LONERGAN WORKSHOP / Questions for Discussion / THURSDAY / 17 June 1982

- 1. Would you speak of the relations between the <u>patterns</u> of experience (generically) and the differentiations of consciousness (likewise generically)?
- 2. What are the <u>ontological correlatives</u> of the distinct kinds of <u>cognitional</u> acts on the third, fourth, and lifth levels, respectively, of consciousness?
- 3. In your Tuesday evening paper you referred in passing to H.-G. Gadamer's "discipline of questioning" as a guaranteer of truth. Are there common touch-stones in your epistemology and Sadamer's? Is there a similar notion of being in your thought and his?
- 4. In response to a question eshed yesteriny clout eccentical discussions, you remarked that consitteen are not likely to come up with the kind of creative thought that is needed in addressing disagreements between Christian communions.
 - Could you connect this comment with your statement in <u>Method</u> (p. 368) that such divisions "resides mainly in the cognitive meaning of the Christian message"?
- 5. It has been said -- by a New England philosopher, I think -- that consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.

While I would not want to try to force a meraly formal consistency onto your published remarks, I would be interested to know whether the difference between the following is of any significance; and, if so, what that significance is:

- (a) Your discussion on Tuesday evening of a <u>five</u>fold differentiation of consciousness (realms of theory, interiority, transcendence, and scholarship differentiated from common sense);
- (b) The six differentiations -- and thirty-one combinations -- discussed in <u>Method's chapter on "Foundations" (p. 272)</u>, where the reales to be distinguished from common sense are all of the above, <u>plus art</u>.

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 Could you comment on the task of the functional specialty foundations as the task of articulating a <u>Begrifflichkoit</u>?

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1. Generically, patterns of experience are patters in data, in data of sense and/or in data of consciousness; e. g. Thales was so interested in the stars that he failed to notice the well into which he tumbled.

Generically, differentiations of consciousness are differentiations that result from different kinds of cognitional development. Commonsense develops by adding insightto insight until familiarity with a milieu is attained so that one feels at home: one spontaneously knows what tosay, what to do, what not to say, what not to do, in any of the situations that occur in that milieu. Hence there as many brands of common sense as there are significantly different milieux; a stranger is found to be strange. A science accumulates insights but at the same time develops a technical language that mystifies people of common sense and no technical attainments. A scholar becomes familiar with the languae and literature and history of places and times different from his own. A philosopher lists differentiations of consciousness the better to understand different thinkers, etc.

2. Judgments of fact and possibility and probability: whatever exists, or could exist (ab esse ad posse valet illatio), or has a measure of probability.

Moral judgemnets: the reality of good men and the reality of bad men extending to all the different manners in which people can be good or bad morally.

Religious judgments: the existence of God and theological issues; moral judgments with a religious basis; factual judgments with a religous basis.

3. A conspicuous contribution of the Enlightenment to the modern mind was their dogmatic insistence that those who disagreed with their convictions oropinions were prejudiced

Gadamer took a resolute stand against that prejudice. I am very grateful to him for that.

He knew Collingwood's contention that one cannot understad a statement unless one discovers the question it is intended to answer. In other words, logic should not deal simply with terms propositions and inferences. It should think in terms of questions and answers. Gadamer agrees with Collingwood and so do I. /not

But I am/really up on Gadamer. Where he seems to stand, or take a stand, is on the basis of Kant's Third Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft, which Copleston refers to as his aesthetics and telology[Ch 15 of vol 6] and notes as an intermediary between natural science and the science of human freedom

It is a basis that suits Gadamer's role as a philosopher of culture.

I do not know whether Gadamer draws my distinction between notion of being and concept of being, where the notion is what one intends in asking quesitons

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4. The point I was trying to make is the difference between doctrine and systematics. Doctrines exist to give Yes or No answers to precise questions. Systematics exists to meet questions seeking understanding, questions that of themselves offer help to some insight, some grasp of the issue. What discussion groups aim at is understanding one another and through/understanding seeking a common ground

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5. Writing books such as Insight and Method in Theology is a matter of writing and rewriting until finally one gets a statement of what one wished to say. From beginning to end one is trying over and over to get this and that and then the other somehow straightened out. It involves an enormous amount of typing and retyping to arrive at the point when one decides that's enough.

So I believe there is a good case for equipping authors with word processors.

I wasaware that my lists of differentiations of consciousness varied. I was not aware that I had assured the reader that there were exactly as many as in each case I gave. I did not fancy that anyone would be deceived.

6. Distinguish the idea or concept of a Begrifflichkeit and particular instances of that general term.

My tird lecture at Queens University in Kingston Ontario had for title: The Ongoing Genesis of Methods. It has been published in the bilingual religious review, Studies in Religion, <u>muhlishedviumMnutvmutv</u>

That ongoing gnesis if methods is the idea of Begrifflichkeit The concrete developments of the idea are instances in which the idea os realized.

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The fifth functional specialty enumerates types of concept to be developed in the second part of method

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