

1. Is the distinction between the remote and the proximate criteria of truth a notional or a real distinction? If real, is there a primacy to the remote criterion, or are they 'equiprimordial'?
2. How far back does the direct horizontal content of a judgment go into the 'habitual orientation' or context of judgments and insights previously accumulated? Does the borrowed content of a judgment include the whole prior set of relevant questions and answers? **NO**
3. Development within any given position may reveal the need for a movement to a different position which, while 'including' the data on the base position, also effects "a complex shift in the whole structure" (Insight, p 13) of previous insights and judgments. So later judgments, perhaps, can sublimate earlier judgments in the sense of preserving, completing (and transforming?) them, but if earlier judgments were correct judgments on the hypothesis of the virtually unconditioned can they be simply cancelled by later judgments?
4. Is a further relevant question in response to a question for reflection an operative grasp (and operative definition) of the 'deficiency' of the evidence? In other words, are probable judgments made (by definition) with respect to a known incompleteness of the evidence.
5. You used to arrange your own Trinitarian thought according to an analytic process and a synthetic process. It is clear from your technical note in the chapter on "Religion" in Method (p 120) how the distinction of the realms of meaning expanded the commonsense and theoretic realms treated by the priora euced nos and the priora quoad se, by the introduction of the realm of interiority.

275+

shift in content
thought
a priori q.
principles
of movement
+ etc

basic critical problem
was applied to
main problem

An early post-Aristotelian
Karl Godel
mistaken category
yes - Becker
followed
M. L. ...

development is an
adjustment for history
in no adjustment

relation to the subject
is the critical problem

- (a) What were the main issues that impelled you to move from the twofold ordering of ideas to your later method in theology. Was the main issue the notion of historicity introduced by your wrestling with accounting for development in the evolution of dogma?
- (b) Were there other issues as well -- such as the shift from Aristotelian to modern science as a model for theology? -- such as positing the foundation for moving from one system to another in wisdom? -- such as a concern to distinguish between the aim, proper object, and method of dogmatic theology and of positive theology? -- such as the problems of interpretation raised by a historian who has not examined his cognitional assumptions?
- (c) Were there other issues besides the problems raised for theology by the emergence of the need to account for development through history that brought about the sublation of the analytic and synthetic processes by method's turn to the subject's operations, horizon, conversions, differentiations of consciousness, and to the eventual functional specializations?

- 1 critical problem, position & conditions
- 2 desecration Post Ar an early work of A's
- 3 Mod sc. < descriptive / Heuristic structures
- 4 Mod list as science
- 5 Epochs - differentiation of consciousness -
- 6 hist. of religions
Gen. Cath. Theol. out of its ghetto

QQ 12.3.'81

1. Proximate and remote criteria of truth. Insight 549-52.

Certain judgment: there are no further relevant qq.

Probable judgment: as far as I can see, there are no further relevant qq.

Infallible judgment: at no stage in my development has bias affected my judgment/ Remote criterion.

Real distinction: remote covers past performances; proximate, my present grasp of the evidence.

2. Direct borrowed content. Insight 275f.

Proper content: Yes or No.

Direct borrowed content: the question that leads to Yes or No

Indirect borrowed content: my affirmation or denial is true

3. Within an earlier context a judgment was made in answer to some question; within a later and more developed context, the previous judgment is revised.

Is the earlier judgment simply annulled? Not if the later judgment acknowledges the change of context as the ground of the revision. What is changed is not the earlier judgment but its context.

4. Questioning is the a priori: an immanent principle of movement and rest. The further question arises because movement has occurred but rest has not yet been attained. You are aware that the question has not been answered satisfactorily. Cf Proceedings, Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc. 51(1977), 134f.

5. When the Latin manuals were published, Insight had already been published. They were written for second and third year students at the Gregorian, a class of about 650, who read Latin, learned in Latin, were examined in Latin. They came from some 70 different countries. There was no question of teaching Insight in a theology class, though I did teach in graduate classes.

My solution was to use St Thomas on whose thought I had done two research dissertations. Grace and Freedom and Verbum. On those basic issues I was convinced that the traditional Thomistic school was profoundly influenced by 14th century Scholasticism.

It took seriously the Post Anal; modern scholars regard

in such a
matter/

it as an early work with little representation in the procedures Aristotle employed in the Physics, Metaphysics, ^{De} Anima, etc. Such deductivism was not a success in the fourteenth century; it was not a success in contemporary hermeneutics or history; it was questioned by Kurt Gödel's and similar theorems.

Insight was begun as an exploration of methods generally preparatory to doing a book on Method in Theology. It was published as Insight because I was sent to Rome to teach there. I wanted to write on method because my experience as a student of philosophy for three years and as a student of theology for six convinced me that the great problem was the absence of method.

Plato and Aristotle were forever being puzzled (aporein) and searching (zetein) for answers. So too was Thomas. Later Scholasticism was fixated by ~~XXXXX~~ demonstration, but ended in skepticism and decadence. It was followed by the rationalists and the empiricists and neither was a real improvement on Scholasticism; the rationalists wanted to demonstrate and the empiricists wanted to experience.

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