

Fitzpatrick 128

1. Is Fitzpatrick correct when he asserts that "there are ... no epistemologically privileged facts in Lonergan's cognitional theory"?

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2. The term concept has come up a few times. Could you explain the manner in which you use the three terms

concept

idea and

notion,

and explain how they differ in your usage, if in fact they do?

3. Which philosopher or philosophers did you have in mind when you spoke of "consciousness as perception"?

4. Fitzpatrick quotes your remark in "Christ as Subject: A Reply" to the effect that "knowledge can have no constitutive effect on its object."

As I recall the article, this is taken as a premiss for its argument. Is it possible to argue or show or prove this premiss itself, i.e., that knowledge is not constitutive of its its object? How would such an argument proceed?

5. Is there any sense of "constitutive" in which the object is constituted by knowing it? If so, what is this sense, and how is it distinguished from the sense of constitutive referred to in question 4?

6. In the "Christ as Subject" article (on p. 166 of Collection) you say "a concept cannot be abstracted from its meaning." Could you kindly explain this as I can't understand it.

7. Fitzpatrick quotes your phrase from the same article "without consciousness John has no psychological unity beyond the unity found in the objects of his knowledge." Can you give an example or examples that would help me to give meaning to this passage?

8. What does it mean to say that "consciousness is not merely cognitive but constitutive"?

9. In this same article to which Fitzpatrick has been referring, you use the term "prescind" (Collection, p. 170).

In general, what do you mean by the term "prescind" when you use it? Is it different in meaning from "abstraction," and what does "abstraction" mean in your usage?

10. In my work with your texts, I have been able through introspective self attention to uncover myself as experiencing, as questioning, and so on. I have been able to discover acts of various kinds. But I have never been able to experience myself, ego, as subject, only my acts.

Could you help me with this at all?

11. Finally, in the article which Fitzpatrick has been referring to (Collection, 177) you recall the doctrine

sensibile actu est sensus actu
intelligibile actu est intellectus actu

How are these remarks to be understood? Is there an identity involved, and if so in what sense? Surely act and object differ in knowing?

As I have found this matter extremely difficult to come to terms with, are there any text or texts you could recommend that would supplement your remarks?

End of Fitzpatrick's 1st article.