

1. It would seem that citations of the work of other theologians/philosophers in your own writings does not amount to unqualified approval. Thus there is a great deal that is "usable" in the work of E. Voegelin, although he tends towards an immanentism; similarly, Method refers frequently to Collingwood's Idea of History, but adds the caveat that his view "is contained in an idealist context" (p 206).

The three chapters of Method on interpretation and history refer occasionally to Gadamer's Truth and Method. If the same holds here -- if, that is, you would not be inclined to agree entirely with Gadamer's position -- would you be willing to state in what sense(s) Truth and Method is compatible and (especially) incompatible with your own position? (I am aware of only one such statement: Method, p 169.) [82]

2. Does the distinction between data of sense and data of consciousness parallel the distinction between external and internal experience? Do these sets of distinctions also parallel the distinction between sensation and perception?

The data of sense are the contents of sense, but the data of consciousness are the acts of the different levels of cognitional structure and not the contents (except for the contents of acts of sensing). Hence the contents of the further levels do not pertain to the data of consciousness except in the introspective mode (Insight, p 276), where the data is the whole process of the direct mode; is this correct?

Does the distinction between the direct mode and the introspective mode parallel a later distinction between infrastructure and superstructure? Does the later distinction differ in any significant way from the earlier distinction? If so, how?

3. Although I have consulted the relevant passages of Insight on heuristic structures, as you suggest on p 224 of Method, I am still unclear as to how the questions that are taken up in the section that runs from p 224 to p 233 can be said to fall under the title of that section. Are the questions themselves heuristic? Or do they concern a method (the historian's) that is heuristic? Or both?

4. Continuing the same question: the last item posed in the introductory paragraph (Method, p 224) is, "Do historians know or do they believe?" When we reach p 233, we find that, in certain meanings of the word, historians do believe. Does this mean that they do not know?

What then of the passage a bit later, according to which, for the critical realist, historical facts are "events in the world mediated by true acts of meaning" (p 239). Presumably these true acts are historical judgments. Are they judgments of belief, only? Or are they indeed judgments of fact? If my question discloses a confusion, where does it stem from?

5. Do perceptual images (insight, p 276) roughly correspond to Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' sensible forms?

6. Here is another "box of tools" question. Now and then Method uses the word, apprehend, and its cognates -- most recently, on p 242 ("he must apprehend reality and real potentiality," etc).

It would seem that your use of the word is not equivalent to "intuition" in the Kantian sense. Correct?

Does it have any technical meaning? Or is it -- rather in the manner of "notion" -- a generic word that you use when the more technical words (understanding, judgment, and the like) are not appropriate? Granted that the quest for definitions that apply omni at soli is not the whole of philosophy, could one ask for a definition of "apprehension"?

*Read Husserl, Grammar & Method, Notion & Real Apprehension*

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Cf Webb 44.

1. Voegelin is a mystic. Doctrines involve religion in wars, persecutions, battles of the books. Webb thorough on this, 221-236.

For a more balanced view of Collingwood, see the Editor's Preface to the Idea of History

vii. C's works are divided between three periods with the Principles of Art in part akin to the second, in part akin to the third.

xxi. 1932 leave of absence from teaching at Oxford; 1938 the first of a series of strokes that eventually reduced him to helplessness; he died in 1943 at the age of 52.

Gadamer: Method 182n6. Truth and Method supposes that method means Cartesian method. I surmise that it is a common view in the Germanic world. Hence Matt Lamb years in Germany accounts for his preferring metamethod with regard to my work.

2. Provided that "experience" is taken in the sense of data and not as the equivalent to Aristotle's empeiria which knows e. g. that Vitamin C is a protection against catching cold, but does not know why.

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Sensation differs from perception as a single event from the same event within a developed consciousness.

It is correct.

Infrastructure and supra structure are far wider in their application. Trinification of the World, pp. 72-74.

3. A heuristic structure is a method: it is knowing what you are doing when doing theology, philosophy, history.

The points treated are points regarding possible elements in a conception of method in history.

ongoing/ 4. Collingwood insists that historians know and do not believe; but also holds that the knowledge ~~x~~ is in the/historical community; the members of the community learn from their predecessors and also learn from one another; as do all scientists. Method 205f. Also critical history of second degree, 194.

Are they beliefs or judgements of fact. They are judgments of scientists, scientific historians.

5. "Perceptual images" (Insight 274) are contrasted with freely formed images. Sensible forms in Ar and Aq are narrower: colors, sounds, hot and cold, wet and dry, heavy and light. They are qualities subject to the second type of motion, viz., change of quality.

6. Apprehension is not a technical word in my vocabulary. It becomes technical in Newman's distinction between notional and real apprehension, ~~notional~~ as contrasted with "Notional and real assent."

The words of ordinary language are not definable.

The basic terms and relations of science, philosophy, ~~theology~~ systematic theology are definable though some terms in theology are fixed by analogy or the procedure to the limit in mathematics.c