

1. In Insight you employ a technical notion of 'notion.' There are treatments of "the general notion of the thing," "the notion of judgment," "the notion of being," of development, of transcendence. In some of these, a notion seems to be a commonly held but vague understanding of certain subject-matter, as in "commonly transcendence is opposed to immanence" (p 634) or "things are conceived as extended in space, permanent in time, and yet subject to change" (p 246). In other contexts, 'notion' seems to be synonymous with a series of preliminary approximations to "the nature of . . ." some subject-matter -- hence, the notion of will, of choice, of freedom (p 607). Third and finally, in some cases, 'notion' seems to be a technical term, denoting purely anticipatory operations of cognitional process, spontaneously operative prior to any insight, but often mistakenly objectified -- such as the notion of the thing, of being, of objectivity, or (in Method) of value.

THE QUESTION: What exactly is the cognitional status of a notion? Is it intermediary between all inquiry and all insight? Or is it constitutive of inquiry itself? (By inquiry I do not mean investigation; cf Second Collection, pp 33-35.) Do notions, as purely anticipatory operations provide the transitive links between different levels of cognitional structure?

Yes

is a technical term

2. This, perhaps, is a tedious and picky question. According to Insight, "in the main, human consciousness flows in some blend of the dramatic and practical patterns of experience" (p 723). Compare: "men commonly live in some blend or mixture of the artistic, dramatic, and practical patterns of experience" (p 625).

(a) Do these quotations simply reflect different levels of generalization? If not, why is the artistic pattern of experience included in the second quotation but not in the first? Do the contents of "Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution" and "The Problem of Liberation" differ systematically enough to warrant the seemingly discrepant generalizations?

(b) Is the 'artistic pattern' synonymous with the 'aesthetic pattern'?

(c) Why is the practical pattern of experience not given the same schematic treatment as the other patterns in Chapter VI of Insight? Is sufficient attention given to it in the section on "Common Sense as Intellectual"?

3. I am having trouble getting the appropriate heuristic images for understanding the real distinction of the 'levels' of cognitional structure. Clearly the levels are mutually and functionally interdependent. But why is imagining placed on the level of empirical consciousness? Is not intelligence operative in the very formation of the schematic image? In the article "Cognitional Structure," this statement appears: "inquiry is intelligence bringing itself to act; it leads from experience through imagination to insight" (Collection, p 223). This seems to imply that inquiry (intelligent consciousness) leads to imagination (empirical consciousness) which in turn leads to insight (i.e., back to intelligent consciousness). Is there operative in this sequence, then, not just the 'way up' but also the 'way down'? Could you explicate these 'ways'?

vertical finality
for consciousness