

Evidence and Fact.

The Thomist middle position on world order cannot be attacked directly. But it can be outflanked by making out that knowledge of it is either impossible or insignificant. The former ~~attack-is-the~~ tactic was employed by the Scotists, the Nominalists, and their heirs. The latter tactic results from rationalist and relativist ~~ways of~~ thought.

The fundamental tenet of Scotist thought, at least in the present issue, is that knowledge must presuppose its object. Aristotle and Aquinas had agreed that primordially knowing is an identity: *sensibile in actu est sensus in actu; intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu* (I 14 2 c). Hence the truth of/divine self-knowledge does not consist in a similarity that would suppose a radical duality; it consists in an absence of dissimilarity (I 16 5 2m). But for Scotus knowledge primordially is a matter of taking a look; and one cannot take a look without the "looked at" being presupposed. From this position there automatically follows, if one is as consistent as Scotus, both a negation of insight intellectual insight into sensible presentations and an affirmation of a formal distinction ex natura rei.

Aquinas had affirmed, as a matter of fact lying within everyone's experience, that intellect ~~sees~~ in the present life intellect actually understands by turning to sensible images (I 84 7). But Scotus can admit no more than a concomitance between intellectual and imaginative activity, for intellect must have its own object.

Aquinas had affirmed, as a matter of fact lying within everyone's experience, that in the present life intellect actually understands by turning to sensible images, so that the proper object of our intellects is the quiddity existing in corporeal matter (I 87 4 c). Scotus can grant a concomitance of intellectual and imaginative activity. But he must insist on the presentation of a universal object prior to intellectual-activity knowledge of the universal. It will not make sense to say that sense presents the particular in which intellect grasps the universal, and so one must affirm that there is first produced a universal species as object and only then subsequently an apprehension of this object. (Op Ox 1 d 3 q 6 Garcia I 398 ff nn 442 ff).

~~Now this position eliminates from the world of facts~~

However great the logical elegance of this position, it eliminates a matter of fact. We do grasp the intelligibility of a concrete multiplicity. We understand the master-builder erecting the particular cathedral by directing the several workman each to his proper task. We can have a notion of the intelligibility of world order. But while we can, Scotus cannot. Hence it is that when Scotus would account for divine knowledge of the contingent, he must invoke

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divine free choice, not merely to ~~xxxx~~ account for the existence or occurrence of the contingent but even to account for the nexus that contingently exists or occurs. Thus, he affirms that God knows the natures of things naturally and necessarily; he knows some of them as necessarily conjoined and some as necessarily separated; and obviously enough a contingent truth cannot be known in this manner, for then it would not be contingent. (Op Ox 1 d 39 q 1 a 2 Garcia I 1209 f n 1111 Minges II 102)

There are, accordingly, natures that are indifferent to conjunction or separation; God's knowledge of their relation, prior to any free choice, is neutral: "Et ideo intellectus divinus concipiens ~~xxxx~~ terminos tales futurorum contingentium ante actum voluntatis solum habet cognitionem neutram de complexione, qualem habeo de ista complexione, an astra sint paria" (Report II d 38 q 2 Vives 22 469 Minges II 106 f). ~~What-makes-the-contingent~~ What puts a relation between terms that are neither necessarily conjoined nor necessarily separated is divine free choice and, once such a choice is supposed, God's knowledge of the contingent nexus is just as natural as his knowledge of the necessary or impossible (Op Ox 1 d 39 q 1 a 3 Garcia I 1224 n 1129; H Schwamm,...)

Scotus argument holds for every type of contingency, and so it holds not merely for foreknowledge of contingent events but also for the contingent laws of world order.

\*Secundum quod\* intellectus offert voluntati divinae talem legem, puta quod omnis glorificandus prius est gratificandus, si placet voluntati suae, quae libera est, recta est lex, et ita de aliis legibus. Deus igitur agere potens secundum istas rectas leges, ut praefixae sunt ab eo, dicitur agere secundum potentiam ordinatam. (1 d 44 q 1 Garcia I 1286 n 1181)

On the other hand, by his absolute power God can do anything that does not involve a contradiction; and by his free will he could set up any other set of contingent laws and thereby make them the right laws: "Ideo sicut potest aliter agere ita potest aliam legem statuere rectam Ibid p1287 This does not mean, of course, that God could give the beatific vision to a stone, for that would involve contradiction (Ibid p 1288 n 1183). Scotist voluntarism does not over-rule intelligible necessity. Its function is simply to bridge the gap between intelligible necessity and matters of fact. ~~No less than Scotus, Aquinas affirmed the contingency of world order; but while for Scotus this contingency was a matter of will, for Aquinas order is basically a matter of wisdom; ~~xxxx~~ ~~ordinare~~ Because Aquinas held that "sapientis est ordinare", he also held that "iustitia Dei est veritas." Because Scotus could conceive intellection ~~xxxx~~ only as a matter of relating natures as such,~~

It is important to note the precise difference between Aquinas and Scotus. Scotus admitted contingent intelligibility God knows natures without ~~having-to-create-them~~ necessarily creating them. But Scotus did not grasp the full range of contingent intelligibility: for him either natures as such are related necessarily by intellect or contingently by will. It was because Scotus had cut himself off from the contingent intelligibility of order in a concrete multiplicity that he could not affirm with Aquinas that "sapientis est ordinare" and that "iustitia Dei est veritas."

Now the radical dualism of Scotist conditional theory ~~net-merely-in~~ eliminated not only the intelligible order of concrete multiplicity but also the intelligible unity of abstract multiplicity. Scotus could admit notional distinctions between derived concepts, for derived concepts are the work of the mind. But Scotus could not admit notional distinctions between primitive concepts, for primitive concepts are the work of the object; they are produced in intellect prior to any cognitional activity of intellect, and that must be so because looking presupposes what is looked at. Such is the ground of the distinctio formalis ex natura rei (B Jansen Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis ZfKTH 53 1929 317-44 517-44 Consider the most obvious instance. God the Father is both God and Father; his self-knowledge is intuitive and perfect; there is an absolute correspondence between the known, which is prior, and the knowing, which is subsequent ex natura rei. Now in the known as prior, either there is some distinction between divine essence and divine paternity or else there is ~~not~~ no distinction. If there is, you have granted a distinction that is not the work of the mind; it is not notional. If there is not, then it is impossible for God the Father to know that he communicates to God the Son only the divine essence and not the divine paternity. (In I Sent d 2 q 7 Garcia I 279 ff nn 325 ff).

intellectual/

If Aristotle succeeded in taking Plato's ideas out of their noetic heaven and putting them into things, it was in virtue of/insight into sensible data that he could have them knowable in things. Moreover, that change of place and of mode of knowledge involved the further differences between Platonist idea and Aristotelian form. ~~Now~~ It follows that the Scotist rejection of intellectual insight ~~into~~ involved a reversion from the Aristotelian form to the Platonic idea (see E Gilson Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scot AHLDMA 2 1927 129 ff) and a substitution of a doctrine of partial concurrent causes for hylemorphism (N Picard OFM De positione problematis cognitionis apud Duns Scotum et de eius ratione obiectiva Antonianum 19 1944 292 When, then, Ockham proceeds to demonstrate that there are no universals outside the mind, he is arguing in the same ~~direction as Aristotle~~ ~~argued against Plato~~ ~~direction as Aristotle~~ ~~argued against Plato~~. But while Aristotle argued for an immanent intelligibility within things, Ockham argued merely for their singularity. Scotus made world order ~~purely~~ a matter of divine will; Ockham did as much for natures.

P Vignaux Nominali/  
sme DTC XII 734 ff/

Contingent intelligibility both of order and of nature disappears, and there remains only the principle of contradiction which measures the absolute power of God.

In a far more radical sense, then, than Scotus, the Nominalist affirms the ~~senting~~ voluntarist ground of all contingent relations. Biel wrote:

Deus non potest contra rectam rationem, verum est, sed recta ratio quantum ad exteriora est voluntas sua. Non enim habet aliquam regulam cui teneatur se conformare, sed ipsa divina voluntas est regula omnium contingentium. Nec enim quia aliquid rectum est aut iustum, ideo Deus vult, sed quia Deus vult, ideo iustum et rectum.

Collect 1 d 17 q 1 a 3 coroll 1 K; DTC XI 764.

There is now to be affirmed not merely the gratuity of grace but no less the gratuity of glory; thus, ~~one-is-still-less~~ a-Pelagian that, it was proudly asserted, "~~magis recedit~~ maxime recedit ab errore Pelagii." (DTC XI 774)

God could give glory to those to whom he does not give grace; God could give grace without allowing any title to glory; God does give grace and, because of grace, does give glory purely and simply ~~as~~ by an act of liberality and mercy and in virtue of the decrees which freely and contingently he has made. (Ibid) Obviously, the nominalist problem was not to account for the gratuity of grace; the problem was to find anything that was not equally gratuitous. God cannot realize a contradiction in terms; but any other determination is ultimately a matter of free choice and so gratuitous.

The reader may have been wondering what point there could be in bothering about Scotist and Nominalist thought. After all, we are all Thomists now. But are we? In a recent volume of the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique A Michel finds the radical weakness of Molinism to lie in the very point in which Molina rejects Scotus.

La racine de cette insuffisance réside en ce que les molinistes ne peuvent présenter aucune raison sérieuse montrant comment le simple possible, sans une détermination de la volonté divine, peut devenir futurible. Autre chose est qu'un événement puisse être, autre chose qu'il serait. C'est la difficulté dont les partisans de la science moyenne n'arrivent pas à sortir." DTC XIV(1941)1615

Now Molina's doctrine of partial concurrent causes is Scotist. ~~Again, if it is true that Molina holds God to know contingent futures only subsequently to the free choice of created wills, no one can be blamed for disagreeing.~~ But inasmuch as Molina affirms God to know contingent futures prior to the free choice of divine will, explicitly and consciously Molina is rejecting the Scotist affirmation and indeed in Scotus' ~~own~~ own terms of the "complexio contingens" (Concordia q 14 a 13 disp 50 Paris 1876 Lennerz p 249 n 357). As Finally, the answer to A. Michel's unsolved problem is the same as the answer to Scotus. Divine wisdom conceives possible world orders: divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit. Such orders are orders of things and events. As such, they are possible.

*Epiph*  
 Again, Molina is Scotist in his tacit supposition, that the future free will is somehow an object to be looked at comprehended by God

Such knowledge/  
infallibly/

But surely not only St. Thomas but also God knows about the transcendent infallibility of divine intellect and the transcendent efficacy of divine will. Therefore, God knows that if he were to will any order, everything would occur precisely as divine wisdom conceives it. The hypothesis-of-an-act-of-will/is prior to any act of will. And so prior to any act of will God knows/precisely what would occur in any world order that freely he chose to will with an efficacy that is inseparable from his willing.

But there is another reason for considering Scotist and Nominalist voluntarism which

if/ But besides the fact of their mitigated survival, there is another reason for considering Scotist and Nominalist voluntarism. It is to understand their reaction against them. Scotus had held defined intuitive-knowledge-e intuition as knowledge of the existent and present as existent and present. Ockham asked whether any contradiction was involved in supposing such intuitive knowledge to be conserved by the absolute power of God while, first, the objectum was moved off to infinity and, secondly, it was changed into something else or annihilated. He found no contradiction (DTC XI 768) However, he did consider it contradictory to affirm evidence and deception simultaneous. (ibid. 769) but Nicholaus of Autrecourt introduced a further refinement; it would be contradictory to affirm evidence and deny appearance; but appearance is one thing and reality another (DTC XI 564 f).

It-is-from-the-hopelessness-of

Against the background of nominalist hopelessness, not much mitigated by the great experiment of performed upon the value of

Nominalist logic was as devastating as it was acute. The controversy, de Auxiliis, was not calculated to inspire confidence in the value of debate. Naturally, then, Descartes sought a new method. It would demonstrate with the clarity and rigor of mathematics, and its starting-point would be indubitable. What happened? Malebranche invented ontologism to secure a really indubitably starting-point and Kant pointed out that what follows from the "cogito" is not the existence of Rene Descartes or even of Immanuel Kant but only the necessity of positing a transcendental ego, an a priori condition of the univ. apperceptive unity of consciousness. The indubitable starting-point was not the only difficulty. There was also the implication of the deductive demonstration. If knowledge is to take that form, then there is either one subject or there are many. If there is only one, then the syllogistic chain exhibits the necessary predicates of the unique substance, and so we have Spinoza. If there are many, then each is its own private universe, as isolated as different logical universes of discourse, and so we have Leibniz' monadology.

The indubitable  
starting-point  
was doubted.

of thought/

The Rationalists had taken over from the Nominalists the a criterion of absolute evidence. Descartes' starting-point had to be indubitable; his process had to be mathematically rigorous.

The fallacy of rationalism lies in its criterion of evidence. However attractive may be the Cartesian notion of an indubitable starting-point, unfortunately none exists

Now even this brief outline reveals an important principle. World order is the product of divine wisdom, indeed, but also of divine freedom. It could be otherwise. It is not, then, the sort of thing that is to be known by taking an indubitable starting-point and proceeding with mathematical rigor. On the contrary, if that is your criterion of evidence, world order automatically becomes insignificant. Just as Scotus eliminated world-order by denying the insight into sensible data which grasps the intelligibility of concrete multiplicity, so the rationalist ideal of absolute evidence with no less effectiveness eliminates world order by making it an object beneath serious intellectual consideration. For there is no a priori deduction of world order; it is a product of wisdom and freedom; and so it is an intelligibility that is to be known only from an understanding of facts of observation and the factual content of divine revelation.

quodlibet

In this, of course, world order is not in a worse position than any other ens completum. God certainly is absolutely evident quoad se, but in our knowledge it is necessary, first, to know other existence and, secondly, from that premise to arrive at a knowledge of a First Cause and Last End. Again, absolute evidence enters as a component within our knowledge of material things; for ens-aiada-are the light of our intellects is a created participation of the uncreated light (I 84 5; 88 3 lm) indeed, the stuff of our intellects is such that, were they not passive potencies, they would have to be God (I 79 2 c). But though there is a grasp of the rationes aeternae that enters as a component within our knowledge of material things, still that grasp is no more than a component. This is, if you will, a pure reason; but pure reason, by itself, does not know any ens completum. Mathematics enjoys its spaxad splendid rigor by prescind-ing from matters of fact; whether circles exist, is no concern of the geometer; how close real things approximate to circles, is a problem he gaily leaves to physicists and engineers; agai and neither physicists nor engineers have absolute evidence on the point but plij sufficient evidence. Again, we can be certain we have souls from the soul's very presence of itself to itself; but what is a soul, is another matter requiring diligent and subtle study in which many have erred (I 37 1 c). Set yourself a criterion of absolute evidence and you maxxy exclude from the start the possibility of knowing with certitude what it is of whose existence you are certain by its presence to itself. Matters of fact are products of divine freedom; the evidence for them is not abselate the absolute inevitability of pure reason

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but the sufficient evidence that is assessed by well-informed and well-balanced judgment.

indubitably/

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Finally, if fully conscious and deliberate rationalism is dead and gone, its root is still with quite alive. Kant liquidated the rationalist ambition to know/his own soul, the world, and God. But Kant failed to liquidate the rationalist criterion of absolute evidence. Hence ~~The difference between rationalist and relativist is simply this: the rationalist hoped to know by absolute evidence; the relativist knows that hope is vain, and falsely concludes that certitude is out of the question. It would be naive indeed to suppose that, because relativists insist upon the factual and pose as in league with scientific method,~~ And it is upon the survival of that most basic element of all that relativism takes its stand. What the rationalist believed he could attain, the relativist knows to be unattainable; but from that knowledge he too hastily infers that, therefore, certitude is impossible. ~~For it would be naive, in most naive to suppose that relativism~~ It is one thing to affirm the indubitable, as for example, first principles. It is quite another to affirm with certitude upon a ground of sufficient evidence; it is the basis

Upon the survival of that most basic element of all, the relativist takes his stand. Principles and matters of fact, the certitudes of all mankind and the hypotheses of the most recent scientific opinion, all are rolled into a misty unity in which some propositions, no doubt, are truer than others but only in the sense that, though false, they are less false. The radical distrust of the human mind, that is prior to the Cartesian "cogito" and the motive for the search for the indubitable, finds ultimately its release and expression when rationalism disappears and yields its proud place to relativism. It follows that what is needed, if the rationalist and relativist experiment is not to be repeated, is a radical trust in human intelligence, in its ability to understand the intelligibilities that could be otherwise, and in its ability to judge-wisely weigh wisely the evidence and so ~~pronounce with certitude, as it is possible~~ on the proper occasions to pronounce with certitude that in fact such intelligibilities are. For ultimately there is no substitute for good judgment, and the ~~ideas of the electronic computer, or of symbolic logic, or of Cartesian method~~ are idea of Cartesian method, or of some surrogate for it, is no more than a mistaken attempt to escape from the responsibility of a rational being. ~~Not merely is there no~~

invariable,

to which is added on no other terms.

~~electronic computer and no symbolic techniques~~  
 There is no electronic computer, no symbolic techniques, no book, no system, no person that can elicit ~~make~~ your judgments for you. That is your act + also your responsibility. The human theologian was not written without an incredible reliance on the human intellect; and it is to

Potential Integration.

Coriscus is muscial and Coriscus is white. The pigment of his skin can be explained. Again, there is an explanation for his musical ability, skill, and taste. But there is no science of the "musical and white." The incidence of both these predicates in Coriscus is just per accidens. Similarly, the empirical sciences investigate particular aspects of the universe and of man. Philosophy investigates the-universe-as-a-whole man as a whole in his relation to the universe as a whole. Theology adds an account of ~~supernatural-revelation, faith,~~ the supernatural order. But the conjunction of the three in the same universe and in the same men must remain per accidens. From the abstract viewpoint not only is there no solution but ~~not~~ there is not even any question of a problem.

Still objectively the universe is ordered by divine wisdom and man is an object of special providence; nothing is left to chance; ultimately there is no per accidens. Again, the object of human intellect is ens, and outside that there is nothing, and order is not nothing. Finally, while science in potency is of the universal, still science in act is of the particular. Did the ~~science~~ departments of human knowledge remain in the abstract they could no more conflict than Leibniz' monads. But they do not remain in the abstract. The law of inverse squares involves a concrete view of the sun and the planets. The principle of invariance involves a concrete view of space and time. ~~The-hypethesis-of-natural-selection~~ The doctrine of evolution is a view of all life on this planet. Human understanding does not stop short with the abstract; it endeavors to know the many through the one; as God knows all possible worlds in his single essence, so the human intellect strives to mount to every higher viewpoints to embrace, as well as possible, all things in a single view. It is because such viewpoints conflict in the concrete, because they struggle for mastery within human minds, because they inform the choices of human wills, because they dictate policies and programs, stimulate desires and fears, create situations that can neither be ignored nor avoided, that a problem of integration both exists and can be solved. Nor is St. Thomas any patron of the ~~ivory~~ theological ivory tower. His synthesis is not a set of abstract theses. It is the Catholic world view ~~integrated with Aristotelian metaphysics, physics, psychology, astronomy, meteorology, chemistry, biology~~ ~~that attains~~ integration with Aristotelian thought by assimilating and dominating Aristotelian metaphysics, physics, ~~chemistry, biology,~~ meteorology, biology, psychology, ethics, and politics. Nor was St. Thomas less a doctor for all time because he was so thoroughly involved in his own time. *Being is what exists.*

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astronomy,  
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negative/

Still, actual integration exists only in the mind of God and in the scientia beata of Christ. Our concern is with potential integration and, ~~more-immediately,~~ in the present paper, with the/conditions of the possibility of potential integration. To consider the positive conditions would involve a theological methodology, a consideration of ~~the-problem-of-development,~~ dogmatic and theological development, a systematic contrast between theological progress, philosophic progress, and the quite different progress of the empirical sciences. ~~Such~~ Such large and intricate subjects have not been touched. So what we have had to say is, in short, very little because only negative.

There is an order of the existing universe. It is one and intelligible. It necessarily is one of the endless manners in which divine perfection could be manifested. ~~It contingently is the manner in which that perfection is manifested.~~ It transcends the necessity and contingency of relations between natures as such for it relates concrete factors in concrete situations. Though necessarily a possibility, though embracing necessary but abstract relations, ~~still though strictly intelligible,~~ still it is not itself necessary. ~~It could be otherwise.~~

types of/

It transcends because it includes the necessity and contingency of relations between natures as such, for it relates concrete factors in concrete situations. Like anything else it enjoys necessity ex suppositione, for it is subject to the principle of identity. But there its necessity ends. Contingently it is the order in which God freely chose to manifest his perfection. Contingently it is the order of the natures and/operations it relates for they could be ordered otherwise. Inasmuch as it is to be known by us, the knowing will be by understanding the unity of concrete multiplicity and by judging on sufficient evidence that that understanding is de facto correct. Hence it cannot be known ~~either by Scotist intellect, nor Nominalist logical rigor, nor rationalist itch for the indubitable, nor relativist doubt of the absolute~~

concrete/  
no/being except/

~~or nominalist logical fervor and voluntarist order~~ if with Scotus one ~~precludes~~ makes meaningless the intelligibility of concrete multiplicity or with the rationalists and relativists one distrusts the capacity of human judgment to arrive at truth except by rule-of-thumb. the absolute evidence that belongs to/the esse divine identity of essence and existence.

Order

speculative  
practical

~~The need of integration is human. It is a need of the understanding of man in which arise the differences among the sciences, between the sciences and philosophy, and between both of these and theology. Besides the subjective need of unity in the human mind, there is also an objective need; for however diverse the sources and methods of the sciences, philosophy, and theology, still all treat of man, all have their repercussions upon human life and society, so that theoretical conflicts sooner or later result in human diversity, dissension, opposition, division, and struggle.~~

its

If the need of integration is human, the principle is divine. One divine wisdom is the intelligent architect of a single universe, and one absolute goodness is its ultimate goal. On the side of the object there already is intelligible unity. The problem of integration exists on the side of the subject, and nothing short of the objective principle of integration can meet the subjective need. Mathematics integrates the positive sciences in so far as they are mathematical; but as one proceeds from ~~chemistry to~~ physics to chemistry, from chemistry to biology, from biology to the specifically human sciences, the role of mathematics decreases. Where mathematics fails, one can call upon philosophy. But even a theistic philosophy does not meet the issue completely. For in the existent universe besides the facts of nature and the facts of man as man, there is also a supernatural economy, distinct in origin and end from the specifically human, yet everywhere penetrating the fabric of human life and human events. Without a special modification adaptation of its method, empirical science cannot master human facts that are not merely human. Nor can philosophy provide the needed adaptation. One must turn to theology both for the proof of the existence of a supernatural order and for the categories in which alone its manifestations can be successfully classified and correlated, systematized and explained. But theology rests upon faith, and faith rests upon the truth that is God. The ultimate principle, then, of integration is God himself; ~~and it is~~ it is given us by revelation and faith; and it is expounded by theology.

as an organization

There is today a ~~material~~ novelty to the problem of integration. Neither the medieval nor the renaissance theologian was confronted by the application of empirical method to the whole range of human facts. The achievement of the middle ages was the integration of theology and philosophy; and in that age then that was sufficient, for the science of the time came easily under the category of a philosophy of nature. The renaissance witnessed the beginning of a break; science asserted the difference of its method, and though the name of natural philosophy long survived, the underlying reality had changed. But it was only with the emergence of empirical sciences of man that an entirely new situation appeared. There is

Order

a radically new method of answering the old question, What is man? Biologists, paleontologists, anthropologists are concerned with his origins. Economists are concerned with the material conditions of his life. Psychologists and sociologists are busy with the inner and outer manifestations of his mind. The-cultural, -religious, Historical theorists collect and analyse the facts-of his-cultures, - facts relevant to the origins, developments, crises, break-downs, and disintegrations of his cultural patterns, his religions, and his civilizations.

Historians are busy with everything but a part, and

In the chill light of 1950 the new answers are not more heartening to men generally than they have been all along to theologians. But the actual course of events does not settle any questions of principle. It will always be true that Christ is the sign of contradiction, so that empirical method without Christ will continue to supply analogues to the higher criticism and the history *Devmengesichte*, histories of dogma, to *laissez faire* and *psychoanalysis*. "He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathers not, scatters." But it is no less true that in the designs of divine providence all things are to be reconciled in Christ (Col 1 20). As the Fathers saw in Socrates and Plato Greek culture a preparation of the gospel and regarded Socrates and Plato as pedagogues to Christ, as Aquinas made Aristotelian philosophy an *ancilla theologiae*, so in principle must ~~one may conclude~~ that empirical sciences ~~can~~ provide a concrete complement to philosophic abstraction in the catalytic function of releasing theology's inner dynamic and aiding it to bring forth from its stores both the old in a new relevance and the new that was possessed but not appreciated.

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But if there is a novelty in the contemporary problem of integration, still it ~~is~~ is a material novelty and not a formal one. Such has been the burden of Papal pronouncements from *Lamentabili* to *Humani generis*, which apply to passing crises and emergencies what had already been determined affirmed in the Vatican Council; ~~the-faith-dogma-develops-and-dogma-remains-the-same~~ there is a growth, individual and social, of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom; yet it is ever within the limits of self-consistency, of univocal meaning, and of the identical truth (Cf. DB 1800). Precisely because apologetic is Catholic, it can come to the point only by establishing the fact of revelation. Precisely because theology is Catholic, it can fulfil its function only by working out the content of revelation. New questions, ~~and~~ new obstacles, and new aids have to fit ~~within~~ within a context that is settled.

But if it were a simple matter to draw out the implications of that position, the crises and emergencies would not have arisen. In fact, the issue has many sides and aspects, and to one of them this note is devoted. It seems more than a coincidence that from first to last,

But what is at stake in this problem of integration is not some ~~sort of~~ speculation of ~~speculation~~ ~~an~~ ~~incommensurate~~ ~~and~~ ~~unstable~~ ~~speculation~~ ~~for~~ ~~speculation~~ ~~whereas~~ ~~an~~ ~~obscuring~~ ~~to~~ ~~man~~ with sufficient intelligence and leisure to grasp the problems it also able to work out some sort of integration that meets his individual needs.

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4 captionally J A

fr. reading

Now what is at stake in this problem of integration is not the satisfaction of some uncommon and perhaps unrestrained appetite for speculative coherence. The fact is that a man/with sufficient intelligence and leisure to study theology, philosophy, and the empirical sciences and to grasp the problem that their relations involve, also is able to work out some sort of integration that meets his individual needs. ~~These-who-suffer~~ Those that suffer are these not the men of wide culture and acute intelligence. They are those ~~wh~~ that know one department at first hand and other departments at second or third hand. They are those that master no subject but take an intelligent interest in all. They are those with neither mastery nor keen intelligence that, none the less, have to live and to make decisions within the framework of modern society. Above all, the masses suffer. How much they suffer is witnessed by those European countries that still are free and once were Catholic.

From memory/

~~If I may quote His Eminence, the Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago, the problems of the Church in America are problems of education and sociology; and the problem major difficulty is to find. This apostasy of the masses is Disintegration has its root on the speculative level; but knowledge guides action; action produces situations; situations ~~give~~ contain problems; and these concrete problems cannot be avoided by ~~any~~ mere disdain of speculative integration. The fact is that without speculative integration the problems not only remain unsolved but cannot even be understood; and it is far harder for the masses to believe that their concrete problems have not some simple extremely simple and~~

than for the cultured/

~~-----It-is-this-practical-intensely-practical-aspect~~

ast, imponderable/

It is this relation between theoretical integration and the web of popular suppositions and convictions that has made the ~~issues~~ theological issues of the past sixty years at once so varied, so recurrent, and so explosive. The "new apologetic" of the eighteen-nineties was a philosophic approach to theology; and the philosophy was not simply philosophy but contained a philosophy of action, ~~concerned-with-an-analysis-of-facts~~, taking its root in the pragmatic necessity of action, and ~~concerned with the analysis of a range of facts dictated/not by an antecedent distinction between nature and grace but by the~~

selected/

and developing its argument from the suppositions of that factual need. ~~not a~~ But this philosophic approach was ~~not~~ philosophy of thought or of truth but of action. It stood upon the pragmatic necessity of action. It developed from the suppositions of action. And since

It-is-the-link-between-theoretical-integration

Now it is the link between theoretical integration and the vast, imponderable web of popular suppositions and convictions that has made the theological issues of the past sixty years at once so varied, so recurrent, and so explosive. Integration regards the whole; it is on all fronts at once; and it is capable of relating by internal lines any front with any other. To grasp the perspectives of an integrated position, it is not necessary first to spend three years studying ~~medieval~~ philosophy and then to spend four years studying theology. One can begin anywhere. The "new apologetic" of the eighteen-nineties was a philosophic approach to theology. Still it was philosophy in a new manner. It rested upon the pragmatic necessity of action. ~~It deduced the~~ It analysed the ~~existing~~ suppositions of action within the context of the existent universe. It dealt with matters of fact, and since in fact man cannot observe the natural law without the help of divine grace, inevitably, it cut across the classical distinction between nature and grace. In the next phenomenon, modernism, philosophy is just mental agility and refinement for relativism is something less than an affirmation; still the relativism in question was not any Pyrrhonic detachment but an ardent devotion ~~of~~ to the method of empirical science; ~~amongst which~~ by association this devotion took over the orientation ~~of the science of that time towards~~ of classical science which had not grasped that the real is known in knowing the true, which supposed, on the contrary, that the real is the datum to be understood ~~of classical science~~, and so was led to accord to religious experience the primacy which pre-Einsteinian physics granted to imagined atoms. ~~If the integralism of~~ The reaction against modernism was deep and profound; ~~the integ- it is true that the superficial integralism of certain ecclesiastical careerists was seen discredit~~ there appeared a long series of learned monographs ~~speculative thought found its way sought its way~~ it has been characterized ~~yet it fell~~ it has been manifested by a dominant ~~It has been marked~~ congeries of ~~it was~~ brought forth a remarkable series of historical ~~monographs~~ <sup>and apologetic studies</sup> from the great theological and apologetic dictionaries, through the monumental works of Lebreton and de Grandmaison, down to the serial publications of learned groups and the periodical organs of particular societies. Speculative thought ~~was not been~~ excluded, but it has felt under the obligation to take on an historical form as in Marechal's brilliant Point de Départ de la Métaphysique. Finally, Moreover, this speculation ~~in-historical~~ not merely has owed the historical ~~manifestation~~ manner of its presentation but also its questions to the underlying issue of integration. For the problems have turned on the natural desire for the vision of God, on the concreteness of being, on the method of philosophy, on the method of theology, on the vehicles, liturgical, symbolic, cultural, and popular, that carry systematically formulated truth into the hearts of many.

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It was within this context that there arose the "new theology" and symptomatically its best known expressions are to be read in epilogues in which ~~the~~ authors ~~xxx~~ end their historical investigations with rapid sketches of ideals that haunt their minds.

~~There has been and a~~

There is and has been, then, a novel problem of integration. But the novelty is not formal but material. Such has been the burden of Papal pronouncements from Lamentabili ~~sk~~ to Humani generis. The Vatican Council had quoted Vincent of Lerins to the effect that there is a growth, individual and social, of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom; yet that growth is ever within the limits of self-consistency, of univocal meaning, of an identical truth (DB 1800). ~~Pepe-Pius-XII~~ His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, closes his Encyclical Letter with a ~~parallel~~ the same message compounded of encouraged and warning: "Nitantur utique omni vi omni que contentione ut disciplinas, quas tradunt, provehant; sed caveant etiam ne limites transgrediantur a Nobis statutos ad veritatem fidei ac doctrinae catholicae tuendam. In quaestiones novas, quas hodierna cultura ~~sk~~ ac progrediens, aetas in medium protulerunt, diligentissimam suam conferant pervestigationem, sed ea qua par est prudentia et cautela; nec denique putent, falso "irenismo" indulgentes, ad Ecclesiae sinum dissidentes et errantes feligiter reduci posse, nisi integra veritas in Ecclesia vicens, absque ulla corruptione detractoneque, sincere omnibus tradatur." AAS 42(1950) 578.

Now it happens that the old name for integration is order. The order of the universe is the work of the infinite wisdom of God. Accordingly, I propose in this note to offer some indications of the Thomist notion of world order, to set forth ~~its~~ the principal fundamental elements in that notion, and so from/ objective order that exists without man's labor proceed to, the canons men must acknowledge in their thinking if speculative effort is not to be a force of disintegration.

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Correspondence Nature and Grace.

Peter Lombard in his Sentences distinguished not states of nature but states of liberty. There was the state of original justice characterized by posse peccare and posse non peccare. There was the paradoxical state of fallen man with his posse peccare and non posse non peccare. There was the final state of beatitude with its non posse peccare. The division goes back to St. Augustine's De correptione et gratia. It was saved by an incoherent introduction of St. Jerome's affirmation that man always can avoid sin. But it imposed an intolerable burden upon any effort to define human freedom. With the problem the twelfth century struggled in vain burden upon any effort either to give an intelligible account of divine grace or ~~to~~ even to define human liberty. To break the circle it was found necessary to transpose the issue from liberty to nature and from grace to the supernatural, and this transposition was still in process when Aquinas began to write.

they It is important to observe, however, that in the writings of Aquinas the identification of universal order, form, end, and good of the created universe cannot be extended to

If-one-asks

Now I have argued elsewhere that in the writings of Aquinas the shift from liberty-to-nature and from grace to the super

Elsewhere I have argued that this shift from the merely psychological to the metaphysical did not imply for Aquinas

I have pointed out elsewhere that for Aquinas this shift was not from the merely psychological to the merely metaphysical. On the contrary, it was the inclusion of all the wealth psychological wealth of St. Paul and St. Augustine within a metaphysical frame-work. But there is a further observation to be made. The metaphysics are not abstract; they are ~~not~~ a function of a notion of being that thinks of being as somehow distinct from the universe-of-concrete-existents totality of concrete existences; and consequently nature and grace are ~~not~~ conceived not abstractly but within a concrete world order. Aquinas distinguished between the proper good of a man and the proper good of a horse or stone; again, with regard to man, he distinguished between his proper good as a man and as a citizen; finally, with regard to the citizen, he distinguished between his citizenship in a human ~~sta~~ polity and his participation of the heavenly Jerusalem and, no less; the "cives sanctorum et domestici Dei" (Eph 2 19) that still are within this life. The good of a man as a man is his perfection in knowledge of truth and the rule of reason over his lower appetites. The good of man as

~~the~~ citizen of the ~~the~~ earthly ~~state~~ polity is his subordination to the order of the polity; but his good as citizen of ~~the~~ heavenly Jerusalem is beyond the faculty of nature and rests upon the free initiative of God (De Virt in Comm a9 c)

Not only does world order supply Aquinas with a middle term between the individual good of man in knowledge and virtue and, on the other hand, the good of the state and the good of the City of God

What is to be noticed in this conception is that Aquinas can move so easily from the perfection of the individual in knowledge and virtue to

It is worth noting the secret of this easy transition from the good of the individual through the good of the ~~the~~ state to the good of the City of God. Its principle is not nature nor a relation of nature to grace. Its principle is the concrete intelligibility of universal parts both/both/order which embraces/individuals and states,/the cities of men and the ~~ultimate-perfection-of-the-Church-militant-and-triumphant-Mystical-Body-of-Christ~~. Because Aquinas starts from the whole, he can always see any part in its relations ~~to-the-whole~~ both to the whole and to any other part. But, further, this is the only manner in which such integrated thinking can be achieved. ~~For-the-whole~~ Because the whole is the work of divine wisdom, there is a reason for everything and so integration is possible. Because the whole is the work of divine freedom, the reasons are not necessary; they stand upon a supposition of divine free choice of this whole and not another; they disappear into thin air as soon as the supposition of the choice and the whole is removed.

There is a further consequence. For Aquinas the concepts of "end" and of "nature" are not/correlative. This comes as a shock when one reads such a passage as the following: *dicendum quod soli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis, Cuiuslibet autem creaturae quia idem est sibi esse et beatum esse. Cuiuslibet autem creaturae esse beatum non est natura, sed ultimus finis.* I 62 4 c. We understand well enough that God's beatitude is natural to him. We know that the de facto beatitude of rational creatures is above their nature. But we are very apt to be at a loss when confronted with a contrast between nature and final end. ~~We-are-very-apt-to-pretend-that-a-creature's-beatitude~~

Now some light is thrown on this antithesis of nature and end by the fact that Aquinas conceived the/end of the universe to be identical with its order and that he distinguished between a first perfection of order as form, ~~on-the-seventh-day-of-the~~ which was achieved on the seventh day of creation, and a second perfection resulting from operation, which is the perfect beatitude of the saints after the Last Day (I 73 1 c). Still one reaches



There-is-a-striking

Now there is a real difficulty in conceiving world order after the manner of St. Thomas, and a brief excursus into Scotist thought will reveal, I think, just where the roots of this difficulty lie.

insight  
of some distinction  
of high level  
development

For Scotus it was evident that knowing presupposes its object. Knowing is a matter of taking a look, and no one can take a look without presupposing what is looked at. Aristotle and Aquinas had agreed that primordially knowing is an identity: *sensus in actu est sensibilis in actu; intellectus in actu est intelligibilis in actu* (I 14 2). For Aquinas the truth of essential divine self-knowledge ~~was~~ did not consist in any similarity of knowing and known, for similarity supposes duality; hence, as he put it, divine self-knowledge is true by an absence of dissimilarity (I 16.2 5m). Such is the first point, and I think the reader will concede that Scotus holds-the-easier-position has the advantage of plausibility.

essential/

intellectual/

From the evident supposition of an object by knowledge, Scotus demonstrated the impossibility of/insight into sensible data. Aquinas had affirmed, as a matter of fact lying within everyone's experience, that we actually understand by turning to phantasms, that the proper object of intellect is "*quidditas vel natura in materia corporali existens*." I 84 7. Now Scotus was quite ready to grant that ~~we~~ simultaneously we think the universal and imagine the particular; what he could not grant was that intellect had its object in the sensible data. There must be produced in intellect a universal species which is prior to/cognition and its proper object. Op Ox 1 d 3 q 6 Garc I 398 ff nn 442 f:

intellectual/

This step eliminates not merely a psychological fact. but also the possibility of the Thomist concept of world order. For world order is the intelligibility of a concrete multiplicity, and such an intelligibility can be conceived by us only if insight into phantasm is possible. Scotus has room for the application of universals to particular instances; but he has no room for the/synthesis of involved in concrete order.

intellectual

The result was voluntarism. Like Scotus, God knew universal natures, knew their necessary relations, and their impossibilities. But short of relations of necessity and impossibility, there were no relations at all. In the divine mind the contingent relation had to be of the same type ~~as~~ as Scotus' knowledge of the question, an *astra sint paria*. Hence to account for divine knowledge of the contingent, and not merely for its existence or occurrence but also for contingent nexus between existences or occurrences, divine will had to be invoked.

There follows a most important corollary. The order of the universe is the work of divine wisdom. It is intelligible. To some extent it can be known by us, first by the natural light of reason, and ~~is~~ still more by the light of faith. But to say that it is intelligible is not to say that it is necessary. And to say that ~~it~~ ~~may~~ to some extent it can be known by us does not imply that we can know other/world orders.

equally possible/

~~To say that it is intelligible is not to say that it is necessary. Were that true, then there could be no escape from deductive emanationism one would be back with the emanationists. There would be a premise from which world order could be deduced~~

~~To say that it is intelligible is not to say that it is necessary in any sense except that in which it is true to affirm, "Socrates dum sedet necessario sedet."~~

To say that it is intelligible is not to say that it is necessary. There is of course a sense in which anything can be made out to be necessary: "Socrates dum sedet, necessario sedet"; but apart from such necessity ex suppositione, which does not prevent Socrates from rising at the merest whim, the intelligibility of world order does not mean the necessity of world order. It is not necessary existentially but only possible; of all such possibilities, none need exist and only one happens to exist. It is not necessary essentially. Not by its own essence, for it is not an essence but only a pattern of relations. Not by the essences or natures it contains, for though essences and natures have necessary consequences and exigences, still those necessities are quite abstract and can be met concretely in a vast variety of manners.

To say that to some extent we can know the intelligibility of the existing world order is not to imply that we can know the intelligibility of equally possible world orders. We can know the intelligibility of this order a posteriori from intelligent observation and from divine revelation. But it does not follow that we can figure out how God would arrange other orders that we know to be possible and concrete but cannot observe and have not had revealed to us.

*includ.*  
concretely/

~~I suggest that these principles cut short a great deal of disputing about the natural desire ~~for~~ to know quid sit Deus.~~

I suggest that these principles are paramount ~~is~~ in any integration of nature and grace. Both are parts of a world order designed by infinite intelligence and wisdom. Their relations are intelligible and, to some extent, can be known. But that does not mean that their relations are necessary. Nor is anyone, who can give an account of such intelligibility, to be required to go on and ~~to~~ give an equally intelligible account of one or

more of the world orders in which there could be nature without grace.

But while these principles are paramount, it remains that they cannot be applied with any great ease. One has only to recall the disputes that once existed ~~and, in certain instances~~ over Euclid's parallel postulate. ~~Until the development of the non-Euclidean geometries, parallel and the more general geometries, it was common enough to suppose that that parallel was indeed necessary but not quite self-evident.~~

~~Until the developments of the last two centuries, it was common to suppose that that postulate was indeed a necessary but perhaps not a quite evident truth. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, it is evidently possible but not at all necessary. The minimum conclusion is that, it is not easy to obtain general agreement on the question that any given intelligibility is a possibility or a necessity.~~ as long as judgment is based on mere inspection, it will not be easy to obtain general agreement either that any given intelligibility is a possibility or that it is a necessity.

It is this ambiguity that underlies, I suggest, the disputes over the nature desire to see God. The natural-desire-sets-up-an To affirm the natural desire is to affirm an intelligible relation between intellect and the vision of God. But is the intelligibility a possibility or is it a necessity? To many, I suspect, it cannot be an intelligibility unless it is a necessity. This gives results in the two extreme schools of those who grasp the intelligibility and so affirm a necessity and those who reject necessity and so reject/intelligibility. Both must be wrong, for a universe that is the product of wisdom and freedom has, ~~as~~ so to speak, an exigence for intelligibilities that are not necessities but possibilities:

The same ambiguity, I believe, ~~is~~ constituted the trap into which Fr. H. de Lubac's Surnatural was caught. In the present world order a man's job is not to be a mere man but to be more than a man. Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. That truth ramifies endlessly through the doctrine and the economy of grace. It is of fundamental significance in any understanding of man considered either individually or socially or historically. It is enshrined in tradition. It is especially relevant to the presentation of Catholic truth at the present time when the initial devel of automatic progress has ~~been~~ yielded his place to dialectical materialism, nationalist destin megalomania and fatalism, fanatic ~~and~~ nihilism, and existentialist despair and, in the midst of it all, ~~sheer stupid drifting and muddling~~ and, ~~as~~ for the surviving innocents, the paradise of the welfare state.

Before//  
But if this difficulty exists in geometry, it is all the more formidable in theology. Who can pretend by mere inspection to say whether an intelligible relation is ~~to~~ a possibility or a supernatural necessity ~~improperly grasped?~~ the/

earthly  
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welfare state. Still there is the question, Is this basic intelligibility of man as he is ~~an~~ a possibility that also is a fact, or is it a necessity? At the root of the exaggerated significance of "pure nature" lies the assumption that if it is an intelligibility, it must be a necessity; hence to maintain the doctrine of the gratuity of grace, all intelligible links between nature and grace are cut. At the opposite extreme there is ~~Surnaturel~~ the book, Surnaturel, astounding in its erudition, subtle magnificent in its subtle mastery of the dialectic of opposing schools and successive schools, yet laboring constantly/under the fundamental illusion that, if there is this intelligibility of spirit in the present world order, it is inseparable from spirit; Only in an analogous sense, is spirit a nature, for spirit is the nature that has to go beyond nature.

But-against-both-extreme

Against both extreme views, against the extreme that denies the intelligibility of world order, and against the extreme that makes that intelligibility a necessity nature, there stands St. Thomas. World order is intelligible, for it is the product of wisdom. World order is contingent, for it is the product of freedom. ~~Not-is-St.-Thomas~~ ~~without-a-support-that-might-not-be-expected~~ This may be a hard doctrine for a Scotus, an Ockham, a Descartes, a Spinoza. But who can find it hard to-day, when the whole of modern science rests upon an identical foundation? There is a very exact parallel between St. Thomas explaining world order by making the right suppositions about an antecedent matter of fact, namely, divine free choice, and the modern scientist explaining natures and order by making the right suppositions about consequent matters of fact, things as they are.

if I am not mistaken/  
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