

I Order + End

II End + Nature

III Pure Nature

IV The Elimination of Order

Necessary nature or world

- 1) Logic
- 2) Deontology
- 3) Rationalism
- 4) Mixed schools

V Representation of Order

only necessary nature to be known

1) equally valid for all possible worlds

2) deont world order

3) rational doctrine : nothing or exigence

4) spirit + nature : nothing or exigence
Information distinction - no generality + nature split.

5) nature + grace : Concrete : essential + whole

6) spirit acts : acceptation, order establisment

7) incomprehension of empirical science | situation philosophy

8) incomprehension of theology or abstract science

9) incomprehension of development of science

10) incomprehension of popular needs

I Order, End

II End & Nature

III Pure Nature

IV The Elimination of Order

V The Restoration of Order

What were the rationalists up to? They effected a new transposition of the old problem. What Aquinas had settled by appealing to divine wisdom and freedom, Scotus had upset by appealing to an incomplete theory of knowledge. The rationalists were ~~xx~~ out to restore what Scotus and the Nominalists had destroyed. Their concern was for evidence, and they demanded absolute evidence. The starting-point had to be indubitable. The process had to be as rigorous as mathematics. But for the rationalists to succeed the universe would have to be different from what it is. A universe that is a product of wisdom and freedom is not knowable by absolute evidence. It exists as a matter of fact. It consists of these natures and not others; as a matter of fact. It is ordered in this fashion and not some other fashion as a matter of fact. For matters of fact evidence is not absolute but only sufficient.

and order/

Let me explain what I mean. Quoad se God is absolutely evident. Again, within our knowledge there is absolute evidence, for ~~xxx~~ the light of our intellects is a created participation of uncreated light (I 84 5; 88 3 lm); our intellects are of such stuff that were they not passive potencies they would be God (I 79 2 c). Still that evidence is for principles and not for matters of fact; it makes clear that a finite essence/~~doxx~~ not necessarily exist and so that our bright ideas have to be followed by the further question, An sit; but the second question, the question whose answer is verification, is ~~not~~ answered met not by absolute evidence but by sufficient evidence. I Anyone can be certain he has a soul by the mere fact of its presence, but the nature of the soul ~~requires-a-diligent~~ can be known only by a diligent and subtle study in which many great men have erred (I 87 1 c). But if nature is known with difficulty, then what are you certain of with so much ease?

No doubt, one can readily say that there must be something

What were the rationalists up to? They accepted the Nominalist criterion of evidence, but they rejected the Nominalist conclusion of scepticism. ~~Either evidence is absolute, or there is no knowledge~~ If they felt they had ~~the evidence~~ the absolute type of evidence they demanded, they were driven to affirming a necessitated universe. ~~If they knew such evidence was~~ In the measure they knew such evidence to be lacking, they were driven to more pretentious forms of Nominalist ignorance.

Now the human mind is capable of absolute evidence. ~~xxxx~~ The light of our intellects is a created participation of the uncreated light (I 84 5; 88 3 lm); it is capable of grasping the rationes xxxi aeternae, not by some vague Augustinian vision of truth, but in intelligent conception and in rational affirmation (Ibid). Still such knowledge is but a component within the larger whole in which we know the existence and nature of contingent beings produced and ordered by freedom as well as wisdom. Though we are capable of grasping absolute evidence, still we cannot have absolute evidence either for what does not exist absolutely or for what does exist absolutely. Not for the former, for there is no proportion between the contingently existing and contingently ordered thing and the absolute necessity of pure understanding and purer reason. Not for the latter, for in this life we know the existence of God not a priori nor a simultaneo but only a posteriori. It is the lot of human intellect to be of such perfection that were it not a passive potency it would be God (L 79 2 c) yet to operate on objects that are products of wisdom and freedom, that possess an intelligibility which might be other than it is, that are known to possess the intelligibility they do possess, not by any a priori deduction of the universe but simply as a matter of fact established by evidence that is not absolute but only sufficient.

Nature and Destiny.

~~There is a strange contrast to the Tho~~

There is a strange abruptness to the Thomist contrast of nature and end. After distinguishing the imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life ~~by-using-natural~~ in virtue of natural powers endowment and, on the other hand, the perfect beatitude of the next life when, we hope, we shall see God as he is, St. Thomas went on to say that the angels were created ~~in-their-natural-happiness-but-not-~~ in possession of the first happiness that was naturally attainable by them but not in the ~~sex~~ ultimate happiness that exceeds the faculty of nature. This is all clear enough. But what is strange is the ~~adda~~ reason offered he offered, that ultimate happiness is not something of nature but nature's end; "quia haec beatitudo non est aliquid naturae, sed naturae finis." I 62 1 c. The same queer contrast appears a few articles later. To God alone is perfect happiness natural, for ~~in~~ him alone are ~~is~~ being and being happy identical. ~~For~~ any creature whatever, happiness is not nature but last end. "Dicendum quod soli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis, quia idem est sibi esse et beatum esse. Cuiuslibet autem creaturae esse beatum non est natura sed ultimus finis." I 62 4 c.

both/
the/

~~It will be the purpose of the present article to attempt to throw some light on the Thomist mode of conceiving ~~xxxxxx~~ the relations between nature and destiny and on the source of the contemporary impulse the more recent impulse; ~~xxx~~~~

Nature, it seems, is one thing; but the perfect happiness of nature, the ultimate end of nature is quite another. With such statements, taken materially, everyone will agree

Nature, it seems, is one thing; but the destiny of nature is another.

~~A meticulous logician would point out that the sole possibility of the truth~~

Nature, it seems, is one thing; but the destiny of nature is another.

merely/

Two questions arise. First, what is the Thomist mode of conceiving nature and destiny? Why is it not more than an apparent and verbal contradiction for Aquinas to say "non est aliquid naturae, sed naturae finis"? Secondly, what ~~is-the-root-of~~ are the sources, what is the root of the divergence between the Thomist mode of conception and later more familiar modes in which to speak of the beatific vision as "naturae finis" would be tantamount to saying that it was ~~maxx~~ attainable by natural powers?

Order and End.

The brief answer to our first question is that Aquinas conceived the end or destiny of creatures, not at all in terms of their nature~~s~~, but in terms of world order. There was to ~~be~~ his thinking a master concept that settled at a single stroke, first of all, the order, form, good, and end of the whole created universe and, secondly, by immediate implication which natures were to be created, what operations they were to perform, what goals they were to reach. That master concept is world order.

The brief answer to our first question is that Aquinas conceived the end or destiny of creatures, not as a function of their nature~~s~~, but as a function of a master concept, the ordo universi. From that concept there followed both natures and their destinies. The connection between nature and ~~as~~ destiny was not immediate. It was mediated by the higher principle of world order. Hence, in the present section an effort will be made to familiarize the reader with the notion of world order, and in the next section the precise character of the resultant relation between nature~~s~~ and destiny will be considered.

Order

Ordo universi.

anything is possible
and any possibility
is ordered by its own
inherent
in principle

If now we turn to the historical aspect of the problem of integration, we find

If one asks turns to the historical aspect of the problem of integration, one cannot but be struck by the fact that the most important, the most esteemed, and the most influential of theologians quite unmistakably made the existing order of the universe a key idea of his work. This fact, if it leaves unexplained why Catholic thinkers are concerned about integration, at least provides the assurance that what they seek is within easy reach.

though spontaneously one associates the notion of world order with ethics.

The convenient starting-point is a ~~xxx~~ passage in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Lambda 10, 1075a 12 ff) which Aquinas frequently ~~quoted~~ cited (1 d 39 q 2 a 1 sol; De Ver 5 3; CG I 78 §4; I 47 3 1m; 103 2 3m) and sometimes developed (CG II 24 §4; I 21 1 3m). It distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic end. An extrinsic end is illustrated by the place that is the term of a local movement. An intrinsic end is exemplified by the form that is reached by alteration or generation. But the significant point is that, when there is a whole composed of parts, then the form, ~~the~~ intrinsic end, and the good is constituted by the order of the parts. (In XII Met., lect 12 §2627-31.)

the

This identification of order, form, intrinsic end, and good of a composite whole was applied by Aquinas to the created universe; and correlative to this step was the affirmation that God is the extrinsic end of the universe and of all it contains and that the excellence of the universe as a whole surpasses the excellence and value of any of its parts.

twofold/

This identification of the order, the form, and the intrinsic end, and the good of a composite whole was applied by Aquinas to the created universe. This application was complemented by two immediate corollaries: first, God is the extrinsic end of the universe; secondly, ~~xxx~~ the excellence and value of the universe as a whole surpasses that of any of its parts. It follows that the order of the universe comes closest to divine perfection, that it ~~xxx~~ resembles God more than any other creature, that it is the best among created things, that it is the product of divine wisdom, that it is prior in his intention, ~~mere-prime~~ that principally it is willed, that most of all it is cared for, that its proper cause is God himself, that it is what God principally causes, that God knows parts of the universe by knowing the whole, that God wills parts by willing the whole, that the end and form of the parts is the whole.

Hence in his letter
to Aquinas
commented 1

In the Contra Gentiles such affirmations are recurrent but scattered. It will perhaps be helpful to collect a few of the more striking statements of notes Pure Nature.

I have been quoting mainly from the Contra Gentiles but

In the Summa theologiae the same positions are maintained and given a more sweeping development.

I 22 4

I 47 1

I 103 2 3m

From the order of the universe is demonstrated the existence (I 2 3) and the unity (I 11 3) of God. That order is the distributive justice of God I 21 1, and that justice is ontological truth L 21 2. In the CG it was clear that the divine wisdom ordered not only things but also their operations III 64 §11. But now there is distinguished a first perfection that was the order of the universe on the seventh day of creation and a second perfection which is the perfect beatitude of the saints eternally in heaven I 73 1. There is also the dynamic order of things through their operations to their ends: it pre-exists in the divine mind as providence I 22 1 and as eternal law I-II 91 1; it exists in things as divine-governance natural law I-II 91 2, as divine governance I 103 1, as fate I 116 2. It controls achieves necessary effects through necessary causes and contingent effects through contingent causes I 118 c; yet it is inescapable for what may appear to evade providence in one manner comes under it in another I 103 7;

The order of the universe grounds a relative optimism, for to make any existing creatures better would throw out the general order (I 25 6 3m; cf 47 2 1m; 48 2 3m; 56 2 4m). Hence the perfection of the universe requires multiplicity and (I 47 1; cf CG III 97 §2) and inequality (I 47 2 c), spiritual creatures (I 50 1) and material creation (I 62 5), creatures which can fail (I 48 2) but not evil, which comes under order only accidentally (I 48 1 5m). The marvellous connection of things (CG II 68 §6-12 reveals the world to be one with the unity of order (I 47 3) on the analogy of an organism (I 65 2) and, though this suffices to prove that the heavenly bodies influence earthly events (Quodl VI a 19), still this analogy is not to be exaggerated (Quodl IV 3 1m) Finally, as each particular thing has its particular end,

Now

Finally, as the particular end of each thing is its particular good, so the universal end of all things is goodness-itself the universal good. But the universal good is good of itself; it is the essence of goodness; while any particular good is good by participation. Hence, since within the whole range of creatures are good only by participation, it follows that the good that is the end of the universe is extrinsic to the whole universe (I 103 2 c). Further, inasmuch as any creature desires any good whatever, whether by

Order these extremes

and so far is of its own essence yet under divine providence inescapable I 116 3

for and

31 I 118 103 116 3

them//

intelligible, sensible, or natural appetite, it necessarily also desires God as its end, for nothing is good except or desirable except by participation of divine goodness (I 44 4 3m; cf CG III 16-25). Again, anything is said to belong to another inasmuch as it is ordained to the other as its end (I 21 1 3m); but all things belong to God by nature their very nature and being; hence the angels naturally love God more than themselves (I 60 5) and, were it not for the corruption of nature, man too would naturally love God above all (I II 109 3); so it is that all inclination ~~is~~ and action of nature or of will spontaneously ~~is~~ heads for the goal destined for ~~it~~ by God (I 103 8).

Now what is the necessity of multiplicity and inequality, of angels and material ~~creation?~~ creatures? With equal firmness Aquinas rejected both ~~the expressions~~ ~~of~~ rationalism and voluntarism. To those who affirmed universal necessity, he opposed the free will of God (CG

Parus

But how could Aquinas reason about the order of the universe? What value can there be in a demonstration that concludes to the necessity of multiplicity and inequality, of angels and material creatures? This is the methodological point. Aquinas was neither rationalist nor voluntarist: after excluding the error of those who affirmed all things to be of necessity (CG II 23 fin), he proceeded to exclude the error of those who affirmed all things to be by free will without reason (CG II 24 fin). The ground of the universe is not merely rational necessity nor merely free will but both wisdom and freedom; there is nothing without a reason, for divine wisdom is the cause of all; on the other hand, without divine the free exercise of divine will, there would be neither the things with reasons nor the reasons for them. (CG-II-29-30) Absolutely there need be nothing; on given suppositions certain conclusions follow; and the order of the universe is constructed by positing the right suppositions and so arriving at what is (CG II 29, 30, 97; esp §13 ff). // From the transcendent end that is divine goodness, any order of things might follow; it is only from a determinate finite end, that a determinate order can be deduced; and any determinate finite end is freely chosen by God (I 25 5)

De Pot 3 16
I 19 2//

Thus, to quote from the Contra Gentiles?

CG III 64 §10: Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi.

CG I 85 §3: Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum

Such affirmations are recurrent in a series of contexts in the Contra Gentiles. Let us offer some specimens.
Bonum ordinis universi nobilius est

regulated/

Within world order intellectual creatures hold a place of privilege. The principal parts of a whole are needed on their own account for the whole; other factors enter only for the maintenance or improvement of the their maintenance or improvement. Thus, in the universe other things are for the sake of intellectual creatures, while intellectual creatures are for their own sake. But this difference in no manner implies that intellectual creatures are not subordinate both to God and to the whole. CGent III §§4x5 112 esp §§4, 10. Such subordination of persons to the whole of creation world order as to an end and higher good ~~may seem~~ may seem a difficult doctrine. Yet without it persons become anarchic individualists. Even of the Blessed Trinity St. Thomas wrote: "Sed contra: Ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. Sed in divinis personis non est confusio, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo est ibi ordo." (I 42 3). The order to which persons are subject regards not the species but the individual (CG III 113); it is a matter of law (ibid 114), directing man to God (ibid 115) and the end of law is the love of God (116) and of one's neighbour (117). Clearly, no difficulty can be made raised against that doctrine. Certainly, such subordination to world order is unobjectionable and, if I am not mistaken, difficulty arises only from a confusion between the end of final causality and the objects of love. To love is ~~to~~ velle bonum alicui. The order of ends is the order of good values, of intelligible wholes; and the greatest created whole is the greatest created value. Into this order persons enter not as factors but as beneficiaries order created persons enter in two manners: as beings, they are particular instances of the good and parts of a total good; as persons, they are beneficiaries, and the greater the total good that is willed them, the more they are loved.

I 20 1 3m.

created/

Nature and Order
Necessity and Contingence

The Thomist doctrine of world order was a consciously selected middle position between a necessary emanationism and an anti-intellectual voluntarism. Against the voluntarist Aquinas insisted that the universe is the work of divine wisdom, that wisdom is the principle of intelligible order, and therefore that there is a reason for everything in the universe (CG II 24). Against the emanationist Aquinas was no less insistent that divine freedom is the cause not only of things but also of the order that obtains between among them (CG II 23, 25-30). ~~But how is this double doctrine to be maintained~~

not merely

Nor was this middle position merely a matter of playing freedom against necessity and wisdom against contingency. For Aquinas/knew how to affirm both wisdom and freedom at once but also explained in detail how this was to be achieved. For after assigning reasons for a series of aspects of divine providence (CG III 97 §§1-12), he revealed the underlying technique. Divine goodness-is love of absolute goodness is the ~~xxx~~ ground of creation; yet it is not ~~the~~ a necessitating ground, for absolute goodness by itself is perfect. If one supposes that ~~God~~ by way of similitude God wishes to communicate his goodness, it will follow that diverse creatures will be needed to represent by parts what in God is one. If one supposes the measure of universal perfection to be attained by ~~some~~ many creatures in each species, one can draw further conclusions. There is always a reason to be assigned, but it is assigned not absolutely but on the supposition of a free choice of the divine will. In this manner one excludes both the error of those ~~who~~ that attribute everything to divine will without reason and, at the same time, the error of those that hold divine providence ~~to~~ to be necessitated in its determination of the order of things. (Ibid §§12-15).

This balance between emanationism and voluntarism has another expression. There are necessary effects and there are contingent effects; the necessary effects proceed from necessary causes and the contingent effects from contingent causes. But God stands not within but without the order of contingency and necessity. The

eius/

Nam voluntas divina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes/differentias. Sunt autem differentiae entis possibile et necessarium; et ideo ex ipsa voluntate divina originantur necessitas et contingentia in rebus et distinctio utriusque secundum rationem proximarum causarum: ad effectus enim quos voluit necessarios esse, disposuit causas necessarias; ad effectus autem quos voluit esse contingentes, ordinavit causas contingenter agentes, idest potentes deficere. Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel necessarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependant a voluntate divina, sicut a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae. In I Peri Herm., lect 14 §22. ed Leon I, 70.

~~Now this passage does not make sense if necessity~~

But what is this necessity and contingency which divine will transcends? A threefold distinction is needed. There is the necessity which obtains whether or not God chooses to create: it is the necessity of divine existence, divine knowledge, divine love of absolute goodness. Besides this absolute necessity, there is the transcending necessity; it obtains only if God wills some world order; it consists in the truth that whatever God wills that must be. [I 19 8; 116 3]. Finally, besides absolute necessity and transcending necessity there is transcended necessity; this is the necessity that is relative to natures, that assigns to a nature its inseparable properties, and its exigences, that it affirms that under given conditions natural causes naturally and necessarily produce determinate effects.

It is the third necessity with its correlative contingency that divine will transcends. For all order is to an end. But it is only the finite end to be produced that demands determinate means in a determinate arrangement. But any finite end is freely chosen by divine will, and by that choice

Cf On Possibility]

It is the third necessity with its correlative contingency that divine will transcends. For all order is to an end. But the ultimate and extrinsic end of absolute goodness. Still, it is only the finite end that demands determinate means in a determinate order. And any finite end is freely chosen by divine will. I 25 5 c. Because the finite end is freely chosen, the order to the finite end is freely chosen; because the order to the finite end is freely chosen, it is divine will that selects necessary causes for effects that are to be necessary and contingent causes for effects that are to be contingent. Thus, the intelligible structure of the universe no less than its existence, its necessary laws no less than its contingent events, are the product of divine freedom. At the same time, it also is true that there the whole universe is the product of divine wisdom, for it is wisdom that grasps in the divine essence the series of possible world orders that could represent divine perfection and that grasps these orders not abstractly nor partially but each in its entirety and concretely, knowing the many in the one, the matter in form, the potency in act, the negative in the positive, and the abstract in the concrete, without the slightest succession or discourse.

the effect in its cause,

There is an important corollary to be drawn. Aquinas grasped the order of the universe by making the right suppositions about divine will: "Manifestum igitur fit quod providentia secundum rationem quandam res dispensat: et tamen haec ratio sumitur ex suppositione voluntatis divinae" CG III 97 §14. For the theologian, the free act of divine will was the primordial fact that effected the transition from the anything that might be but need not be to the determinate things and order that are. But it is apparent that another method is equally possible. As Aquinas aimed at making the right suppositions about divine will, so the scientist aims at making the right suppositions about

(Note on Possibil)

does not/
I 25 5 c
ibid 3 c

It is this third necessity with its corresponding contingency that divine will transcends. The ground of the transcendence lies in an extremely significant ~~difference between order to the ultimate and extrinsic end of divine goodness and order to~~ theorem, which I present in its full generality elsewhere. Briefly, all order is to an end; for the order in question is intelligible, all intelligibility is in terms of causality, and the end is the first of causes, ~~moving-the-agent-to~~ But as we have seen there is the extrinsic end of divine goodness, and the intrinsic end immanent in the created universe. Now the extrinsic end is not something to be produced; it ~~demandxxx~~ determinate means in a determinate arrangement; and so anything with the ratio entis is possible. On the other hand, the intrinsic and finite end of creation does demand proportionate causes producing effects necessarily or contingently; but any such finite end is freely chosen. Thus the free choice of the finite end is a free choice of such and such necessary effects and, again, of such and such contingent effects; further, inasmuch as it is a free choice of effects as necessary or as contingent, it similarly is a free choice of the corresponding necessary or contingent causes. It follows that divine freedom is the cause not merely of the existence of the universe but also of its intelligible structure, not merely of the events of the universe but also of the necessary or contingent laws that govern those events.

a participation or a
Still this ~~universal significance of divine freedom~~ is not secured at the expense of divine wisdom. Anything with the ratio entis is possible, but divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit (I 25 5 c) so that nothing incompatible with divine wisdom or divine goodness is possible (ibid 1m). God is the primary object of his pure act of understanding; but the secondary object contains everything else as a correlative of the primary; and the one act of understanding that grasps the primary object also grasps the secondary without any discourse or succession. As we distinguish between divine being, divine omnipotence, and divine wisdom, so we distinguish between the secondary object as participations of being, as possibilities correlative to omnipotence, as world orders correlative to divine wisdom. As the distinctions between divine being, omnipotence, and wisdom are founded only on our mode of conception, so also are the corresponding distinctions between participations of being, possibilities, and possible orders. But God knows in his essence the total series of possible manifestations of his perfection; each possible manifestation is a whole world order; and the lot are grasped as it were incidentally in grasping the divine essence. The many are known in the one, potency in act, matter in form, the negative in the positive, the abstract in the concrete, the ordered in the order, and all at once by a single intentio.

possible/

Ref. 69 35; (I 15 2). Not in Possibil

Still this transcendence of divine will is not at the expense of divine wisdom. Will is rational appetite and so by definition follows intellect. Hence the transcendence of divine will must be based upon a corresponding transcendence of divine wisdom. What, then, is this prior ground?

Let us go back to the complete notion of world order which, we have seen, involves an identification of order, form, end, and good. The form of a composite whole is the intelligible order of its parts; it is the ultimate complement that unites the parts into a whole and so is their end and good. Now order is not without the ordered, nor the good of order without the instances of good that are united by order. Thus, it is because God has the idea of the order of the universe that he has proper knowledge of every part of the universe (I 15 2 c); and it is because God wills the good of the universe that he wills every particular instance of good in the universe (CG I 86 §4; 78 §4). Further, while our minds rise from the many to the one, the divine mind descends from the one to the many. God knows the other only through his own essence (CG I 46§; he knows himself perfectly (I 47); primo et per se he knows only himself (I 48); none the less, he has proper knowledge of everything else (49 & 50) from the single species that is his essence and in the single intentio intellecta that is his Word (53 §5); ~~as~~ hence as we know a house by grasping at once foundations, walls, and roof, as we know a proposition by grasping at once subject and predicate, so in a single grasp God knows all (CG I 55 §§2 - 5). Now it is the order of the universe that is most perfect in the universe and most resembles divine perfection; it ~~seems to~~ follows that God knows in his essence ~~the~~ the order of the universe and in the order of the universe all that is ordered; moreover, since anything with the ratio entis is possible (I 25 3) and since divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit (I 25 5), it would seem that God knows in his essence the total series of world orders and within that series all the parts of each. Thus, without succession or discourse God would know the many in the one, the ordered in the order, potency and privation in act, the negative in the positive, the abstract in the concrete.

Now each such order is a-product the fruit of the infinite wisdom of God; it is thoroughly intelligible and positively coherent; it is exactly the opposite of a chance aggregate. Yet any such order may embrace within itself the-necessity both the necessity of necessary causes and effects and the contingency of contingent causes and effects. How is that possible? On the one hand, it is possible because the necessity and contingency that are included within the order are not with respect to being but with respect to essence or nature. On the other hand, it is possible because the intelligibility of the order itself is with respect to being; necessarily the order is a possible manner of manifesting ~~divine~~ divine ~~perfection~~ perfection; contingently, the order is the actual manner in which God has chosen to manifest his perfection.

(I 15 2 c

matter in form,/

Order

24 11

this aspect of

Nor is there anything abstruse in, ~~such~~, transcendence.*

"Verum et falsum sunt in mente; bonum et malum sunt in rebus." An end is a good, and necessarily it is concrete.

both/

Any medieval writer knew perfectly well that a master-builder erected a cathedral by directing/such necessary causes as chisels and mallets to their necessary effects and such contingent causes as workment to their contingent effects of swinging mallets and hitting chisels. The plan of the master-builder is an intelligibility but it

one/another/

relates, not/nature as such to/nature as such, but this concrete factor to that concrete factor in a concrete & dynamic situation.

On efficacy & infallibility, see TS.

the correct perspective not by such a mere juxtaposition but by going back to the basic notions in which the end conceived/as it were/is prior to the creature and the creature prior to its nature. ~~For the end is the first of causes; it moves the agent to produce its effect and to direct the effect to the end. Thus, there is first the end, secondly, the effect or creature, and, thirdly, the nature of the creature which is instrumental to the end only instrumental to the end.~~

intended/

nature. For the end is the first of causes; it moves the agent; the agent produces and directs his effect; and finally the effect, as directed to the end, attains the end. Thus, first there is the end; secondly, there is the creature produced by the agent; thirdly, there is the effect considered in itself, and this is nature; fourthly, there is the effect as directed to the end, and here nature is not the principal agent but necessarily an instrument. One cannot agree with the Thomist doctrine that every finite agent is just an instrument of God operating all in all and, at the same time, conceive the last end as something proportionate and correlative to nature. The last end has to be the last situation of universal order, and universal order is, like esse, a proper effect of divine operation. ()

10 → It follows that not only in the present order is there a distinction between nature and ultimate end but also in any order there is a distinction between nature and ultimate end.

or/

to/

The same conclusion can be reached by another route. In any world order any nature will have its constituents, its inseparable accidents, and the fulfilment of its exigences. Otherwise the order would not be possible, for a nature without its constituents or without its inseparable accidents, or without the fulfilment of its exigences, would be a contradiction in terms. Thus, this necessity is but a converse to impossibility absolute impossibility, and so we knew about all possible worlds and the absolutely impossible is nothing, and nothing pertains to no possible world is not something in any possible world. Now the impossibility of nothing admits a thousand different expressions; one can repeat that a nature cannot be without its constituents, its inseparable accidents, and its exigences, in as many different manners as there are known natures, constituents, inseparable accidents, and exigences; such repetition will add to clarity and forcefulness of expression; but ~~in the long run~~ apart from such rhetorical benefit one achieves no more than saying that nothing is not something. There is a further aspect to the matter. What holds for any possible world suffices for the specific determination of none. Propositions valid for any universe not only are very general but also are equally abstract. But among possible worlds there is none that consists solely of abstractions. Besides the abstract necessities that flow from natures there must be, as well, the concrete order.

Pure Nature.

possible/
The notion of pure nature involves an ambiguity. Is our knowledge of it just a part of our knowledge of God? Or is our knowledge of it knowledge of a ~~mx~~ world order? *in the way?*

In the former sense Aquinas would not have had any hesitation in admitting it. Divine omnipotence extends to anything with the ratio entis. Moreover, there is for anything with the ratio entis a world order devised by infinite wisdom and in harmony with infinite goodness (Note on Possibility); divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit (I 25 5 c). Finally, no contradiction is involved in the affirmation of intellectual creatures without grace or glory or destiny to either; it would be contradictory to say that they could not have such a destiny, for in fact they have it in this world order; but there is no contradiction in conceiving nature to be without

In the former sense ~~that~~ Aquinas would not have had any difficulty or hesitation in affirming it. Divine omnipotence extends to everything with the ratio entis; but nature without grace or glory or an actual destiny to either involves no contradiction; therefore it possesses the ratio entis and so is within the range of divine omnipotence. Nor is there any argument ~~ka~~ against this on the score that such a possibility is merely abstract, that it does not involve a concretely intelligible world order. Divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. There is nothing with the ratio entis that is not either a world order or a part of one. ~~Thus, we can know pure nature as a possible term of~~
divine omnipotence

temperament/
But it is one thing to affirm the possibility of a pure nature in the sense that it lies within the effective range of divine omnipotence as really identical with divine wisdom. It is quite another thing to affirm that we can know just as much about pure nature as about the order that happens to exist, that we can know scientifically and rigorously almost as much about pure nature as about the ~~the~~ world order that happens to exist. This is the thesis of the high and dry deductive/sekel that knows by demonstration and has little or no respect for the mere guess-work that is achieved by coming to understand mere matters of fact. What Aquinas would have to say about such a position may be gathered from his account of the scientia beata of our Lord. The primary object of that knowledge is the divine essence; the secondary object is the existing world order, its past, present, future, its deeds, words, thoughts, and besides all that occurs also all that lies in potentia creatureae. On the other hand, that science does not include all that lies in the power of God, for that would suppose a finite comprehension of the divine essence, which is impossible. III 10 2 c; 3 d 14 a 2 sol 2

in which in endless manners separable accidents are added to inseparable accidents and so fulfil exigences with all the diversity that the infinity ingenuity of divine wisdom conceives. Once more, then, we reach the same conclusion: natures included within a world order are one thing; the order itself is quite another; and the ~~the~~ ultimate end to which natures are directed is a function not/of the nature but of the order.

directly/

when principal argument is ~~debatable~~
thought/

we///

at least one/

absolute/

all that/

Now I have been speaking of possible worlds, largely out of deference to the point of view, ~~introduced effectively by Duns Scotus, and his friends.~~ But it is a well known fact that the mind of Aquinas does not run along those lines, and it will not be amiss to explain why it does not. World orders can be known, like anything else, in either of two manners. They can be known a priori in the divine essence, and so God knows all of them perfectly. They can be known a posteriori if they exist, and so we can know a great deal about the order of the existing universe. But what can ~~we~~ know about possible world orders that do not exist? Inasmuch as we know ~~God~~ divine omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, we know that they are possible, concrete, intelligible, and freely rejected. Inasmuch as divine omnipotence can produce anything with the ratio entis, we can affirm that there is ~~a world-order possible world order containing anything we can conceive as possessing the ratio entis~~ we know to possess the ratio entis. Inasmuch as/impossibilities can be expressed as necessities, we can puff our cheeks to proclaim what must be in any possible world. But all ~~this~~ leaves untouched the one relevant point, namely, our ability to draw up the blue-prints for possible world orders. That is beyond our power, for world order is a proper effect of God. Indeed, so far was Aquinas from thinking that theologians should aspire to knowledge of merely possible world orders, that he omitted such knowledge from the scientia beata of the humanity of Christ. Christ knows everything that was or is or will be; he knows not only past, present, and future deeds but also words and thoughts; not only does he know everything that occurs but also he knows everything lying ~~in~~ within the power of existing creatures; but Christ does not know ~~what~~ lies within the power of God, for to know that would suppose a comprehension of the divine essence (III 10 2 cf 3 d 14 a2sol 2 De Ver 8 4; 20 4 and 5; Comp theol 216).

the/

From this there follows a most important corollary. ~~The existing world order is the product of divine wisdom. We cannot comprehend it, for it contains the mystery of divine counsel so often mentioned by St. Paul. But though we cannot comprehend it, we can understand a great deal about it. Not only is such understanding possible, but also it is extremely illuminating and satisfying. It is the proper instrument to counteract/false understandings of evolutionary materialism, dialectical materialism, Hegelian idealism, nationalist destinies, historical theories of an organicist or humanistic turn, nihilist fanaticism, and existentialist despair. Such are the~~