should acknowledge that in the passage cited Aquinas affirms
both that the notional act is prior to the relation and conse-
quent to the ~~personal~~ constitutive personal property. But
also I think it legitimate for a commentator to point out
a difference between the notional act that is prior and the
notional act that is consequent. The notional act that is
prior is the procession of Q. 27, from which follows the
relations of Q. 28, by which are constituted the persons of
Q. 29, in the order of the _fieri_ of our systematic conceptualization
of the Blessed Trinity. But the notional act that is subsequent
is the notional act of Q. 41; it is the notional act of our
systematic conceptualization not as _in fieri_ but as _in facto esse_.

The same point may be made to complement the answer to
the question whether the _potentia generandi_ is common to three
persons or proper to the Father. Aquinas stated that _potentia
generandi_ directly means the divine essence, obliquely connotes
the relation; that ~~directly~~ its direct meaning is the common
essence, and its oblique connotation is of a notion proper to
the Father [I 41 5 c et 3m].

The same point has a bearing on the precise significance
of the created _imago Dei_ in trinitarian speculation. There is
in God a procession that properly is generation, and the generation
is "per modum intelligibilis actionis." [I 27 2 c]. On the
other hand, "idquo Pater generat est natura divina" [I 41 5 c]
and "sicut Deus pot-st generare Filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas
generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia gen-randi"
[ibid. Sed contra. Cf. I 40 2 c et 4m]. ~~Moreover, there is
the testimony of James of Metz that Brother Thomas did not
as a principle/hold the Son to proceed from the divine intellect nor the Holy
Spirit to proceed from the divine will as a principle but that
the principle in either case was the divine nature~~

Moreover there is the interesting statement of James of Metz!

"Sic ergo principium, quo procedit Filius a Patre in divinis,
non est intellectus, sed natura et similiter principium quo
procedit Spiritus sanctus ab utroque est natura non voluntas
et hoc dixit [frater] Thomas parisius in scholis publice,
quod non intelligebat Filius procedere a Patre per actum
intellectus sicut audivit magister Albertus ab eo." Schmaus,
Liber propugnatorius, p 127 f note 48. See the documentation
on the parallel views of Durandus, James of Lausanne, and to
the astonishment of Dr. Schmaus also of Herveus Natalis and
John of Naples. ibid pp. 126-34.

Now I think one has to put the question. Are the two positions
compatible? Can one say that divine generation is "per modum
intelligibilis actionis" and also affirm that "id quo Pater
generat est natura divina," ~~that-as-the-Son-resembles-the
Father-not-exclusively-in-intellect-but-in-the-whole-of-divine
nature,soxthexpotency~~ where the latter statement has the
implications of its premises, namely, that the principle of
generation must be similar to the term, that the term of divine
generation is the divine nature, and therefore the principle
must be the divine nature [See I 41 5 c]. Since the Son is
God and not just the divine intellect, one must defend the
compatibility of the two statements or else drop the psychological
analogy. ~~Axdafance~~ Relevant to such a defence would be a

There was a grave risk that the Thomist synthesis would pass for just one of these blends in which were lost not only the mutual correction and complementing of Aristotle and Augustine but even the profounder elements proper to Aristotle or proper to Augustine. Let us descend to details.

Act and Activity.

The notion of act as formal cause is peculiar to Aristotle. Act is perfection perfecting the perfectible. Augustinian thought lacked this category, and lacking it was forced to place perfection elsewhere. Besides being formal cause, act is also the ground of efficient causality. It was in this consequence, this manifestation, this fecundity of the perfection of act that Augustinians, following Augustine, saw the perfe and expressed their view of perfection and excellence. The later Augustindans, who had been to school to Aristotle, had an Aristotelian tag to justify their position: _agens est nobilius patiente_. But finite act, besides being perfection formally and the ground of further perfection efficiently, also is itself an effect. Thus, finite must also be/ act can be a _pati_. But Augustinian perfection cannot be a _pati_; its failure to grasp the notion of formal cause implied that perfection had to be activity.

The central battle was fought between Aristotelians and Augustinians on the issue of the subject's activity or passivity in the emergence of acts of cognition and, still more vehemently, in the emergence of acts of free will

Peculiarly Aristotelian are the notions of potency and act, material and formal causality. What is potential or material is just a principle of perfectibility. What is act or form is perfection.

A further characteristic of the <u>via doctrinae</u> concerns
the precise significance of the created <u>imago Dei</u> in trinitarian
thought. Briefly one may say that the function of the <u>imago</u>
pertains primarily and essentially to the <u>fieri</u> of our concepts;
it provides the analogy by which we mount towards the conception
of the divine persons; but it is transcended once the persons
are conceived as constituted. The point may be put in a more
acute form by saying that the <u>imago</u> ~~determinates~~ determines
the nature of the processions in Q. 27 as "per modum intelligibilis
actionis" and "per modum amoris," but it does not determine

respectively/   the principle of the notional acts of Q. 41 to be/the divine
                 intellect and the divine will. According to Aquinas "id quo
natura/   Pater generat est ~~essentia~~ divina" and the reason is explicit
                 "Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in
                 quo generatum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur
                 Patri gignenti in natura divina. Unde natura divina in Patre
It can/perhaps   est potentia generandi in ipso" I 41 5 c. ~~Moreover it~~ be said
                 that by divine nature Aquinas meant the remote principle of
                 generation but understood the proximate principle to be the
But one must   intellect.//~~He~~ wrote "sicut Deus potest generare Filium, ita
bear in mind   et vult. Sed voluntas ~~est~~ generandi significat essentiam. Ergo
that Aquinas//   et potentia generandi." Ibid. Sed contra. Moreover, James of
                 Metz claimed that Brother Thomas in his public teaching in
                 Paris affirmed "quod non intelligebat Filius procedere a Patre
                 per actum intellectus sicut audivit magister Albertus ab eo"
                 Schmaus, Liber propug, p. 127 f, note 48; see whole section pp
                 125-34. Plainly, this statement of James with its appeal
                 to Aquinas' <u>Sentences</u> cannot overrule the greater certainty
I 34 2 c   we have that in God <u>Verbum</u> is a personal name/[See Marston,
                 on the decision of the 23 Paris Masters, De Eman-aetern q 6 p 116 f]
                 and that the Son proceeds by an emanation of intellect ibid&I 27 2.

V. Verbum Aeternum.

The purpose of the present article is to place
in its historical setting what we have gathered in previous
artciles (1) of Thomist thought on the concept of <u>verbum</u>.
We have considered psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics;
we now have to move to the proper context of speculation on
<u>verbum</u>, namely, to trinitarian theory. We have concentrated
our gaze on the two principal actors, Aristotle and Aquinas;
we now have to take into account the intellectual ferment of
the thirteenth century, its antecedents, its manifold and
shifting forces, its consequents.

1)

as best we may/

TYPES OF TRINITARIAN THEORY.

Théodore de Regnon's Études de theologie positive
sur la Sainte Trinité (Paris, 4 vols., 1892 and 1898) drew
attention to a difference between Greek and Latin trinitarian
thought. This distinction, based on extremely wide reading
and an acute attention to differences of formulation, not only
has exercised considerable influence on later studies but also
retains, even today, its validity as a statement of fact.
~~But-statements-of-fact-this-contention~~   However, I believe,
that the many monographs written on trinitarian theorists
and still more the/intensive research carried on during the
past sixty years on the history of medieval thought not only
make possible but also make necessary a more detailed and
more flexible classification.

increasingly/

Instead of speaking of Greek and Latin views, I
propose to speak of generic and specific ~~views~~ theories, of
advances from the generic towards the specific, and of reversions
from the specific back to the generic. Generic and specific
theories will be sub-divided according as they stand in the
<u>via inventionis</u> or the <u>via doctrinae</u>. Advances towards the
specific may be divided according to the line of advance, and
reversions to the generic may be divided according to the
difficulties that force the reversion.

In its <u>via inventionis</u> the generic view develops
from the New Testament to the writings of St. John Damascene.
In the Apostles' Creed only the Father is named explicitly God.
At Nicaea the consubstantiality of the Son was defined. At
Constantinople the equality of the Holy Spirit (simul adoratur
et conglorificatur) was added. The consubstantiality of three
divine persons implied that they could differ in no absolute
quality or perfection; the inference that only Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit were distinguished only by their mutual
relations was established mainly by the Cappadocians (Arnou,
Chevalier). But such relations could only be relations of
origin; and this inference was confirmed by New-Test scriptural
affirmations of the generation of the Son and of the procession
of the Holy Spirit.

Why do such outstanding Catholic intellects seem to attempt
to demonstrate what simultaneously they proclaim lies beyond
so to speak/   human reason? The fault is not theirs but/that of their time.
They lived before Philip the Chancellor thought out the entitative
disproportion between nature, reason, natural friendship, and
natural desert and, on the other hand, grace, faith, charity,
and merit [Lonergan TS

Secondly, a scientific theology requires as a subsidiary
the acceptance and development of sciences based on the light
of human reason. For theological understanding appeals to the
analogy of nature [DB 1796]: a scientific development of theo-
logical understanding cannot stand upon a literary, a metaphorical,
an approximative account of nature; it must have the scientific
contrasts/   account of nature. Neither the literary developments of St.
Augustine nor the schematic directness of St. Anselm will do.
One has to go to school to Aristotle. Despite-the-fears-of
good-conservatives The history of thirteenth century thought
is, in large measure, the history of the rising tide of Aristotelian-
ism [See outline, Van Steenberghen], and at its end all-thinking,
whether-of-Aristotelians-or-of-Augustinians,-was-cast-in-an
Aristotelian-mould-[Koch]. even the most determined Augustinians
hads to cast their anti-Aristotelian theses in an Aristotelian
mould. [Koch] Jakob von Metz).

Thirdly, it is enough not enough to separate theology
from other science and to accept and develop other science as
an aid to theology. The pursuit of theology as itself somehow
a science has to be undertaken. But what does this mean?
It means the systematic pursuit of the "aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum
intelligentiam eamque fructuossimam" affirmed by the Vatican
DB 1796   Council./ It means the astounding novelty oft the teaching of
Brother Thomas witnessed by William of Tocco [Ehrle: Xenia Thom].
It means the incomprehensible introduction of pagan idols into
the house of God that John Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury,
felt in duty bound to denounce [Ehrle Zeit kath Theol 1889]
It means that theology is not just a practical science, nor
just the complement to holy affections, but primarily a science
[see L. B. Gillon, Signification historique de la theologie de
saint Thomas, DTC 15(1946) 651-93, especially 657 f] in some
trasposition of the Aristotelian meaning of the term. If one
would understand sympathetically the vigorous, almost violent,
resistance-of-Augustinianismxmovement practically,victorious
Augustinian movement of the closing quarter of the thirteenth
/note   century[[ibid]*when, on the testimony of Godfrey of Fontaines,
** put this in
the lessacute/theological students at the University of Paris thought-they
(simpliciores)would-be-excommunicated-if-they-as-much-as-read-the-works-of
Thomas-Aquinas werex withdrawn from reading the writings of
Aquinas and looked upon his doctrine as suspect since officially
it was suggested to be "erronea et reprobabilis." [Godefridi
de Fontibus, Quodl. XII, q. 5 (Les Philosophes Belges, Tome V,
Louvain 1932) p. 102 f. The spicy title of the question reads:
"Utrum Episcopus parisiensis peccet in hoc quod omittit corrigere
quosdam articulos a praedecessore suo condemnatos."]]
* when one recalls that the essence of science for Aristotle
understanding/is not just certitude, but knowing the reason, the real reason,
the cause [NB Lennerz, De Fide, science of part and cont.]

As ~~mp~~ Platonist opposition to Aristotle has its ultimate
root in incomprehension, so also has Aristotelian and Augustinian
opposition to Thomism. But ~~in~~ it would be a grave mistake to

suppose that in either case the incomprehension was/ordinary
dulness of wit. The men who opposed or misunderstood Aquinas
were not dull. They merely failed to see the woods for the

trees, failed to approach single issues with/big minds that
do not permit the immediate question to throw off balance the

intricate inter-dependence of/psychology, metaphysics, and
epistemology, failed to grasp that Brother Thomas had been up
to something far profounder than they suspected and that his
writings involved a fundamental and far-reaching transposition
of issues and methods. In a sense the tragedy of Aquinas was
that there was only one Aquinas and not a succession of them
~~to-be-a-daily-sun-at-Paris-and-provide-the-irreplaceable~~
~~living-teacher-on-all-the-issues~~ to provide Paris from 1275 to

1375 with a daily sun/ ~~a-living-teacher,~~ to supply living
teachers that would indicate where the real issues lay and
what were the fertile lines of approach and solution.

More realistical~~l~~y, one may say that the trouble was
the lack of methodology. Aquinas discovered what scientific
theology might mean and be. Methodology involves not only
knowledge of what science is but also a reflective examination
of its procedures;~~and-an-explicit-justification-of~~ applied
method~~ol~~ogy involves the presentation of one's scientific work
within explanatory cadres that ~~tell~~ narrate just how and why
the work as a whole and in its several parts was undertaken.
Perhaps the strokes of genius can never be presented methodologically
for the simple reason that the methods invol·e as much novelty

Such presentation easily becomes very complex and bewildering
and, perhaps, the strokes of genius

More realistically, one might describe the trouble as
the lack of methodlogy. ~~Aquinas~~ But Aquinas discovered what
scientific theology might mean and be; it would have been
piling Pelion on Ossa for him to have added the further com-
plexity of methodological justification to his scientific work;
from the nature of his time he could do no more than be the
wise man setting down all questions in order and given each
an answer coherent with his answers to the others. Aquinas
agreed with Aristotle and he agreed with Augustine; he said
so; but his agreement with Aristotle was tempered by an agreement
with Augustine that proved to Aristotelians he was no Aristotelian
~~ax~~ and mislead Thomists into believing they would reach Thomism
by grasping Aristotle; and his agreement with Augustine was
tempered by an agreement with Aristotle that made manifest to
Augustinians his desertion of traditional ways of thought and
his introduction into ~~theology-of-alien~~ the very heart of
theology of alien, even pagan, elements.

The Augustinian Reaction.

It has been said that Aristotle was the greatest of the Platonists, and I would add that Platonists after Aristotle had written men would be Platonists only if they failed to understand the Aristotelian transformation of Plato

As Aristotle was the greatest of the Platonists, so Aquinas was the greatest of the Augustinians. As the condition of remaining a Platonist after reading Aristotle has been incomprehension, so also the condition of remaining an Augustinian after Aquinas has been incomprehension.

Trinitarian speculation prior to Aquinas stands to the thought of the <u>Summa theologiae</u> much as does matter to form. The study of earlier writers reveals the sources of ~~this-and that-item-in-the-Thomist-synthesis-that~~ the scattered elements ~~of-Thomist~~ which Aquinas rought into ~~unity~~ ordered unity, but it is only intelligence operating on the Thomist text itself that discovers the personal contribution

more or less/   Trinitarian speculation prior to Aquinas stands to the thought of the Summa theologiae much as does matter to form. For this reason the study of earlier ~~or-contemporary~~ writers may reveal the sources of the/scattered elements from which Aquinas selected his materials. But it is only intelligence operating on the Thomist text itself that can reveal the principal contribution of Aquinas, namely, <u>sapientis est ordinare</u>. The trouble is, however, that writers subsequent to Aquinas also stand to him as greater or smaller fragments to a whole. Accordingly, we undertake this study of the Augustinian reaction in the hope both of explaining ~~the-subsequent-dev~~ how there could be Augustinians after Aquinas, who was the greatest of the Augustinians, and also of making plausible our claim that the thinitarian thought of Aquinas was the whole and not some one of the larger fragments more commonly attributed to him.

However, one comes to the crucial point in the characterisation of trinitarian theory as scientific theology in its *via doctrinae* only when one asks what precisely is the nature of the divine processions. The answer to this question cannot be established completely until a number of subsidiary points have been passed in review. But it will be well to note at once its general character if only to indicate the direction in which the argument is moving. We think it noteworthy, then, that while Scotus openly spoke of the divine processions as productions [Oxon In I Sent d 3 aa 2 et 3 ad qq 6 et 7, Fernandez pp 240-72], while kxa such speech seems to be common among the writers discussed by Dr. Schmaus in his monumental wokkx on the Liber propugnatorius and its historical antecedents, none the less it is quite rare in Aquinas. In the Sentences, xopxi borrowing from Alexander of Hales

Let us conclude this section with a series of propositions.
As matter stands to form and as matter and form stand to existence,
so possible intellect stands to species and, in turn, possible
intellect and species stand to <u>intelligere</u>. Possible intellect
is the univ_rsal ~~poteney~~ receptive potency (potens omnia fieri)
of the intelligible order. Species is its first act. Intelligere
is its second act. Possible intellect ~~xraxnotxsffi~~ and species
are principles of int_lligere, but/not efficient principles,

principia motus in eo in quo est and not principia motus in alio.
Further, they are different as natural principles: ~~being-in~~
potency to acquire the species is essential potency, the potency
of matter to form, the potency of the pupil to learn; potency,
once one has the species, is accidental, due to the absence of
necessary condit_ons, as the potency of form to operation, of
the master to consider what habitually he knows; still in both
cases the potency is n_tural and receptive, not efficient; the
reception of the intelligere is a <u>pati</u> as well as the reception
of the <u>species</u>; agian, the reception of the intelligere is a
<u>processio o erationis</u>, the advent of perfection to the perfectible.
On the other hand, once one has not only the first act of species

but the second act of intelligere, one can and ~~dass~~/utter an
inner word. One can, for the <u>intelligere</u> is second act and so
proportionate to~~tm~~ the second acts of d_fining or judging
One can, for the intelligere is the second act of the species:
as second act it is proportionate to the second acts of defining
or judging; as second act of the species, it is proportionate
to the content of the definition or judgment. One not only
can but also must utter the inner word: ~~fer-the-conditions~~
one can have the species without the intelligere because one
can have the species without a corresponding phantasm; but one
cannot have the intelligere without the inner word, for the
inner word involves no further conditions. Is one to say
that the thinker in virtue of his intell_gere is the efficient
cause of the <u>verbum</u>? Aquinas calls t'is procession <u>processio</u>
<u>op_rati</u>, a procession of perfection from perfection, of act
from act. One has the equality required in the created <u>imago</u>
of the Trin_tarian processions. But one might dispute about
the applicability of the Aristotelian definition. The produced
<u>verbum</u> is not "in alio" or even "in eodem qua aliud." It is
an immanent procession in which is absent both the potentiality
involved in an Aristotelian natural principle and the otherness
required in the recdpient of an Aristotelian product. Aquinas
was aware of this. ST I 27 1 contrasts efficient causality
~~with-its-implications-of-Arianism-or-Sabellianism~~ with immanent
action: efficient causality provides an analogy that leads to
Arianism or Sabellianism; ~~immanent-action,-the-greater-its~~
~~perfection~~ but in immanent action,the greater its perfection,
the closer to identity are its princpple and term [cf ad 2m,
CGent, I 27 5 lm; corr_ct TS Verbum III].

From the via inventionis of the generic view there **are**
springs a number of speculative issues. Athanasius argued
from the spirituality of God the Father to the consubstantiality
of the Son. The Arian controversies and the later the Christological
problems gave birth to ~~settle the~~ efforts to settle the meaning
of 'upostasis, ousia, phusis; Damascene worked on this issue (Bilz)
and Boethius made his questionable contribution (Schurr).
In the early medieval period the problem of substance and relation
came to a head in the writings and condemnation of Gilbert de la
Porree (Hayen).

A via doctrinae is but a transposition of a via inventionis.
It brings unity to a slowly acquired multiplicity by the intro-
duction of a single guiding principle. Generic trinitarian
theory attains such a transposition and unity in the ~~Neo-Platon~~
Platonist priority of the Good and the equally Platonist axiom
bonum est diffusivum sui. The pure/instance of generic theory
in the via doctrinae is to be found in Richard of St. Victor
(DTC, Ethier); and the/widespread influence of Richard on the
thirteenth ~~century~~ and even later centuries has resulted not
only from Richard's genius but also from the difficulty of
arriving at specific trinitarian theory and the difficulty of
maintaining one's position even after arriving.

For specific theory sets itself an arduous problem. It is
not content to speak of persons and nature, essence and relations,
processions and distinctions, unity and plurality. It asks
what the processions are. Dr. Bilz has noted the absence in
St. John Damascene/of this type of question and/of the ~~inter~~
type of interest supposed by the question. On the other hand,
the labor of St. Augustine's De Trinitate heads ever to the
goal of knowing, Quid sit Deus, and comes out with the answer
that the double aspiration of the Soliloquies,"Noverim me, Noverim
Te,"has but a single solution, that, in so far as we can in this
life, we ~~know God~~ in the image of our own souls [Schmaus p 416 f].

But if St. Augustine gave the West an awareness of the
possibility of specific trinitarian theory, if he marked out
~~the~~ with psychological acumen and literary skill the one pro-
mising line of attack, it remains that he left the medieval
theologians with an enormous task to ~~perform to~~ discover and
to perform. There had to be grasped that ~~to~~ to ask the nature
of the trinitarian processions was to presuppose that, in some
analogous sense, theology was a science. There had to be grasped
that theology as somehow a science draws upon the analogy of finite
nature and so presupposes the existence and sufficient development
of the sciences concerned with finite nature. Finally, these
profound intuitions had to be followed through to their logical
conclusions.

Without attempting to trace even in outline the history of
theology [See M.J.Congar, La théologie, Etude historique, DTC
15(1946), 346-447], three basic points must be made. There
cannot be any scientific theology without a systematically
developed distinction between the natural and the supernatural.
But that distinction was developed only in the first half of
the thirteenth century ~~(Landgraf TS)~~; and it is the lack of
that ~~distinction~~ systematizing of the concepts of nature and
grace that sets a problem in St. Anselm's treatment of mysteries
[Bayart] and Richard of St. Victor's rationes necessariae[DTC Ethier]