

Finis

3 d 33 q 2 a 1 sol 1: finis est potissimum in unoquoque....
ad illud quod est potissimum in qualibet
re, ordinantur omnia quae sunt illius rei.

I 5 2 1m: finis est causa causarum

Nam materia prima appetit participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum, nihil autem appetit nisi simile sibi: non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens.

.. bonum extenditur ad existentia et non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum causalitatem; ut per non existentia intelligamus non ea simpliciter quae penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et non in actu...

Ens ~~xxx~~ autem non importat habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel exemplaris; cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt in actu.

I 5 4 c: id quod est primum in causando, ultimum est in causato

In causando autem primum invenitur bonum et finis qui movet efficientem

I-II 1 1 c: Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Cf a2 ad3m

ibid ad 1m: finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae. ~~cf xxx xad x3m~~.

In II Phys., lect 14 §8: In nullo enim alio natura ab arte differre videtur differre, nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium extrinsecum..... Unde patet quod natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum: sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere, quod esse ipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.

CG III 24 §5: Unde etiam patet quod quodlibet opus naturae est opus substantiae intelligentis: nam effectus principalis attribuitur primo moventi dirigenti in finem, quam instrumentis ab eo directis. Et propter hoc operationes naturae inveniuntur ordinate procedere ad finem, sicut operationes sapientis.

In Job 5, lect 1: dispositiones naturales rerum non sunt sine causa sed propter determinatum finem.

I 47 1 c fin 300b 18-21: Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura.

q. C. I, 78 #4
I 103 2 3m 616a 42 ff: Dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi; hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem [cf c. ipsa bonitas absoluta]

I 73 1 c 430b 51 ff: Dicendum quod duplex est rei perfectio: prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis.... Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo Sanctorum, quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi. Prima autem perfectio, quae est in integritate universi, fuit in prima rerum institutione. Et haec deputatur septimo diei.

I 19 5 3m 135b 51 ff: Utpote si dicamus quod Deus voluit hominem habere manus ut deservirent intellectui, operando diversa opera; et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc quod esset homo; et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum. Cf ibid c; I 23 5 c

1. Met. Lambda 10 1075a 12 ff
In XII Met. lect 12 §2627-31

2627: "Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alicuius, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad finem, [mobile: locus] Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis. Forma autem alicuius totius, quod est unum per per ordinationem quamdam partium, est ordo ipsius: unde relinquitur quod sit bonum eius."

Cited: l d 39 q 2 a 1 sol; De Ver 5 3; CG I 78 §4; I 47 3 lm; 103 2 3m

Employed: CG II 24 §4; I 24 1 3m.

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2. Finis extrinsecus: God

a "Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis: bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum" I 103 2 c.

Cf. esse subsistens vs. ens per participationem: I 2 3 Quarta via
Cf. bonum contractum unde contrarietas II 65 1 2m

b I 44 4 3m: "... omnia appetunt Deum ut finem, appetendo quodcumque bonum, sive appetitu intelligibili, sive sensibili, sive naturali, qui est sine cognitione; quia nihil habet rationem boni et appetibilis, nisi scdm quod participat Dei similitudinem."
CG III 16-25

c I 60 5 c: "Unumquodque autem in rebus ~~exist~~ naturalibus quod scdm naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in se ipsum"

Hence angels love God naturally more than themselves

Cf I 21 1 3m: "Dicitur autem esse suum alicuius quod ad ipsum ordinatur, sicut servus est domini, et non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est."

Cf I-II 109 3: Man would naturally love God above all, were it not for corruption of nature. ibid. lm difference from charity.

d Subordination to extrinsic end I 103 2 3m; CG III 64 #2.

3. Finis intrinsecus: existence.

I 103 2 3m: "Dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi; hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis..."

I 73 1 c: "Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit... Prima autem perfectio, quae est in integritate universi, fuit in prima rerum institutione. Et haec deputatur septimo diei."

b Excellence.

I 47 1 c: "Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaelibet creatura."

Because single creature could not sufficiently represent divine goodness: what in God is simpliciter et uniformiter, in creatures is multipliciter et divisim. *ibid.*

Because creature not like demonstrative middle term, which is one, but like probable middle terms, which are many. *ibid* 3m.

I 22 4 c: "Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens est perfectio universi."

CG I 70 §4: "Bonum ordinis universi nobilius est qualibet parte universi; cum partes singulae ordinentur ad bonum ordinis qui est in toto sicut ad finem, ut per Philosophum patet in XI Met..."

CG I 78 §4: Proof that God wills singula bona from fact that he wills ordo universi.

ibid §5: proof that he wills singula, else ordo ex casu.

CG I 85 §3: "Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum effectuum quam aliquod particulare bonum particulare; quanto in illo completior invenitur suae bonitatis similitudo"

CG II 39 §7: "bonum et optimum universi consistit in ordine partium ad invicem... ordo partium universi et distinctio earum est finis productionis universi..."

CG II 42 §3: "Optimum autem in omnibus entibus causatis est ordo universi, in quo bonum universi consistit: sicut et in rebus humanis bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius (I Eth., ii, 8; 1094b). Oportet igitur ordinem universi sicut in causam propriam reducere in Deum.

Cf. CG II 24: sapientis ordinare.. producere per sapientiam §4; producere per ordinem suae sapientiae §5; producere per ordinem sui intellectus §5

CG II 42 §5: subordination of actions and ends of second causes to end of first cause "ie ordo partium universi quasi ultima forma"

CG III 64 §11: As wisdom governs order of things, so it governs order of operations.

b Excellence, con'd.

CG II 44 §2: Quanto aliquid est melius in effectibus, tanto est prius in intentione agentis. Optimum autem in rebus creatis est perfectio universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum: in omnibus enim perfectio totius praesinet perfectioni singularium partium."

CG II 45 §8: "Operi a summe bono artifice facto non debuit deesse summa perfectio. Sed bonum ordinis diversorum est melius quolibet illorum ordinatorum per se sumpto: est enim formale respectu singularium, sicut perfectio totius respectu partium.

CG III 64 §9: "Id autem quod est maxime bonum in rebus causatis, est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum, ut Philosophus dicit... cui etiam consonat divina Scriptura... (valde bona).. Bonum igitur ordinis rerum causatarum a Deo est id quod est praecipue volitum et causatum a Deo

ibid. §10: "Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi: cum ad ipsum ordinatur, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei.... Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi.

CG III 69 §18: "Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id quod optimum habent: nam singula in ipsis/se sunt bona, simul autem omnia sunt optima, propter ordinem universi; semper enim totum est melius partibus et finis ipsarum."

c Description.

I 65 2 c: "constituitur totum universum sicut totum ex partibus" analogy of man. CF Quodl ~~VII~~ ^{AT 3 1m} limitations of analogy.

CG II 68 §6-12: "mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest"

CG III 22: ordo rerum in finem

CG III 112 §8-10: special rules. cf §3-5.

Aquinas
Ordo universi
Multiple aspects.

- I 2 3 c Quinta: From order follows existence of God
I 11 3 c: From order follows unity of God CG I 42 §4-7
I 15 2 c: Idea of order in God implies ideas of ordered *I 14, 8: Ant. per*
I 21 1 c: Ordo universi is distributive justice of God
ad 3m: ratio debiti
I 21 2 c: Justice of God is ontological truth (I 16 1 c)
I 22 1 c: Providence is "ratio ordinis rerum in finem in
mente divina praëxistens"
I 23 1 c: Predestination which is part of providence
I 23 5 c: cannot be attributed to any of its effects
I 47 3 c: The world is one unitate ordinis; *Quod est a 19 :: Caelum infinit.*
I 103 1 c: Execution of order of providence is governance / effects
I 116 2 c: Fate is this order as in things ordained to produce /
I-II 91 1 c: Eternal law, proved by fact of providence, is
"ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe
universitatis existens"
I-II 91 2 c: Natural law is eternal law as participated by
rational creatures cf ad 2m.

- I 42 3 Sed contra: "Ubi cumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi
est confusio"
I 21 1 c: "ordo universi, qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus
quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam"
I 25 6 3m: This universe is best inasmuch as making this or that
thing better would throw out the general order
Cf. 47 2 lm; 48 3m; 56 2 4m

- Propter perfectionem universi
II 47 1 c: Multiplicity *cf II 97 2 Analogy of multiplication of virtues*
I 47 2 c: Inequality (cf ad 3m; 65 2 3m; CG II 45 §9)
I 48 1 5m: Not malum; falls under order only per accidens
I 48 2 c: Creatures which can fail
I 50 1 c: Incorporeal creatures
I 65 2 c: Material creation

~~However, not a little difficulty may be experienced in concerning the intrinsic end of the universe~~

While the Thomist concept of the extrinsic end of the universe is always the same, a series of different meanings seems to be attached to the intrinsic end. There is the first constitution of the universe, the end of its production, and this is the order of the parts making them an initial whole (I 73 1; CG II 39 §7). There is the good of order that most of all is willed and caused by God, and it is the effect of his government CG III 64 §9; to deprive things of their activities would be to deprive them of their relations to one another ~~and so to remove the order which is the best of things~~ and so to remove from things their order, which is better than the parts of the universe and their end CG III 69 §18 There is the ultimate perfection which the beatitude of the saints at the end of the world (I 73 1 c). Finally, there are more general statements than any of these three: it is the whole universe that most perfectly represents the divine goodness (I 47 1); it is the good of the totality of his effects that God principally wills (CG I 85 §3); it is the good of the order of the whole universe that comes closest to divine goodness (CG III 64 §10); everything pertains to a single world which is one by its order (I 47 3 c).

universal
of the
universes

This apparent diversity is a source of difficulty if one does not adopt the divine view-point. To God everything is present (CG I 66 §7; I 14 9 c). Divine knowledge is not in time, so that at one time God sees Abraham, at another Isaac, and at a third Jacob; eternity is tota simul (Cajetan In I 14 13 §xii Leon IV 189). Hence, as God views as present to him both the beginning of the world, the/course of events, and the everlasting beatitude of the saints, so also he considers the order of the/whole. From within time it is easier to think of the order of parts at the beginning, the order within each successive situation, the order of the final state, and the series of orders connecting each previous with each subsequent situation. As that is easier/to think about, so it ~~is~~ easier for Aquinas to write about the aspect of total order that ~~is~~ was immediately relevant. Still as there is but one divine wisdom and one created universe, as the whole of it is present to God at once, so there is really but a single order, uniting all the parts of all times and places in a single intelligible unity (I 116 2 3m). That single order is the ultimate perfection and end and form of the whole, for it is what makes the universe a whole and good.

total/

complete/

for us/was/

~~To conceive the intrinsic end of the universe as its final situation not only is to mistake~~

The ultimate beatitude of the saints in heaven is, indeed, the last thing added to the universe. In that sense it is its end. But from a more exact view-point, this ultimate beatitude is just another part added to the whole; and the truly ultimate perfection is the pattern of intelligible relations that unites absolutely all parts into a single object for the scientia visionis.

The importance of the more exact view-point may be illustrated in two manners. If one thinks of the final situation as the intrinsic end of the universe, one can conceive God as the artificer of all things that are (I 14 8 c) but one has difficulty in combining with that view the other vi-w, equally true, ~~that God is not the artificer but the~~

that with respect to evils God is not the artificer but the doctor (I 14 16 c). Again, it is considering the end as the final situation that leads to the abominable disjunction of the last three centuries: either God obliquely destines people to hell ante praevisa merita; or else, just as reprobation is conditioned by sins that God does not cause, so also predestination is conditioned by merits. ~~Neither view is compatible with Thomism: I-19-6; 23-aa-1-3-5; 103-aa-7-8.~~ As neither of these conclusions is compatible with Thomism (I 19 6; 23: 1 3 5; 103 7 8), so/their common ~~premise~~ assumption that the ~~and~~ intrinsic end of the universe is its final situation.

alternative/

one cannot
regard as
Thomist/

1. The basic dilemma.
Everything is due to necessity: CG II 23 ult
Everything is due to divine choice absque ratione CG II 24 ult.
2. The basic solution in this universe.
Nothing is due to necessity and everything has its reason in divine wisdom.
Absolutely there need be nothing but God; ex suppositione of divine will, everything God wills is necessary I 19 2 c
On the supposition of this, that may be necessary or contingent; but the necessity or contingency reduces to the order of divine wisdom willed/to be by God. I 21 1 3m; CG II 29 30; III 97
Ultimate created ends are ex simplici voluntate I 19 5 3m.

freely/

3. Re possible universe.
De Pot 3 16: Quod enim Deus tale universum onstituere voluerit, non est necessarium neque debitum, neque ex fine, neque ex potentia efficientis, neque materiae, ut ostensum est. Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium ~~est~~ fuit quod tales et tales creaturas produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret.

Hoc enim universum est optimum eorum quae sunt; et quod sic sit optimum, ex summa Dei bonitate habet. Non tamen bonitas Dei est ita obligata huic universo, quin melius vel minus bonum aliud universum facere potuisset.

Sic igitur dicendum est, quod ab uno primo multitudo et diversitas processit, non propter materiae necessitatem, nec propter potentiae limitationem, nec propter bonitatem, nec propter bonitatis obligationem (optimus optimum producat necesse est); sed ex ordine sapientiae, ut in diversitate creaturarum perfectio consisteret universi.

CG III 97 §13: God's goodness does not necessitate creatures. On the supposition that he will manifest his goodness through similitude, then multiplicity and diversity but no determination of which creatures or in what measure. On further suppositions, further determinations.

§14: Manifestum fit/igitur quod providentia scdm rationem quandam res dispensat: et tamen haec ratio sumitur ex suppositione voluntatis divinae.

4. Our knowledge of possible world order will be only a set of suppositions, and very abstract suppositions.
Whether or not they are coherent, represent divine goodness ad extra, is beyond our competence to judge (propria causa is God)
Without knowing ordo universi possibilis, basic defect inevitable in speculating on status in such unknown order.
Solubilia argumenta: possibility scdm quid proves possible object of thought; gratuity clear, ex simplici Dei voluntate.
Supernatural per man: vult ei bonum C; ordinat bonum divinum in hominem N

1. Finality is causal relation to an end. Answers why? not who?
2. Essential finality is finality determined by an essence.
Substantial essence for act of existence; accidental form (species, habit of will, sight) for its operation.
Proximately disposed matter for form.
(inseparable)/ Accidents/from and for substantial essence; existence for operation and especially for ultimate in its operation as determined by proportion of substantial essence. *Still this supposes ordo universi for realization terms of actualization*
3. Functional finality is finality determined by the ordo universi.
CG III 98 §1: duplex ordo a dependens ex prima omnium causa
b dependens ex quadam causa particulari (hic ordo multiplex)
CG III 100 §2: "contra ordinem proprium alicuius naturae"
"contrarium particulari formae" yet not contra naturam simpliciter
I 56 1 1m; De Ver 8 6 1m; angel does not comprehend his own virtus as it is ex ordine divinae sapientiae
I 21 1 3m: ordo universi grants each thing what is proper to its nature and condition
I 65 2 c: analogy of ordo universi and organism.

b Root of functional finality is remote essential potency
a' to receive: matter on moon might be transferred to earth, become part of organic, be informed by spiritual soul
b' to produce: instrument contributes something of its own, yet what is of its own is essentially less than proper effect of principle cause.
Obediential potency is remote essential potency to receive when only God can effect dispositions for reception and reception: visio not by any finite species, nor by any natural disposition

c Division of functional finality into lateral and vertical.
Lateral: members of species to each other and to species
Vertical: lower species to higher; ignobiliora propter nobiliora

d Functional : essential :: concrete : abstract.
Functional is in virtue of whole, utilizes essential by realizing its concrete conditions, attains what is better than essential.
4. Desiderium naturale visionis Dei.
a pre-systematic formulations b intellectualist c voluntarist
All together for theological note; but not all together for coherent thinking, deductions, else mere confusion.
Essentially it is obediential potency of intellect, identical with intellect as capable of receiving from God
Because intellect is of such a nature, it reveals its capacity in question, Quid sit Deus, tho not to philosopher.
It is potential ordination to beatific vision; actual ordination is a general in ordo universi (universal salvific will)
b applied in gift of grace.
5. Nihil in natura frustra. Desiderium naturale non potest esse inane. Distinctions needed.
If essential finality of nature, then a metaphysical principle but inapplicable to desiderium visionis.
If ordo sapientiae divinae, then actual or possible; if actual, true de facto et post factum; if possible, then a presumption that is true in affirming goodness of God, yet not a presumption that we can justify in any seriously detailed manner.

Potentia ordinata
Potentia absoluta

Suarez, tr. I, lib. III, cap. IX, n. 19 [Vives 1866, I, 229]

"Et in omni opinione certum est, potentiam non dici absolutam vel ordinatam nisi per respectum ad voluntatem, nam quatenus soluta concipitur ab omni lege seu decreto voluntatis dicitur absoluta, ordinata vero ut coniuncta illi. Potest autem hoc esse duobus modis. Unus est, quatenus potentia intelligitur coniuncta alicui legi universali, ut de movendo coelo continue. In qua lege potest Deus dispensare, cum voluerit, ut cum solem sistere facit, quod iuxta hanc expositionem censetur per potentiam absolutam fecisse. Alius modus est, ut potentia intelligatur coniuncta decreto aeternae voluntatis Dei de omnibus et singulis, quae in quolibet tempore operatus est, et ita quidquid de facto operatur, dicitur facere per potentiam ordinatam, quia semper operatur iuxta decretum suum et ita solum ea dicitur posse de absoluta potentia, quae numquam facturum est. Et uterque modus est satis usitatus, prior tamen videtur magis conformis communi modo loquendi et communior."

cf. Disp. met., disp. 30, sect. xvii, n. 32 [XXVI (1877) 216]

Scotus [P. Minges, Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina phil et theol, Quarachi 1930, II, 186 §17 cf I 226 407s 578s]

"Iudam salvati" is de potentia absoluta, but not de ordinata

Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl VI q 1, Phil Belges III 1914 94 f.
essentially same.

Pesch C, Praelectiones dogmaticae, II, De Deo Uno etc., ed 3a 1906
p. 245 f., §441

Essentially same: distinguishes absoluta, ordinata, ordinaria
Attributes to Jansenists view that absoluta prescind from
wisdom and holiness of God, ordinata supposes wisdom and holiness;
P. rejects on ground that what is repugnant to one attribute is
repugnant to all.

Aquinas, Schütz Paderborn 1895, p. 615 top.

I 25 5 lm; 3 d 1 2 3 c; 2 l~~x~~ 1 1 c; 4 d 46 1 2 2 c; pot 1 5
ob 2, 4, 6, ad 5; ver 23 8 2m; Quod 4 3 4 c; Graec 16

de Lubac, Surnaturel, p. 267 ff and 267 note 4, supposes
Aquinas in I 25 5 lm to consider potentia absoluta as mere
abstraction

William de la Mare, Correctorium pp 409-10, distinguishes
potentia absoluta and potentia ordinaria, quite legitimately
and in line with Pesch.

Oelbaum, Biel

OTC XI 76f ff

de pot. ord. secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo
de pot. absol. quibus casus non involvunt contradictionem

- I 19 2 ^{ad 2^m} A: "sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo bonitatem suam."
I 19 3 c: "sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione; supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest voluntas eius mutari."
I 19 5 c: "sicut in Deo intelligere causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc."
ibid. 3m: "... Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios fines ~~eretes~~ creatos superiores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum."
I 73 1 c: "Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo Sanctorum, quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi." cf I 19 5 3m

I 21 1 3m:

uniquique debetur quod suum est... quod ad ipsum ordinatur, sicut servus est domini, et non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo debiti importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod ordinatur.

Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus (finis ext. int.)

Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat; et secundum hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, scdm quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur.

Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod habeat id quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut homini quod habeat manus, et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur iustitiam, quando dat alicui unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum scdm ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, sed potius alia in ipsum.

Cf. CG II 29 30; III 97 §13 14.

Aquinas
Possibles.

1. Possible is relative to power to produce, capacity to receive. Possible relatively to divine power is possible absolutely; whatever has ratio entis; whatever is free from contradiction I 25 3 c; III 13 1 c; CG I 84; II 22 25; Pot I 6; I 7; Quodl III 1; V 3.

2. Potentia absoluta : ordinata :: sc. simp. intel. : sc. visionis. I 25 5 lm

Hence erring intellect not measure of ratio entis CG I 84 §4.

3. God knows other not in ipsis but in se ipso (I 14 5 c) as secondary objects (ibid 3m) propria cognitione (a. 6; cf argument cognita causa cognoscitur effectus CG I 50 §2) without imperfection of discourse (I 14 7 c) without synthesizing partial bits of knowledge (I 14 14 c) Cf I 19 5 c

CG I 55: "quando aliqua multa accipiuntur quocumque modo unita, simul intelliguntur" (§2);

"multa igitur ad quae simul intentio non fertur, non simul intuemur" (§4)

"qui enim comparationem duorum considerat, intentionem ad utrumque dirigit et simul intuetur utrumque" (§4)

"Omnia autem quae sunt in divina essentia sub una intentione necesse est cadere" (§5) cf I 56-59.

I 15 2 c: God knows "ideam ordinis universi"; therefore he must know the ideas of things ordered.

CG II 42 §6: Same deduction

Hence, Essentia Dei : ordines possibles :: ordo univ : res
For Ubi cumque pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio.

Aquinas
Ordo universi
Personalism

I 20 1 3m: "actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc est/enim proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum"

NB This finis cui is improperly finis: it does not imply subordination of the lover or of the radical gift which is identical with the lover: God gives himself Inc GrSanc Visio.

CG III 112 §4: In quolibet toto partes principales propter se exiguntur ad constitutionem totius... Naturae ergo intellectuales sunt propter se praeparatae a divina providentia procuratae, alia vero omnia propter ipsa. Cf III 111, 113 ff.

§10: Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus: quod ipsa ulterius non ordinantur in Deum et in perfectionem universi Cf §8-10.

§5: Manifestum est partes omnes ordinari ad perfectionem totius: non enim est totum propter partes, sed partes propter totum sunt.

I 23 5 3m: It is ex simplici voluntate that this matter under this kind of form, this individual predestined and that not.

I 73 1 c: beatitude of saints is ultimate perfection of universe

I 19 5 3m: what is ultimate in order of ends is ex simplici voluntate

Personal is within the order of the universe, not violated by it, but developed by it. I 42 3 Sed contra: Ubi pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio.

View-points
Possibles.

Ockham: [P Vignaux, DTC, XI 767, art. Nominalisme.]

Two basic principles in theory of possibility.

a Quidquid potest Deus per causam efficientem mediatam, hoc potest immediate.

b "ubi quodlibet aliquorum convenit alicui contingenter, si non sit contradictio, Deus potest facere ipsum sine omnibus simul. Sic enim probatur potissime materiam posse esse sine omni forma." Quod VI q 5.

Human nature involves no contradiction; grace comes to it contingently; therefore there can be human nature without grace.

Cf de Lubac, Surnaturel, p 269 note 7: "nisi videam evidentem contradictionem sequi" then affirm that God can do it.

ibid. p. 278: "Deus potest omne absolutum distinctum ab alio deparare, et in esse sine eo conservare" Quodl VI q. 1.

Nicolaus d'Autrecourt

"Non apparet quod una res perfectius intelligatur ex eo quod altera cognoscitur" Lubac p 278 note 1, Vignaux DTC XI 570

Conceptual atomism based upon exigence of evidence

Scotus

a Minges, doctrina Scoti, III, p 40 ff "De separabilitate materiae primae a forma"

b ibid., II, 433-49: care needed in interpreting Scotus; natura pura seems to exclude little save santifying grace and glory
Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Skotus

c Minges, II 107-20, on ideas, possibles; an infinity of Ideas, based on divine essence, consequent to divine apprehension, (esse cognitum); p 117 rejects Aquinas' rejection of distinct ideas of individual and generic. (Vives XXII 448 s)

Arist., Ethic Nic., X vii 8, 1177b 31

ou khron de kata tous parainouvtas anthwpiva phroveiv
avthrwpon ovta oude thvntev-t thrvnta tov thvntov, all' eph'
osov evdekhetai athavatizeiv kai pavta poieiv pros to znv
kata to kratistov twv ev 'autw₁' ei gar kai tw₁ ognw₁ mikrov
esti, duvamei kai timiotnti polu mallov pavtwv 'uperekhei.

Desiderium naturale

In III Sent d 27 q 2 a 2 ad 4m Utrum caritas sit virtus.

"Desiderium autem naturale non potest esse nisi rei quae
quae naturaliter haberi potest."

Cf De Caritate a 2 ad 16m; II II 24 2 2m. Non repetitur solutio
I II 62 1 3m quod a b c l m n

De Ver q 22 a 7 c

"tunc meretur, non ex hoc quod appetit beatitudinem quam
naturaliter appetit, sed ex hoc quod appetit hoc speciale quod
non naturaliter appetit, ut visionem Dei, in quo tamen secundum
rei veritatem sua beatitudo consistit."