to patristic thought too much of the medieval procedure of
combining theology with metaphysics.  In fact, the broad lines
of the patristic process seem to be (1) an affinity with
Stoic thought followed by a tentative transposition that
eventually proved to be a trap, (2) an affinity with Middle
Platonism, a tentative transposition and, it seems, the
resulting Arian controversy, and (3) the introduction of
technical terms (consubstantial, nature, person) whose meaning
was fixed by the exigences of the theological issues.

As subordinationism has been discerned in antenicene
writers from Justin to Origen (Aeby), so elements of Stoicism
have been found recurrent in the same period from Clement of
Rome to Clement of Alexandria (Spanneut).  But not a little
clarity, I believe, accrues to this otherwise surprising
situation if one turns from "what was meant" by the words
"acts        employed to the        of meaning" of the writers.  For just
as we undergo a "leap in being" when our motivation settles
over from "what's in it for us" to "what truly is worth while,"
so too there is a "leap in intelligence" when we discover
that our learning to speak transposed us from a "world of
immediacy" to a "world mediated by meaning" and, further,
that the criteria relevant in the world of immediacy are no
longer sufficent when we live in the world mediated by meaning.
In the world of immediacy the "real" is what is familiar to
a successfully functioning animal; in the far larger world
mediated by meaning the "real" is known not only by sense
but by the combination of elements brought about when
intelligence informs the data of sense and judgment posits
the informed data.

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combining theology with metaphysics.  In fact, the broad lines
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stantial, nature, person) whose meaning was fixed by the exigences
of the theological issues.

In this process the key element is "affinity."  To revert
to a distinction already drawn, affinity resides not in "what
was meant" but in "acts of meaning."  The elements of Stoicism
that have been found recurrent in antenicene writers from Clem-
ent of Rome to Clement of Alexandria (Spanneut) primarily
reside not in      doctrines but in misapprehensions of reality.

## The Emergence of Articulated Christology

We have now to pursue further what earlier we remarked, that the Christian tradition held constantly to an intermediate postion between the polytheism of pagans and the solitary monotheism of the Hebrews

We have now to add to our earlier suggestion that Christians at different times and places held uniformly to an intermediate position between the polytheism of pagans and the solitary mono- theism of the Hebrews.

In the first place I would note that this position is com- parative: it refers to pagans and Hebrews. Further, it is negative: it differs from the positions respectively of pagans and of Hebrews. Finally, it is extrinsic: it characterizes Christianity not by its own doctrine but by the doctrines of others.

Secondly, I would note that it is not so much a recurrent and explicit formula as an underlying assumption. It could be taken for granted ꜱyxＣhꜱꜱꜱꜱꜱꜱꜱ not only among Christians but also
ꜱxꜱꜱ/among Jews and ꜱꜱꜱꜱꜱꜱ and even among pagans.

Thirdly, I would note that it functioned as an element of tacit knowledge. After Nicea it could furnich a rallying point for bishops at odds over ꜱ technical terminology. ꜱꜱxꜱꜱꜱxꜱxꜱꜱ Were there in God three persons or three hypostases? At the synod of Alexandria in ꜱꜱꜱ 362 there were bishops to insist on three persons and, with St Jerome, consider an affirmation of three hypostases to be heretical. But there were other bishops no less insistent ꜱ that a confession of three hypotheses alone was orthodox. But the impasse was readily solved by Athanasius who simply asked the former group whether

Let me offer an example. Thirty-seven years after the
decree of Nicea, at a synod in Alexandria in the year 362,
there were bishops claiming that in God there were three persons
but not three hypostases, and others no less convinced that
in God there were not merely three persons but three distinct
hypostases. Athanasius saw through the terminological muddle.
He asked the former if they denied three hypostases because
they agreed with the Sabellians, and such an interpretation
they indignantly repudiated. He then asked the other group
if by affirming three hypostases they intended to affirm
three gods and, no less indignantly that imputation was rejected.
In brief, whatever was meant at Nicea, it did not mean that
the council reverted either to the polytheism of pagans or
to the solitary monotheism of the Hebrews. Nor is there any
evidence that

Their position
was well represented by Augustine when he would write "three
persons or substances." It was outdated by the author of the
Quicumque vult (DS 75) who neither partioned the substance nor
identified the persons with one another.