

Between a deductive emanationism, such as Avicenna's, and an anti-intellectual voluntarism, such as was represented by the Loquentes in lege Saracenorum, St. Thomas Aquinas consciously and deliberately selected a middle position. Against the voluntarist he appealed to divine wisdom: the universe is a product of wisdom; wisdom is the principle of intelligible order; and so there is a reason for everything. CG II 24 Against the more formidable emanationist Aquinas insisted that divine freedom is the cause not only of the existence of things but also of their order. God does not act from natural necessity (CG II 23). His intellect is not confined to ~~nece~~ determinate effects (26). His will can choose anything intellect presents to it (27). Creation could not arise from any debt of justice (28 29) nor from any obligation to the good or the best (De Pot 3 16 C). Neither chance nor any type of emanationist theory accounts for the distinction of things (39-45). Finally, while for every aspect of divine providence and governance there are reasons to be assigned; still in the last resort all such reasons stand on the supposition of a divine free choice

Manifestum igitur fit quod providentia secundum rationem quandam res dispensat: et tamen haec ratio sumitur ex suppositione voluntatis divinae. Sic igitur per praemissa duplex error excluditur. Eorum scilicet qui credunt quod omnia simplicem voluntatem sequuntur absque ratione... Excluditur etiam error eorum qui dicunt causarum ordinem ex divina providentia secundum modum necessitatis provenire CG III 97 §14 f.

If Aquinas argued at greater length against deductions of the universe, it was because the authors of the "great chains of being" had something to say for themselves. If he insisted that divine free choice was the cause of all, he also was brutal with people who wished to stop short at divine free will and assign no ground. ~~but divine/goodness or mercy.~~

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Dicere autem quod ex simplici voluntate dependeat iustitia, est dicere quod divina voluntas non precedat secundum ordinem sapientiae, quod est blasphemum. De Ver 23 6 c. C. 42169 12.1 [91]  
It is rare that Aquinas makes out that an adversary is a blasphemer, and it is noteworthy that he places the blasphemy, not in the affirmation that divine justice is simply a matter of will, but in the underlying affirmation that divine will does not follow the order of divine wisdom. Yet it would be difficult to make out that in this Aquinas was mistaken. Will is will inasmuch as it is rational appetite, and it is good inasmuch as it follows intellect. Its object is the "bonum intellectum," (CG II 27), and to remove its object is to remove not only will but also moral goodness and real freedom. --Hence, when he came to giving the intrinsic argument freedom. No doubt, divine free choice is the cause of everything, but it is a cause ~~not in its~~ precisely inasmuch as it is an adjunct of intellect.

Secundum hoc enim effectus.... causa rerum. I 19 4 c.  
At the root of all is the intellect of God; and ~~it is because~~ ~~divine action is "per modum intelligibilem"~~, that it is through the choice of a free will.

and the source of divine power is through divine will because divine  
the source of divine will is "per modum intelligibilem"

An accurate analysis of this cooperation of <sup>divine</sup> wisdom and freedom is of considerable importance

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However, it may be asked how this neat balance between wisdom and freedom is to be maintained. Let us begin from divine knowledge of the order of the existing universe. All entities, past, present, and future, are present to God eternally (CG I 66 §7; I 14 9 c). [For operari sequitur esse: as God in the single instant of eternity is contemporaneous with all entities though they exist at different times, so also God in the single instant of eternity knows as present to himself all entities though they are not present to one another. At some instant God, the sun, and Alexander's horse existed; at some other instant God, the sun, and Caesar's horse existed. The two horses were not contemporaneous. The sun at different times was contemporaneous with both horses. But since eternity is tota simul, it was at the same instant of eternity that God was contemporaneous with both horses. See Cajetan, In I 14 13 §xii Leon IV 189]. But if all present to God, the ~~entire~~ intelligible order of all is present to God. Such is divine knowledge of the order of the universe in the scientia approbationis (I 14 8 c) or scientia visionis (I 14 9 c) or the scientia simpliciter practica (I 14 16 c).

Now divine wisdom precedes divine will. God wills all particular instances of the good because he wills the good of the ~~ex~~ universal order [CG I 78 §4]. The good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe [CG I 86 §3]. God does not will this because he wills that; he wills that this be because of that; he wills their order of things [I 19 5 c]. God's will is a cause inasmuch as it is the inclination that carries out what is conceived by intellect [I 19 4 c].

It follows that there is a divine knowledge of the order of the universe prior to divine free choice of that order. This knowledge is not ~~simpliciter practica~~ scientia approbationis, or scientia visionis, or scientia simpliciter practica. It is the third type of speculative knowledge. The first type is knowledge of what one cannot produce; such is God's knowledge of himself, and a creature's knowledge of God or of nature. The second type is knowledge of what one can produce but in the speculative mode; it is by defining and assigning universal predicates. The third type is knowledge of what one can produce inasmuch as it can be produced though without the actual intention of producing it. ~~Ibid I 14 16 c~~. Such knowledge is causal not actually but virtually. Ibid 1m. It is practical not actually but virtually I 15 3 2m. It is an idea, not as an exemplar, but as a ratio Ibid. It seems that a special name may as well be introduced to designate such knowledge of the operabilia in quantum huiusmodi I 14 16 Ad 1d qd ~~We shall call it concrete knowledge. An instance of such concrete knowledge—~~  
We shall call it the concrete conception. ~~Thus inasmuch as~~ God conceives the possibility of the whole existing universe with everything it contains, he will be said to conceive concretely.

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In the concrete conception the key element is the notion of end. For an end is a good, and a good is concrete; "bonum et malum sunt in rebus." Again, it is in terms of the end that wisdom orders what is for the end (I 25 5 c). Thirdly, the end is the object of will (I II 1 1 c). Fourthly, the end is the first of causes (I 5 2 1m). Fifthly, the end as intended/is a cause (I II 1 1 1m).

~~However, the relevant end is not the absolute goodness of God. For absolute goodness exceeds the proportion of finite substances; it does not supply a principle whence can be derived by wisdom a determinate selection of means and a determinate series and pattern of operations (I 25 5 c). Again, God wills absolute goodness necessarily, and so it is not an object of free choice (I 19 3 c).~~

However, the relevant end is not the absolute goodness of God. Though it is a concrete good and the first of all causes and the ground of God's intending anything else, still it does not meet the requirements of the immediate issue. Because absolute goodness exceeds the proportion of finite substance, it cannot supply a principle whence can be derived by wisdom a determinate selection of means and a determinate pattern and series of finite operations; any world order would be because of absolute goodness (I 25 5 c). Again, because God wills absolute goodness necessarily, it is not an object of divine free choice (I 19 3 c). The end under consideration is the principle of order and an object of free choice.

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Secondly, the relevant end is not/the proportionate end of some nature ~~nor~~ the mere aggregate of proportionate ends of an aggregate of natures. A mere aggregate is without order, and so it cannot be a principle of ordering; on the other hand, a universe is not generally a single instance of a nature. More radically, however, there is a lack of concreteness to the naturally proportionate end. For finite nature does not include its own existence. ~~Natural~~ Operations natural to finite substances do not occur except instrumentally under the movement and guidance of the first agent (I 103 5; 105 5; 116 1-3). Naturally proportionate ends have the same lack of concrete determinateness as have finite natures. They are defined in terms of natures (I 62 1 c: perfectio... quam possunt assequi virtute suae naturae. I II 62 1 c: ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae); or inversely natures are defined in terms of them (II Phys lect 14 §8: Unde patet quod natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum). Hence it is that naturally proportionate ends are not always actually attained, as in extinct biological species, and sometimes are not actually intended by God, as in men and angels (De Ver 27 2; I ~~II~~ 62 1; I II 5 5; 62 1).

Thirdly, the relevant end is the perfectio universi. But it is of some importance to form correctly one's analogous concept of this end. God's knowledge stands to all created things, as the knowledge of an artificer to his artefact I 14 8 c. Still, God does not plan, will, and produce evil and sin; his practical knowledge envisages them as the practical knowledge of a medical doctor envisages disease (I 14 16 c). How is one to have things both ways at once? By taking the view point

to have things both ways at once? If God is the universal artificer, how can he be doctor and not artificer of evil? I have discussed this problem previously (TS 3 1942 547 ff) and at present am concerned solely with the correct conception of the end of the universe. Now it is quite true that ~~the~~ in a sense the end of the universe is its final situation (I 73 l c). However, it is this chronological view of the end that emphasizes the weak point in the analogy from artificers and doctors. If one is to be accurate, one must endeavor to grasp and retain the atemporal view in which God eternally conceives, chooses, and sees the whole of a temporal process. Materially this process is a vast manifold of entities. But there are patterns of intelligible relations connecting all elements in each world situation; and there are further patterns connecting each successive pair of situations. All these patterns form a single intelligible unity so that the world is one by the unity of order I 47 3 c. Now an end is ultima rei perfectio. But the ultimate perfection of the universe is what makes it a universe; it is the one intelligibility uniting all ~~its~~ parts existing at all times; and it is with respect to this end of intelligible unity that all things of all times are ordered. The chronologically last situation or what is good in it is just as much a part of the whole as anything else; and it is the whole that eternally is conceived, chosen, and seen by God. I admit, of course, that to reach the proper view-point and to stay there is difficult; otherwise theologians would not for centuries have been insisting that since the heavenly Jerusalem is the end, therefore God/destines people to hell ante praevisa merita; or inversely, since God does not destine people to hell ante praevisa merita, God's will is subject to some condition in predestining them to heaven.

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~~no less condition of a good people into heaven than in sending them to hell.~~

The end, then, that is the perfection of the universe is the key element in the concrete conception that exists in divine wisdom prior to the divine free choice of this universe. But God's knowledge is invariable. I 14 15 c. God could do more than he does, but he could not know more than he does, except by way of the scientia visionis Ibid 2m. The reason is that the existence of a scientia visionis is contingent; it is predicated of God not entitatively but terminatively. On the other hand, divine knowledge prior to divine free choice is identical with the divine substance and so completely immutable Ibid c. But there are endless other universes that God could have created; such creation would not have added to his entitative knowledge; and ~~so it follows that God must possess a concrete conception of every possible universe.~~ since God would have known any other universe as well as he knows this one, it follows that he must possess a concrete conception of every possible universe.

There remains another step. Prior to divine free choice of this universe, God possessed a concrete conception of it, and in that conception the key element is the end that is the intelligible unity of the whole. Now can we generalize? Can ~~we say that God possesses a concrete conception of every possible universe prior to any act of divine free will?~~ we say that if God had chosen any other universe, he would have possessed a concrete conception of it prior to choosing it? This, I think, is necessary. For were it not so, then that universe would not have been the product of wisdom and freedom. In other words, the Thomist account of this universe is based on principles valid for any universe; indeed, unless one holds that, one will be forced to a denial of the ~~ex~~ fully explicit Thomist account of this universe. An argument may be added. Divine knowledge is invariable I 14 15 c. God could do more than he does, but he could not know more than he does, ~~Ibid 2m~~ except by way of the scientia visionis Ibid 2m. The reason for this is that the scientia simplicis intelligentiae is identical with the divine substance, but the scientia visionis is predicated of God not entitatively but terminatively. Now, God would know any universe/as well as he knows this one and in the manner in which he knows this one. But as such hypothetical creation, so the hypothetical scientia visionis, would not involve an entitative difference in God. It follows that God actually possesses a concrete conception of every possible universe.

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Let us resume. God knows the other only in his own essence CG I 46. He knows himself perfectly 47, and primo et per se it is only himself that he knows 48. But as God knows himself perfectly, he knows his own power perfectly and so must know the possibilities correlative to that power I 14 5 c. But God's power is without limits or conditions; necessarily, then, there are neither limits nor conditions to what is possible; only the nothingness of contradiction can be impossible (I 25 3 c; III 13 1 c). As God could cause any possibility, so he knows all possibilities, and among them the ~~ex~~ total range of possible world orders. Again,

Let us resume. God knows the other only in his own essence CG I 46. He knows himself perfectly 47, and primo et per se it is only himself that he knows 48. But knowing his own essence, he has proper knowledge of everything else; as the perfection of a man includes the perfection of an animal, so the perfection of God includes all perfection (CG I 54 §3). But the good of universal order ~~xxxxxx~~ resembles the divine essence more than any particular creature and, universally, the whole is more perfect than the part; hence in his essence God knows the total range of possible world orders. Again, since God knows himself perfectly, he knows his own power perfectly, and so must know the possibilities that are correlative to his ~~ex~~ power. But his power is without limits or conditions; and so neither limits nor conditions can be imposed upon the range of the possibles; only the nothingness of contradiction can be impossible (I 25 3; III 13 1). As God knows all possibility, he must know the total range of possible world orders. Again, God knows all at once. By the single species that is his essence and the single intentio intellecta that is his word CG I 53, he has proper knowledge of everything else. Just as we know a house by grasping at once foundations, walls, and roof, just as we know a proposition by grasping at once

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Ibid lm/

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subject and predicate, so with equal ease, in a single glance, God knows all/without any taint of discourse or succession (57) not by reasoning but by understanding (Ibid §8). He-knows He does not reason from effects to causes but knows effects in knowing their causes I 14 7 c. But the first of causes is the end. Hence as God knows the total range of possible universes world orders, so in the intelligible unity that is the end of each, he knows all that is to the end. ~~Thus, divine wisdom keeps pace with divine omnipotence (divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit I 25 5 c) and nothing contrary to divine wisdom is possible, for every possibility lies within a concrete order devised by divine wisdom. As in this universe God has the idea of each thing because he has the idea of universal order (I 15 2 c), so in the concrete conception of the unity centering in the unity of each/universe God has proper knowledge of everything 49-50, of singulars 65, of what~~ (I 15 2 c), so in the concrete conceptions of the intelligible unities of all possible universes God possesses all ideas. ~~Because such knowledge is in terms of a concrete end, no less than in this universe is it of singulars 65, of future contingents 67, of movements of will 68, of infinities 69, of what is vile 70, of evils 71.~~

As the concrete conception of this universe includes singulars 65, future contingents 67, movements of will 68, what is vile 70, and evils 71, so the concrete conceptions of possible world orders include all of what lies merely in a creature's power to opine, imagine, or mean I 14 9; III 3 3 c, so the equally concrete conceptions of every universe include all that pertains to them actually or potentially. ~~Finally, an end that is known in the divine essence is good; but all possibilities lie within orders~~

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That God knows all possible ends of all possible universes in his essence, and that in ~~the~~ ends he knows concretely all that could be is ordered to each, implies something more than the unity and simultaneity of divine knowledge of the other. It implies that divine wisdom keeps pace with divine omnipotence (I 25 5 c: divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit), for all possibility lies within an order devised by infinite wisdom, so that nothing contrary to divine wisdom is possible Ibid lm. It implies that all possibility is ordered to an end that is a participation of divine perfection, and so that nothing contrary to divine goodness is possible Ibid. It implies that God could choose anything freely, wisely, and well. It implies that in any possible universe there would be a reason for everything, because of divine wisdom, yet that reason would rest ultimately on a supposition of divine will. It implies that divine freedom determines not merely what things exist but also the world order in which they exist; for all possible orders for each thing are offered to its choice. It implies not merely that divine wisdom skillfully patterns necessary and contingent causes and effects in a single order, but also that divine will transcends the created order of necessity and contingency (In Per Herm I lect 14 §22 Leon I 70) for it grounds the ultimate supposition of ~~there being any order~~ both that there actually is an order and that it is this one that is.

Indeed, quite incidentally, it solves A. Michel's vigorous objections to the scientia media (Science de Dieu, ~~xxx~~ DTC XIV 1614 f). It is not only St. Thomas (I 19 8 c) and a good Molinist like Fr Lennarz (De Deo Uno Rome 1948 p 251 n 359) that know of the efficacy of divine will. God knows it. Since he does, he cannot help knowing that, were he to will any concretely conceived world order, then everything, even created free choices, would occur as he conceived them. That knowledge differs from knowledge of possibility. It is independent of any actual free choice. It arises on the supposition that God would will some order. It regards what creatures would choose.