

We are now in a position to discuss the main excuse for this essay: that the form of inference is seeing the same truth both as true and as implying other truth; that the language pattern of inference is not syllogism but the modus ponens of the hypothetical argument. Schematically the latter is:

If A is B, then C is D; but A is B; therefore, C is D.

Here the first proposition states an implication; the second states a fact; the third gives the conclusion. There are no rules about its use that are not more than obvious. There is no canon of inference such as the dictum de omni et nullo; it concludes in its own right. There are no restrictions on expression; everything is formal. "A is B" may be one proposition or it may be twenty; it may be an infinitesimal of thought ~~tee-nice-ah~~ almost too nice to be expressed; it may be the result of years of experience and study, and so vast, so involved, or even so disjointed that it can barely be worked into a book. It does not even overlook the intriguing art of drawing false conclusions from false premises in the right way; for a more general statement of the form would be that inference is seeing the same proposition both as itself granted and also as granted to imply another proposition. It offers a very sensible explanation of the fact that in the best circles dialecticians do not deny your major ~~premise~~ premise: ~~it is~~ for two hypothetical propositions are required to prove a hypothetical proposition, and handling two such propositions when you think they are categorical is apt to be awkward. Finally what has already been said about ~~language-~~ the grievances of language ~~are~~ is fairly conclusive evidence that it is the way men do infer, and ought to give rise to absolute conviction that it is the way that men ^{should} express their inferences. For no one can deny that causal ~~statements~~ ^{sentences} are the right expression of one's reasons; ~~further, inference is an analysis of reasoning;~~ ^{the form of} ~~consequently, an analysis of the causal~~ ^{sentence} ~~into its two components of simple declaration and conditional~~ ^{clause} ~~clause (implication) would be an analysis~~ ^{sentence} ~~of reasoning.~~ ^{of reasoning.}

Taking the question ~~from-an-a posteriori~~, ^{almost} we find that this pattern clears up the difficulty of ^{all} inference being informal. It shows in the first place that much putative informal inference is quite formal; ^{in the second place} it gives a reason for the informal being informal. For manifestly it may very well occur that either the facts have been asserted elsewhere and may be taken for granted, ~~or, on the other hand,~~ that the implication of the facts is too obvious to be mentioned. Illustrations of the former cannot be

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