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THE DIALECTIC OF EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS:

Essays in Methodical Theology

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## PREFACE

This book presupposes that the writings of Bernard Lonergan, and especially his two major works, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding<sup>1</sup> and Method in Theology,<sup>2</sup> have consolidated the possibility of a significant advance in theological reflection in the Catholic tradition. Insight, of course, is indispensable for understanding and implementing Method in Theology, for engaging in methodological reflection together with Lonergan and for doing theology as Lonergan would have it done. For it is from Insight that one will be able to derive what Lonergan calls general theological categories.<sup>3</sup> As Philip McShane has insisted, Method in Theology is a more difficult and more profound book than Insight, all appearances and interpretations to the contrary notwithstanding.<sup>4</sup> But without Insight, "without the personal labour involved in arriving at one's own adequate general theological categories, . . . sets of special categories relative to religious interiority, authenticity, and redemptive history may well emerge, but they run the danger of being a new nominalism."<sup>5</sup>

In general, I must presume in my readers a rather thorough familiarity with Lonergan's work, and move on from there. The movement is twofold. First I wish to add what I believe is a necessary differentiating advance upon Lonergan's understanding of the theological foundations of a comprehensive reflection on the human condition.<sup>6</sup> The advance consists in a differentiation of dramatic-aesthetic subjectivity that will permit a specification of the Christian conversion that grounds a Christian theology.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, I wish to explore the implications of theological foundations in their impact on the crucial task of mediating the Christian religion to the cultural meanings and values that govern the contemporary emergence of a

universal human community. This second task will engage me in a theology of culture. Thus intrinsic to my contribution is the effort to present an expanded notion of theological foundations that takes into account the necessity of psychic conversion on the part of the theologian.<sup>8</sup> But there is also attempted an exercise in theological reflection on the contemporary human community. These two emphases run throughout the entire work, permeating each of the proposals for a methodical theology which I shall present. The second emphasis takes the form of theology itself. That is, it is no longer method, but a theology of culture, a theology in the second phase,<sup>9</sup> where the theologian's concern is not so much to understand what others have said as it is to state, organize, and relate to other disciplines and to contemporary cultures what he himself holds to be true.

Also basic to the entire book is a conviction that the coming generations and centuries will witness the struggle between two simultaneous and dialectically opposed qualitative mutations of human consciousness. One mutation will be regressive, and it will affect for some time the majority of humankind, including the Christian churches to the extent that they fail to be the genuine carriers of advancing differentiation. It will take the direction of Lewis Mumford's "post-historic man,"<sup>10</sup> whose neurophysiology, memory, imagination, intelligence, and freedom will be rigidified into patterns of behavior or schemes of recurrence<sup>11</sup> cumulatively fixed by neural, psychological, social, economic, political, and conceptual conditioning and determinism. The second, concomitant, and dialectically opposite mutation will be in the direction of Mumford's "world-cultural man,"<sup>12</sup> and will take its bearings on the self-conscious retrieval of the transcultural psychic and intentional dimensions of human consciousness.<sup>13</sup>

It is a movement into what Lonergan calls the third stage of meaning.<sup>14</sup> Its foundations are laid in Lonergan's "self-appropriation," and in lesser but no less necessary part by C. G. Jung's "individuation."<sup>15</sup> But Jung's contribution will have to be purified of its psychic romanticism and epistemological idealism through dialectical confrontation with Lonergan's intentionality analysis. The dimensions of interiority disclosed by these two thinkers must become mutually complementary, reinforcing, and in certain details even corrective. The correction in both cases is in the interests of what Lonergan calls genuineness,<sup>16</sup> the admission into consciousness of the tension in one's development between limitation and transcendence.

Because Lonergan does not extend to dreaming consciousness the relations of sublation that obtain among the levels of consciousness, he runs the risk of overweighting the tension in the direction of transcendence. Because Jung lacks an adequate cognitional theory he runs the opposed risk of an overweighting in the direction of limitation.<sup>17</sup> I will locate the tension itself in the transcendental time-structure of human imagination and sensitivity, of the psyche in its constitution of empirical consciousness, and in the dramatic disproportion between this time-structure and the notion of being that is intelligent and rational consciousness. For the time-structure of the psyche, I will have to turn to the thought of Martin Heidegger,<sup>18</sup> who has captured this time-structure but also been captured by it, making it constitutive of the Dasein of human understanding and of its equiprimordial dispositional Befindlichkeit,<sup>19</sup> and thus emptying thinking of its dialectical capacities. In contrast with Heideggerian hermeneutics, I will demonstrate the transformative consequences for the organization of human affairs that follow from a satisfactory notion of authenticity.

And so we are back to the two emphases that permeate this book, which for now we may delineate as an understanding of theological foundations that draws on the mutual complementarity of Lonergan's intentionality analysis and Jung's analytical psychology, and a theology of culture structured on these foundations.

No doubt it is already obvious that I hold that theological foundations are identical with the foundations of the stage of meaning of world-cultural humanity, and with the basis of a new science of the art of being human, a scienza nuova.<sup>20</sup> This claim, certain to be misunderstood, and even when understood to meet violent opposition from various quarters, can easily be demonstrated to be present already in Lonergan's writings. Thus in Method in Theology theological foundations are invoked "to decide which really are the positions and which really are the counter-positions" in human studies.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, "through the self-knowledge, the self-appropriation, the self-possession that result from making explicit the basic normative pattern of the recurrent and related operations of human cognitional process, it becomes possible to envisage a future in which all workers in all fields can find in transcendental method common norms, foundations, systematics, and common critical, dialectical, and heuristic procedures."<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, such an appeal to authority is not sufficient, for the second phase of theology is not founded on authority, nor is it based exclusively on the exegesis of others' writings, but on the understanding one has of oneself.<sup>23</sup> One must risk disclosing his self-understanding if one wishes to ground the claim that theological foundations are the foundations also of our genuine historical option and of its scienza nuova.

Philip McShane has discovered in Gaston Bachelard's The Poetics of

Space the watchword of that axis of human evolution that will give rise to the diaspora community of minds and hearts, meanings and values, of world-cultural humanity: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house."<sup>24</sup> For us the house corresponds to Lonergan's cosmopolis,<sup>25</sup> as this is extended beyond a higher viewpoint in the mind to higher integrations in the being and praxis of man effected by redemptive encounter with the divine.<sup>26</sup> Let it be noted from the outset that, while I view a methodical theology as necessarily political, the cosmopolis of which it is the soul is

. . . not a group denouncing other groups; it is not a super-state ruling states; it is not an organization that enrolls members, nor an academy that endorses opinions, nor a court that administers a legal code. It is a withdrawal from practicality to save practicality. It is a dimension of consciousness, a heightened grasp of historical origins, a discovery of historical responsibilities. . . . It stands on a basic analysis of the compound-in-tension that is man; it confronts problems of which men are aware; it invites the vast potentialities and pent-up energies of our time to contribute to their solution by developing an art and a literature, a theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and help they need and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense.<sup>27</sup>

The task of building will not be easy, for relatively very few hands will participate at first, and obstacles to their work will regularly interfere

at every major point in the process, because of the inertial tendencies present in the countervailing ever less comprehensive series of ranges of schemes of recurrence. And our own constant temptation, partly by way of reaction and partly because we are who we are, will be to build, not a house, but a tower that would reach up to the heavens and that only contributes sooner or later to the opposed mutation of consciousness in the direction of irretrievable alienation. Our house must be a temple, a shrine. Only then will it truly be a house, a home.<sup>28</sup> The building standards that govern its construction are threefold. First is simplicity, the creative and harmonious tension individually and socially between structure and the liberation of dramatic artistry, between complexity and the multiform freedom of appropriation. Lonergan eloquently describes one phenomenon that occurs in the social sphere when man's constitution of the human world lacks this simplicity:

One might as well declare openly that all new ideas are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge; they never know whether or not the new idea will work; much less can they divine how it might be corrected or developed; and since the one thing they dread is making a mistake, they devote their energies to paper work and postpone decisions.<sup>29</sup>

Second is steadfastness, Bachelard's indomitable courage, perseverance in the face of inevitable ridicule, misunderstanding, contempt, humiliation, and occasional martyrdom. Third, and conditioning the first two, is trans-

cedence, the humble acknowledgment of who it is that is building the house, of the divine partner in the movement of life without whose initiative and direction in the structuring of the edifice and the differentiating of its interior arrangement we build in vain.<sup>30</sup>



FOOTNOTES, INTRODUCTION, 1

<sup>1</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd; New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

<sup>2</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd; New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

<sup>3</sup>See the section, "General Theological Categories," in Method in Theology, pp. 285-288. Such categories are employed, Lonergan says, in all of theology's functional specialties. Ibid., p. 292. Compare Eric Voegelin's criticism of the lack of philosophical foundations in most of Old Testament research in Order and History, Volume I: Israel and Revelation (Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 282-303.

<sup>4</sup>Philip McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations: Being at Home in the Transcendental Method (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1976), p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp vi-vii.

<sup>6</sup>The first direction is more methodological than theological. But on the overlapping of method and theology, see my paper, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in Lonergan Workshop II, edited by Frederick Lawrence (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978). I have dealt with this first direction in a less comprehensive manner in Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977) and in several more recently written articles: "Psychic Conversion" (The Thomist, April, 1977, pp. 200-236), "Subject, Psyche, and Theology's Foundations" (Journal of Religion, July, 1977, pp. 267-287), and "Aesthetics and the Opposites" (Thought, June, 1977, pp. 117-133).

<sup>7</sup>On conversion as foundational reality, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 267-269.

FOOTNOTES, INTRODUCTION, 2

<sup>8</sup>On psychic conversion, see the articles and book referred to in footnote 2 above.

<sup>9</sup>On the two phases of theology, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 133.

<sup>10</sup>See Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), pp. 120-136.

<sup>11</sup>On schemes of recurrence, a crucial notion for our understanding of the advancing differentiation of human consciousness, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 48, 52, 87, 117, 125, 203-211, 533, 608. See also my article, "Aesthetics and the Opposites," esp. pp. 117-120.

<sup>12</sup>Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man, pp. 137-168.

<sup>13</sup>See again my article, "Aesthetics and the Opposites," as well as a subsequent article yet to be published, "Insight and Archetype: The Complementarity of Lonergan and Jung."

<sup>14</sup>On the stages of meaning, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 85-99.

<sup>15</sup>See my article, "Insight and Archetype."

<sup>16</sup>See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 472-479.

<sup>17</sup>This risk is clearly succumbed to by two of Jung's followers, no matter how strongly they disagree in their respective truncations of the human person. I refer to the orthodox Marie-Louise von Franz, C. G. Jung: His Myth in Our Time (New York: C. G. Jung Foundation, 1975) and the heterodox James Hillman, The Myth of Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972) and Re-Visioning Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

<sup>18</sup>Especially Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951).

<sup>19</sup>See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie

FOOTNOTES, INTRODUCTION, 3

and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 171-172.

<sup>20</sup>"I am led to believe that the issue, which goes by the name of a Christian philosophy, is basically a question on the deepest level of methodology, the one that investigates the operative ideals not only of scientists and philosophers but also, since Catholic truth is involved, theologians. It is, I fear, in Vico's phrase, a scienza nuova." Bernard Lonergan, Gregorianum, 1959; pp. 182-183, in a review.

<sup>21</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 365. On positions and counter-positions, see Insight, pp. 387-388.

<sup>22</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 267.

<sup>24</sup>Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 61.

<sup>25</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 238-242.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 633-690.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 241.

<sup>28</sup>See the dream of Jungian Max Zeller which I comment on in "Aesthetics and the Opposites," p. 125, footnote 18.

<sup>29</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 234-235.

<sup>30</sup>See Psalm 127.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF A METHODICAL THEOLOGY

It is our intention to present a lengthy series of considerations contributory to the construction of a methodical theology. These proposals will make sense only to the extent that we are able to clarify from the outset precisely what we mean by a methodical theology.

1. Hermeneutic Consciousness and Advancing Differentiation.

Bernard Lonergan has written that "a theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."<sup>1</sup> If this empirical description of the general function of theology is accurate-- and I will presume that it is--then a set of proposals for a contemporary methodical Christian theology will specify in a heuristic and directive manner what is at stake when one methodically mediates the Christian religious differentiation of consciousness with the contemporary dialectic of cultural meanings and values.

History demonstrates that theologies are quite different depending on the degree of religious differentiation that a theologian is able to mediate to a culture, and on the cognitive and existential differentiations and regressions with which he sets out to mediate transcendental and soteriological significance. All theological endeavor is finite, hermeneutical, and, when authentic, incremental. Theology is an ongoing process of the mind, precisely because religious and cultural differentiations are in a condition, at any time in history, either of advance or of regression or of struggle between the two. At any point, what is being either differentiated

or compacted is what we shall call the original experience of existential subjectivity in its search for direction in the movement of life. Cultural anthropology and the history of religions and philosophies will manifest varying degrees of compactness and differentiation of this original experience at different moments and in different cultures. With Eric Voegelin, I will wager that the highest degree of differentiation yet rendered available to posterity belongs to those whose appropriated cultural heritage includes the anthropological and transcendent disengagements of classical Greek philosophy, the transcendent-historical differentiation of Yahwistic faith, and the soteriological differentiation that appears in Christian revelation.<sup>2</sup> But with Lonergan, I will also maintain--and at this point we call for methodical theology--that this posterity can neither be preserved nor made effective individually and culturally in our time, unless it surrenders its previously foundational privilege to the further degree of differentiation that occurs as one advances in self-knowledge to the explanatory account of subjectivity. Such an advance is possible only by accepting and turning to advantage through rigorous dialectic the positive gains of modernity in modern science, in modern methods of historical scholarship, human science, and religious studies, and in modern philosophy.<sup>3</sup> These developments have been coincidentally anticipating the leap in being that Lonergan has called the transcendental method, where they are at last systematized and consolidated. The leap in being is the intellectual and existential cultural drama of our unique point in history. And only with this leap does theology become methodical.

Hans-Georg Gadamer has emphasized well, indeed profoundly, the finite character of all hermeneutic understanding.<sup>4</sup> But surely it is obvious

that the sense in which, following Lonergan, the terms "method" and "methodical" are employed here, differs quite substantially from Gadamer's ironic use of these terms.<sup>5</sup> Lonergan has differentiated what for Gadamer is a more compact hermeneutical experience into a set of eight interrelated functional specialties,<sup>6</sup> and has introduced into his account of the experience the proper acknowledgment of the opening of the interpreting mind and heart to the realm of the divine that constitutes a transcendent differentiation of consciousness.<sup>7</sup> Because of the eightfold differentiation of an incremental hermeneutic of historical experience, Lonergan's functional specialty of interpretation cannot be taken as an expression of a hermeneutic theory as Gadamer would accept the meaning of the term, hermeneutics. Because of the acknowledgment of the appropriateness of an opening of hermeneutic consciousness to absolute self-transcendence, we are provided with functional specialties called dialectic and foundations,<sup>8</sup> where normative exigencies of cognitive, moral, and religious consciousness are shown to add to the entire hermeneutic enterprise a much needed precision of the dialectical nature of what Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons.<sup>9</sup> Here there appears the methodical differentiation.

The classical anthropological and transcendent differentiations emerging from the Platonic and Aristotelian advances on myth have in the past combined with the Israelite historical and the Christian soteriological differentiations in such a way as to give rise to a normative notion of culture. Lonergan calls this notion classicist, and indicates that in fact it is counter-positional to the full impact of the soteriological differentiation.<sup>10</sup> The sharp contrast between modern and Aristotelian ideals of

science, along with the advancing differentiations of modern historical methods and human science, have invalidated the classicist notion of culture, thus leaving theology the enormous task of mediating the soteriological differentiation of consciousness that appears in Christianity's disengagement of the original experience, with a self-understanding of culture that is, first, more at home in principle with Christianity's advance in differentiation; yet, second, far more complicated than the classicist notion; and third, precisely because of Christianity's long symbiosis with the normative notion of culture, inimical to the soteriological advance as long as this advance cannot extricate itself from classicism. The task becomes even more difficult in that the extrication cannot be unqualified repudiation. The anthropological and transcendent differentiations of classic philosophy have to be maintained by a soteriologically differentiated hermeneutic consciousness that would advance the perhaps inexhaustible task of complete differentiation heading toward full positions on the human subject, on the objectivity that is correlative to the subject's authenticity, and on the being that is participated in by the integrity of cognitive and existential consciousness. But these classic differentiations can no longer be considered basic. They have to be grounded in, derived from, and critically monitored by, a hermeneutic consciousness that takes its stand on the leap in being that is the transcendental method.

One is concerned, then, with theology's method, when theology is no longer thought to be a permanent achievement but is known to be an ongoing process.<sup>11</sup> Method is appropriated, first, for the sake of guiding this ongoing process in a normative, critical, dialectical, and systematic manner that "assures continuity without imposing rigidity;"<sup>12</sup> secondly, for the



sake of providing foundations for an interdisciplinary construction of a scienza nuova completely in keeping with the advance in differentiation that promotes one to method;<sup>13</sup> and, finally, for the sake of safeguarding against the Protean theological temptation of our age--the simplistic reversion to theological extrinsicism, supernaturalism, and revelational positivism or nominalism--that was already overcome even in the erroneously classicist manner of conjoining the Greek anthropological and transcendent differentiations with the Christian soteriological advance. While this reversion is the theological temptation par excellence, it is often countered by a peculiarly modern reversion to compactness through which the acculturated (and deculturated) theologian succumbs to a theological immanentism, a Gnosticism whose possible forms are at least as many as those of the opposed theological aberration. The truth that cuts between supernaturalism and secularism is that "the objects of theology do not lie outside the transcendental field. For that field is unrestricted, and so outside it there is nothing at all."<sup>14</sup> Neither is transcendence an opening one happens upon independently of the process of mediating the world by meaning, constituting the world by responding to the directions one discovers in the movement of life, and constituting oneself in the process; nor is a theology that would mediate transcendence and culture structurally a different kind of pursuit of understanding from other integral hermeneutic performances of the human mind and heart. If a theology does not satisfy the structure imposed by the normative ordering of inquiry in the advance of intentionality toward right decision, it is not a matter of knowledge but of ideology, and to be teaching or writing it is to be promoting alienation. What sharply distinguishes a responsibly methodical theology from either fundamentalist or secularist

alienation is the seriousness with which it assumes the uniquely theological capacity of bringing all of the culturally available differentiations of the original experience at any given point in history forward to an integrated unity that renders possible yet further differentiating advance. A theology that would not be an ideology cannot be done in our day except from the foundations of the transcendental method.

My essay is not limited, however, to extolling the advance in differentiation that occurs through the disengagements of cognitive and existential consciousness in the writings of Lonergan, and to recommending this advance to any theologian in search of a prolegomenon to future theology. Method itself is not fully disengaged in Lonergan's writings. There is more of subjectivity yet to be differentiated. The first two parts of the present book locate and try to advance the needed further differentiation, which, like those rendered available by Lonergan, can occur solely in the minds and hearts and sensitivities of individual human subjects. Perhaps its nature will begin to show itself in this first chapter, for the general notion of a theology whose performance is controlled, directed, and promoted by method in the full sense of the term is our immediate concern.

## 2. The Twofold Mediatory Function of a Methodical Theology.

We begin by unpacking Lonergan's succinct formulation of theology's dialectically hermeneutic function. And we recall at once that the term, theology, is not a Christian, but a Platonic invention, intended to indicate the mediation of the order of being that the soul discovers in the opening to world-transcendent reality with the orientations that this opening corrects, purges of illusions, converts to truth from the way of ignorance and

falsehood.<sup>15</sup> I once defined theology as "the pursuit of accurate understanding regarding the moments of ultimacy in human experience, the referent of such moments, and their meaning for the individual and cultural life of humankind."<sup>16</sup> I would now prefer to speak of the world-transcendent context of all experience rather than of the precise moments of ultimacy in which this context comes to fuller clarity; of the final anagogic setting that determines the comprehensive intelligibility of all experience and expression;<sup>17</sup> or, with Eric Voegelin, of the Metaxy, the In-Between of cognitive and existential experience, the tension of the divine-human encounter as the basic structure of original experience.<sup>18</sup> This basic structure received its earliest clear anthropological-theological differentiation as the order of the soul in Greek philosophy,<sup>19</sup> and its earliest historical-theological differentiation as the order of history in the experience of Israel.<sup>20</sup> Theology's task is not only to further these differentiations by bringing them into the modern context, but also, as Christian, to mediate with them and with our culturally acquired immanent differentiations the further soteriological differentiation that occurs definitively in and because of the person and destiny of Jesus.<sup>21</sup> There are thus two sets of mediations that concern Christian theology: the mediation of the transcendent differentiation with all of the various immanent differentiations of consciousness thus far disengaged by the mind and heart of man, and the mediation of the soteriological differentiation of the Gospel and of its development in Christian doctrine with all of the other differentiations, both transcendent and immanent.<sup>22</sup>

The transcendent differentiation is constitutive of religion. The soteriological differentiation is constitutive of Christianity. The immanent

differentiations--common sense, theory, art, scholarship, interiority--are constitutive of cognitive and existential inquiry in their orientations toward the knowing and making of proportionate being.<sup>23</sup> Theology's twofold mediatory concern makes it comprehensive of all reflection on the human condition. And yet at different theological moments, the mediations, whether methodical or pre-methodical, will have different qualities, for the transcendent differentiation can itself be related in a complementary, a genetic, or a dialectical fashion to the various immanent differentiations that constitute a culture's cognitive and existential relation to proportionate being;<sup>24</sup> and the soteriological differentiation, while it cannot be related genetically to the integrity even of the transcendent differentiation,<sup>25</sup> nonetheless may stand either in a complementary or a dialectical relationship with it. In the case of the conversion of St. Paul, the relationship was dialectical. Only conversion, a radical about-face, could effect mediation. But the contemporary dialogue of representatives of the great world religions would seem to indicate the possibility of complementary mediations as well.<sup>26</sup> Here the issue is not conversion so much as understanding and cooperation, not dialectic so much as dialogue.<sup>27</sup>

The inner structure of a culture, defined empirically as the operative meanings and values that inform a given way of life,<sup>28</sup> is a function of the differentiation or compactness of the various immanent, the transcendent, and the soteriological dimensions of cognitive and existential experience. A culture, then, is a function of human consciousness. Cultural advance is a matter of differentiation, while cultural regression takes the form of a reversion to unmediated or less mediated compactness. Consciousness is simply experience, the subject as subject. In any given instance, it may or

may not have learned, through the mediation of education in its various forms, to operate in various differentiated realms of meaning. To the extent it has not, it is compact or undifferentiated consciousness, and the culture that flows from it is either archaic and mythical or regressive, depending on whether or not the differentiations of the realms of meaning are available in the cultural tradition. As Voegelin has insisted, to the extent that modernity has forgotten or rejected the anthropological and transcendent differentiations achieved in Greek philosophy and the soteriological differentiation disengaged by revelation, it is not to be considered neopagan, a reversion to archaism, but rather a development out of recessive strands immanent in the Christian heritage itself, and so Gnostic,<sup>29</sup> but nonetheless regressive.

Central, I believe, to the Gnosticism of modernity so insisted on by Voegelin is the illusion regarding consciousness itself that has been spotted and relentlessly attacked by Lonergan. Consciousness is not objective self-consciousness, "the primary because most immediately evident object which disposes instrumentally of ideas and representations by means of a technical orientation," "reducible to an objective awareness of itself."<sup>30</sup> From Lonergan's cognitional analysis, it is clear that I may be the conscious subject of the operations of knowing without knowing what I am doing when I am knowing. From psychotherapy, it is clear that I may be the conscious subject of certain feelings, without knowing what I feel. In either case what is already conscious becomes known, not by an inward look, but by quite complex operations of mediation through which consciousness is objectified. In either case, too, when objectification is the result of intelligent inquiry and reasonable reflection, the result is a mediated differentiation of consciousness that is itself so radical that it constitutes a

conversion, whether it be intellectual or psychic.<sup>31</sup> The notion of consciousness as objective self-consciousness is rooted in the blunder that knowing is like taking a good look. "Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision; consciousness is some sort of cognitional event; therefore, consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision; and since it does not inspect outwardly, it must be an inward inspection."<sup>32</sup>

Thus to speak of culture as a function of consciousness is not to postulate apodictically a supremely creative and constitutive transcendental ego independent of the historical relativity of situatedness and tradition. In its origins and its processes, consciousness is as receptive as it is constitutive, as traditional as it is originaive. Its self-transcendence, wherein lies its authenticity as consciousness, its participation in the true order of being, is constituted by the tense unity of its receptive and constitutive features, and by the dependence of the constitutive capacity on the active receptivity of inquiry through which the real world is mediated by meaning to the conscious subject. The cognitive and the existential experience of consciousness, whether concerned with the world of sense or with the world of the self, are both constituted in their integrity by the active receptivity of the normative order of inquiry.

What allows us, then, to speak of a leap in being that occurs in the transcendental method is that this normative order of inquiry itself is mediated to consciousness through a differentiation that is quite unique to our age. The operations that constitute consciousness are intentional, and a reflexive technique has been developed through which consciousness is able to bring the operations as intentional to bear upon the operations as conscious. Through such a technique, what was conscious becomes known.

Because what was conscious is the generating principle of all human knowledge and decision, rendering it known provides the subject with a set of foundations for knowledge and decision that enables a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human cognitive and existential praxis. It is in this sense of intelligent emergent probability that we may speak of the explanatory interior differentiation of consciousness as both something beyond the historical, anthropological, transcendent, and soteriological differentiations that are our heritage, and equally worthy of being called a leap in being.<sup>33</sup>

Consciousness, then, is not the objective self-consciousness of some fictive inward perception. In fact, in itself it is not knowledge at all, but simply the presence of the human subject to himself or herself in all of the operations and feelings, compact or differentiated, of which he or she is the subject. This presence is not that of any object, for it is not as intended in any operation that it is presence. The operations have objects, but consciousness is not an operation. The presence in question differentiates consciousness from the condition of dreamless sleep or of a coma, not from the condition of ignorance. Whenever we are neither dreamless nor comatose, we are conscious, however ignorant. The presence of consciousness through operations and feelings to objects is an intentional presence, but the presence of consciousness to itself is simply experience. The experience is quite different depending on the kinds of operations that the conscious subject is performing, and on the quality of the feelings that orient one dynamically to the objects of those operations. But only the operations constitute knowledge. Consciousness itself is not perception of any kind--sensitive, intelligent, rational, or existential--but simply the

experience that enables us to call these operations conscious in the first place.<sup>34</sup> To speak of culture as a function of consciousness is simply to state, then, that the meanings and values that inform and constitute a given way of life will be dependent on the relative differentiation or compactness of the realms and functions of meaning<sup>35</sup> in the consciousness of the men and women of that culture. When a cultural situation manifests a relative homogeneity of differentiation or compactness, there prevails a certain harmony in the social life of the culture due to the stable achievement of common meanings and values. When an individual or creative minority of individuals introduces the questions that would advance consciousness to a further degree of differentiation, however, there results the tension that is both the necessary condition of advance and the precipitating cause of representative suffering and martyrdom.

The various major differentiations are themselves subject to development. Later major differentiations may be in part genetic outgrowths of the previous advances. Thus the periagoge of emergence from Plato's cave does not as such stand in dialectical relationship with the refinements of Lonergan's intellectual conversion. It is a position that Lonergan develops, even while reversing the counter-positions that attended it. So too, the Greek disengagement of the psyche as sensorium of transcendence<sup>36</sup> is quite compatible with what I have called psychic conversion, even though the cognitive advances of Lonergan enable me to express this disengagement in a manner that relates it dialectically to specifically modern developments in the exploration of the elemental symbols of the psyche--something I would find impossible if I confined my cognitive self-understanding to the contributions of Plato and Aristotle. Finally, the soteriological differentiation



that emerges with revelation has itself been further differentiated in the course of the development of Christian doctrine and stands today in the position of being further enriched by the differentiation that will emerge from our understanding of the dynamics not only of inner psychic transactions and intentional operations but also of political and economic relations, and from the differentiated sensitivity to creation that will flow from the science of ecology.

To summarize, then, let me say that Lonergan's specification of the task of theology imposes on Christian theology a twofold set of mediatory operations: the complementary, genetic, or dialectical mediation of the transcendent differentiation with various immanent differentiations of consciousness; and the complementary or dialectical mediation of the soteriological differentiation with both the transcendent and immanent differentiations. Because all of the differentiations are themselves in a process of mediated development, theology is an ongoing process. And because there has emerged in our time the modern philosophic differentiation that is consolidated in the work of Lonergan, the ongoing process that is theology can be governed normatively by the leap in being; that is the transcendental method.

### 3. Method in History.

A culture is the structured resultant of the relative differentiation or compactness of the various immanent, the transcendent, and the soteriological dimensions of human consciousness. Consciousness is the arena of history, which itself is a dimension of proportionate being, subject to the laws of emergent probability, as is everything else in the universe.<sup>37</sup> When world process becomes history, blind alleys still continue to be travelled;

breakdowns are still suffered, but now personally, socially, and culturally; and yet through it all we may discern a dimly recognizable course through differentiation to expanded consciousness and more precise self-articulation, and through integration to temporary plateaus of relative wholeness on the part of the differentiated self-possession of consciousness. The upwardly directed but indeterminate dynamism of intelligent emergent probability<sup>38</sup> heads through successive differentiations and integrations toward an ever more nuanced and artistically delicate balance of limitation and transcendence<sup>39</sup> in an ever more self-possessed conscious subjectivity.<sup>40</sup> There are novelties along the way, leaps in being, new forms of differentiated awareness, more sophisticated integrations of the capacities of consciousness. The leap in being that is the transcendental method means in part that intelligent, reasonable, and responsible emergent probability can come to understand itself, can work out the laws and patterns of its emergent process, and can thus direct itself from a more secure basis of freedom and responsibility.<sup>41</sup> Knowledge of the immanent intelligibility of conscious emergence and appropriation of its laws grounds the fact that, in the midst of the blind alleys that are being travelled today through ignorance and neglect of the transcendental exigencies of consciousness, the probability is being increased that there will be cut a path of genuine psychological and spiritual, social and cultural, economic and political advance to a new set of conjugate forms in the individual and in the human community, a higher integration in the being of man, new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human knowing and human living. In method, the course of this expansion of consciousness passes through the intelligent, reasonable, and responsible differentiation and integration of the various spontaneities and cultural acquisitions of human consciousness.

Method takes its stand on the recognition of the fact that human living provides a manifold of data that remain purely coincidental events from the standpoint of the physical, chemical, biological, and psychological sciences. These are the events of human inquiry, insight, conceptualization, formulation, reflection, judgment, deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, love.<sup>42</sup> There is the difference between being intelligent and stupid, reasonable and silly, responsible and selfish. Above all, there is rational self-consciousness, the insightful discovery that, within the limits imposed by the laws of the other sciences, it is up to me what kind of person I will be. The science of humanity pivots on the insight that a person makes a work of art out of his or her life when the way one takes is the way of insight, reflection, and humble commitment, that the deepest desire of the human heart is this dramatic artistry, this existential authenticity,<sup>43</sup> and that neglect of its conditions is failed artistry, breakdown and collapse, the failure of one's very life.<sup>44</sup> Method recognizes that the data on men and women as selves will not be understood by studying physics, chemistry, biology, or even sensitive psychology, but by questioning the data of human consciousness itself, by bringing conscious operations as intentional to bear on conscious operations as conscious, by "(1) experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) understanding the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding."<sup>45</sup> From that basic and prolonged exercise in

explanatory self-understanding,<sup>46</sup> there slowly emerges an expanding differentiation of the various realms and stages of meaning,<sup>47</sup> an elaboration of the full structure of the human good,<sup>48</sup> a theory of culture and a dialectical account of history,<sup>49</sup> and a metaphysics that assembles the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, that unifies scientific inquiry, and that provides a dialectical basis for the hermeneutical appropriation, purification, and promotion of social, cultural, and religious traditions.<sup>50</sup> Finally, from that exercise, there emerges a set of foundations, indeed theological foundations, that ground a collaboratively realized comprehensive reflection on the human condition.<sup>51</sup> These foundations are what enable us to speak of transcendental method as a leap in being.

The cumulatively assembled foundations result from the objectification, in the way of interior self-differentiation, of an "original normative pattern of recurrent and related operations that yield cumulative and progressive results."<sup>52</sup> From this objectification there emerges "basic method."<sup>53</sup> What is objectified is "the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility" and relation to transcendent being.<sup>54</sup> Any objectification of this "rock"<sup>55</sup> will, of course, be incomplete, will admit further clarifications and extensions.<sup>56</sup> But the revisions to be introduced in this manner will not affect the structure of the rock itself, nor can they possibly refute the essential elements of the structure that Lonergan has already disengaged.<sup>57</sup>

For me to present in detail the foundations that emerge from the objectification of the original unity of consciousness would entail summarizing all of Insight and most of Method in Theology. It is for this reason that I must presuppose these works. But what can be done without excessive labor

is to list some examples of extension and clarification of the basic method that have already been effected without invalidating previous achievements.

The clearest instance, of course, is the differentiation on Lonergan's part of a fourth level of consciousness, the disengagement of existential consciousness in its concern for judging and realizing value, from the levels of consciousness whose concern is ascertaining what is, understanding correctly. In Insight, rational self-consciousness is collapsed into intelligent and reasonable consciousness, decision is a specialization or extension of intellectual activity,<sup>58</sup> and the good is identified with the intelligent and reasonable.<sup>59</sup> The sense of constraint that one feels in reading the last chapters of Insight, especially in the knowledge that later developments expand the order of intentionality in such an enriching manner, appears almost from the the beginning of Lonergan's movement from the basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity to his laying of the method of a transcendental metaphysics. For explicit metaphysics is defined as "the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being,"<sup>60</sup> yet the operations that constitute "implementation" have not been differentiated. Implementing what one has affirmed to be the case demands evaluation, deliberation, and decision. Moreover, as we read on, we meet other instances of the manner in which Insight's account of intentionality is more compact, less differentiated, than the later objectifications that recognize the distinctness, and even the primacy, of the existential in human consciousness. We find in the chapter on ethics an almost Kantian distinction between affective and effective attitudes,<sup>61</sup> and, as Lonergan himself has acknowledged,<sup>62</sup> an insufficient portrayal of the context in the experience of the heart for the movement to a philosophy of God.

While we cannot overestimate the significance of the emergence of existential concern in Lonergan's later writings, however, we must stress that it not only does not eliminate the crucial significance of the basic positions of Insight on knowing, the real, and objectivity,<sup>63</sup> but that it also is not Lonergan's last word on the differentiation of the order of intentionality. Since Method in Theology, there has been emerging the affirmation of yet a fifth level of consciousness, distinct from and subsuming even the heart's concern for what is good. There is mystical union, the dynamic state of being in love with God, the achievement of what even in Method in Theology is called "a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded."<sup>64</sup>

Next, and perhaps as a result of these expansions of the differentiation of interiority, there is acknowledged the reciprocity of movements within the structure: a creative movement from below upwards, and a therapeutic movement from above downwards.<sup>65</sup> The acknowledgment begins with Method's recognition that the Latin tag, Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, is of minimal relevance,<sup>66</sup> and extends in post-Method developments to the affirmation of the reciprocal conditioning of creating and healing in human history.

. . . Human development is of two quite different kinds. There is development from below upwards, from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgement, from balanced judgement to fruitful courses of action, and from fruitful courses of action to the new situations that call forth further understanding, profounder judgement, richer courses of action.

But there also is development from above downwards. There is the

transformation of falling in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one's tribe, one's city, one's country, mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in his worship. Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values. At once it commands commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omniscient, shortsighted common sense. Where hatred plots around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope.<sup>67</sup>

Moreover: "Just as the creative process, when unaccompanied by healing, is distorted and corrupted by bias, so too the healing process, when unaccompanied by creating, is a soul without a body."<sup>68</sup> Again, in this instance, then, we find a more differentiated expression of a structure and of processes that already were recognized in a somewhat more compact unity by the end of Insight.

Thirdly, there is talk of conversion, of the religious, moral, and intellectual varieties of radical about-face that occur, respectively, when the transcendent exigence of human consciousness<sup>69</sup> is met by the response of otherworldly love, when the criterion of one's decisions shifts from satisfactions, with all their ambiguities, to genuine values despite the sacrifices entailed in realizing them,<sup>70</sup> and when one purges oneself of the cognitive myth that knowing is like taking a good look and replaces it with the self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, intelligent, and rational.<sup>71</sup> The conversions are related to one another, both

in their usual order of occurrence, and in their relations within a single consciousness.<sup>72</sup> As we shall see in the next two chapters, the recognition of a triply converted subjectivity as foundational subjectivity enables Lonergan to move from the position of speaking of the basis or foundations of theology to talk of the theological foundations of a comprehensive, collaborative reflection on the human condition.

Fourthly, in my own work, I have introduced the notion of psychic conversion, and I have done so simply by extending the basic pattern of the levels of intentionality, not upwards, but downwards, so as to include dreaming consciousness and so as to explain the possibility of the transformation even of sensitivity to participation in the divine solution to the problem of evil.<sup>73</sup>

Finally, in the present chapter, I have introduced what I believe to be yet a further necessary precision, by distinguishing, under the influence of Eric Voegelin, a soteriological differentiation of consciousness from the transcendent or religious differentiation.<sup>74</sup> Such a disengagement, it seems, is necessary if one is to be able to speak of a specifically Christian conversion as a process in the cumulative establishing of foundational reality.<sup>75</sup>

And so the objectification of the rock, of the transcendental infrastructure of the subject as subject, goes forward. What is cumulatively being established is a full position on the human subject as subject, an explanatory differentiation of consciousness that uncovers the terms and relations that obtain in the order of intentionality. But the basic leap in being that establishes the explanatory interior differentiation occurs in Chapter Eleven of Insight. Subsequent extensions and clarifications by Lonergan himself and by others do not invalidate the very condition of their



possibility. "All such clarifications and extensions are to be derived from the conscious and intentional operations themselves."<sup>76</sup>

#### 4. The Methodical Exigence in Theology.

The theological mediation of culture and the Christian religion is a matter, we have said, first, of articulating the complementary, genetic, or dialectical relationships that obtain between the transcendent differentiation of consciousness and the relative differentiation or compactness of the other realms of meaning and value that inform a way of life; and secondly, of mediating the soteriological differentiation in its complementary or dialectical relation to all of the other dimensions, including the transcendent exigence. History, as Eric Voegelin has shown, finds its substance "in the experiences in which man gains the understanding of his humanity and together with it the understanding of its limits."<sup>77</sup> For the Christian theologian, this substance of history is mutilated when the experiences of Greek philosophy's opening of the soul to the divine order of being and Christianity's discovery of a saving response to the transcendent exigence of consciousness are forgotten and neglected.

Philosophy and Christianity have endowed man with the stature that enables him, with historical effectiveness, to play the role of rational contemplator and pragmatic master of a nature which has lost its demonic terrors. With equal historical effectiveness, however, limits were placed on human grandeur; for Christianity has concentrated demonism into the permanent danger of a fall from the spirit--that is man's only by the grace of God--into the autonomy of his own self, from the amor

Dei into the amor sui. The insight that man in his mere humanity, without the fides caritate formata, is demonic nothingness has been brought by Christianity to the ultimate border of clarity which by tradition is called revelation.<sup>78</sup>

And yet these theoretical and soteriological differentiations by no means suffice to constitute the articulation of the conscious interiority of the theologian. Not only is there demanded a critical appropriation through these differentiations of the ambiguities of common sense, and a working-through and transcendence of the pre-philosophic and pre-Christian biases of neurosis, egoism, social transference, and shortsighted practicality,<sup>79</sup> which in the sophisticated (or sophistical) consciousness of theologians so often mingle with at least incipient theoretical inclinations so as to mask themselves as systematic theological competencies; but also there are the various immanent differentiations and compactnesses that enter into the constitution of the substance of history, and with these the theologian must acquire personal familiarity: with mythic consciousness in its various forms, with art and scholarship, and above all with the specialization and refinement of the theoretical differentiation in modern science, and with what would seem to be an emerging ecological differentiation that will have enormous consequences for the economic and social, political, and institutional order of human life. It is perhaps Gandhi who has captured with aesthetic and mystical sensitivity, if not with explanatory exactness, what is crucial to the ecological differentiation: the creative tension between limitation and complexity in all arrangements of human affairs.<sup>80</sup> Theology demands of its practitioner the most subtle and delicate articulation of consciousness if Christian theology is not to degenerate, as it can

so easily do, from being a genuine mediation of culture and Christianity to being the ideological justification of some blend of the many alienations that are available to the contemporary mind and heart. It is this demand that calls for method, the pursuit of the modern philosophic differentiation,<sup>81</sup> the articulate and cumulative self-possession of conscious interiority. Theology's responsibility is to provide the foundations of a comprehensive collaborative reflection on the human condition in the context of the full substance of history. Only a methodical mediation of culture and religion is authentically theological. Any theology that is methodologically deficient represents an irresponsible promotion of the deculturation of meanings and values that is the general human tragedy of our day, the cesspool into which most of our contemporaries are plunging headlong.<sup>82</sup>

##### 5. Methodical Theology as Political Theology.

Cultures obviously originate from consciousness in a hermeneutical fashion, and not in the sense that consciousness is autonomously or originatively constitutive of a way of living. Culturally situated consciousness is effective-historical consciousness, in which the preservation and advance of meaning occurs through complementary, genetic, and dialectical fusions of horizons.<sup>83</sup> Cultures are the resultant of a doubly operative functioning of consciousness, through whose relatively differentiated or compact agency the world is mediated and constituted by meaning.

Particularly significant for the cultural constitution of the world into which each of us is born and through whose operative meanings that world is cognitively mediated to us, is the evaluative or existential dimension of consciousness, through which certain ways of living, acting, and

projecting possibilities are deemed worth while or rejected as useless and even evil. The relative dialectical autonomy of constitutive meaning is clarified, however, only by disengaging the notion of authenticity.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment, and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself. This process for the school-master is education, for the sociologist is socialization, for the cultural anthropologist is acculturation. But for the individual in the process it is his coming to be a man, his existing as a man in the fuller sense of the name.

Such existing may be authentic or unauthentic, and this may occur in two different ways. There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him. There is the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself. In the second case history and, ultimately, divine providence pass judgment on traditions. . . . The unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity of a tradition. Then, in the measure a subject takes the tradition, as it exists, for his standard, in that measure he can do no more than authentically realize unauthenticity.<sup>84</sup>

Moreover, it would seem that the empirical notion of culture as the operative set of meanings and values informing a given way of life can be employed in two different manners. In a relatively restricted and particularized sense, its reference is to the common sense of a

people. We know from Lonergan that the common sense of a culture consists in a set of insights shared by a group of people and oriented to the dramatic and practical execution of the tasks set by life. This set of insights is always complemented in particular situations by an additional insight into the concrete set of circumstances that must be dealt with here and now.<sup>85</sup> The combination of common sense and insight into concrete situations generates, under more or less stable conditions, a mastery of new situations in an artistic or practically effective fashion. The set of insights that constitutes common sense will differ from one people to the next, and the difference can be more or less dramatic depending on the degree of absence of the fusion of cultural traditions.<sup>86</sup> At times the differences may be so acute as to lead to mutual incomprehension, hostility, ridicule, and even warfare, unless the standpoint of common sense is either broadened significantly or transcended in favor of a more universal and crosscultural differentiation of consciousness.

In this restricted sense, for every operative set of meanings and values that inform the dramatic art and practical know-how of common sense, there is a different culture. To the extent that one is sharing in the common operative assumptions, one is a participant in the culture. One may even participate in several cultures at once, if we use the empirical notion of culture most strictly. Then if the operative assumptions clash, the cumulative individual resolutions of the conflicts may generate modifications in the common sense of the group and in the extreme may lead even to the formation of a new culture either on a broader or a more compact basis.

A more general sense of culture as an empirical notion embraces

larger totalities of people and longer periods of time. At the limit, it allows us to speak of cultural epochs, where differentiation is not among varieties of common sense but is determined by controls of meaning and value.<sup>87</sup> This more general usage of the term, culture, is from a historical perspective more basic, in that it provides a general framework of intelligibility for understanding what is going forward in the inter-relations and conflicts of smaller cultural units and of individuals within these units. There are several qualitatively different sets of controls by which the world is mediated and constituted by meaning. New and finer controls of meaning and value emerge with new differentiations of consciousness. Thus Lonergan, employing ideal-types,<sup>88</sup> differentiates three stages of meaning in the cultural history of the West--three cultural epochs, according to whether meaning is controlled by common sense, by theory, or by interiorly differentiated consciousness.<sup>89</sup>

The emergence of the third stage of meaning through transcendental method is the radical cultural exigence of our time. The responsibility for meeting the demand lies, I believe, in an especially urgent way with theology in its twofold mediation of the transcendent and the soteriological differentiations with the various culturally acquired immanent differentiations of consciousness that constitute the anthropological component of the substance of our history. Theological foundations promote and articulate the self-appropriation of human interiority.<sup>90</sup> The radically dramatic quality of the exigence appears in Lewis Mumford's typology of the alternatives that lie before us: post-historic man or world-cultural man.<sup>91</sup> Realistically, we must assume that both are inevitable: the sequences of evolutionary blind alleys that most of

humanity will travel in the several centuries to come, and the gradually emerging series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human living grounded in the heightening, differentiation, and integration of human consciousness through the leap in being that is transcendental method. So too, in a Gnostic vein that nonetheless contains a germ of fruitful insight that must be dialectically disengaged from its immanentist ideology, C. G. Jung speaks of an age of individuation, of the pursuit of a differentiated wholeness that will eventuate in a new religion, one whose temple will take 600 years to build but upon foundations that are already laid.<sup>92</sup>

And scholars of religion speak of a convergence and cooperation of the major religions of the world as basic to the transition into a new epoch.<sup>93</sup>

Lonergan disengages best what is common to all of these intimations of a human future: the insistence on the expansion, heightening, differentiation, integration, and self-appropriation of human consciousness as the key to a new set of controls of mediating and constitutive meaning and of orientating value. The implication, clearly, is the emergence of new operative assumptions of meaning and value, and consequently new social and cultural, political and economic arrangements informing new lifestyles that meet the exigencies of the perennial desire of the human heart to make of life a work of dramatic art. In previous essays, I have conceived the cumulative outcome of this individual and cultural drama to consist foundationally in the realization of an androgyny of interiority, the reconciliation through transcendental method of intentionality and psyche, science and story, theory and poetry, politics and dramatic artistry.<sup>94</sup> If the general, and in the limit epochal, notion of culture is also the basic notion, and if the struggles of an emergent leap in

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being constitute the epochal drama in which we are all engaged, then we are indeed provided with an ultimate context for understanding the vicissitudes of more particular cultures as they interact with one another in our time and of individuals of more or less differentiated interiority within these cultures.

While a methodical theology is thus inescapably political, it cannot be overemphasized that the radical struggle is not social or political but individual. Only individual subjects are conscious. Consciousness is the unity of the subject's presence to himself or herself in all of one's various human operations. The unity is more or less differentiated, but in either an initial and undifferentiated or a retrieved and articulated condition of genuineness or authenticity,<sup>95</sup> it is, from a creative point of view, the unity that begins with the sublation of the consciousness of the dream by waking memory into the consciousness of the empirical subject, and that extends through the unfolding of intentionality on the empirical, intelligent, and rational levels, to its fulfilment in existential and religious consciousness; and from the even more basic therapeutic point of view, it is the unity effected when the mediation of salvific love with existential responsibility sharpens one's dedication to values, overcomes the biases that infect one's pursuit of intelligibility and truth, and reaches down even into unconscious neurophysiology to stimulate and release the symbols that empower the creative upward movement of empirical, intelligent, rational, existential, and religious intentionality.<sup>96</sup> The privileged arena of the drama of an emerging cultural epoch is the consciousness of the individual subject. It is there that the struggle is taking place, there that the emerging



epoch takes form, there that the successive breakthroughs that would promote world-cultural humanity are being accepted or refused. What is going forward in our time, most fundamentally, is the struggle for a qualitative leap in conscious being. From that struggle emerge transformations in styles of living that promote existential and social liberation from the suffocating pressures of a cultural epoch that has seen its day, but that is holding to its hegemony over consciousness with a tenacity that can be broken only by the subtlest and most delicate, because most resolved, resistance.<sup>97</sup>

#### 6. Religion as Resistance.

And so we come, finally, to the religious differentiations, transcendent and soteriological, that a methodical Christian theology is to mediate with the various immanent differentiations. If the theologian is to mediate these differentiations, he must first make them his own in the explanatory fashion of transcendental method.

The religion of the subject who is emerging into differentiation in the way of interiority most fully embodies the definition of rational religion that was offered by Alfred North Whitehead: what the individual does with his own solitariness.<sup>98</sup> In either a compact or differentiated form, religion has been, as Whitehead recognized, "an unquestioned factor throughout the long stretch of human history," and its concern has always been with what, through Christian mediations, we have come to call justification, with the transformation of character that sets one right with the order of being.<sup>99</sup> In its compact forms, religion is primarily a social fact. As social, it achieved expression in the rituals and myths of

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cosmological societies and in the early Israelite embodiments of the historical differentiation effected by the Sinaitic revelation. Due to the advances in differentiation that for Western man are embodied in the prophets of Israel, the tragedians and philosophers of Greece, and the Incarnation of the Logos in Jesus, it is now the case that a religion that "sinks back into sociability" is a religion in its decay.<sup>100</sup> "The age of martyrs dawns with the coming of rationalism."<sup>101</sup> "All collective emotions leave untouched the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being, consciously alone with itself, for its own sake. . . . If you are never solitary, you are never religious."<sup>102</sup>

Soren Kierkegaard, too, speaks of and stretches himself and his readers toward a religiousness in which "by relating to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which posited it."<sup>103</sup> With advancing differentiation, then, religion has been disengaged as intrinsic to the process of constitutive meaning. It is not something one does over and above, or unrelated to, the existential project of world-constitution and concomitant self-constitution. The stage of constitutive meaning grounded in the multi-form appropriation of the order of intentionality, then, will demand and exhibit the most differentiated religiosity that the substance of history to date permits.

Now if religion is the discovery and cultivation of the transparent groundedness of individual existential consciousness in absolute transcendence, then it is simultaneously the carrier of humanity to the leap in being that, in transcendental method, establishes such consciousness in a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in world-

constitution. Religion and the culture-bearing capacity of consciousness are one. For the individual whose participation in the substance of history is a hermeneutic appropriation of the epochal differentiations of the past into a consciousness that is promoting a further enriching differentiation in the way of interiority, religion is identical with the discerning constitution of world-cultural humanity in the retrieval of genuineness that passes through the explanatory self-appropriation of transcendental method. The individuating emergence of theological foundations is a process at once religious and indispensable to fulfilling the responsibility of carrying emergent probability to a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human life.

How is it the case, though, that "by relating to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which posited it?" Kierkegaard's notion of faith has been lucidly treated by Ernest Becker in relation to the contrasting power of inauthentic cultural traditions, psychological transferences, and the flaccid attempts of psychological religionists to heal the individual consciousness from the other-power that it succumbs to so as to render itself oblivious to the inevitability of death.<sup>104</sup> But for Becker the groundedness of the self in transcendent being is not transparent. It is a "creative illusion," the best projection indeed, but still a projection. What is it, then, about authentic self-constitution that makes it religiously self-authenticating? The best answer, of course, to such a question will be found in story form. But some account must be given in heuristic fashion of what one meets when one takes seriously the task of negotiating one's own solitariness. With Lonergan and David Tracy, I agree that a religious

phenomenology must give way to a metaphysical form of argumentation that answers the question of what it is that one is in love with, compelled or grasped or claimed by, submissive to. But only later can I treat the respective metaphysical accounts of these two Catholic theologians.<sup>105</sup> Our question now concerns not God but the discovery of God. It is a major task of transcendental method to objectify the transparent groundedness of authentic self-constitution in transcendent being. The key to this objectification is the further differentiating advance upon Lonergan's intellectual conversion that I have called psychic conversion.<sup>106</sup>

But before speaking of psychic conversion, we must review its context in Lonergan's own writings. The next two chapters, then, deal with Lonergan's advance from a concern with the foundations of theology to a heuristic account of foundations as theological.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 1

<sup>1</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. ix.

<sup>2</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), Chapters Two and Three.

<sup>3</sup>Thus Lonergan speaks of a third stage of meaning, the stage of interiorly differentiated consciousness. See Method in Theology, pp. 85-99. See also Lonergan's Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1957), pp. 388-389.

<sup>4</sup>Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translation edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming from the second (1965) edition of Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: Mohr (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

<sup>5</sup>On Gadamer's irony, see Frederick Lawrence, "Gadamer and Lonergan: A Dialectical Comparison," unpublished paper written for the Lonergan symposium of the 1976 annual convention of the American Academy of Religion, pp. 13, 15.

<sup>6</sup>See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter Five.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-84.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., Chapters Ten and Eleven.

<sup>9</sup>See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 267-274. Compare Lonergan on the critique of mistaken beliefs and of the mistaken believer, in Method in Theology, pp. 43-44.

<sup>10</sup>Bernard Lonergan, "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness," in A Second Collection, edited by Bernard Tyrrell and William Ryan (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), pp. 1-9; cf. especially pp. 5-6 for the respective relations of classicist and modern

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 2

empirical notions of culture to Christian revelation.

<sup>11</sup>"When the classicist notion of culture prevails, theology is conceived as a permanent achievement, and then one discourses on its nature. When culture is conceived empirically, theology is known to be an ongoing process, and then one writes on its method." Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. ix. On pp. 138-140, Lonergan presents the broad sweep of the changes that have occurred within Christian theology from the original non-differentiation of religion and theology through a process of differentiation heading toward the condition heuristically outlined by Lonergan in which "the differentiated specialties function as an integrated unity." For more detail on the classicist and modern notions of culture, see Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 252-267, and many of the papers in A Second Collection (see previous footnote).

<sup>12</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 21.

<sup>13</sup>"It is in the measure that special methods acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be attained for attacking interdisciplinary problems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within a higher unity of vocabulary, thought, and orientation, in which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the solution of fundamental problems." Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, pp. 69-70.

<sup>16</sup>Robert M. Doran, "Aesthetics and the Opposites," Thought, June 1977, p. 117.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 3

<sup>17</sup>See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 115-128. See also Joseph Flanagan, "Transcendental Dialectic of Desire and Fear," in Lonergan Workshop I and "Aesthetic Conversion" in Lonergan Workshop II.

<sup>18</sup>See, for instance, Voegelin's brilliant lecture, "The Gospel and Culture," in D.G. Miller and D.Y. Haridjian, eds., Jesus and Man's Hope (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971), pp. 59-101.

<sup>19</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chapter Two.

<sup>20</sup>Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. I: Israel and Revelation (Louisiana State University Press, 1956).

<sup>21</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chapter Three, esp. pp. 76-80.

<sup>22</sup>Voegelin, on whom I am dependent here, would not follow me into speaking positively of the development of Christian doctrine. But more of that later.

<sup>23</sup>On the notions of proportionate and transcendent being, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 391.

<sup>24</sup>On complementary, genetic, and dialectical relations among horizons, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 236-237.

<sup>25</sup>This is not to say that it introduces into the order of intentionality a principle of disharmony, however. See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, Chapter Twenty.

<sup>26</sup>See William Johnston, Christian Zen (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

<sup>27</sup>See Friedrich Heiler, "The History of Religions as a Preparation

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 4

for the Cooperation of Religions," in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, edited by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 132-160. On dialectic and dialogue, see Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," paper delivered at the 1977 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, esp. p. 19. Here, though, the issue is not the soteriological differentiation.

<sup>28</sup>"Besides the classicist, there also is the empirical notion of culture. It is the set of meanings and values that informs a way of life. It may remain unchanged for ages. It may be in process of slow development or rapid dissolution." Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. xi.

<sup>29</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 107.

<sup>30</sup>Frederick Lawrence, "Gaulamer and Lonergan: A Dialectical Comparison," p. 36. As Lawrence indicates, such an illusion relates to the Kantian presupposition that epistemology is the fundamental philosophic point of departure. Epistemology settles the quaestio iuris concerning how experiences of truth are valid or possible. In Lonergan's terms, epistemology asks, "Why is doing that knowing?" Clearly, on such terms, there is a prior question to be settled, the quaestio facti, "What am I doing when I am knowing?" This is the question of cognitional theory. On Cartesian subjectivity, see Hiram Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973).

<sup>31</sup>On intellectual conversion, see Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 238-240; on psychic conversion, see below, Chapter Five.

<sup>32</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup>The expression, "leap in being," is Eric Voegelin's. See



FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 5

Israel and Revelation, pp. 40-41. On emergent probability, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 121-128; on intelligent emergent probability, ibid., pp. 209-211.

<sup>34</sup>See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 6-9.

<sup>35</sup>See ibid., pp. 76-85.

<sup>36</sup>See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 75.

<sup>37</sup>On history as emergent probability, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 209-211.

<sup>38</sup>On finality, ibid., pp. 444-451.

<sup>39</sup>On limitation and transcendence as a law of human development, ibid., pp. 472-479.

<sup>40</sup>See my paper, "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in Lonergan Workshop II.

<sup>41</sup>See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 227.

<sup>42</sup>For an extreme example of an attempt to explain such events on the analogy of classical mechanics, see Sigmund Freud, "Project for a Scientific Psychology," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated under the general editorship of James Strachey, Volume I: Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unpublished Drafts (London: The Hogarth Press, 1966), pp. 283-397. See also the commentary and interpretation of this work by Paul Ricoeur, in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 69-86. Ricoeur shows that the latent presence of Freudian hermeneutics in this early (1895) text makes the "Project" stand "as the greatest effort Freud ever made to force a mass of psychical facts within the framework of a quanti-

tative theory, and as the demonstration by way of the absurd that the content exceeds the form." Ibid., p. 73. Ricoeur's noting of the fact that Freud specifies no numerical law to govern his notion of "quantity"--a summation of excitation homologous to physical energy--is interesting in light of Lonergan's detailing of the manner in which, in the scientific study even of organisms, to say nothing of the psyche and intelligence, genetic method increasingly assumes priority over classical method and the relevant heuristic notion becomes development rather than an unspecified correlation to be specified or an indeterminate function to be determined. Insight, pp. 459-463. See especially the negative observation on the significance and efficacy of measurement for genetic method, p. 463. I have generalized this observation to apply even to energy when that energy is psychic. See "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning."

<sup>43</sup>In ibid., I have related existential authenticity and dramatic artistry.

<sup>44</sup>On neurosis and failed artistry, see Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), Chapter Ten.

<sup>45</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 14-15.

<sup>46</sup>On self-affirmation as explanatory, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 334-335.

<sup>47</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 81-99.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 47-52.

<sup>49</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight, Chapters Six, Seven, Eighteen, and Twenty.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., Chapters Fourteen through Seventeen.

<sup>51</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, Chapter Eleven.

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 20, and Chapter Four.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 18-20; see Insight, Chapter Eleven, for the argument that the self-affirmation of the knower flows from the reflective grasp of a virtually unconditioned.

<sup>58</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 596.

<sup>59</sup>"In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling." Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in A Second Collection, p. 277. A detailed study of this development appears in Frederick Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value," Science et Esprit, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1977), pp. 123-143.

<sup>60</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 391.

<sup>61</sup>In ibid., p. 624, Lonergan speaks of a universal willingness that "consists not in the mere recognition of an ideal norm but in the adoption of an attitude towards the universe of being, not in the adoption

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 8

of an affective attitude that would desire but not perform but in the adoption of an effective attitude in which performance matches aspiration." By the time of Method in Theology, in comparison, feelings are what give "intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin" (pp. 30-31). The truly effective attitude is one where affectivity is of a single piece because of the gift of God's love. Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>62</sup>Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," p. 277.

<sup>63</sup>"The very wealth of existential reflection can turn out to be a trap. It is indeed the key that opens the doors to a philosophy, not of man in the abstract, but of concrete human living in its historical unfolding. Still, one must not think that such concreteness eliminates the ancient problems of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, for if they occur in an abstract context, they recur with all the more force in a concrete context." Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject," in A Second Collection, pp. 69-86. The quotation is from p. 85.

<sup>64</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 107. For the notion of a fifth level of consciousness, see Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), p. 38.

<sup>65</sup>Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," in Bernard Lonergan: Three Lectures, edited by R. Eric O'Connor (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1975), pp. 55-68.

<sup>66</sup>See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 122-123.

<sup>67</sup>Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," p. 63.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

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<sup>69</sup>Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 83-84.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 240.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., pp. 238-240.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., pp. 241-243.

<sup>73</sup>Most satisfactorily to date in "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in Lonergan Workshop II.

<sup>74</sup>"The impossibility of philia between God and man may be considered typical for the whole range of anthropological truth. The experiences that were explicated into a theory of man by the mystic philosophers had in common the accent on the human side of the orientation of the soul toward divinity. The soul orients itself toward a God who rests in his immovable transcendence; it reaches out toward divine reality, but it does not meet an answering movement from beyond. The Christian bending of God in grace toward the soul does not come within the range of these experiences--though, to be sure, in reading Plato one has the feeling of moving continuously on the verge of a breakthrough into this new dimension. The experience of mutuality in the relation with God, of the amicitia in the Thomistic sense, of the grace which imposes a supernatural form on the nature of man, is the specific difference of Christian truth. The revelation of this grace in history, through the incarnation of the Logos in Christ, intelligibly fulfilled the adventitious movement of the spirit in the mystic philosophers. The critical authority over the older truth of society which the soul had gained through its opening and its orientation toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself. In this sense, then, it may be said

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 10

that the fact of revelation is its content." Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 78.

<sup>75</sup> Nonetheless, one must keep in mind the remarks made above concerning the possibility of a relation between the transcendent differentiation and the soteriological differentiation that is not dialectical but complementary.

<sup>76</sup> Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 20.

<sup>77</sup> Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 78.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., pp. 78-79.

<sup>79</sup> On dramatic bias, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 191-206; on individual, group, and general bias, ibid., pp. 218-242.

<sup>80</sup> See Lanza del Vasto, Return to the Source (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

<sup>81</sup> Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 96.

<sup>82</sup> On the implication of higher education itself in this process of deculturation, I have written some reflections in a paper privately circulated at Marquette University, "Faith, Education, and Freedom."

<sup>83</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 267-274; 305-341; Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 385-390; 530-594; Method in Theology, pp. 235-266.

<sup>84</sup> Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 79-80.

<sup>85</sup> Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 173-181.

<sup>86</sup> For examples, see C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 247-252.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 11

<sup>87</sup>On the notion of the control of meaning, see Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," especially pp. 255-259.

<sup>88</sup>"The ideal-type . . . is not a description of reality or a hypothesis about reality. It is a theoretical construct in which possible events are intelligibly related to constitute an internally coherent system. Its utility is both heuristic and expository, that is, it can be useful inasmuch as it suggests and helps formulate hypotheses and, again, when a concrete situation approximates to the theoretical construct, it can guide an analysis of the situation and promote a clear understanding of it." Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 227.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 85-99.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., Chapter Eleven.

<sup>91</sup>Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), pp. 120-166.

<sup>92</sup>Max Zeller, "The Task of the Analyst," Psychological Perspectives (Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring, 1975), pp. 74-76.

<sup>93</sup>See Friedrich Heiler, "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," as in footnote 27 above.

<sup>94</sup>See especially "Aesthetics and the Opposites," Thought, June, 1977, pp. 117-133.

<sup>95</sup>On genuineness or authenticity as conditional and analogous, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 475-479.

<sup>96</sup>For details, see my "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," Lonergan Workshop II.

<sup>97</sup>The separation of individual conversion from social transformation thus rests on an inadequate theoretic basis. The healing movement

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 12

from above downwards does not come to term without a creative movement from below upwards that runs the entire course of the order of intentionality. To speak of or promote a "conversion" while neglecting the social component of the human good is really to speak of or promote a perversion. We are not lacking in our day, of course, in self-appointed gurus instrumental in the education of socially irresponsible, i.e., psychopathic, spiritualists.

<sup>98</sup> Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 16.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>103</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, in Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 147.

<sup>104</sup> Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, especially Chapter Five.

<sup>105</sup> See Bernard Lonergan, Insight, Chapter Nineteen; David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975), Chapters Seven and Eight.

<sup>106</sup> Robert Doran, Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977) and the other publications referred to in Introduction, Footnote Six above. Experiences with students have shown me that I have not yet clarified sufficiently that by psychic conversion is meant an explanatory



FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, 13

appropriation of symbolic interiority, not a healing of affectivity that can be given one in any stage of meaning. While I have no quarrel with psychic health, it is not what I mean by psychic conversion.