.*, sudden healing

(S.T. 1, q. 105, **a. 8**); *De Potentia*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 3m.)

N.B. In speaking about divine help, some theologians call a help that is not an elevating help but only healing supernatural as to manner, but call a help that also elevates supernatural as to substance.

Distinguishing natural help according to its nature: free, contingent, accidental, adventitious, artificial, acquired, lucky.

Opposite to natural: elicited, moral, spiritual, divine, unusual, extraordinary, miraculous, personal.

In speaking of human nature, natural is predicated in two senses that are totally contrary:

‘I see what is the better course and I approve of it – but I follow the worse.’

‘To err is human’ – even though the intellect naturally seeks what is true.

Distinguishing natural help according to its relation to nature: unnatural, monstrous (violent) preternatural.

Preternatural (philosophically) is that which is not contrary to nature but is beyond connaturality.

In a specific sense: something gratuitous that perfect a creature beyond its due; yet within its own order, without its being raised to the divine order as participating in divine life.

Preternatural (in a specific sense) involves two things: that of which it is predicated does not simply follow from the nature of the subject in which it is; it is beyond what is due, not formally but materially; without it, that is, its nature is not frustrated; (b) yet in such a way that it is not in every respect intrinsically superior to that nature – not that it be a nature, but that it be better in its own way of proceeding.

Sometimes preternatural is defined as (a) relative angelic or diabolical supernatural (in a qualified sense); (b) absolute supernatural as to manner – a miracle, for example.

Supernatural

Ordinary: sanctifying grace, etc. *Surpasses all supernatural gifts given by God in [the normal course ?]*

Extraordinary: charisms, graces freely given.

EXCEEDS THE PROPORTION, i.e., is beyond both the powers and the exigencies and complementary to a concordant nature per se, i.e, considering its limits, law, and natural condition.

THEREFORE, defined philosophically, the supernatural is a gift of God that exceeds absolutely every substance created creatable, both its powers and exigencies and the fitting complements within its proper limits.

N.B. Supernatural is not necessarily opposed to
to natural, in the sense of ‘native’, ‘original’ DB 130
nor to natural, in the sense of ‘suitable,’ that is, in concordance with a nature.

ADVERSARIES

Certain Catholics (at least those known as such) who hold that a limited supernatural substance is probably not an impossibility, or at least that no arguments can prove that such a substance is impossible.

de Bay: supernatural = that which does not accompany the origin. In order that gifts of grace be judged supernatural they postulate an indignity to nature.

Jansen: supernatural is incompatible with what is due resulting from works, but not with what is due arising from an innate condition of nature.

Rationalists: Naturalism. There are various definitions of supernaturality. DB 1788, 1790, 1808, 1813, 1816, etc. (Suprasensible, spiritual, spirit, moral freedom, morality, spiritual life.)

Pantheists, Materialists, Atheists.

Semi-rationalists:

Günther, DB 1655-58

Hermes, DB 1818-22; Kühn.

Modernists: are opposed to the notions of supernaturality.

(a) on account of agnosticism, DB 2071

(b) by reason of their theory of vital immanence and about a religious sense, whereby they affirm that all faith and all supernatural power spontaneously emanate from the soul alone and are fully proportionate to its natural exigence. DB 2074, 2077, 2103.

Catholic immanentists (Blondel), etc. DB 2103.

At least with respect to their careless way of speaking: ‘Man in himself, i.e., in considering his own tendencies or through his moral weakness detects his *need* for religious good or help, which is found only in the Catholic Christian religion, and therefore that good or help is owing to human nature lest it be evil.’ See D’A [D’Alès ?] II, p. 603ff. P. 155.

Certain careless CATHOLICS: Stattler, Hirscher.

Supernatural = that which is produced not by secondary causes but immediately by God.

Supernatural = infinite (finite); divine (not divine); supercreated (uncreated), but created
= predominance of the spirit over the flesh.

Ligeard: (op. cit. 114-17): 'On peut par l'analyse psychologique des tendances de la nature humaine, sans faire intervenir les données de la révélation, démontrer à un incroyant qu'il y a en lui une tendance naturelle inexplicable, une inspiration positive au surnaturel.'

['By way of a psychological analysis of the tendencies of human nature, without reference to the data of revelation, one can demonstrate to an unbeliever that he has within himself an inexplicable natural tendency, an aspiration for the supernatural.']

NOTE: Certain.

N.B. Refers to the ABSOLUTE SUPERNATURAL AS TO SUBSTANCE, about which alone there can be any controversy.

PROOF:

That definition of the absolutely supernatural considered philosophically is correct which expresses a departure from nature (an advance above nature) that fits only and every absolutely supernatural entity.

But our definition expresses the departure from nature that fits only and every absolutely supernatural entity.

Therefore ...

MAJOR: is clear from its very terms.

MINOR: First part: FITS EVERY SUPERNATURAL ENTITY.

The absolutely supernatural is reducible to the hypostatic union, the beatific vision, and sanctifying grace.

But a departure from nature (the advance above nature expressed in our definition), i.e., a lack of proportion with any limited substance, fits those three instances.

Therefore our definition fits every absolute supernatural entity.

2nd MAJOR – stands because the other absolute supernatural entities are the causes or the effects of these three.

2nd MINOR – stands because either

(a) no limited supernatural substance exists;

(b) that which does not exceed its power is either

(1) a natural result and thus not of superior excellence, or

(2) a connatural end that with its necessary connections specifies a nature, or

(3) personal merits that are the fruit of natural morals, or

(4) consonant complements which are of the same genus and are completed.

MINOR: Second part: Fits only a supernatural entity.

- (a) For otherwise a natural entity would in no way be connected per se with its nature (*the natural would be supernatural*);
- (b) from the lack of a contrary argument, since such departure [from nature] applies to no rational animal or angel, which could present the strongest contrary argument.

FOR THIS DEPARTURE applies only to a supernatural entity:

(1) because the proportion that is excluded regards a created substance (essence) and one that is fully constituted. Therefore it excludes the soul, which is an incomplete substantial principle.

(2) because a rational soul is required as the end specifying a human body being organized through generation upon which it depends as upon a positive disposition and partner naturally required per se.

(3) because even though the production of an angel is required neither by some other natural being or group of beings nor by the substance of the angel itself, still its conservation, presuming its creation, is required by a certain right, since it is immortal by nature.

There is also the fact that an angel is a created substance, or *nature*; and hence it is excluded from being supernatural partly from the very concept of *supernatural* and partly because it implies a *limited substance*.

CONFIRMATION

1- From the Fathers of the Church.

They speak of the GIFTS of God: above nature, acquired, outside the substance, not within the power of nature, essentially gratuitous and undeserved, which can be lost (contrary to natural qualities) and are simply by grace;

Deification, sanctification, share of the spirit [Spirit?], the divine form impressed upon us, divine filiation, assimilation or and union with God, familiarity with God, beatific vision.

RJ 235, 253, 407, 529, 607, 699 766, 780, 813, 941, 944, 950, 960, 1011, 1027, 1071, 1185, 1203, 1237, 1282, 1318f., 1433, 1343 [*sic*; probably 1443], 1456, 1457f., 11468, 1473, 1496, 1755, 1777, 1791, 1807, 1837, 1851, 1857, 1889, 1939, 1974, 1982, 1999, 2005, 2034, 2044f., 2063, 2106f., 2115, 2265, 2286, 2353, 2359.

DB 311, 313.

2- From sacred Scripture, the Councils, Fathers, theologians throughout the treatise on grace.

DB 180, 311, 313, 1786, 1808.

3- From Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*:

1, q. 12, a. 4. [Vision of God impossible without grace]

1-2, q. 5, a. 5: To see God in his essence is above the nature not only of man but of any created thing.

1-2, q. 109, a.5: Man's end [eternal life] exceeds the proportion of human nature.

2-2. q. 23, a. 3, ad 3m: Charity is a participation of a superior nature.

Scholion I: On the absolute supernatural as to its manner.

- (a) as to the efficient cause, or about miracles: see the treatise *De vera religione*
- (b) as to the final cause:
 - (1) on the supernatural end itself: DB 1786, and the treatise *De novissimis, De revelatione*, and later;
 - (2) on actions: later in section on merit.

Scholion II: On the various states of human nature.

‘State’ – here, the condition or way of existing of human nature in its totality, in its ordination to its ultimate end in accordance with the order of divine providence.

(1) The state of pure nature: that state in which man would be left with only the principles of his nature and with the consequences of those principles (some distress, a natural end and concurrence.

(2) The state of unimpaired nature, that is, in which man would possess the gift of integrity: the state in which the sentient appetite is so subject to the rational appetite that of its own accord in remains within the bounds of rectitude and never moves a reluctant will to what is evil. This state per se does not include the supernatural in the strict sense. (Preternatural)

(3) The state of original justice or innocence (that of our first parents before their sin): the state which consisted of a threefold rectitude, ‘whereby the reason was subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, and the body was subject to the soul’ (S.T. 1, q. 95, a. 1). (Sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, from error, from suffering, from sickness, from death.)

(4) The state of fallen nature: the state of nature after the sin of Adam. This most wretched state has two characteristics: on one hand, man’s only end remains a supernatural end; on the other hand, man is left without grace, without which such an end cannot be attained. This state also lacks those gifts or immunities which in the state of innocence result from sanctifying grace.

(5) The state of nature repaired through Christ’s redemption: that state in which by sanctifying grace are restored its supernatural subordination of reason to God and its ordination to its ultimate end, but is left with the rebelling of its lower appetite against its higher appetite; in other words, concupiscence remains, even though we are able to resist it. This state is that of the human person rather than of his nature.

Hence the following assertions:

(a) In actual fact human nature exists only in the state of original justice and in the state of fallen but repaired nature.

(b) Original justice, which consists of the state of innocence and by the loss of which man falls into the state of fallen nature, is not completely distinct from sanctifying and elevating grace but only incompletely.

(c) The state of pure nature would have included, in addition to the essential principles of man and the faculties needed for a man to have the physical strength to attain his natural end, special divine helps that were quite necessary for him to have had the moral power to attain his end.

(d) In the state of original justice, man, possessed the help necessary to counteract his natural weakness thanks to the gift of integrity, which at that time resulted from sanctifying grace; but in the state of fallen nature this gift of integrity is lost and also those helps that would have assisted man in the state of pure nature. Finally, in the state of repaired nature, although the

disorder of his lower appetite remains, nevertheless the attainment of his ultimate end, which is supernatural, becomes morally possible through the bestowal of supernatural helps, which are known as 'graces'.

(c) Fallen man, if not raised up by the grace of Christ, would be in a worse condition than he would have been in in the state of pure nature. (Boyer, *De Gratia*, 12ff.)

De la Taille, *MF* 6. 1 col. (note): 'in the state of innocent nature, than which our present state, if one only considers the realities of our nature, is far worse – as, God willing, we shall show ...'

See Boyer, *Essais sur la doctrine de S. Augustin*: Could God have created man ?? the state of ignorance and hardship: 237-72.

Difficulties.

DECLARATION 2

Absolutely supernatural being, considered theologically, is that which by its intrinsic perfection pertains to union with God under the aspect of his intimate life.

N.B. This has to do with the absolutely supernatural as to substance.

Considered theologically, by directly and primarily regarding God, the *terminus ad quem* is the approach made in that elevation and ascent. Other opinions: considered positively; real definition, concrete idea considered ontologically, considered absolutely; primary idea.

Union = coming together of two or more elements under and in some formality.

Can be either moral or physical.

Moral union is that in which two or more persons are bound together in affection, in their activity, legally, etc., so that, while remaining several physically, they become one morally; for example, in the case of husband and wife.

The union at issue here is not a moral union only, and so can be called a physical union, although it is far different from physical union, both substantial and accidental, with which we are familiar.

A physical union is that in which several units come together to form a unity in the ontological order.

This union with God is real, belonging to the ontological order, is mysterious, and surpasses any reality and unity known to us, and can be effected by God alone.

In this union, the terms that are united are God and rational creatures; the *terminus ad quem* of the union is the Triune God, the source of unity. The formality in and under which they are

united is the intimate life of God, which clearly consists of operation, an operation, indeed, that is both vital and spiritual.

Every union can be understood in three ways:

Actively (the joining together, the act of uniting): this is the action of God uniting a rational creature to his intimate life. [Loneragan changes 'rational' to 'intellectual' to include angels].

Passively, as an accomplished fact: (Here fundamentally [BL writes 'it is the foundation of the union] is the absence of all division between the divine life as participated in by a rational creature and the unparticipated divine life.

Formally (here)

Passively, in the process of uniting. (Relatively. The real relation of a rational creature to the three persons of the Trinity. [BL writes, 'Why this distinction?']

Union with God in terms of his intimate divine life.

Perfections [BL writes: 'modes d'union = perfections ... avoir 3 modes'] of God; can be distinguished in three ways:

- (1) Perfections which belong to God alone and cannot be participated in by any creature: e.g., subsistent existence itself, infinity, supreme dominion (C.G. 1, c. 30).
- (2) Perfections of God which can be participated in according to some proportionality.

This participation can take place by way of

- a vestige (an effect representing only the causality of a cause but not the form of one), e.g., one being, etc., and those consequences of it that do not suppose intellectuality. (S.T. 1, q. 45, a. 7).
- an image (effect representing cause as to the likeness to its form.) (Ibid.)
 - of representation (i.e., according to the way of operating. S.T. 1, q. 27, a.3.
 - of conformity (i.e., according to the unity of the object; e.g., man understands and loves God and no longer only himself. S.T. 1, q. 93. [BL writes, 'not only the faculty but the object? the same]
- natural, according to the aptitude man has for understanding and loving God (hence law, beatitude, and natural knowledge of God)
- supernatural: man understands and loves God as God understands and loves himself: knowledge of God as he is in himself. (Same as the participation of the perfection of God referred to in the following section.)

(3) Perfections that are fitting to God alone insofar as they constitute the operations of his intimate life, that is, the knowledge possessed by God alone, the depths of God, the vision of God himself, God's trititarian life.

(In our case, for example, the sanctuary of conscience, the *apex animae*.)

Naturally, no creature can have even the slightest inkling of these, so there is no possibility of communicating them to creatures, nor can they be naturally communicated by God.

Only through an absolutely supernatural revelation can the possibility of their communication be known, and only supernaturally can they actually be communicated.

Parti-cipate is 'to take part', partake, *partem capere*, and therefore when anything receives something that belongs fully and essentially to another, it is universally said to share it or participate in it. (S.T., In Toeth de Hebdom [?] 1, 2.)

Participation in the natural order is μετοχή

Participation in the supernatural order is κοινωνία

Now the union we are dealing with takes place through participation in a perfection that is so proper to God that God himself, using his right of propriety, may wisely reserve it exclusively to himself and not communicate it, even analogically, to any creature – notwithstanding his will to create the world, and in fact every possible kind of finite beings.

This is the communication of God as he is in himself in his Trinitarian Life.

Just as in the natural order □κ μετοχής there is the analogy of proportionality in each analogate, so in the supernatural order □κ κοινωνίας there is the analogy of proportionality proper between the 'Trinitarian Life' as participated in by a just soul and the 'Trinitarian Life' that is God, because the formality 'Trinitarian Life' is verified in each analogate.

Μετοχη and κοινωνια are specifically distinct participations in the perfections of God, so that they are not merely degrees of participation in the same line of perfection but constitute two fundamentally distinct orders between which there exists an insuperable abyss on the part of creation.

Κοινωνια is not only something new, unexpected, unforeseen, outstanding, superb and sublime, but also totally inaccessible by natural powers.

It is not a mere development, however great, of μετοχή, in its own line, but is something added and extrinsic, inserting into nature extraneous elements, new, from 'without' and from 'apart', and from 'beyond' and from 'above'.

Μετοχή is owing to God's utterly free decision; κοινωνία on the other hand is owing to the utterly free decision of God's mercy.

In other words, μετοχή and κοινωνία are not univocal but analogous participations, simply different from each other, and only similar in some respect.

This is quite obvious: Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie*, pp. 251-55.

In μετοχή

God is considered

As one
As being
Creator
Lord
Author of nature
Provident
Efficient cause only

Is only present
Gives of what he has

Creature

Drawn out of nothing
Has relation to God
Substance
Servant, slave

God is known

Under the formality of being
Indirectly, mediately
Abstractive
Exteriorly
Through orientation
(Tends toward God)
Knowledge through intellect
Light of intellect is being in the
sensible

In κοινωνία

As Triune
As divine
Genitor
Father
Author of grace
Predestining
Also actuates, i.e.,
quasi formal cause
Is also indwelling
Gives himself

Drawn out of obediential potency
Is a relation to the Triune God
Accident
Son or daughter

Under the formality of Trinity
Directly, immediately

Interiorly
Through the intimate life of God
(Possesses God)
Knowledge through faith

Light of the intellect is God himself

‘The knowledge of faith, truly attained [?] despite its obscurity from God, such as he is not only in himself but through relation to himself, is not reducible to knowledge flowing solely from understanding, for which there is no other term except pure analogy, so sublime is it together with the living God, that whatever one may do, it attains the first Being only in its relationship with the world whose principle It is. Between the two there is a ‘great gulf’, an abyss which prohibits all homogeneity.’ (According to the mind of C. de la Taille. RB R 1928.32.)

From its intrinsic perfection;

That which not only, being absolutely supernatural as to its manner, is extrinsically by God’s will, ordered to this union, but which by reason of its entity either formally constitutes this union or is connected with it, at least remotely, as per se principle or effect.

Hence the substantially absolutely supernatural, considered theologically, is rightly defined as to the access of a creature to God.

That which by reason of its own perfection, or per se, is connected either by identity or formally or effectively or as an effect having a perfection which in this sense is proper to God alone, which God could wisely reserve entirely to himself, on whatever other supposition, by the use of his omnipotent power to create.

Anversaries:

(A) Who err by excess:

(1) Transubstantiation of a creature into God: Eckard, DB 510, 513; Molinos, DB 1225, 1230, 1232f; Rosmini, DB 1918, 1926ff.

(2) God would become the form of a creature, as, for example, the soul is the form of the body: Eutyches, see DB 710; Michael Servetus.

(3) This is necessarily a hypostatic union, as in the case of Christ: Molinor, DB 511.

(B) Who err by defect:

(1) Perfection ‘to the limit’ of nature itself, created in its proper line; a univocal augmentation, not quantitative but qualitative; e.g., Bergson: ‘The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.’ [BL: he eliminates the abyss between the natural and the supernatural: he elevates nature in such a way that there is continuity between the natural and the supernatural. And: (From this error Bergson implies that all beings = equivocal.)

(2) External application of divine holiness ((e.g., silver plated), e.g., Luther, DB 820f. [BL: as one changes one’s clothes]

(3) de Bay, DB 1021, 1023f.

(4) Moderists: DB 2108, 2087, 2081.

(5) Pantheists (Fear of the divine): DB 1801ff.

(6) Rationalists (It is too beautiful to be true): DB 1807f. [BL draws a bracket around either all four of these or the last three and writes: it comes ultimately to the analogy of being.]

Theological Note: Certain, and said by some to be Of Faith as partly contained in Scripture and Tradition.

Meaning of the thesis:

The substantially supernatural is said to be in creatures inasmuch as that which substantially is and can only be in God occurs in creatures participating in the interior divine life. The creature does not necessarily become God, but in fact creature—God (S.T. 1-2, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2m). [The text in the *Summa* had *bonitatem* instead of *vitam internam*, ‘goodness’ instead of ‘eternal life.’ BL changed it. The text also had *Non necessario fit creatura—Deus*, which BL changed to *Non necessario creatura fit Deus*.

Proof.

(1) From Scripture: 2 Peter 1:4. (Greek for ‘sharer of divine nature’).

In this text there is asserted that a certain absolutely substantial supernatural entity (sanctifying grace) considered theologically is said to be in the proper sense a physical and physically permanent sharing in the divine nature poured into us;

But (i) such a sharing in the divine nature pertains by reason of its intrinsic perfection to union with God under the formality of God’s intimate life.

Major premise: is clear from the treatise on sanctifying grace.

Minor:

(1) is clear from the terms.

(2) from everything else;

In general: see de la Taille in MF (*Mysterium Fidei*) 512.

All grace is of one formality [BL: species] inasmuch as it orders the subject to see God as he is. For the vision of God is one and the same in all, generically or specifically (as transcending all genus and species, so that it pertains to the order of the Godlike): since it is in all whose end is the same object, so to speak, by which the divine intellect is specified.

Every nature has its species from the act to which of itself it ultimately tends, as an animal [is specified] by its property of sensing and man [is specified] by his degree of abstract knowing.

Grace, therefore, which is in the just as a nature (directly affecting not their operation or power but their substance) has its species from that vision which it equips them to elicit: and since, as we have said, grace is one and the same, it necessarily follows that grace is one and the same in all: in Christ and in all the just, be they angels or men.

In particular (See R.SR 1920, 253-69; de la Taille).

On the hypostatic union, it is clear from its very notion that it is not of a lower order (cf. treatise on the Incarnate Word)

On the beatific vision (1 Jn 3:2-3). Cf. treatise *De Deo Uno*.

Other references: because there are causes or effects of sanctifying grace, St Thomas, for example, in speaking of charity, writes as follows: ‘Charity is not a virtue of man as man but inasmuch as by participation he becomes God, and a son of God, according to 1 Jn 3:1.’

(b) By itself: from the foregoing and from its terms.

(2) From the teaching of the Church: e.g., DB 178f., 799f., 811-13, 796, 842, 1786.

From the schema of the Vatican Council, *Collectio Lacensis* 7, 555 b ff.:

The Christian faith acknowledges the existence of a great mystery of divine kindness from the very beginning of the human race. Man, having been made in the image and likeness of God, by his very nature is directed to know, worship, and love, in a manner that is in keeping with his innate ability. But the supreme Founder and Lord of all things, whose power is not restricted to the properties and laws of created nature, out of his infinite goodness willed to raise the human race in the person of its progenitor to a sublime state in which he would be made a sharer of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1: 4). Therefore, besides the gifts by which would perfect him in his own nature, God poured into him the Holy Spirit, so that though by nature a servant yet by the grace of holiness a son, no longer by the strength of nature alone but by love given him from on high, he would by fulfilling God's commandments and performing works of virtue be worthy of an eternal inheritance.

... so that ... rising from virtue to virtue he would be transported to the kingdom of heaven to behold the God of gods, a vision incapable of being seen by any natural faculty, but a face to face vision of God as he is, and, transformed by this vision, would drink of a torrent of divine pleasure.

This is that elevation of man which catholic Doctors, following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers of the Church, have rightly called supernatural, transcending both the power and the exigency of such created nature, and therefore owing neither to the merits nor to the natural condition of man, but is a gratuitous benefit from the generosity of God.

Likewise 566 a. Canon III.2: If anyone says that this order is to be admitted to be supernatural only in so far as it can be said to be supernatural, that is, whatever does not belong to the essential perfection of man; and does not acknowledge that there are divine gifts and institutions that surpass both the power and exigency of created nature and perfect it beyond its natural order: *anathema sit*.

Canon 4: If anyone says that that holiness and justice in which man was created before the fall was not supernatural but which could have been attained by virtuous living by one's innate natural powers: *anathema sit*.

(3) From the Fathers: they call these gifts as follows:

Deification: θεωσις, θειωσις, θεοποιησις, θεωσις κατα θεωσιν

(Not κατα ον): θεοποιειναι, θεοποιειν; (an apotheosis), assimilation to and union with God: □φομοιωσις και □νωσις προς θεον; not δουλοι (slaves) but θεοι κατα χαριν (gods by way of charity; familiarity with God: thus, e.g., Athanasius R770, 780, 788; Basil: R941, 944, 960; St Greg. Nyssa, R1027; Didymus Alex., R1071; Ambrose, R1318; Augustine, R1433; Cyril of Alex., R2063; Pseudo-Denis the Areopagite, R2286, etc. [BL: Pinard de la Boulaye, p. 125, retreat 1933, "la vie Divine."])

(4) Ex: e.g., St Thomas, *De Caritate*, a. 2, ad 15um:

In this article St Thomas asks 'whether charity is a virtue', and in the 15th objection he writes: 'According to the Philosopher, friendship consists in some sort of equality. But between God and us there is the greatest inequality, being infinitely distant. Therefore there cannot be friendship in God toward us or in us toward God; and so charity, which denotes this sort of friendship, does not seem to be a virtue. —thus replies the holy Doctor.

It must be said that charity is not a virtue of man as man but as through participation man becomes God and a son of God, according to 1 Jn 3:1: ‘See what love the Father has lavished upon us, that we are called and are sons of God.’

Corollary 1 – The essential uncreated supernatural is that in God which is known to God alone about himself: ‘No one ever sees God (Jn 1:18); no one except the Father knows the Son, and no one except the Son knows the Father (Mt 11:27).

Summa theol., 1, q. 1, a. 6: Sacred doctrine most properly treats of God under the aspect of the highest cause; not only as he is knowable through creatures (which is what philosophers know; see Rom 1: ‘what is known about God is known to them’), but also as God is known to himself alone and has revealed to others.’

Ibid. q. 12, a. 4: It follows, then, that to know self-subsistent existence is naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, and that it is above and beyond the natural power of any created intellect, since no creature is its own existence but only has it through participation.

Ibid. q. 32, a. 1: Through natural reason humans can come to know what belongs to the unity of God’s essence but not to the distinction of persons.

Ibid. 1-2, q. 109, a. 1: The human intellect cannot know more sublime intelligibilities unless it is strengthened by a more powerful light, as in the case of the light of faith, or of prophecy. This light is called the ‘light of grace’, in that it is added to natural light.

Summa contra Gentiles, I, c. 3: There are certain truths that exceed all the power of the human intellect, such as that God is three and one. Cf. *ibid.* c. 8.

A created supernatural is essentially a formal participation in the intimate life of God, even if analogical with what in God is known to him alone about himself.

Hence the absolute substantial supernatural considered theologically can also be defined

- (a) a gift of the strictly divine order (DB 1786)
- (b) a gift through which there is participated some property that is naturally proper to God alone;
- (c) a gift of God pertaining to deification, to the Godlike life of God, to the sharing in the divine nature, to union with God as author of grace, to the face-to-face vision of God.

Corollary 2 — Just as in the natural order of things different things have different requirements, in which a harmony among things consists, so also in the supernatural order different things have different needs, and so on, and thus there is a certain supernatural world, having no less harmony among its various parts than there is in the natural world. Hence one supernatural gift can be said to be *due* to another supernatural gift and yet remain supernatural. DB 842. (Monsabré: 18th Conference, 3rd part.). Thus, for example, from sanctifying grace flow the theological virtues, the right to the beatific vision, and so to the light of glory.

Corollary 3 — Thus the absolutely supernatural, considered theologically, is not a mere development of an intellectual nature in its own proper sphere, as, for example, the perfection of a human or an angel, but is a radical change, it is a transfer from the simple human or angelic order, or of a superior nature, to the divine order.

E: 1171, 1203, 2193.

Corollary 4 — What we have said above can be confirmed from the schemas of the Vatican Council, *Collectio Lacensis* 7:

566: III. 1,2,3; V, n. 1; 567, 5;

555b; 555c; 557a.4; 558c; 562a; 563c;

516. The whole of Chapter 16; 547c. {?} from Traditur ... to 548 (39)f.

Excursus 1. There are two ways of erring concerning the relationships between nature and supernature.

(1) To deny the distinction between them is to affirm the homogeneity of all things, like the materialists, determinists, monists, pantheists, and evolutionists; in that case the supernatural is but a degree of evolution that arrives at a state of perfection.

(The univocity of all beings)

(2) To deny their union is to affirm the heterogeneity of all things. Physical laws of nature do not exist, but all things are singular, new, unexpected, unforeseeable, extraordinary, sublime, and hence the supernatural is only something that is more novel, more unexpected, more unforeseen than other phenomena.

(The absolute equivocity of all beings)

According to catholic teaching they are distinct (for the supernatural supposes the natural) but are united (the supernatural perfects nature).

(Analogy of all beings)

Excursus 2. How the supernatural is not only a participation in divine perfection to a greater degree than a natural participation in divine perfection but is a specifically different participation (difference not only of degree but a difference in kind)?

See the preliminary notes dealing with the distinction between μετοχή and κοινωνία.

Participation (μετοχή) is not communication (κοινωνία). God does not communicate himself; God gives himself only to the just soul as such, even though he is participated in by the whole of creation, material and immaterial. Every being possesses some resemblance to him with his perfections. Only the saints have some association with his nature and his life (sharers in the divine nature). De la Taille, *RSR* 1926, 320ff.

Difficulties: W.8, p. 8 [by hand: W = Würzburgers]

Readings:

A. Adapted from Penido, *The role of analogy in dogmatic theology*, pp. 251-55.

‘Radical immanence must be denied: impossible to go from μετοχή to κοινωνία without direct intervention on the part of God; grace is not at all a flowering of nature; but on the other hand, negation of radical extrinsicism; this passage is accomplished by the actuation of capacities already latent in nature. (Grace is marvelously adapted to us; it responds to our deeper aspirations, intensifies our energies; through grace we outdo ourselves. If it is divine, it is

notwithstanding part of being, of spiritual being, as we ourselves are also, and we are spiritual, made in the image of God. There is in us, then, a capacity, not an exigence, for supernatural life.)

Grace is therefore not a violence but a perfecting.

This is not at all to deny radical extrinsicism as to hold with St Thomas that at its infusion grace is not created but drawn from the 'obediential potency' of the soul.

If St Thomas denies the identity between superature and nature, he maintains their strict unity.

In the life of grace there exists a perfect continuity; faith is but a 'foretaste of that knowledge which will render us blessed in the future,' *Comp. Theol.* c. 2. From the first beginnings of charity to the raptures of mysticism to the vision of glory itself, it is the same movement that continues, the same river that broadens out. There is here a 'way of increase', a univocity. We can pass homogeneously from faith to the contemplation of the Trinity; not a matter of becoming divine, as the false mystics would have it, but to possess it; the created supernatural is not a substance but an accident in the category of action; but accident is essentially relative, and in the present case, relative to the divine supernatural; the accident grows, the relation increases, each time it releases itself further, yet without ever dissolving into identity. (See above on union taken relatively.)

An advocate of univocity would say that nature itself is also an essential relation with God; if it grows to infinity, or must continue along the same line up to the divine essence as such.

It is not that, since a created substance has this relation, it no longer IS: in proceeding along your quantitative way, climbing the ladder of the finite, you increase being but not the relation. You will not be any further ahead at the end. Although grace entails a growth of the relation; charity also is called 'the seed of glory'; from one to the other there is a continual development, growth, expansion, and maturation of the same seed.

Nature, in return, is not a GERM of superature; it is but the POINT OF INSERTION; univocity cannot be appealed to here, and catholic teaching bids us as a consequence to maintain, against Jansenius, Baius and immanentism, the absolute gratuity of all supernatural gifts.

A tendency to univocity will ultimately lead to a more or less radical confusion of the two orders. Someone will maintain, for example, that the distinction between nature and superature is not OBJECTIVE, but depends simply on an arbitrary determination on the part of God, and another will confuse faith with reason.

(Adapted from Penido: *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*, 251-55.)

B. Adapted from Chesterton, *Heretics*, chapter 12.

The real difference between Paganism (Nature) and Christianity (Supernature) is the difference between the natural virtues and the three mystical Virtues of Christianity (Faith, Hope, Charity).

The NATURAL virtues are the SAD virtues, the REASONABLE virtues.

The MYSTICAL virtues are the GAY and EXUBERANT virtues, and are in their essence as UNREASONABLE as they can be, in the sense that they involve a PARADOX in their own nature, and that this is not true of any of the typically pagan or rationalist virtues.

JUSTICE consists in finding out a certain thing due to a certain man and giving it to him.
 TEMPERANCE consists in finding the proper limit of a particular indulgence and adhering to that.

But CHARITY means pardoning what is unpardonable, or it is no virtue at all. It is the power of defending that which we know to be indefensible. It is the underserving who require charity, and the ideal either does not exist at all, or exists wholly for them.

HOPE means hoping when things are hopeless, or it is no virtue at all. It is the power of being cheerful in circumstances which we know to be desperate. The virtue of hope exists only in earthquake and eclipse. For practical purposes it is at the hopeless moment that we require the hopeful man, and the virtue either does not exist at all or begins to exist at that moment. Exactly at the instant when hope ceases to be reasonable it begins to be useful.

As long as matters are really hopeful, hope is a mere flattery or platitude; it is only when everything is hopeless that hope begins to be a strength at all. LIKE ALL CHRISTIAN VIRTUES IT IS AS UNREASONABLE AS IT IS INDISPENSABLE. (*Heretics*, ch. 8)

FAITH means believing the incredible or it is no virtue at all.

They are all three paradoxical; they are all three practical and they are all three paradoxical because they are practical.

Whatever may be the meaning of the contradiction, it is the fact that the only kind of hope that is of any use in a battle is a HOPE that denies arithmetic. Whatever may be the meaning of the contradiction, it is the fact that the only kind of CHARITY which any weak spirit wants or which any generous spirit feels is the charity which forgives the sins that are like scarlet. Whatever may be the meaning of FAITH, it must always mean a certainty about something we cannot prove. The one kind of sin that CHARITY should cover is the sin which is inexcusable.

C. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, ch. VI.

‘Charity is a paradox, like modesty and courage. Stated baldly, charity certainly means one of two things – pardoning unpardonable acts, or loving unlovable people ...

A sensible pagan would say that there were some people one could forgive, and some one couldn’t: a slave who stole wine could be laughed at; a slave who betrayed his benefactor could be killed, and cursed even after he was killed. Insofar as the act was pardonable, the man was pardonable. That again is rational, and even refreshing; but it is a dilution [sic]. It leaves no place for a pure horror of injustice, such as that which is great beauty in the innocent. And it leaves no place for a mere tenderness for men as men, such as is the whole fascination of the charitable Christianity came in here as before [sic]. It came in startlingly with a sword, and clove one thing from another. It divided the crime from the criminal. The criminal we must forgive unto seventy times seven. The crime we must not forgive at all. It was not enough that slaves who stole wine inspired partly anger and partly kindness. We must be much more angry with theft than before, and yet much kinder to thieves than before. There was room for wrath and love to run wild.

DECLARATION 3

An intrinsically supernatural created nature is an absolute impossibility – that is, an intellectual creature to whom, by reason of its natural principles, supernatural gifts are connaturally due.

BL: A question of right; in declaration 2, a question of fact.

P.2.51; S.Th 1, q. 12, a. 4; De grat 8.3; Ripalda, De ente supernaturali disp{utatio} 23; Molina, In 1, 12, 5, disp. 2; Valencia, in Q. 1, disp. 1, qu. 12, punct. 3; Piccirelli, De Deo, 385; Becanus, Theol. Schol. 1, 9, 5; Lennerz, De Deo, pp. 102-9; Narent ds Études, 93, 156-65.

IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE: i.e., it consists of mutually incompatible characteristics. It is not only a question of fact but also of right; not only about a created nature but also of any creatable one.

INTRINSICALLY SUPERNATURAL CREATED NATURE: i.e, it is an intellectual creature which per se and by reason of its own constitutive principles that it has by right, as excellent in its order as an absolutely supernatural gift regarding substance, considered theologically.

In other words, it is a created nature which by reason of its constitutive elements is proportionate to an absolutely supernatural gift regarding substance.

INTELLECTUAL CREATURE: that is, any creature endowed with intellectuality, and so also rational creatures.

TO WHOM BY REASON OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ITS NATURE ARE CONNATURALLY DUE: that is, without which that nature would be frustrated, indeed even monstrous; for example, fire needs heat; a human needs reason, etc.

SUPERNATURAL GIFTS: those that belong to union with God as to his intimate life, such as, e.g., the hypostatic union, the intuitive vision of God (the light of glory), sanctifying grace, the light of faith, actual grace, and so on.

ADVERSARIES:

Ripalda, Molina, Valentia, Morlaix.

NOTE: MOST COMMON OPINION: all theologians, both ancient and modern, with few exceptions, hold this teaching and it seems CERTAIN.

1. From the Fathers of the Church.

The Fathers agree in this, that a creature in general is a slave, not a son or daughter, nor a friend of God, and they base this assertion on the very notion of creation;

But those who state this about a creature and indeed on this basis evidently hold that no actually existing or even possible intellectual creature, by reason of the principles of its nature, is proportionate to sanctifying grace, and the rest.

Therefore according to the Fathers there is no intellectual creature, existing or possible, to whom by the principles of its nature, are connaturally owed supernatural gifts.

Therefore an intrinsically supernatural created nature is an absolute impossibility.

MINOR: It is clear (1) from the fact that authors are to be understood in their proper sense, unless there is some reason to the contrary; and especially because the formality of

creation is the same in all creatures, existing or merely possible; (2) because a creature to whom sanctifying grace is due naturally is naturally a son or daughter and friend of God (as will later be clear in the treatise of sanctifying grace). Filiation, one, that is, that would be essential, would necessarily lead to natural filiation, which by the same token would hold for any absolute supernatural, on account of the intrinsic connection of the others.

MAJOR: e.g., Cyril of Alexandria, Athanasius, etc., etc. See R 187, 385, 410, 766, 788, 811, 1011, 1273, 1468, 1777, 2089, 2106.

This argument is CONFIRMED by the fact that creation (production of a thing from nothing of itself or of a subject) can in no way be or ought to be confused with generation (the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle with a resulting likeness in nature). Now, a creature is brought to supernatural gifts through generation (Jn 3:3-9); but creation does not imply generation, that is, generation cannot be inferred from the mere idea of creation. (From the thesis on the attributes of the divine nature had through sanctifying grace.)

2. From Scripture:

Mt 11:27, 16:17; Jn 1:12, 1:18; 1 Cor 2:11, 6-12; 1 Tim 1:17, 6:16; 1 Jn 4:12.

3. From theologians, who distinguish between natural and supernatural, what is owing and not owing to nature.

4. From the *Summa Theologiae*:

1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 5m: to see God in his essence is above nature, not only the nature of man but above any created nature.

1-2, q. 109, a. 5: the end of man exceeds the proportion of his nature.

2-2, q. 23, a. 3, ad 3m: Charity is a participation in a superior nature.

1, q. 12, a. 4.

5. From reason (Impossibility on the part of a creature)

(a) It is clear from revelation that a Christian is truly deified by the supernatural gifts and especially by sanctifying grace, through an assimilation to the divine nature.

But if a finite supernatural substance were possible, the true deification of a Christian through an assimilation to the divine nature would be impossible.

Therefore ...

MAJOR: Clear from the treatise on grace.

MINOR: A true deification of a Christian through assimilation to the divine nature by means of sanctifying grace is impossible unless that perfection of God whose likeness we receive through this grace is *truly proper to God alone*, so that only God would possess it connaturally in his own right;

But if a supernatural substance were possible, then that perfection whose likeness we receive by means of sanctifying grace would not be truly proper to God alone, so that God alone would connaturally and in his own right possess it; indeed, there would never be any deification at all;

Therefore if a supernatural substance were possible, the true deification of a Christian through assimilation to the divine nature would be impossible.

LAST MINOR: Because a Christian receiving sanctifying grace would receive a perfection proper to God and that substance, that gift would not belong specifically to the divine order. S.Th.

(b) A created or creatable creature is totally and entirely a potential being; That such a being would exigently, that is, in a proper manner, have what is altogether proper to Pure Act is a contradiction in terms; Therefore. BL: impossible ... intrinsically supernatural.

CONFIRMED by various absurdities which would follow from ...[?]
It would follow that a creature would be
(a) one to whom a hypostatic union with a divine Person is connaturally owed;
(b) who would be impeccable by its very nature;
(c) who would be naturally an adoptive son/daughter of God and consequently a natural son/daughter; for a filiation that would exist essentially (that is, by nature) necessarily becomes natural filiation. The Word of God would not be unique.

PROOF (FROM A MORAL ATTRIBUTE OF GOD)

Read 1 Cor 2:6-3; 1 Cor 2:10; 1 Tim 1:17, 6:16.

The supreme independence of God, his moral dignity, his right to be lord by himself, require that God reserve to himself alone the inner sanctum of his intimate life, a right that men and angels have for themselves. (Think of the seal of confession, professional secret)

The intuitive vision of God is the supreme revelation of the divine essence, that is, the revelation of the inner sanctum of God's intimate life.

Hence, if some created intrinsically supernatural nature were possible, God, supposing his will to create, could not reserve to himself alone the hidden and profound inner sanctum of his intimate life.

This, as is obvious, is absolutely impossible.

This holds for every intrinsically supernatural gift, because every intrinsically supernatural gift has its specification from the beatific vision to which it is at least radically ordered.

Études, 93.159 (Harent)

THE SUPERNATURAL STATE of the PRESENT LIFE is not essentially different from that of the FUTURE LIFE. What constitutes essentially the SUPERNATURAL is the IMMEDIATE UNION OF THE SOUL WITH GOD. In this union is found the eternal life that is for the Christian essentially the same here below and in eternity. In heaven as in the present life there is *koinonia*. Cardinal Mercier: *La vie intérieure*, 489; Love never ceases (1 Cor 13:8).

COROLLARY I:

Otherwise there would be only a modal distinction and not a specific distinction between the order of natural truth and the order of supernatural truth. DB 1786; 1795ff.

COROLLARY II:

NATURAL GIFTS: by a totally free choice; free from all necessity; DB 1783, 1805.

SUPERNATURAL GIFTS: out of God's infinite goodness; DB 1786; conferred by the free choice of divine goodness; inexhaustible goodness; a gratuitous boon from God's goodness. Schema of Vatican Council, *Collectio Lacensis* 7.547d.

God willed to impart to his rational creature KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF, and a COMMUNICATION OF HIMSELF, and UNION WITH HIM IN A FAR MORE SUBLIME ORDER of being, in which natural powers, however greatly perfected within their own order, do not attain, and so this order is above the created powers and beyond all the exigencies required by natural perfection, and hence a supernatural order. Therefore the good of this order, even supposing the creation of a rational nature and whatever degree of natural perfection one could wish, is unowed to any natural exigency or merit; and in this sense such goods are said to be superadded and gratuitous, and solely CONFERRED BY THE TOTALLY FREE CHOICE OF THE DIVINE GOODNESS. Accordingly, by this very fact, just as the existence of this order and its communication is an unowed gift of God, so it can be known by us only through divine revelation. As it is written, 'What eye has not seen, ...' 1 Cor 2:9ff.

COROLLARY III:

God alone can naturally know himself as he is in himself and love himself without any created intermediary, and enjoy the vision and the immediate possession of his infinite Essence; in a word, the 'supernatural' is natural to God alone. In other words, only for God is Trinitarian life natural. (Card. Mercier, *La vie intérieure*, p. 488).

COROLLARY IV: CHRIST'S GRACE OF UNION.

In every created essence there is a real distinction between essence and existence.

In the line of ESSENCE, every intrinsically supernatural created being is something accidental. [BL added 'created' by hand.] (1-2, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2m).

In the line of EXISTENCE, THE GRACE OF UNION of Christ, although it is not a substance, still it is not an accident, but reductively belongs to the predicament of substance. [BL: it is something substantial]

The grace of union is a passive communication of the divine *esse* of the person of the Word, in the line of existence, taking the place of the created existence of a proper act of being which was naturally owed to the humanity of Christ.

Now the existence of a substance is not a substance, but is as something substantial that is reduced to the predicament of substance. (See the treatise *De Verbo Incarnato*).

OBJECTIONS.

[There is a handwritten page of objections from Ripalda; handwriting seems to be BL's. It has no page number. In the notes it is placed between the last two pages, numbered 29 and 30. Reverse of page 29 is blank, but BL writes: Objections.

Ripalda: 1 – Deus: as omnipotent ... can create a supernatural substance. (BL distinguishes the antecedent:) Dist. – can create a possible supernatural substance, C, impossible, N. He distinguishes the conclusion, distinguish differently – considering his omnipotence alone: let it pass (e.g., word? Immortal soul) – considering his omnipotence plus other attributes, N. (God cannot contradict himself).

2- There exist supernatural accidents, C. ... there can exist supernatural substances, I deny the consequent. – There is no such thing as an intrinsically supernatural creature. (*a posteriori*)

3- those goods are finite... can be produced by God. BL distinguishes antecedent: I distinguish the antecedent: on the part of the subject, I grant (e.g., beatific vision); - on the part of one rightly demanding [it], I deny (that supernatural created gift means there is a relation to the intimate life of God, which is not created) (De la Talle, *Mysterium Fidei*, 509?)

DECLARATION 4

The supernatural order is not self-contradictory; or, is negatively possible.

P. 1-169; Palmieri, *De Deo creante*, 303-09; V. Noort, *De Deo creatore*, 53ff. (from which the proof is taken); Mattinssi, II ? Kantiano, 211ff., 240ff., 273.

ORDER: suitable disposition of means to an end.

SUPERNATURAL ORDER; suitable disposition of supernatural means and laws to a supernatural end. A creature foreordained to a supernatural end and whose proportionate means contribute towards that end is said to be raised to a supernatural end.

NOT SELF-CONTRADICTION: i.e., does not consist of mutually exclusive predicates.

OR: ... to indicate more clearly what we want to prove: that it is not negatively possible.

NEGATIVELY POSSIBLE, i.e., that the impossibility of a supernatural order cannot be proven by any peremptory reason.

Such a negative proof is not enough, since we deem that it must be granted that the actual possibility of a simply and absolutely supernatural order cannot be positively proven by reason. Cf. 1, q. 21, a. 2. (see Corollary 2).

From the schema of the Vatican Council, *Col. Lac.* 7.548: 'Just as the existence of this order and its communication above nature is an unowed gift of God's grace, so neither can it be known to us except through divine revelation', and quotes 1 Cor 2.9-10.

ADVERSARIES

Materialists, Determinists, Monists, Pantheists, Evolutionists, and Rationalists reject *a priori*, the elevation of a creature to a supernatural order, alleging its possibility [?]; in proving this, they proceed in two ways.

(1) by affirming that nothing is supernatural.

(2) by so extolling nature as to have all supernatural goods required by nature, lest any be frustrated.

As Dr. Carrel, *Man the Unknown*, has said, this position is antiscientific; no true scientist has any right to deny facts, since *ab esse ad posse valet illatio*.

NOTE; APOLOGETICALLY: Certain

DOGMATICALLY: de fine definita, DB 1786, 1807, 1808.

PROOF

The elevation of a creature to the supernatural order cannot be said to be impossible, unless one shows:

(a) that the notion of supernatural good involves a contradiction;

(b) that its bestowal is absolutely impossible

(i) either on the part of God

(ii) or on the part of a creature.

But this cannot be shown.

Therefore ...

MAJOR premise: is evident, since such an impossibility cannot occur unless because of the gift itself (a) or because of God who confers it (b.1) or because of a creature that receives it (b.2).

MINOR:

(a) The notion of supernatural gift, exceeding the power and the exigency of the creature, does not have contradictory predicates.

For it is not CONTRARY to nature (not indifferent, neutral, inappropriate) [BL: for according to obediencial potency] unsuitable, violent [BL: for the supernatural perfects nature).

Even though it is not WITHIN the proportionate object of an intellectual nature, still it is not OUTSIDE an object that is proportionable or commensurate with such a nature. It is BEYOND and ABOVE the connatural potency of a nature left to itself, but nevertheless it is IN ACCORDANCE WITH the obediencial potency of a nature, and it is so on account of the analogical nature of the Uncreated and the created.

THIS BEING SAID:

(b) The conferring of such a gift is not self-contradictory, either

(1) on the part of God, whose

(aa) power extends to all that is intrinsically possible;

(bb) ability¹ to dispose things is able to harmoniously unite the

supernatural with the natural;

(cc) goodness shines forth most clearly in such an elevation of a creature.

(2) on the part of the creature being elevated.

Supernatural realities are not inappropriate for a nature, nor are they against nature but are above nature;

¹ Reading *potentia* for *patientia*.

Therefore they neither destroy nature nor substantially change it, because every supernatural gift is radically accidental,
nor do they violate nature, but rather perfect it beyond its own order.

Supernatural realities are not indifferent to nature, because then they would be neither good nor bad.

Supernatural realities are suitable for nature, not with respect to its essence, powers, exigencies, etc., for then that would be natural; but with respect to its obediencial potency, which necessarily flows from the fullness of God's dominion over his creation. For that would imply that there is a creature that God could not use for all purposes that are not contrary to its nature.

COROLLARY I

THE SUPERNATURAL

(a) IS NOT

- 1- CONTRARY TO nature. (indifferent, neutral, inappropriate, inconvenient, violent)
- 2- WITHIN an object proportionate with a nature
- 3- OUTSIDE an object proportionable or commensurable with a nature; BUT

(b) IT IS

- 1- BEYOND and ABOVE a natural power, left to itself;
- 2- IN KEEPING WITH its obediencial potency.

The supernatural supposes the natural and adds to it; it intimately penetrates it and adapts itself to it, yet without being mixed with it: this is the characteristic of IMMANENCE.

On the other hand, the supernatural surpasses nature, it raises it above itself in attaching it directly to God; the supernatural is DIVINE; this is the characteristic of TRANSCENDENCE (???).

Grace completes and crowns nature in transforming it into an END properly so called which was but the upper and unattainable LIMIT of a radical tendency;

or, if you prefer, in raising it into EFFICACIOUS MEANS for attaining an EXPLICIT END for psychological activities that by themselves were but a the IMPOTENT EXPRESSION of a DEAF TENDENCY. (Maréchal, *Psychology of the Mystics*, p. 250)

COROLLRY II (From Lange, *De Gratia*, p. 199ff., 287)

A. REASON CANNOT PROVE:

- (1) the NECESSITY of the supernatural order; for it is not necessary.
- (2) the EXISTENCE of the supernatural order; for the absolutely supernatural order transcends all experience whatever of this life.
- (3) MORE PROBABLY it cannot POSITIVELY prove the POSSIBILITY of the supernatural order; for the beatific vision is a mystery strictly so called.

Against those who deny this assertion, he writes: 'We understand that a created spirit through its faculties of intelligence and volition is capable of receiving from God whatever in the fullness of the true and the good can be communicated to it in a finite manner.'

But IT IS AND REMAINS a question whether the intellectual good of the intuitive vision of God and the corresponding volitional goods can be participated in by a created spirit. It is more likely that our intellect, left to itself, cannot prove with certitude the affirmative part of this question. (See p. 2. 167f.)

B. REASON CAN:

(1) Solve objections against the POSSIBILITY of supernatural elevation.

(2) Supposing the POSSIBILITY of the supernatural order, which is known from revelation along with its EXISTENCE, reason can demonstrate how APPROPRIATE it is, how greatly it PERFECTS nature and FULFILS most perfectly every appetite and desire.

(3) Supposing the divinely established supernatural END, reason demonstrates how BECOMING it is for THE WISDOM OF GOD to equip humans in this present life with those gifts by which in a truly human way and by suitable actions they tend to that end.

‘For then each and every thing is best made when it is suitably ordered to its end’ (CG 1, 1)

DIFFICULTIES will be solved in the next DECLARATION.

DECLARATION 5

The exigency of the obediencial potency of our nature for the supernatural order can be inferred. (BL: we proceed negatively as in the preceding declaration, i.e., there is no contradiction). (Garrigou-Lagrange, *De revelatione*, t. 1).

POTENCY: that which is a principle ([S.T.] 1, q. 41, a. 5, ad 1m).

PRINCIPLE: whatever anything proceeds from in any way.

OBJECTIVE: possibility

(A) SUBJECTIVE: actuated possibility

the capacity for any perfection (1-2, q. 55, a. 2)

(B) ACTIVE: principle of acting, of informing (3, q. 13, a. 1)

PASSIVE: the aptitude or capacity for being affected by or receiving something in another (3, q. 11, a. 1)

NATURAL: ordered to an act or object that is proportionate to the nature (3, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1m)

OBEDIENCIAL: not immediately ordered to some act or some object, but expressing the order to an agent of a superior order which it obeys; (C) the capacity by which an agent of a lower nature is obedient to a superior agent in anything that is not self-contradictory (Rom 9:21).

BY REFERENCE:

- to a RELATIVELY SUPERNATURAL agent, *Comp. Theol.* c. 104)

- to an ABSOLUTELY SUPERNATURAL agent, RJ 1703, DB 2102. (P. 5, 60ff.. 200).

OBEDIENCIAL POTENCY, as referring to the absolutely supernatural agent, namely, God, is defined as follows:

The aptitude or capacity innate in things for receiving in itself that which the will of God ordains. (3, q. 11, a. 1; 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3m).

That POTENCY is passive. The difference between passive and active potency is that the latter (active) always denoted a positive order to a determinate act – for example, the faculty of sight and thus a natural exigency to be completed, e.g., clay in the hand of a potter.

Hence it is the POTENCY THAT IS POSITIVE, REAL, RECEPTIVE, and IDENTICAL TO THE SUBJECT. Even though before its elevation there was no active potency for elevation, nevertheless through elevation both active potency and passive potency are elevated. (R19c2). (3, q. 9, a. 2)

That passive potency supposed that there is in such a nature some real fundamental suitability as a result of which there is that out of which an ACT CAN BE EDUCED through the influence of a superior agent; e.g., that that suitability is present, for instance, in wood² for a chair but not in water; it is not pure logic.

Hence the SUPERNATURAL is not created (substance alone is the term of creation), nor concreated (like a natural accident in creation of a substance which cannot exist without accidents), nor in-created, but IS EDUCED OUT OF THE OBEDIENTIAL POTENCY OF THE SUBJECT.

It is WITHIN THINGS inasmuch as some obediential potency exists in any nature with respect to the supernatural ? that are not metaphysically impossible in a particular species—a stone, for example, cannot be elevated to the beatific vision.

In other words, it can be defined as:

A positive, real, receptive potency or aptitude of a creature, identical with the subject, for receiving whatever in it that God shall have ordered to be produced, above and beyond its condition and natural exigency, inasmuch as the creature is really capable of grace and glory to the extent that an intellectual creature is not merely a trace but also even an image of God. (Gen 1:26). As St Augustine says, it is proper for a FINITE being TO BE SUBJECTED, but proper for the INFINITE to DOMINATE.

The aptitude of created things to receive something that is above their nature, in accordance with the decision of the superior agent; and having received this, and with the concursus of the superior agent that is not owed to them, they fulfil their function, which they could not do by their natural power and with the concursus that is their due.

MEANING OF THE THESIS: Any intellectual creature, particularly a human creature, is not proportionate with the supernatural, but is so by God's omnipotence.

Obediential potency is the SIGN THAT there is in our nature a point of insertion for the supernatural order, NOT, however, a SEED or EXIGENCY.

A FURTHER CONSIDERATION

A. From a consideration of the proportionable object of our intellect.

The authorities are divided on this point, and there is a voluminous literature on this question.

On this controversy, you may ponder the following quotations from G. Rabeau, 'Apologeticus', p. 61:

² Reading *ligno* for *logno*.

“We are made to possess God fully, but we do not have the right, and it is beyond our ability, to do so. These TWO PROPOSITIONS must be maintained. Reconciling them through an explanation that would dispel such obscurity is impossible since it is a matter of the INTIMATE NATURE of God and of his FREE ACTION: it is the realm of mystery clung to by faith.

Attempts to explain this are none the less legitimate, even necessary, since the question inevitably arises and is of interest to our interior life as well as to philosophy.

Everyone admits, as a principle of explanation, that the Thomist axiom ‘that a natural desire cannot be valueless’ (a natural desire cannot be futile).

SOME attend more to the functioning of our intelligence, showing that our thought, in attending to material objects and eliciting general notions, always goes beyond them by its natural powers. There remains, however, A SCIENTIFIC VOID, we might say. Naturally, we have no idea what could fill this void, and we have no right to demand that it be filled.

This, we believe, is what P. Gardeil means, if at least this summary does not distort his theory. (See ‘Le désir naturel de voir Dieu’, *Revue Thomiste*, Sept. 1926.

OTHERS, focusing on all our tendencies, recognize besides those that have a definite and proportionate object, others that go to what is simply possible³: I cannot demand, for example, to be king, and I am not able to take the throne by force. The face-to-face vision of God is beyond me in every way; there is, however, a place for it in what my soul is open to. But in fact (not by right) God placed his infinite fullness in these availabilities. (See de Broglie in *RSE* 1924 and 1925, and in *Gregorianum*, 1928).

This second explanation is not essentially different from the first one.

It is also, I think, the opinion of Roland-Gosselin: *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (1929) 193-223.

DIFFICULTIES are dealt with.

Page 40: At the bottom of p. 40, BL begins to treat a series of objections. His treatment is continued on the reverse of page 40, which was blank, and on the reverse of page 39, which also was blank. He writes:

1- Obediential potency would have to be either natural or supernatural. It is not natural (for it aims at supernatural things), nor is it natural (for it belongs to our nature) ... it does not exist.

Major premise is distinguished: natural both subjectively and objectively, I deny; natural both subjectively and intrinsically, I grant.

Minor premise: it is not natural: subjectively, intrinsically and absolutely, I deny; objectively, extrinsically and relatively, I grant. It is not supernatural: subjectively, I grant (for as supernatural it is something extrinsic); objectively: through a proportionate agent alone, I grant; through a superior agent, I deny.

³ Or ‘impossible’? (Tr.)

2- A created intellect is more distant from God than the senses are from a created intellect. But the senses cannot be elevated to the intelligibles ... nor can the intellect be to the divine. Distinguish the major: as to the way of existing, I grant; as to the formality of intelligence, I deny. (Between a created and the divine intelligence, there is still intellect). *Contra Gentiles* III, q. 54).

I grant the minor premise, and distinguish the consequent accordingly

3- The object of the human intellect is being in sensible things
.... it cannot be elevated.

I distinguish the antecedent thus: proportionate object, I grant
Proportionable, adequate, I deny.

4- God is above being

... cannot be attained even superaturally, even by the intellect

Distinguish: in the sense that it is not in a genus, in a predicament, I grant

In the sense that the notion of being is not unified, I deny

5- The supernatural is not contained in nature, hence it cannot be elevated

Distinguish: it is not contained in a non-elevatable nature, I grant; in an elevatable nature

& in its active potency, I grant

in its passive potency,

if that nature is left to itself, I grant

in its obediencial potency, I deny.

6- Obediencial potecy, as mysterious, is unintelligible, therefore does not exist.

Distinguish: is an obvious contradiction in terms, I deny

is not positively intelligible, I pass.

DECLARATION 6

Natural acts and supernatural acts are entitatively or essentially different.

ACT: (here, second act) – the operation of a potency; act elicited from potency; but operation is the actuality of a power, e.g. intellection is the actuality of the intellectual power. First act is the potency itself (S.T., *De Potentia*, q. 1, a. 1.) [Referent to Aquinas added by BL]

NATURAL ACT is elicited act, by the strengths and abilities belonging to any nature and not surpassing its exigencies and strengths.

SUPERNATURAL ACT is an act elicited by some supernatural principle that does not intrinsically belong by right to any created nature and surpassing its exigencies and strengths.

These are all supernatural SALVIFIC ACTS which, in order to be produced, require interior supernatural grace, actual or habitual.

They are ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT

ESSENCE = that by which a thing is assigned to a determined species.

ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT – those which have at least an ULTIMATE DIFFERENCE; e.g., man, wolf; and do not differ merely by some difference foreign to a proper formality, a definition or essence; e.g., a white man, a black man

Those that differ essentially can belong to the same genus; e.g., natural thoughts and supernatural thoughts; they are essentially different, yet are the same as thoughts.

N.B. We prescind here from the question whether acts that are entitatively supernatural are necessarily distinct from natural acts by reason of their formal object. This will be treated in the following declaration [presumably the treatise on actual grace, A36].

ADVERSARIES: No Catholic will deny that the act of the beatific vision is entitatively supernatural.

As to a supernatural act in this present life, some theologians prior to the Council of Trent denied that such acts differ essentially from natural acts, but asserted that the only difference was only some accidental manner (intensity, ease, promptness); perhaps, however, they intended to reject only the distinction resulting from their formal object. [BL puts the words from ‘perhaps’ to the end in quotes, and writes: (Boyer)] After Trent, this opinion was rejected by all as less compatible with divine Theology. [Text had ‘nimis’, which BL corrects to ‘minus’.]

NOTE: COMMON OPINION. Some say it is theologically certain; it is most certainly closely connected with the truths of faith. [BL: it will become clear – from “De Gratia”, from the very first thesis.]

MEANING OF THE THESIS: Supernatural acts differ essentially from natural acts of the same genus. In other words: acts that are specifically alike cannot through natural powers become supernatural acts.

PROOF

1. FROM THE FACT THAT THERE OUGHT TO EXIST A PROPORTION BETWEEN MEANS AND THE END.

A supernatural act is an act immediately and specially moved by God as ordered to eternal life.

But an act immediately and specially moved by God as ordered to eternal life is entitatively and essentially different from a natural act

Therefore natural acts and supernatural acts differ from each other entitatively and essentially.

MAJOR premise: from the treatise on grace

MINOR: for why would a very special motion on the part of God be required if its effect did not intrinsically and essentially surpass our powers along with the ordinary concursus of God?

2. FROM THE EXISTENCE OF INFUSED HABITS

There has to be a proportion between acts and their principle;

But supernatural acts proceed, as from their principles, from intrinsically infused supernatural habits;

Therefore these acts themselves are intrinsically and essentially supernatural.

MAJOR: a principle per se of any act is not its principle per se if it does not have a proportion to that act

MINOR: after the definitions of Trent, this would be very difficult to deny, as is abundantly clear from the treatise on the Virtues.

3. FROM THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

From it, it is clear that grace, required for supernatural acts, gives not only greater facility in acting but the *basic ability itself*, so that such acts utterly surpass natural abilities and powers. DB 104f., 176ff., 812ff., 797, 1791, 1814.

4. FROM THE FATHERS

The necessity for grace to act ‘as one ought’ (salvifically, supernaturally) is asserted by the Fathers against the Pelagians; and that necessity is not only moral (a matter of greater ease) but also physical and absolute, i.e., regarding the very entity or essence of an act (without qualification).

E. g., Rouët de Journal, Index Theologicus 308.

COROLLARY

Natural acts and supernatural acts are distinguished

(1) by reason of their preceding light: (reason, faith); [BL adds: reason=intellect; supernat: God]

(2) by reason of the principle from which they proceed;

(3) by reason of the end to which they tend. [BL adds:
nature: good connatural with our nature::supernatural:good which is above
our natural exigency.]

(4) by reason of their inner dignity and moral worth

(5) by reason of their formal object or motive, as will be seen in the following
Declaration

DIFFICULTIES

[BL writes: Boyer, *De Gratia*, 1938 (word? Edition p. 92(?))]

1- For this these can be required ... in order that acts become meritorious, ... our arguments are not valid.

I deny the antecedent. For those acts can become meritorius from the fact that there is something that is not in our nature; such an act is intrinsically changed

2- the councils demand ...

... what is demanded only some manner of acting (which can be extrinsic)

I distinguish the antecedent: the councils demand ... an accidental manner of acting, I deny; an essential manner of acting, I grant. (accidental: more and less in the same line – quality) (essential: in another species)

DECLARATION 7

SUPERNATURAL ACTS ARE NECESSARILY SPECIFIED BY THEIR FORMAL OBJECT

It is clear from the preceding Declaration that supernatural acts are specifically different from natural acts of the same genus.

It remains to be asked in what this specific difference consists.

There are two opinions among theologians.

The FIRST opinion applies the principle, ACTS ARE SPECIFIED BY THEIR FORMAL OBJECT, understanding this to be WITHOUT EXCEPTION, in this sense, that is, that wherever there are specifically different acts, their formal objects are essentially different; hence it affirms that a specific difference between natural and supernatural acts necessarily consists in their being ordered to specifically different objects.

Thus the Thomists: Suarez (I.2c II); Salmanticenses (*De grat.*, disp. 3, dub. 3); John of St Thomas; w. Mazzela (*De grat.*, disp. 1, a. 2); Garrigou-Lagrange (*De revelatione*, 2, 1. 497); Acta Pontificiae Academiae., Romae, S.Th., anno 1934. Romae 1935); Mattiusi (*Rev. Philosophiae neoscholasticae*, 1918d); de la Taille, Boyer, etc.

The SECOND opinion admits that specifically different acts can have the very same formal object, and hence denies that supernatural acts in this life have a formal object that is unattainable by natural acts, and places their specific difference in their essentially different entitative perfection; they proceed from the essentially different entitative perfection of the principles from which those acts proceed, and so it denies that a supernatural act is necessarily specified by its formal object.

Thus Scotus (3 Sent., d. 31, n. 4); Molina (*Concordia*, p. 14, 13. Disp.38); Ripalda (*De ente supernaturali*, 1 5, d. 44 n.2); De Lugo (*De fide*, disp., a.1, n. 3); Franzelin (*De div. Tradit.*, p. 602); Billot (ex professo in *De Virt. Infusis*, Prol. III); Janssens, Berasa, Schiffini, Slenerz [sic; Lennerz?] *Gregorianum* 1936, 143 sqq.) etc.

SUPERNATURAL ACT is an act elicited from some intrinsic supernatural principle not owed to any created nature and surpassing the powers and exigencies of that nature.

It is not a question here about the specification of supernatural acts taken UNIVERSALLY, because the adversaries admit, e.g., that the act of the beatific vision is necessarily specified by a supernatural formal object, since, as all agree, it can only be elicited from an elevated faculty.

FORMAL OBJECT: that which extrinsically moves a faculty to act. That which per se is attained by an act, faculty, or habit, and by reason of which the material object is attained.

In speaking about supernatural act, faculty, or habit, it is nothing other than the MOTIVE, i.e., that on account of which the act, faculty, or habit tends to the material object; thus, e.g., in acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition:

I BELIEVE all that the Catholic Church believes and teaches, BECAUSE THOU hast revealed it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

I HOPE for eternal life ... WHICH thou hast promised to those ...

I LOVE THEE... BECAUSE Thou art infinitely good and infinitely loveable ...

I AM SORRY for all my sins BECAUSE ... I have offended Thee, supremely good
(See Cardinal Gasparri, Catholic Catechism, pp. 240)

Thus de la Taille's definition: in the object that has the strength to move an act.

MATERIAL ACT: that which is attained by an act not by reason of itself and per se but by reason of the formal object; thus, e.g., in the act, faculty, or habit of charity, an enemy is loved as a material object, not by reason of him and per se but by reason of the formal object: FOR LOVE of Thee I love my neighbor, and I forgive him (Gasparri, l.c.).

The SPECIFICATIVE is intrinsic or extrinsic.

INTRINSIC is that through which a thing is formally constituted in a species; e.g., rationality in the case of humans.

EXTRINSIC is generally that which *causes the intrinsic specificative*.
(And it is to this that the term 'specificative' more properly belongs; for what is intrinsic is said to be the specific difference, or more generally, the intrinsic constitutive, whether or not it prescind from that which is the ultimate difference.)

When, however, we say that habits, potencies, or acts are specified through their objects, in neither way, at least any exclusive and proper way, is the specificative received. For an object is not the cause of the act, potency, or habit, nor is it anything that constitutes them intrinsically.

But the word 'THROUGH' denotes a definitive principle, EXTRINSIC to a thing, but INTRINSIC to the definition of a thing. Thus acts, potencies, and habits are distinguished through their objects a priori, not as through differences, nor as through purely extrinsic causes, but as through causes necessarily included in their definitions. Therefore:

The SPECIFICATIVE referred to here is:

The suitability for and commensurability with a potency (act, habit), such that [word written by BL?] it is their quiddity, BY WHICH they are POTENCY (act, habit); that is, as they

are formally potency (habit, act), and as they are essentially ordered to their object according to a relation not only predicamental but precisely transcendental. S.T. I, q. 77, a. 3.

Thus in a definition there is stated that **BY WHICH** they are **POTENCIES**.

As Cajetan says: 'we can speak about potencies in two ways.'

IN ONE WAY, inasmuch as they are **POTENCIES**; e.g., eyesight as the **VISUAL POTENCY**, and this is a general expression, specifically the same in a man, a lion, an eagle, etc.

IN THE SECOND WAY, inasmuch as they are **PROPERTIES** of such or such a nature; and we do not speak this way. For they are distinguished according to the diversity of the natures in which they are and from which they emanate; for example, eyesight as a **PROPERTY** of such or such a nature can have a further specification, e.g., eyesight of a lion, a bat, an eagle, a human, a child, a woman.

In treating of **FAITH**, Fr de la Taille gives a good illustration of this by speaking of **FAITH AS FAITH** and of **faith AS OF AN ANGEL DURING ITS LIFE, OR OF A MAN** [in this life].

"From a strictly theological point of view, the faith of angels during their period of probation is the same virtue as ours. The **DIFFERENCES OF STATE** pertain to the difference of subject. This difference of subject between them and us comes up again in all the ramifications of grace; and yet their grace is not of another kind from others, because it is **SPECIFIED**, in their case as in ours, by its being ordered to the **INTUITIVE VISION**, which in itself is independent of the difference of subjects.

That is why St Thomas enunciates in a universal manner this principle which he applies both to an angel before its glorification and to the first man before the fall, and to us, contemplative or not: 'Faith is **COMMON** to all who have knowledge of God, though not yet having attained their future blessedness, by adhering to the First Truth' (II-II, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1m 2m, 3m)." (Contemplative prayer: p. 12, note).

We ask, then, whether a supernatural act, of faith, for example, can have the same formal object as any corresponding supernatural act; whether, e.g., to believe in God is such an act as is able, while keeping the same tendency and the same motive, to become natural or supernatural indifferently, according only to whether or not the intellect of the agent has been raised by God to a higher order.

If natural and supernatural acts are specified by their formal objects, a supernatural act will be one that, with the tendency and the motive remaining the same, can never be elicited from a non-elevated faculty.

Adversaries make a distinction between the substance of an act and the manner of an act.

The **SUBSTANCE OF AN ACT** is the very essence of that perfection considered as **OPERATING** properly, as Billot says, with the precision that it is indifferent to a determination of naturality or supernaturality: thus, for example, faith precisely understood can at least exist physically by grace as by nature.

The **MANNER OF AN ACT** is something that comes to that act, modifying it, but without that act being essentially changed. In our case:

The MANNER OF A SUPERNATURAL ACT, as Billot maintains, is a formality that limits an act to that entitative perfection through which it has an ordination to eternal life. Hence supernatural acts reduplicatively as supernatural are not specified by their object.

Oes. [?] these distinguish between a supernatural act as act and as supernatural.

They do not deny that a supernatural act as act, that is, as to substance, can be said to be supernatural, both from the fact that it proceeds from an elicitive supernatural principle and from the fact that it denotes an order to a supernatural object.

If, however, a supernatural act is considered as supernatural (in its manner), then it is supernatural only from the fact that it proceeds from a supernatural elicitive principle and from some intrinsic manner (indeed different, according to some authors), but not from the fact that it is necessarily specified by a supernatural object.

We, on the contrary, intend to prove that a supernatural entity and an elicitive supernatural principle always accompany a formal supernatural object.

Not in this sense, of course, that our way of understanding in a supernatural act is so changed that the material object of that known supernatural thing is not already intelligible in sensible data; for experience testifies that not even when influenced by grace does man attain the purely intelligible, especially the supernatural, but rather their proper manner; nor in the sense that the signs or the means which our intellect uses every day to elicit its acts are in any way changed, but

in this sense, that a supernatural act attains some formality which is not attained and cannot be attained by a natural⁴ act.

No one denies that natural acts and supernatural acts can have the same material object – God, for example, as a material object (the one thing under consideration can be considered as author of the natural order and as author of the supernatural order – two formal objects). DB 1034.

But in this Declaration on the FORMAL OBJECT there is a question only about an object considered under a special formality and determined by a certain agent.

[BL. Theological note: More probable]

PROOF:

1 – The supernatural act of the beatific vision is necessarily specified by a supernatural formal object.

But all supernatural acts belong to the same species as the act of the beatific vision;
Therefore supernatural acts are necessarily specified by a supernatural formal object.

MAJOR premise: admitted by all.

MINOR premise is proved thus:

Quantitative difference – ‘more’ and ‘less’ – does not change the species

⁴ Reading *naturali* for *supernaturali*.

But being more or less is the only difference between the act of the beatific vision and other supernatural acts;

Therefore all supernatural acts are of the same species as that of the beatific vision.

MAJOR is universally admitted

MINOR. Every supernatural act is a relation whose essence is to tend towards the Most Holy Trinity; but this tendency towards the Trinity is to be found in any supernatural act, in this life as well as in the next. The act of faith, for example, is but a foretaste of that knowledge which will be our happiness in the life to come; from the first beginnings of charity all the way to glory there is gradual increase in one's relation to or tendency towards the Trinity, which occurs only by way of growth, that is, according to more and less. So, for example, charity is called the 'seed of glory'; in charity there is the development towards the vision along the same lines, maturation, increase, unfolding of the same seed: obviously, the seed of the fruit and the fruit of the seed are of the same species; for the seed is simply the fruit at its very beginning stage, and the fruit is simply the seed at the stage of its final perfection.

2 – This is CONFIRMED by the documents of the faith, which seem to favor our opinion.

For these documents, according to their obvious meaning, require grace on account of the very nature of the act to be elicited, considered in itself; therefore the same act by reason of its proper nature is such that with its faculty left in a natural state, it cannot be elicited; therefore it does not become supernatural because it proceeds from a supernatural faculty or principle, but it proceeds from a superior faculty because by its very nature (according to the ultimate determination of its substance) it is supernatural.

The ANTECEDENT is proven from SCRIPTURAL TEXTS, which place the formality of supernaturality in any respect under which the act is posited or to be posited, that is, in its supernatural formal object.

For example, 1 Thess. 2:23; Jn 15:5; 2 Cor 3:5, which, taken in their obvious meaning, signify the inability of a nature to elicit the act itself with respect to the ultimate determination resulting from its object.

FROM THE CONSTANT TEACHING OF CHRIST, e.g., Mt 6:17ff. Christ always says: Do such things and you will possess eternal life, which consists in the beatific vision, i.e., he always points to a supernatural motive, which is the supernatural formal object. THIS is 'de facto'. But 'de iure', the intention or psychological and moral motive coincides with the formal object.

FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CHURCH. Conciliar canons seem to have the same interpretation, for they rebuke Pelagius for having said that man in his natural condition is able, e.g., to believe in God as revealer: DB 178, 180; but that by grace man is able easily to believe. In other words, grace is required not only for a supernatural act as supernatural (an act as to its manner) but also for a supernatural act as an act, that is, simply to believe (an act as to its substance)

3 – CONFIRMATION from the TEACHING OF THE FATHERS, especially from St Augustine. (See Fr de la Taille on this)

Now, a supernatural act can be considered according to its final, exemplary, formal and efficient causes, and in every respect there is implied a supernatural formal object.

(a) According to its FINAL CAUSE, which arises from the DESIRE FOR ETERNAL HAPPINESS: in desiring it we become capable of obtaining that goal. Thus, St Gregory Nazianzen; St Augustine, *In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus*.

(b) According to its EXEMPLARY CAUSE: THROUGH THE DESIRE FOR ETERNAL LIFE, God assimilates humans to himself, i.e., longing for God assimilates to God. So Augustine, *Tractatus in Jn.*: “In our desiring you have initiated beatitude itself.”

(c) According to its FORMAL CAUSE, i.e., according to the special goodness of supernatural acts, which special goodness the Fathers place in THE DESIRE ITSELF FOR SUPERNATURAL HAPPINESS.

(d) According to its EFFICIENT CAUSE, namely from the necessity for grace; that is, from the work of the Holy Spirit which tends to a SUPERNATURAL END; so, for example, to be drawn to Christ is supernatural act: “How much more emphatically must we say that a man is drawn to Christ who delights in truth, delights in happiness, ... delights in everlasting life – and all this is Christ... Give me the one who desires,⁵ give me the one who hungers, give me the one who journeys thirsting in this solitude, sighing for the fountain in an eternal homeland: give me such a one, and he knows what I am saying.” RJ 1822.

Thus again: Just as, therefore, no one is properly wise and correctly understands unless he has received the spirit of wisdom and understanding ... so without the SPIRIT of faith there is no one who will rightly believe. (*Epist.* 194, c. 4, n. 18: PL 33, 830). Cf. RJ 1450.

4 – From St Thomas

(a) Reginald in his work *Three Principles* expounds the entire teaching of St Thomas under these three principles:

a- Being is analogous

b- God is pure act

c- Habits, potencies, and acts are specified by their formal object

(b) In many texts St Thomas teaches ex professo that habits, potencies and acts are necessarily specified by their FORMAL OBJECT: S.T. 1, q. 77, a. 3; 1-2, q. 9, a. 1; q. 18, aa. 2 & 6; q. 49, a. 3; q. 54, a. 1, ad 1m, q. 54, aa. 2 & 3.

(c) He always distinguishes between the natural and supernatural ORDER, indeed between the order of natural truths and that of supernatural truths. 1, q. 1, a. 1; 1, q. 12, a. 4; 1-2, q. 63, a. 4; 1-2, q. 109, a. 1; 2-2, q. 8, a. 1.

(d) He always denies that supernatural FAITH and another faith have the same formal object; e.g., 2-2, q. 1; 2.2, q. 5, aa. 2 & 3, and passim, e.g., *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 98, ad 4m.

⁵ Reading *desiderantem* for *desiderium*. See RJ 1822.

[BL: 'believe' is predicated equivocally of ?, of the faithful, and of demons ...; and the faith in them is not from some infused light of grace, as it is in the faithful.

(e) He always denies that supernatural and natural LOVE OF GOD have the same formal object; e.g., 1-2, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1m; 1-2, q. 27, a. 2; q. 65, a. 5; 2-2, q. 5, aa. 2&3, etc.

(f) He explicitly and openly distinguishes between a natural and a supernatural act of moral virtues, e.g., of temperance from the formal object: "Infused virute and acquired virtue differ not only as to their ultimate end but also as to the order to their proper objects." 1-2, q. 63, a. 4.

OBJECTIONS

In our opponents' theory, even though a supernatural act proceeds from a supernatural principle, still that act is entitatively natural as to its substance but entitatively supernatural as to its supernatural manner; from the fact, however, that their major premise draws the minor to itself, they say that the act is entitatively supernatural and essentially distinct from the natural act because it proceeds from a supernatural elicitive principle and has its supernaturality from its manner. See Declaration 6, where they agree with us as to the essential distinction between natural and supernatural acts.

That supernatural which is termed supernatural solely from its elicitive principle and not also from its formal object Thomists call supernatural as to manner; in French, le 'surnaturel plaqué', coe. plaqué d'or,⁶ to designate a copper or some white metal overlaid with gold leaf.

COROLLARY: Just as supernatural acts are necessarily specified by a supernatural object, supernatural potencies and habits are likewise.

DIFFICULTIES: See Boyer, *De Gratia* (1938), pp. 95-108.

BL:

Bottom and continuing on the reverse, BL writes objections and answers:

1 – There are examples in which the same formal object is attained by essetially different subjects (e.g., the beatific vision by the act of an angel or that of a human).

I deny the antecedent. Or:

I distinguish: = by different acts as different, e.g., as vision, I deny

By acts considered under different conditions, I pass (this is not treated in the thesis)
(e.g., accidental differences)

2 – objects of the supernatural order are not known by us except by sensible abstracts species. Natural knowledge can attain whatever is attained by natural species.

... natural and supernatural knowledge can have the same formal object

Major: ordered and illumined by supernatural light, I grant
without this illumination and ordination, I deny.

Minor: I contradistinguish.

⁶ 'Supernatural-plated', 'Gold-plated.'

3 – Act is not only specified from its object but also from its elicitive principle (for where principles specifically differ, the acts also must be differentiated)

...it suffices ...

Major: is specified consequently and dependently upon a specification received, I grant;
 “ antecedently and independently, I deny.

4 – “act is specified ... is true if it is a matter of the substance of the act, but it is not universally true (i.e., not: concerning the supernatural manner of attaining acts) (objection of Card. Billot, *De Virtutibus*)

I deny the assertion: for that manner _____ is either accidental or essential:

- if it is accidental, it cannot determine the act

- if it is essential, it cannot attain the act as supernatural, but [only] as act.

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